Seven Pines
Seven Pines Rulebook
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Introduction
Seven Pines is part of the 12th game in The Gamers' Civil War, Brigade Series. The Seven Pines scenarios recreate the two days' battle of Seven Pines, (or Fair Oaks) on May 31st and June 1st, 1862. This battle was the prelude to the full Seven Days' battles a month later.
These rules address the battle of Seven Pines. As such, this is complete unto itself, Gaines Mill is not needed to play these scenarios as it is to play the companion game Savage Station.
Counter Note: The units and leaders used for Seven Pines are designated by the white stripe at the top of their counter.
1.0 Terrain Notes
1.1 Swamp and Wooded Swamp Hexes
Shift one column left on the Fire Combat Table if one or more firers in a combat are in a swamp (or wooded swamp) hex. There is no additional penalty if more than one such unit fires to a given combat.
1.2 Richmond Fort Hexes
These numbered forts were erected by the citizens of Richmond early in the war. They effect only the hexsides they face, and any unit fired on through an unprotected hexside does not gain the benefit of the fort hex.
Note that the effects are different than those listed in Savage Station.
Those benefits are: -2 on the Fire Combat Table, +6 on the Morale Table. Crossing a Fort hexside costs any unit 1/2 of its movement allowance.
1.3 Confederate Trenches
These trenches were dug by the Confederates only after Lee assumed command, much to the disgust of the men in the ranks. They are not in effect for any Seven Pines Scenario.
1.4 Union Redoubts and Trenches
The Union army did not initially erect a solid trench line, but McClellan, ever the engineer, did have the army create a number of redoubts for defense. In Seven Pines, only the numbered Redoubts (1-5) are in play. The effects of a redoubt are the same as the regular series trenches. No other trench hexsides (those shown for use in Savage Station) have any effect in Seven Pines.
1.5 The Rains of May 30th
The rain on May 30th greatly hindered movements on the 31st. On that day, all streams cost +5 movement points for infantry, cavalry and leaders, and impassable for wagons and artillery. In addition, the bridge over Gillie's Creek was washed out and replaced with an improvised one. Any units crossing the stream at hexside D26.07-D26.08 must pay 3 extra MPs.
1.6 Use of Tracks
Because these maps must mate with the rest of The Seven Days on-map tracks and admin materials have been omitted so as to not interfere with either linkage or full use of the available terrain. Losses are kept track of only on the Loss Charts (no Casualty Tracks) and Artillery Ammunition must be tracked on paper (no Artillery Ammunition Tracks). Furthermore, the Terrain Key and such are on the Player's Aide Card along with the Turn and Day Records. This required one-color printing for these, but we assume the standard elevation color scheme (and most of the common terrain symbols) to be obvious to experienced and inexperienced players alike.
1.7 North
North is toward the 1.xx hexrow of each map. Map D is in the west, Map F is in the east.
2.0 Union Special Rules
2.1 Historical McClellan Restrictions
For all of the restrictions listed below, note that they remain in effect even if McClellan becomes a casualty.
2.1a Union Anti-initiative Ratings. For any initiative that would require Union troops to attack, McClellan has an anti-initiative of -2. For orders involving movement or defense (only), McClellan has no anti-initiative. No Union corps commander has anti-initiative.
2.1b McClellan's Paranoia. McClellan was convinced that the Rebel army greatly outnumbered his own forces at all times. Therefore, he was extremely cautious about any aggressive move made by his own forces, always alert to an enemy counterattack.
To reflect this fear, subtract 2 from any Corps Attack Stoppage Check (if using the defensive orders option, do not use this modifier for defensive checks.)
2.2 Attachments and Detachments
No Union Corps can attach units to another corps. A corps can detach up to one division to operate on Divisional Goals. Brigades cannot be detached or given Divisional Goals.
2.3 Heintzelman in Command
For scenarios 5.1 through 5.5, Heintzelman, not McClellan, is in command of the Union troops on the map. A repl leader - not one of the division commanders - is commanding the 3rd Corps, and all orders from Heintzelman to the 3rd Corps must go through the regular order issue and acceptance procedures.
2.4 Union Options
2.4a Grover's Brigade. In any scenario that calls for the arrival of Hooker's Division (2-3) allow 1-2-3 to enter with it. This option gives the CSA player 1 VP.
This brigade was left behind to guard the Union rear, where it proved unneeded. It was a fine unit, and could have been put to good use in the battleline.
2.4b More rapid response of 3rd Corps. In any scenario that has 3rd Corps units listed as reinforcements, move the arrival time for Hooker's Division (2-3) units up 4 game-turns. This option gives the CSA player 5 VP.
The Union army was alert to the peril 4th Corps was in, and had taken steps to support it. 3rd Corps was specifically tasked with supporting Keyes in the event of an attack. However, Hooker's Division was left further from the battlefield, and could have been stationed much closer.
2.4c McClellan Attacks! Ignore the historical McClellan restrictions listed in 2.1a and 2.1b. This option gives the Confederate Player 2 VP.
The historical McClellan restrictions are pretty limiting for the Union player. This option simply assumes that McClellan showed a little more aggressiveness than was the case historically.
3.0 Confederate Special Rules
3.1 CSA Command Arrangements
The CSA forces are organized into wings, which function exactly like corps in the game. Huger's Division (Hu Division) does not belong to any wing, and can only be given orders via Divisional Goal directly from the Army HQ.
3.2 CSA Separate Units
The CSA player has three separate artillery units, designated ANV. At any time, each of these artillery units must trace command radii to any friendly division commander, and can act upon any orders that division may have. Actual issued orders are not needed to switch divisions, etc, simply tracing radii to another division commander during the command phase is all that is needed.
3.3 Attachments and Detachments
No unit can attach subordinate units. Divisions can detach individual brigades (or be detached themselves) to operate under Divisional Goals.
3.4 Confederate Options
3.4a The Longstreet Two-step. In all the Seven Pines scenarios, Longstreet is rated 0. The CSA player may exercise the variant option of flipping Longstreet to his "4" rated side, instead. Exercising this option would give the Union player 5 VP.
Somewhere between Johnston and Longstreet communications broke down entirely. What exactly happened will never be entirely clear, given the verbal nature of Johnston's orders, but the results were disastrous for Johnston's plan of attack. Usually, Longstreet had a gift for grasping the details of a plan clearly, and here we allow him the benefit of the doubt.
3.4b The rest of the Left Wing. In any of the scenarios which include the Left Wing, under Smith, players may add Magruder's Division (M-L) comprised of 6 Brigades of infantry and 2 artillery units. These units may set up within 6 hexes of the Left HQ, but no closer than 5 hexes to any Union unit. This option awards the USA player 10 VP.
These troops were busy guarding the crossings of the Chickahominy so that the rest of the Union army did not cross that river and march directly on Richmond. Their use would be a much more daring gamble by Johnston, and require a swift, decisive victory to preclude just such a crossing. This option heavily favors the CSA Player.
4.0 Victory
Victory is decided via the accumulation of points by each side based on their performances. Victory Points are awarded in four categories: for overall losses inflicted on the enemy, for terrain captured on the map, for structural damage inflicted on enemy organizations, and for use of options. At the end of each scenario, total up the Victory Points awarded to each player based on the tables below. Subtract the Confederate Victory Points from the Union Victory Points, and using this difference, check the specific scenario to determine the level of victory.
4.1 Victory Points Awarded for Terrain
Points are awarded for control of specific hexes on maps D and E. To control a hex, the player must have a unit occupying that hex, or have been the last player to pass a unit through that hex. Points are only awarded at the end of the scenario.
| Hex | USA Award | CSA Award |
|---|---|---|
| D27.19 | 5 | 0 |
| D29.11 | 5 | 0 |
| D10.15 | 5 | 0 |
| Each Urban Hex | 10 | 0 |
| E5.06 | 3 | 0 |
| E28.01 | 3 | 0 |
| E45.16 | 3 | 1 |
| E26.20 | 2 | 3 |
| E19.16 | 2 |
4.2 Victory Points Awarded for Casualties
These awards are given only for permanent losses. Ignore stragglers and artillery losses in this calculation. Then compare the total to the chart below, and give the opposing player that number of victory points. For instance, if the Union army lost 57 permanent casualties, the CSA Player would get 10 VP.
| CSA Losses | CSA Losses (with Optionals) | USA Losses | VP Award |
|---|---|---|---|
| 17 | 24 | 19 | 1 |
| 25 | 36 | 28 | 3 |
| 34 | 48 | 37 | 5 |
| 43 | 60 | 46 | 7 |
| 51 | 72 | 55 | 10 |
| 68 | 96 | 74 | 14 |
| 85 | 120 |
4.3 Victory Points Awarded for Wrecked Formations
Victory points are also awarded for wrecking larger formations. Awards are made for each division of either army that is permanently wrecked (do not count stragglers) at the end of the scenario. Each division is worth the number of points given on the chart below.
| CSA Divisions | VP Award |
|---|---|
| L-R | 6 |
| dH-R | 4 |
| Hu Div | 2 |
| S-L | 5 |
| M-L (opt) | 5 |
| USA Divisions | VP Award |
|---|---|
| 1-2 | 3 |
| 2-2 | 3 |
| 2-3 | 3 |
| 3-3 | 3 |
| 1-4 | 2 |
| 2-4 | 2 |
5.0 Scenarios
5.1 Scenario 1: May 31st
This scenario covers the historical action on May 31st, and as such is quite limited in scope. Despite the initial CSA advantage in numbers, players will quickly see how few troops were actually sent forward to engage the Federals; namely the four brigades of D H Hill's division, virtually unsupported by the vast force arrayed behind them.
General Information:
- First Turn: 1:00 p.m. May 31st
- Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. May 31st
- Scenario Length: 15 Turns
- Maps used: D and E
- First Player: CSA
Union Information
Set Up:
- 2-4, 4b - w/i 2 E22.13
- 1-4, 4b(3) 4b - w/i 1 E26.20
- 4 HQ and Supply, Keyes - E27.23
- 2-3-3, 3-3-3, 3b - w/i 2 E26.31
Artillery Ammunition: 30
Reinforcements:
| Time | Units | Enter at |
|---|---|---|
| 3 p.m. May 31st | Heintzelman, 3 HQ and Supply | E27.35 |
| Sumner, 2 HQ, Sedgwick, 1-2-2 | E1.35 | |
| 1-3-3 | E25.35 | |
| 3:30 p.m. | 2-2-2 | E1.35 |
| Richardson, 1-1-2 | E6.34 | |
| 4:00 p.m. | 3-2-2, 2 Corps supply | E1.35 |
| 2-1-2 | E6.34 | |
| 4:30 p.m. | 3-1-2 | E1.35 |
| 5:00 p.m. |
Orders:
- 4 Corps - defend the vicinity of Seven Pines
- 3 Corps - move to the support of 4 Corps, and help defend Seven Pines, counterattack if necessary to restore the Seven Pines position.
- 3-3 - Has a divisional goal as stated for 3 Corps order, above, reverts to the Corps command when its HQ arrives.
- 2 Corps - Move to vicinity of Fair Oaks and defend that position, and protect the flank of the Seven Pines position.
Any reinforcements that arrive out of command range, have standing orders to move to their join their HQ and become subject to any orders that its command might have.
Confederate Information
Set Up:
- G-dH-R - E24.08 ex E23.08
- Ro-dH-R - E26.08 ex E27.09
- Rs-dH-R - E26.07 ex E27.08
- F-dH-R - E24.06 ex E23.06
- dH-Rb, D H Hill - E25.07
- Hu Div - w/i 3 E48.10
- Right HQ and Supply - D27.20
- L-R - w/i 3 D27.20
- Hm-S-L, Ht-S-L - w/i 1 E2.10
- rest of S-L - w/i 2 E5.05
- Left HQ and Supply, ANV HQ and Supply, 3xANVb - w/i 2 E5.05
Artillery Ammunition: 35
Reinforcements: None
Orders:
- dH-R - has a divisional goal to attack to capture Seven Pines, and then to continue the attack to capture the crossroads at E26.31
- L-R - P-L-R has a Divisional Goal to move to the Rail Road at D17.25 and defend. W-L-R, C-L-R, and Pr-L-R have divisional goals to move to join Huger's Division (Hu Div) and support it if attacked. No other units of the division have divisional goals
- Hu Div - has a Divisional Goal to defend the Charles City Road
- Right Wing - The RW has no orders
- Left Wing - attack towards Fair Oaks in support of dH-R attack. Once Fair Oaks is captured, the attack will continue to capture Orchard Station. These orders have a D2 status, and the Confederate player cannot start rolling for delay removal until the 2:00 p.m. turn command phase.
Victory:
| Result | USA minus CSA VP |
|---|---|
| USA Massive Victory | 10 or more |
| USA Major Victory | 7 to 9 |
| USA Minor Victory | 3 to 6 |
| Draw | -2 to 2 |
| CSA Minor Victory | -3 to -6 |
| CSA Major Victory | -7 to -9 |
| CSA Massive Victory | -10 or less |
Historically, the result was a draw, with a final value of -1. The USA won 7 VP for CSA losses, 4 for wrecking dH-R, and none for terrain. The CSA won 5 VP for USA losses, and 7 for terrain.
5.2 Scenario 2: May 31st, the failed approach
This scenario recreates all of the historical action of May 31st, including the confusion within the CSA command which so badly disarranged Johnston's original plan. The CSA player will find himself stuck with some strange orders indeed.
General Information:
- First Turn: 6:00 a.m. May 31st
- Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. May 31st.
- Scenario Length: 29 Turns
- Maps Used: D and E
- First Player: CSA
Union Information
Set Up:
- 2-4, 4b - w/i 2 E22.13
- 1-4, 4b(3) 4b - w/i 1 E26.20
- 4 HQ and Supply, Keyes - E27.23
- 2-3-3, 3-3-3, 3b - w/i 2 E26.31
Artillery Ammunition: 30
Reinforcements:
The following Union reinforcements do not have a specific appearance time listed. Instead, they have a number - +2, for example. This number is the number of turns following the first turn of any Union unit being fired upon from a range of 3 hexes or less that the listed units appear. For instance, if the first such fire occurs at Noon, then all units with the reinforcement code of "+2" appear at 1:00 p.m.
| Code | Units | Enter at |
|---|---|---|
| +2 | Heintzelman, 3 HQ and Supply | E27.35 |
| Sumner, 2 HQ, Sedgwick, 1-2-2 | E1.35 | |
| 1-3-3 | E25.35 | |
| +3 | 2-2-2 | E1.35 |
| Richardson, 1-1-2 | E6.34 | |
| +4 | 3-2-2, 2 Corps supply | E1.35 |
| 2-1 | E6.34 | |
| +5 | 3-1-2 | E1.35 |
| +6 |
Orders:
- 4 Corps - defend the vicinity of Seven Pines.
- 3 Corps - move to the support of 4 Corps, and help defend Seven Pines, counterattack if necessary to restore the Seven Pines position.
- 3-3 - has a divisional goal as stated for 3 Corps order, above, reverts to the Corps command when its HQ arrives.
- 2 Corps - move to vicinity of Fair Oaks and defend that position, and protect the flank of the Seven Pines position.
Any reinforcements that arrive out of command range, have standing orders to move to their join their HQ and become subject to any orders their command may have.
Confederate Information
Set Up:
- Ro-dH-R - E48.10
- dH-R - w/i 3 D27.22
- L-R - w/i 3 D10.15
- Left HQ and Supply - D10.15
- S-L - w/i 3 D6.01
- Right HQ and Supply - D6.01
- ANV HQ and Supply, 3x ANVb - w/i 2 D11.10
Artillery Ammunition: 35
Reinforcements:
- 7:30 a.m. - Hu Division - D17.00
Orders:
- L-R - has a Divisional Goal to move west via the Nine-Mile Road to the Darbytown Road, and then southeast to cross Gillie's Creek at hex D26.07. Once all units are across, the division must move off the road and halt, and wait for all of Hu Div to pass. Once Hu Div has cleared the Williamsburg Road, the L-R is to move via the Williamsburg Road to the vicinity of D27.30, halt and defend the Williamsburg Road.
- Hu Division - has a Divisional Goal to move via the Darbytown Road, cross Gillie's Creek via hex D26.07 - after L-R has crossed and cleared the road - proceed to the Williamsburg Road. From there, the division must move to the Charles City Road, and advance to hex E48.10, where it will relieve the Ro-dH-R brigade and defend the Charles City Road.
- Ro-dH-R - Until relieved by Hu Div, this brigade has a Divisional Goal to defend the Charles City Road. Once Hu Div arrives, this brigade has a Divisional Goal to move north, in the direction of Seven Pines, rejoin the rest of its division astride the Williamsburg Road, and participate in that Division's attack.
- dH-R - has a Divisional Goal to move east on the Williamsburg Road. Once Ro-dH-R rejoins the command, dH-R has a Divisional Goal to attack the Union troops along the Williamsburg Road with the objective of capturing Seven Pines and the crossroads at E26.31.
- S-L - has a Divisional Goal of moving via the secondary road northeast around the racetrack to the Nine Mile Road, and then east along the Nine Mile Road to Old Tavern. There it will halt and defend the Nine Mile Road around the vicinity of E5.05.
Design note: The above orders faithfully recapture the degree of confusion the Confederate Army faced on May 31st. While some units technically had orders to attack (S-L, for instance) those orders were so conditional and vague that it would, in effect, take another order issue from Army HQ to actually convert that attack into reality.
Victory:
| Result | USA minus CSA VP |
|---|---|
| USA Massive Victory | 10 or more |
| USA Major Victory | 7 to 9 |
| USA Minor Victory | 3 to 6 |
| Draw | -2 to 2 |
| CSA Minor Victory | -3 to -6 |
| CSA Major Victory | -7 to -9 |
| CSA Massive Victory | -10 or less |
Historically, the result was a draw, with a final value of -1. The USA won 7 VP for CSA losses, 4 for wrecking dH-R, and none for terrain. The CSA won 5 VP for USA losses, and 7 for terrain.
5.3 Scenario 3: June 1st
The historical engagement on June 1st was a small affair, again a fine example of miscarried plans. Smith had ordered Longstreet to renew the attack at dawn, but Longstreet simply disobeyed. Likely he believed that his force had done all the fighting the day before (not true - DH Hill had carried the action, but the bulk of Huger's and Longstreet's own divisions had been unengaged) and resented Smith not initiating the attack with the Left Wing. The result was another day of disappointing results.
General Information:
- First Turn: 6:00 a.m. June 1st
- Last Turn: 12:00 p.m. June 1st.
- Scenario Length: 13 turns
- Maps used: E
- First Player: Confederate
- Losses: Both players start with the losses shown in the table in 5.6. These accumulated losses do count for Victory Point purposes.
Union Information
Set Up:
- 2 Corps HQ and Supply - E15.24
- 2b - E12.21
- 2-2-2 - E13.21
- 1-2-2 - E15.19
- 2b - E16.18
- 3-2-2 - E18.17
- 2b - E19.18
- 2-1-2 - E20.19
- 1-1-2 - E21.22
- 3-1-2 - E15.22
Note: any of the units of 2 Corps may set up with extended lines already deployed, if so desired.
- 3 Corps HQ and Supply - E27.35
- 2-2-3, 3-2-3 - w/i 1 E27.35
- 1-3-3, 3b - E26.30
- 3b - E25.31
- 3-3-3 - E24.30
- 2-3-3 - E23.28
- 4 Corps HQ and Supply - E25.35
- 1-4, 4b, 4b(3) - w/i 1 E24.33
- 2-4, 4b - w/i 1 E27.33
Artillery Ammunition: 25
Reinforcements: None
Orders:
- 2-3 is to advance along the Williamsburg Road to attack and recapture Seven Pines.
- 2-3-3 - is attached to 2-3 Division for all purposes, and is to join in the above advance when the 2-3 Division moves so as to place 2-3-3 within command range. Until then, the brigade traces command radius normally, to the 3-3 Division commander.
- 2 Corps is to defend in place.
- 3 Corps is to defend in place.
- 4 Corps is to defend in place.
Confederate Information
Set Up:
- Right HQ and Supply - E22.11
- M-Hu - E22.17
- A-Hu - E22.19
- B-Hu, Hu b - E24.25
- C-L-R - E23.19
- P-L-R - E24.20
- Pr-L-R - E25.22
- A-L-R - E27.22
- W-L-R, K-L-R L-Rb - w/i 1 E27.17
- dH-R - w/i 2 E25.11
- S-L, ANVb - w/i 3 E15.13
- Left HQ and Supply, ANV HQ and Supply, 2xANVb - E5.06
Johnson is wounded, and out of play. Smith now commands both the army and the Left Wing, sets up in E5.06, and may not move unless a Union unit comes within 2 hexes of E5.06.
Artillery Ammunition: 20
Reinforcements: None
Orders:
- The Right Wing has no orders, except those noted below.
- The Left Wing is to defend in place.
- M-Hu, A-Hu, and P-L-R each have a divisional goal to attack north to clear the Railroad of Union troops.
- The remainder of Hu Division is to defend in place.
Smith now commands both the Army and the Left Wing. Any orders from Smith must be issued normally, and are accepted as if an imaginary Repl Leader with a rating of 1 is in command of the Left Wing.
Design note: The orders for the three brigade attack, above, were issued by DH Hill under his own initiative for these three units to probe the Union line. As such, they were very unusual, given that none of the brigades in question were even under DH Hill's authority at the time. Technically, Smith had ordered Longstreet to attack north with the entire Right Wing, but for all intents and purposes, Longstreet ignored that order. Hence the Right Wing and Huger are both without attack orders at the start of this scenario.
Victory (as printed, the last row reads "CSA Massive Victroy"):
| Result | USA minus CSA VP |
|---|---|
| USA Massive Victory | 10 or more |
| USA Major Victory | 7 to 9 |
| USA Minor Victory | 3 to 6 |
| Draw | -2 to 2 |
| CSA Minor Victory | -3 to -6 |
| CSA Major Victory | -7 to -9 |
| CSA Massive Victory | -10 or less |
Historically, the result was a draw, with a final value of -1. The USA won 7 VP for CSA losses, 4 for wrecking dH-R, and none for terrain. The CSA won 5 VP for USA losses, and 7 for terrain.
5.4 Scenario 4: The Battle of Seven Pines
This scenario recreates the full two days' battle of Seven Pines, warts and all. The Confederate initial orders make it an especially difficult scenario for the CSA player.
General Information:
- First Turn: 1:00 p.m. May 31st.
- Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. June 1st.
- Scenario Length: 55 Turns.
- Maps used: D and E
- First Player: CSA
Union Information
Set Up:
- 2-4, 4b - w/i 2 E22.13
- 1-4, 4b(3) 4b - w/i 1 E26.20
- 4 HQ and Supply, Keyes - E27.23
- 2-3-3, 3-3-3, 3b - w/i 2 E26.31
Artillery Ammunition: 55
Reinforcements:
| Time | Units | Enter at |
|---|---|---|
| 3 p.m. May 31st | Heintzelman, 3 HQ and Supply | E27.35 |
| Sumner, 2 HQ, Sedgwick, 1-2-2 | E1.35 | |
| 1-3-3 | E25.35 | |
| 3:30 p.m. | 2-2-2 | E1.35 |
| Richardson, 1-1-2 | E6.34 | |
| 4:00 p.m. | 3-2-2, 2 Corps supply | E1.35 |
| 2-1-2 | E6.34 | |
| 4:30 p.m. | 3-1-2 | E1.35 |
| 5:00 p.m. |
Orders:
- 4 Corps - defend the vicinity of Seven Pines.
- 3 Corps - move to the support of 4 Corps, and help defend Seven Pines, counterattack if necessary to restore the Seven Pines position.
- 3-3 - has a divisional goal as stated for 3 Corps order, above, reverts to the Corps command when its HQ arrives.
- 2 Corps - move to vicinity of Fair Oaks and defend that position, and protect the flank of the Seven Pines position.
Any reinforcements that arrive out of command range, have standing orders to move to their join their HQ and become subject to any orders their command may have.
Confederate Information
Set Up:
- G-dH-R - E24.08 ex E23.08
- Ro-dH-R - E26.08 ex E27.09
- Rs-dH-R - E26.07 ex E27.08
- F-dH-R - E24.06 ex E23.06
- dH-Rb, D H Hill - E25.07
- Hu Div - w/i 3 E48.10
- Right HQ and Supply - D27.20
- L-R - w/i 3 D27.20
- Hm-S-L, Ht-S-L - w/i 1 E2.10
- rest of S-L - w/i 2 E5.05
- Left HQ and Supply, ANV HQ and Supply, 3xANVb - w/i 2 E5.05
Artillery Ammunition: 45
Reinforcements: None
Orders:
- dH-R - has a divisional goal to attack to capture Seven Pines, and then to continue the attack to capture the crossroads at E26.31.
- L-R - P-L-R has a Divisional Goal to move to the Rail Road at D17.25 and defend. W-L-R, C-L-R, and Pr-L-R have divisional goals to move to join Huger's Division (Hu Div) and support it if attacked. No other units of the division have divisional goals.
- Hu Div - has a Divisional Goal to defend the Charles City Road.
- Right Wing - The RW has no orders.
- Left Wing - attack towards Fair Oaks in support of dH-R attack. Once Fair Oaks is captured, the attack will continue to capture Orchard Station. These orders have a D2 status, and the Confederate player cannot start rolling for delay removal until the 2:00 p.m. turn command phase.
Victory:
| Result | USA minus CSA VP |
|---|---|
| USA Massive Victory | 10 or more |
| USA Major Victory | 7 to 9 |
| USA Minor Victory | 3 to 6 |
| Draw | -2 to 2 |
| CSA Minor Victory | -3 to -6 |
| CSA Major Victory | -7 to -9 |
| CSA Massive Victory | -10 or less |
Historically, the result was a draw, with a final value of 0. The USA won 10 VP for CSA losses, 4 for wrecking dH-R, and none for terrain. The CSA won 7 VP for USA losses, and 7 for terrain.
5.5 Scenario 5: Johnston's Offensive
This scenario presents Johnston's original offensive scheme, a two pronged attack on Fair Oaks and Seven Pines by the converging forces of the Right Wing, supported by Smith's men of the Left Wing. It, more than any other, represents the battle Seven Pines should have been.
General Information:
- First Turn: 6:00 a.m. May 31st
- Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. June 1st
- Scenario Length: 69 Turns
- Maps used: D and E (and F, if desired)
- First Player: CSA
Union Information
Set Up:
- 2-4, 4b - w/i 2 E22.13
- 1-4, 4b(3) 4b - w/i 1 E26.20
- 4 HQ and Supply, Keyes - E27.23
- 2-3-3, 3-3-3, 3b - w/i 2 E26.31
Artillery Ammunition: 55
Reinforcements:
The following Union reinforcements do not have a specific appearance time listed. Instead, they have a number - +2, for example. This number is the number of turns following the first turn of any Union unit being fired upon from a range of 3 hexes or less that the listed units appear. For instance, if the first such fire occurs at Noon, then all units with the reinforcement code of "+2" appear at 1:00 p.m.
| Code | Units | Enter at |
|---|---|---|
| +2 | Heintzelman, 3 HQ and Supply | E27.35 |
| Sumner, 2 HQ, Sedgwick, 1-2-2 | E1.35 | |
| 1-3-3 | E25.35 | |
| +3 | 2-2-2 | E1.35 |
| Richardson, 1-1-2 | E6.34 | |
| +4 | 3-2-2, 2 Corps supply | E1.35 |
| 2-1-2 | E6.34 | |
| +5 | 3-1-2 | E1.35 |
| +6 |
Orders:
- 4 Corps - defend the vicinity of Seven Pines.
- 3 Corps - move to the support of 4 Corps, and help defend Seven Pines, counterattack if necessary to restore the Seven Pines position.
- 3-3 - has a divisional goal as stated for 3 Corps order, above, reverts to the Corps command when its HQ arrives.
- 2 Corps - move to vicinity of Fair Oaks and defend that position, and protect the flank of the Seven Pines position.
Any reinforcements that arrive out of command range, have standing orders to move to their join their HQ and become subject to any orders their command may have.
Confederate Information
Set Up:
- Ro-dH-R - E48.10
- dH-R - w/i 3 D27.22
- L-R - w/i 3 D10.15
- Left HQ and Supply - D10.15
- S-L - w/i 3 D6.01
- Right HQ and Supply - D6.01
- ANV HQ and Supply, 3x ANVb - w/i 2 D11.10
Artillery Ammunition: 45
Reinforcements:
- 7:30 a.m. - Hu Division - D17.00
Orders:
- L-R - has a Divisional Goal to move west via the Nine-Mile Road to the Darbytown Road, and then southeast to cross Gillie's Creek at hex D26.07. Once all units are across, the division must move off the road and halt, and wait for all of Hu Div to pass. Once Hu Div has cleared the Williamsburg Road, the L-R is to move via the Williamsburg Road to the vicinity of D27.30, halt and defend the Williamsburg Road.
- Hu Division - has a Divisional Goal to move via the Darbytown Road, cross Gillie's Creek via hex D26.07 - after L-R has crossed and cleared the road - proceed to the Williamsburg Road. From there, the division must move to the Charles City Road, and advance to hex E48.10, where it will relieve the Ro-dH-R brigade and defend the Charles City Road.
- Ro-dH-R - Until relieved by Hu Div, this brigade has a Divisional Goal to defend the Charles City Road. Once Hu/RW arrives, this brigade has a Divisional Goal to move north, in the direction of Seven Pines, rejoin the rest of its division astride the Williamsburg Road, and participate in that Division's attack.
- dH-R - has a Divisional Goal to move east on the Williamsburg Road. Once Ro-dH-R rejoins the command, dH-R has a Divisional Goal to attack the Union troops along the Williamsburg Road with the objective of capturing Seven Pines and the crossroads at E26.31.
- S-L - has a Divisional Goal of moving via the secondary road northeast around the racetrack to the Nine Mile Road, and then east along the Nine Mile Road to Old Tavern. There it will halt and defend the Nine Mile Road around the vicinity of E5.05.
Design note: The above orders faithfully recapture the degree of confusion the Confederate Army faced on May 31st. While some units technically had orders to attack (S-L, for instance) those orders were so conditional and vague that it would, in effect, take another order issue from Army HQ to actually convert that attack into reality.
Victory:
| Result | USA minus CSA VP |
|---|---|
| USA Massive Victory | 10 or more |
| USA Major Victory | 7 to 9 |
| USA Minor Victory | 3 to 6 |
| Draw | -2 to 2 |
| CSA Minor Victory | -3 to -6 |
| CSA Major Victory | -7 to -9 |
| CSA Massive Victory | -10 or less |
Historically, the result was a draw, with a final value of 0. The USA won 10 VP for CSA losses, 4 for wrecking dH-R, and none for terrain. The CSA won 7 VP for USA losses, and 7 for terrain.
5.6 Historical Losses
| Unit (Union) | 31 May | 1 June | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1-1-2 | - | 6 | 6 |
| 2-1-2 | - | - | - |
| 3-1-2 | - | 2 | 2 |
| 1-2-2 | 2 | - | 2 |
| 2-2-2 | - | - | - |
| 3-2-2 | 1 | - | 1 |
| 1-2-3 | - |
| Unit (Confederate) | 31 May | 1 June | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| A-L-R | 4 | - | 4 |
| C-L-R | - | - | - |
| K-L-R | - | - | - |
| P-L-R | - | 4 | 4 |
| Pr-L-R | - | - | - |
| W-L-R | 1 | - | 1 |
| F-dH-R | 9 |
Loss Charts
The loss charts are the only record of losses (see 1.6). For each brigade the chart lists its morale rating (Morale) and its loss boxes grouped by Fire Level (the Fire Level group, such as AAB or AB, followed by that group's boxes). A check mark within a row of boxes is printed in that position on the chart. The last line of each division group is the division's own box track (division name and commander followed by its boxes).
Confederate Loss Chart - The Seven Days Volume 2: Seven Pines
Unit ID Brigade Morale Fire Levels
C-M-L Cobb D AAA ❏❏❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏✔❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
G-M-L Griffith A AAB ❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
J-M-L DR Jones C AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
K-M-L Kershaw C AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
M-M-L McLaws B AA ❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
T-M-L Toombs C AAB ❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
M-L Magruder ❏❏❏✔❏❏❏
Hd-S-L Hood A AA ❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏✔ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Hm-S-L Hampton A AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏✔ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Ht-S-L Hatton C AA ❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
L-S-L Law B AA ❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏✔ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
P-S-L Pettigrew C AA ❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
S-L Whiting ❏❏❏✔❏❏
F-dH-R Featherston C AA ❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
G-dH-R Garland C AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Ro-dH-R Rodes B AAB ❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Rs-dH-R Rains C AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
dH-R DH Hill ❏❏✔❏❏
A-L-R Anderson B AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏✔❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
C-L-R Colston C AA ❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏✔❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
K-L-R Kemper B AA ❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
P-L-R Pickett A AA ❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏✔❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Pr-L-R Pryor C AA ❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
W-L-R Wilcox C AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
L-R Anderson ❏❏❏✔❏❏❏
A-Hu Armistead B AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
B-Hu Blanchard C AAB ❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
M-Hu Mahone C AA ❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Hu Div Huger ❏❏✔❏
Union Loss Chart - The Seven Days Volume 2: Seven Pines
Unit ID Brigade Morale Fire Levels
1-1-2 Howard B AAB ❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-1-2 Meagher A AA ❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏✔❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-1-2 French C AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
1-2 Richardson ❏❏✔❏
1-2-2 Gorman C AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-2-2 Burns B AAB ❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-2-2 Dana C AAA ❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏✔ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-2 Sedgwick ❏❏✔❏
1-2-3 Grover C AAB ❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏✔ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-2-3 Sickles B AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-2-3 Patterson B A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏✔❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-3 Hooker ❏❏✔❏
1-3-3 Jameson C AAB ❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-3-3 Birney C AB ❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏✔❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-3-3 Berry C AAB ❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏✔❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-3 Kearny ❏❏✔❏
1-1-4 Peck C AAB ❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏✔ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-1-4 AbercombieD AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏✔ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-1-4 Devens C AAB ❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
1-4 Couch ❏❏✔❏
1-2-4 Naglee C AAB ❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-2-4 Wessells D AA ❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-2-4 Palmer C AAB ❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-4 Casey ❏✔❏❏
Historical Notes
Seven Pines may bear the distinction of being the most mis-managed battle of the entire American Civil War. While many battles did not go as planned, few came apart so completely as did Joseph E. Johnston’s in his first offensive effort. The result was a confused clash in the woods and fields east of Richmond, and bitter recriminations afterwards.
The battle itself was intended to be Johnston’s supreme effort to drive the Union invaders from the very gates of the Confederate Capitol, since the Rebel army had simply run out of room to do anything else. Johnston had been retreating all spring, retiring first from his exposed position around Manassas to positions near Fredericksburg (and incidentally disrupting Union General George B. McClellan’s first plan to outflank the Rebels via naval movement: a planned debarkation at Urbanna, Virginia) and then, once McClellan landed on the Peninsula, hurrying south to join Confederate General John B. Magruder’s small command in opposing the might of the Union Army of the Potomac in front of Yorktown. Finally, after a month of inaction and waiting on the Yorktown line, Johnston retreated again, falling back up the length of the Peninsula towards Richmond.
Three months of retrograde action only worsened the tension between Johnston and Confederate President Jefferson Davis, tension that had initially developed over a rank and seniority dispute between the two men that previous winter. Now, with Johnston getting ever closer to Richmond, and with McClellan looming behind him, Davis was losing confidence that Johnston would ever put up a serious fight to save the city. This distrust on Davis’ part was partially unfair, because Johnston was clearly handicapped by numbers. The Union army was over 100,000 men strong, while Johnston’s command was closer to 55,000 troops, a huge disadvantage to face, especially offensively. A month later, during the more famous Seven Days’ fighting, Davis gave Robert E. Lee almost numerical parity with the Federals by drawing in reinforcements from the Shenandoah Valley, southern Virginia, and North Carolina; Johnston got no such augmentation.
Still, Johnston was well aware of the impossibility of giving up Richmond without a fight, and was always looking for some chance to strike a portion of McClellan’s huge army on something approaching even odds. By the end of May, Johnston thought he found just such a chance. The Chickahominy River was the agent for that opportunity. The Chickahominy flows generally southeast, starting north of Richmond and splitting the Peninsula in two before flowing into the James River further east, and any approach to Richmond from the Peninsula will at some point have to cross this stream. Worse for the Federals, McClellan still expected the Union First Corps—originally part of his army but retained by Washington to provide adequate defenses for the Union Capitol—to march overland from Fredericksburg and join the rest of the Army of the Potomac in front of Richmond. This meant that McClellan was actually forced to straddle the Chickahominy, with the 2nd, 5th and 6th Corps on the north bank, and the 3rd and 4th Corps on the south bank. Realizing that the Federals were vulnerable here, Johnston decided to strike a blow at the two Union corps south of the river.
On the 28th of May, Johnston and his chief subordinates met to finalize plans for the attack. Two roads were the best avenues to approach the Union Lines: the Nine-mile Road to the north, and the Williamsburg Stage Road to the south. Both ran east from the Capitol, with the Nine-mile Road curving south after some miles to intersect with the Williamsburg Road at Seven Pines. Hence, these two routes offered parallel approaches and naturally converged on the Union position, making them ideal for Johnston’s plans. Further, the Charles City Road ran southeast, providing a route towards the Union southern flank.
Johnston intended to mass two thirds of his army against the two Federal corps, using all three roads to facilitate the approach. Here, however, communication broke down badly. Johnston’s orders were both vague and verbal: the lack of anything written not only confused commanders at the time, but also badly muddied the waters in trying to figure out exactly what went wrong afterwards.
The crux of the problem lay with General James Longstreet. Johnston’s orders called for Longstreet to have overall initial direction of the approach and battle. Longstreet’s large division was supposed to move up the Nine Mile Road, join General G. W. Smith’s division, and attack the Union right. General D. H. Hill’s division was to move down the Williamsburg Road and open the action by attacking the Union center. Finally, Huger’s division was to move via the Charles City Road and threaten the Union left flank near White Oak Swamp. The signal to Hill’s men to start the attack was the arrival of one of Hill’s brigades—Rodes’— stationed out on the Charles City Road, which was to move out when Huger arrived in its place.
Certainly these orders were rather complicated, with the entire movement keyed to the arrival of Rodes’ command on Hill’s front after being replaced by Huger’s column. Worse yet, Huger was unclear as to whether he was merely a threat or part of the actual attack: Johnston’s orders to him did not specify. With everything linked in such a manner, any one mis-step could break the chain of cause and effect, thereby derailing the whole concept.
However, alternatives were discussed. Longstreet had a simpler proposal: his command would march straight down the Williamsburg Road, join Hill, and attack.
Once Smith heard that firing, Smith would join in from his positions on the Nine Mile Road. Huger’s mission was unchanged. Unfortunately, during a further meeting on the 30th, Johnston rejected this concept, but that must not have been clear in Longstreet’s mind. This, coupled with Huger’s uncertainty as to the exact nature of his own role, meant that two of Johnston’s three columns were not clear on their role in the plan.
On the morning of the 31st, total confusion reigned. Longstreet started off down the wrong road, still intending to move down the Williamsburg Road as Longstreet suggested, rather than down the Nine Mile Road as Johnston’s plan called for. Worse, Longstreet and Huger got into a bizarre dispute over crossing priorities at Gillie’s Creek, a raging torrent from rains the night before. The bridge was washed out, and the only crossing was hastily made, with two wagons parked in the middle of the flood and a footbridge rigged. Despite Huger’s need for speed in order to relieve Rodes’ brigade out on the Charles City Road so his arrival in turn could signal the start of D. H. Hill’s attack, Longstreet insisted in crossing his 12,000 men first, in an argument that was ultimately settled by seniority of rank. Once across, Longstreet promptly halted and let Huger’s men cross and move ahead to proceed down the Charles City Road, wasting further time.
All the while, the other commands waiting impatiently. Johnston was waiting with Smith’s division on the Nine Mile Road, his anxiety further sharpened by the presence of Davis himself. Relations between the two were so strained that despite several hours in close proximity they barely spoke, except for Davis’ periodic inquiries as to why the delay, which cannot have helped Johnston’s mood.
By mid-morning, couriers were sent out to find Longstreet, one of whom returned with word that Longstreet was found on the Williamsburg Road. Given that Longstreet’s men had started out near the Williamsburg Road and would have had to travel on a portion of it anyway to reach the Nine Mile Road, Johnston assumed that this was in fact happening, and while Longstreet was late, he was not off course.
This proved a fatal assumption, for it meant that Johnston, still not grasping that the plan was derailed, elected to simply wait more instead of personally going to seek clarification.
Simultaneously, D. H. Hill was waiting for Rodes to arrive. Being the trigger for what was supposed to be a dawn attack, naturally Hill grew increasingly worried and impatient as the day reached Noon without either any sign of Rodes or word from Huger. Finally, Hill felt he could wait no more, and sent his three available brigades forward into the attack. Rodes was in fact not far off by this time, and quickly followed the rest of Hill’s division into the fight. At last the battle had opened.
As Hill’s men swept forward, they encountered a Union line no more prepared to receive an attack than the Rebels were prepared to deliver one. The initial Federal line was held by General Silas Casey’s 2nd Division of the 4th Corps, Surprised, Casey’s men were swept back, and General Keyes—the Union 4th Corps Commander—quickly called for reinforcements from the Union 3rd Corps, stationed some distance to the rear.
Heintzelman, the Union 3rd Corps commander, responded rapidly, but it would be some time before the two divisions of his corps—under two of the most aggressive Generals in the Union army, Hooker and Kearney—would arrive to support Casey.
Keyes’ other division, under Darius Couch, soon found itself being drawn into Casey’s fight, and further reinforcements were needed. McClellan’s response was to send Sumner’s 2nd Corps south of the river in support, which proved no mean feat. The same flood that had turned Gillie’s Creek into a torrent and delayed the Rebels so badly had also swollen the Chickahominy to the point where the available bridges that 2nd Corps needed were in danger of being swept away. Sumner, however, was adamant concerning his orders, and began crossing his infantry immediately, rickety bridges or no. While the better part of an infantry division made it across that afternoon, almost no artillery did, and the remaining division of Sumner’s corps did not get across until well after dark. None the less, his immediate response aided Keyes’ embattled line at a critical time.
McClellan, who was feeling ill, never crossed to the south bank at any time, despite the manifestly large battle occurring on Keyes’ front. All told, D. H. Hill’s command drove the Union troops for about a mile, attacking three distinct battle-lines. Few of Longstreet’s men even got into the fight— only parts of two brigades were engaged towards the end of the battle on the Williamsburg Road.
It was not until late afternoon—around 4:00 p.m., that Johnston began to get a clear picture of what had happened. Until then, the sounds of the battle on the Williamsburg road were muted, and Johnston dismissed them as long range artillery dueling instead of a major attack. Not until a belated courier arrived from Longstreet was it apparent that those sounds were the main attack, and the Rebels there had been fighting for several hours.
At that point, Johnston ordered G. W. Smith to commit his division, originally intended to be the reserve for Longstreet along the Nine Mile Road. Thus, it was closer to 5:00 p.m. before the lead elements of this column, under General Chase Whiting, advanced to attack the Union lines. Whiting’s men ran into the newly arrived elements of the Federal Second Corps who had filed in to replace Couch’s division, and despite several furious charges, got nowhere.
Clearly the result was disappointing. Johnston had intended to use 22 brigades in a concentrated attack on 6 Federal brigades: instead only 10 Confederate brigades even saw action, and their piecemeal commitment allowed Union reinforcements to intervene significantly, saving the Federal 4th Corps from a disaster. Finally, almost the last casualty of the day was perhaps the most disruptive at all: Johnston himself was wounded observing the fighting along the Nine Mile Road, and forced to give up command to G. W. Smith.
Nightfall found Smith newly thrust into command of a very confused situation, and at one point Smith asked President Davis himself if there was any news from Longstreet—hardly filling Davis with confidence in the new commander. Finally, Smith issued orders for a renewal of the attack the next morning, per Johnston’s intentions. The plan as conceived was not really sound: Longstreet and Hill were to renew the attack at dawn, driving north instead of east this time, while Whiting’s column was to attack south along the Nine Mile Road once Longstreet’s attack was fully developed. The problem was that while Sumner’s Federals did project much further east than did the dented lines of the 3rd and 4th Corps, the Union 2nd Corps was still fresh and very strong. Worse, any drive north by Longstreet would expose his flank to the Federal 3rd Corps which was still effective.
However, Longstreet’s solution to this conundrum was not a good one. He simply ignored Smith, and placed the bulk of the attack once again on Hill, who sent forward three brigades (none from his own division, which was pretty badly beaten up by the previous day’s fighting) in a probing attack that was mainly directed west instead of north. When these three brigades faltered, more men were committed, but fed into action piecemeal. In the end, Longstreet committed six brigades—four of his own and two from Huger—into a series of frontal attacks on the Union 3rd Corps, but the Federals were not driven an inch. Smith heard the fighting, but elected not to commit Whiting’s men, and by midday the action was over.
The final act in the drama was a significant one. At 2:00 p.m., President Davis and his entourage rode up to Smith’s HQ on the Nine Mile Road, where Smith was informed that he was being relieved, and that Davis’ advisor, General Robert E. Lee, was assuming command of the army.
With little fanfare, Smith handed over command; he would resign in November of that year, and ended the war commanding the Georgia State Troops in the Atlanta campaign.
As can be imagined, the recriminations over what went wrong at Seven Pines were massive. Longstreet’s report blamed Huger for the mix-up at Gillie’s Creek, and Johnston accepted much of this in his own report, despite it being clearly at odds with his own battle plans for the 31st. Huger, for his part, did not see either Longstreet’s or Johnston’s reports until much later, and once he did spent much of his post-war career trying to absolve himself of blame, mostly by attacking Longstreet. Smith also spent much time attacking Longstreet for the aborted effort on June 1st, ultimately blaming the latter general for most of what went wrong on that day as well.
The truth is likely beyond reach. Certainly Longstreet took the wrong road, and his criticism of Huger seems misplaced. The darker view of Longstreet has him deliberately sabotaging Johnston to advance his own career visibility, and setting up Huger to take the blame once things went badly. However, none of this explains away the central problem of this theory: namely, that Johnston acquiesced to much of Longstreet’s view of what happened in his own report. I feel the real reason is somewhat less sinister: Longstreet was genuinely confused about the route, quite possible given that it was one of the attack possibilities debated prior to the fight.
Johnston’s orders were manifestly unclear, as evidenced by Huger’s own report on them, and the lack of written orders at all simply makes the possibility of confusion even more likely.
Even the most sympathetic explanation of Longstreet’s actions, however, cannot escape the fact that the two days of Seven Pines were a blot on his record, marked by confusion and poor tactical thinking, and his treatment of Huger was shabby. Worse, Longstreet seems to have decided simply to ignore Smith’s direct order for the June 1st attack, with only a very limited commitment of forces on the second day. Had Longstreet turned in a similar performance a month later, during the Seven Days, there can be little question that he, along with Huger and Magruder, would have been sent off to internal exile in some remote post.
However, the reality is that Longstreet’s actions during the Seven Days were almost the antithesis of his Seven Pines performance: solid, responsive, and displaying a great deal of tactical control in several actions. Whatever else it was, Seven Pines was a learning experience for Longstreet.
Bibliographical Note: Please see the Savage Station Rulebook. The bibliography there covers both battles.
Designer's Notes
The most interesting aspect of Seven Pines is how badly the attack was actually run. I wanted to create a game that would give the player some idea of just how confused the Confederate side was, and the difficulties inherent in orchestrating a more coherent attack out of the mess in place on the morning of May 31st, 1862. I think that the historical scenarios recreate that puzzle as well as any boardgame can.
On the other hand, the basic plan was quite sound, and Johnston did see a real opportunity. I think the contrast between the actual situation and the plan as intended are quite striking, and bode ill for the Federal who has to play that one out. I’m pleased that this game offers such a detailed look at this battle, since it has been largely lost to history and wargaming alike, usually glossed over as an abortive prelude to the Seven Days. For those of you who claim that we never offer up the obscure, or complain about the umpteenth iteration of Gettysburg: here is a chance to spend some time with the largest unknown battle of the war.
Longstreet also provides an interesting problem here. Over the years, a number of gamers have asked me how I would deal with Longstreet at Seven Pines. It would be hard to argue that he was anything other than a “Zero” in game terms, certainly I have no compunctions about doing so here.
I have always tried to limit the evaluation of leadership values to the battle in question: hence ratings for Jackson, for example, that vary between zero and four from game to game. Longstreet fumbled badly here, and was rated accordingly. A month later, of course, he was doing well, and his Seven Days’ ratings reflect that. I’m not sure I can fully explain the inherent schizophrenia here, but I can justify it in game terms.
Students of the battle might well notice a few discrepancies. Featherston’s Confederate Brigade was really led by G. B. Anderson; Featherston was ill. However, I already had enough Andersons running around, I left Featherston’s name on the unit to help reduce confusion. Alternatively, I left R. A. Anderson in command of Longstreet’s Division, despite the fact that this, too, was only a temporary promotion: Longstreet made a point of leaving Anderson in charge and commanding only the wing, and I wanted to simplify the command situation here. The alternative was to add rules leaving Longstreet in command of both, or using (and noting in each case) a Repl leader. Neither solution was very clean, so I simply accepted the situation as is.
There is one other aspect of Confederate command that was a problem: demi-divisions. G. W. Smith’s wing was actually divided into demi-divisions, where a brigade commander would take command of his and a couple of other brigades, on a fairly informal basis. The main problem with following this practice in the game is that it conferred substantial—and unrealistic—advantages to the Confederate player in the form of more leaders for combat and morale purposes. In reality, these formations did not work well, and I didn’t want to reward the player for an unsuccessful mechanic. I prefer that the player deal with the larger, more cumbersome formations.
The Union army is much easier to deal with here, since it exists in a formal Corps structure. The only significant absence is the army commander, a situation bound to be familiar to those of you who have been playing the Seven Days’ Scenarios.
McClellan was somewhat indisposed, and never set foot over the river for the battle, despite the obviously significant action raging across the Chickahominy.
Heintzelman, the Union 3rd Corps commander, assumed tactical control of the battle. Originally, I had thought of allowing the Union player only to send in orders from off-map, and rely on initiative for the rest, but I find this mechanic to be very limiting. To many Confederate players can find ways to artificially manipulate that knowledge to their advantage, something I wanted to avoid. Further, the Union chain of command was pretty clear, and everyone knew Heintzelman was in charge, allowing him to act historically more like an army commander than merely a corps commander. His leadership, while not spectacular, was good enough to orchestrate a solid Union response to the attack once the initial surprise wore off, and I wanted the Federal to have that same ability.
All in all, Seven Pines is more than just a way to fill out the box for the middle third of the Seven Days’ trilogy. It was a bloody and critical action in its own right, in some ways more interesting an action for its mishandling than for any potential generalship skills that might have been displayed. I hope that you all give it a run.
Order of Battle and Counter Manifest
Union Forces - Seven Pines
2 Corps: Sumner
- 2 Corps HQ
- 2 Corps Supply
- 2 Corps Artillery (3x 5-rated batteries)
1-2 Division: Richardson
- 1-1-2 Howard
- 2-1-2 Meagher
- 3-1-2 French
2-2 Division: Sedgwick
- 1-2-2 Gorman
- 2-2-2 Burns
- 3-2-2 Dana
3 Corps: Heintzelman
- 3 Corps HQ
- 3 Corps Supply
- 3 Corps Artillery (2x 5-rated batteries)
2-3 Division: Hooker
- 1-2-3 Grover (opt)
- 2-2-3 Sickles
- 3-2-3 Patterson
3-3 Division: Kearney
- 1-3-3 Jameson
- 2-3-3 Birney
- 3-3-3 Berry
4 Corps: Keyes
- 4 Corps HQ
- 4 Corps Supply
- 4 Corps Artillery (3x 5-rated batteries)
1-4 Division: Couch
- 1-1-4 Peck
- 2-1-4 Abercrombie
- 3-1-4 Devens
2-4 Division: Casey
- 1-2-4 Naglee
- 2-2-4 Wessells
- 3-2-4 Palmer
Confederate Forces - Seven Pines
Army of Northern Virginia Command: Johnston
- A NVa HQ
- A NVa Supply
- A Res Artillery (3x 5-rated batteries)
Longstreet
- Right Wing HQ
- Right Wing Supply
Smith
- Left Wing HQ
- Left Wing Supply
Anderson's Division: Anderson
- A-L-R RH Anderson
- C-L-R Colston
- K-L-R Kemper
- P-L-R Pickett
- Pr-L-R Pryor
- W-L-R Wilcox
- 1x 5-rated Artillery Battery
DH Hill's Division: DH Hill
- F-dH-R Featherston
- G-dH-R Garland
- Ro-dH-R Rodes
- Rs-dH-R Rains
- 1x 5-rated Artillery Battery
Huger's Division: Huger
- A-Hu Armistead
- B-Hu Blanchard
- M-Hu Mahone
- 1x 4-rated Artillery Battery
Magruder's Division (opt): Magruder
- C-M-L Cobb
- G-M-L Griffith
- J-M-L DR Jones
- K-M-L Kershaw
- M-M-L McLaws
- T-M-L Tombs
- 2x 5-rated Artillery Battery
Whiting's Division: Whiting
- Hd-S-L Hood
- Hm-S-L Hampton
- Ht-S-L Hatton
- L-S-L Law
- P-S-L Pettigrew
- 2x 5-rated Artillery Battery