Malvern Hill: The Battles of the Seven Days, Volume III
Malvern Hill: The Battles of the Seven Days, Volume III Rulebook
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Introduction
Malvern Hill is the 13th game in The Gamers' Civil War, Brigade Series and the final installment in a set recreating the Seven Days Battles. This final volume completes and extends the action of the Seven Days campaign, covering the action on June 30th at Glendale (or Freyser's Farm) and the bloody assault at Malvern Hill on July 1st. Finally, campaign scenarios are included allowing players to recreate the full sweep of the bloody last week of June, 1862.
Some of the rules below are for use only in the campaign scenarios, and use counters not found in Malvern Hill, or duplicate rules found in the earlier games. It is my intent to create one rulebook that has all the necessary rules to play the campaign scenarios, saving the player from extra paper shuffling. When playing any of the regular scenarios, ignore these extra rules.
1.0 Terrain Notes
1.1 Swamp and Wooded Swamp Hexes
Shift one column left on the Fire Combat Table if one or more firers in a combat are in a swamp (or wooded swamp) hex. There is no additional penalty if more than one such unit fires at the same target in a given combat.
1.2 Richmond Fort Hexes
These numbered forts were erected by the citizens of Richmond early in the war. They effect only the hexsides they face, and any unit fired on through an unprotected hexside does not gain the benefit of the fort hex.
The Fort benefits are: -1 on the Fire Combat Table, +3 on the Morale Table. Crossing a fort hexside costs any unit +1 movement point.
1.3 Union Trenches and Redoubts; Confederate Trenches
The Union trenches generally face west, towards Richmond; the Confederate trenches generally face east, away from Richmond. Both features are found on Map E in Seven Pines. All trenches provide benefits only through the hexsides they face, and any unit can use any trench without regard to affiliation. Units fired on through unprotected hexsides do not gain trench benefits. Union Redoubts (those numbered features within the Union trench line) are treated as regular trench hexsides—they have no extra benefit.
The trench benefits are: -1 on the Fire Combat Table, +3 on the Morale Table, and any unit crossing a trench hexside pays +1 movement point.
1.4 Chaffin's Bluff and Ball's Bluff
These two fortifications were erected to protect Richmond from Union gunboats ascending the James, and were unsuited for facing land forces. The garrisons were there to man a number of large naval guns, and were not equipped to fight as foot troops. For that matter, the naval guns themselves lacked canister or other anti-personnel ammunition types that would allow them to fight a land invader. Hence, those troops and guns have been omitted. The defenses themselves are left to act as entrenchments in the unlikely event that defenders are attacked while in them.
Just like the Richmond Fort Hexes found in Seven Pines, these defenses effect only the hexsides which they cover. Defenders fired at through unprotected hexsides never receive the defensive benefits these forts provide.
The fort benefits are: -1 on the Fire Combat Table and +3 on the Morale Table. Any unit crossing a fort hexside pays +1 movement points in addition to normal terrain costs.
1.5 The Slash
I do not have any good information as to why this wooded area was so named, or if it was more (or less) impassable than any other wooded area. I have treated it as any other wooded ground.
1.6 Game Tracks
Malvern Hill provides the necessary tracks for all the Seven Days games: Casualty Tracks, Ammunition Tracks, and a comprehensive Turn Record Track. A full color Terrain Key is also included. These tracks are on the bottom of the maps.
1.7 North
North is toward the 1.xx hexrow. Map G is the easternmost map, Map I is the westernmost.
2.0 Union Special Rules
2.1 Acting Army Commanders
If McClellan becomes a casualty, he must be replaced by the highest ranked surviving corps commander. The rank order follows:
- McDowell (if in play)
- Sumner
- Heintzelman
- Keyes
- Porter
- Franklin
2.2 Historical McClellan Restrictions
The restrictions below remain in effect even if McClellan becomes a casualty.
2.2a Union Anti-initiative Ratings. For any initiative attempt that would require Union troops to attack, McClellan has an anti-initiative of -2. For orders attempts involving movement or defense (only), McClellan has no anti-initiative. No Union corps commander has anti-initiative.
2.2b McClellan's Paranoia. McClellan was convinced that the Rebel army greatly outnumbered his own forces at all times. Therefore, he was extremely cautious about any aggressive move made by his own forces, always alert to an enemy counterattack.
To reflect this fear, subtract 2 from the dice roll of any corps attack stoppage check (if using the defensive orders option, do not use this modifier for defensive checks.)
2.3 Attachments and Detachments
The player may not order a Union Corps may attach units from another corps. Some scenarios allow for such attachments, but these are beyond the player's control. A corps may detach up to one division to operate independently for Divisional Goals. No brigade, except those specified in 2.4 below, can be detached or given a divisional goal.
2.4 Union Separate Brigades
The following brigades may be given Divisional Goals. If wrecked, these units check morale at -6, not -4.
2.4a Corps attached Cavalry. The four Union corps cavalry brigades (five when counting the optional 1st Corps brigades) have no divisional affiliation. The brigades attached directly to the various corps trace radii directly to the corps HQ as if they were divisions. They may be detached, and do not count against the corps detachment limit of one division. Cavalry may never be attached to a different Corps.
2.4b The Army Cavalry. This brigade is attached directly to the army HQ. It can be given orders by the Army commander. It can also be attached to a corps. This brigade (and the Engineers, see below) can roll for initiative, as if it had a 2-rated leader. It is not independent, and must always have orders, or be attached to a corps, to act.
2.4c The Train Guard (TGD). The Train Guard represents the force assigned to defend the Army of the Potomac's enormous supply train during McClellan's "change of base." The TGD is independent, but subject to the following restriction: it must always remain stacked with or adjacent to at least one of the Union train counters.
2.4d The Engineer Brigade. Handle the Engineer Brigade exactly like the Union Army Cavalry Brigade. It greatly aids the process of destroying and rebuilding bridges. It adds 2 to any roll involving an existing bridge (either intact or destroyed), and also can build completely new bridges in certain circumstances. See 4.1.
2.4e The Artillery Reserve. There are seven artillery units directly attached to the Army, the Artillery Reserve. These units may always trace command directly to any Union Corps HQ, and act on the orders of that Corps HQ, at any time. They do not need orders to change HQs (move them from one corps command radius to another's to show the change in ownership).
2.5 The Union Train and Changing Base
In Campaign Scenario #3, (Scenario 6.4 from Savage Station) the decision to change base is left outside the Union's control, and is instead presented as a fait accompli. In all the other Campaign Scenarios from the three games, this decision is left in the Union player's hands, and that decision will greatly effect the victory conditions. In either case, the following rules apply.
The Union player can decide to change base in any of his Orders Phases. He notes the turn on his order log. He does not need to tell the Confederate player of his decision, especially if using the option allowing the placement and movement of the train units to remain secret.
Ten hours (not turns) after he decides to change base, the Union Player places all 10 Supply Train counters, plus the Train Guard unit (TGD) on a road or railroad hex in or adjacent to F26.06. This will be the only time that any of these Supply Train units can ever stack with any other unit (exception, see the rules for the TGD, 2.4c above).
As each Supply Train unit moves, it must conform to the rules listed below. The initial stacking period is the only time that any of these rules can be violated, and then only for as long as it takes to move the units so that they are no longer stacked or have their "ZOCs" overlap, as described below. As long as a Supply Train unit does not move at all, it may remain stacked in its initial deployment.
Supply Train unit restrictions:
- Each train counter has a movement allowance of 3.
- A train unit may only move along primary or secondary roads.
- Each train unit is assumed to completely occupy its own hex and all road hexes adjacent to it. No other unit (exception, the TGD above) may move through or stack with any of these hexes at any time. Note that train unit "ZOCs" cannot overlap. At least two road hexes must separate each train unit at all times. Any unit forced to retreat onto or through a train unit is routed instead. Train units may not displace due to retreats or rout-throughs.
- A train unit pays 1 extra MP to cross a bridge.
- A train unit pays 2 extra MP to cross a ford.
- Each train unit may safely exit the map only along the south edge of map H or I.
- No train unit can ever act as a supply source for ammunition. The sole function of these units is to recreate the enormous logistical tail of the Union Army.
- Any time a Confederate combat unit is adjacent to a Supply Train unit, automatically eliminate the supply train unit.
Once decided, the change of base may never be rescinded. The Union Player has no choice but to live with the consequences of his decision.
Optional: If players desire, the Union player can keep the decision to change base a secret. Instead of placing these units on the map, he secretly records their position and turn-by-turn movements on paper. Of course, if any Confederate player moved onto or adjacent to any unit of the train, all train units should immediately be placed on-map. This option preserves the air of uncertainty that Lee faced after the fighting on the 27th concluded.
Exiting the map: Once initiated, the train counters move to exit the map. The train counters leave the map through any of the following hexes: H53.22, H53.27, I53.08, I53.16, I53.33. A train counter exiting the map via any other hex is destroyed and the Confederate Player receives any victory points due for that loss. Once safely off-map, remove the supply train counters from play and they are no longer vulnerable to VP loss.
2.6 Designating a Wing Commander
In any scenario, The Union Player can create a single semi-autonomous wing commander to control part of his army. This wing commander can be any of the Union corps commanders on the map. McClellan creates a wing commander by issuing a simple order. When it implements, the named corps commander becomes wing commander. Any number of on-map corps can be placed under one wing commander.
A wing commander can issue orders to other Union corps under his authority, but can do so only through initiative when stacked with that corps commander. The Wing commander never uses command points, or issues regular orders. A wing commander begins a scenario only if so designated in the specific scenario rules.
2.7 Union Options
2.7a The Big Mac attack. Ignore the historical McClellan restrictions listed in 2.2a and 2.2b. This gives the Confederate Player 5 VP.
The historical McClellan restrictions are pretty limiting for the Union player, and make it very difficult to mount a real attack. This option assumes that McClellan heeded the urgings of his subordinates and called Lee's bluff in front of Richmond.
2.7b The Union 1st Corps. In any scenario starting on June 26th, allow the 1st Corps (all) to arrive at B1.10 or B1.30 on the first turn with orders to move to join the Army HQ and await further orders.
In any scenario starting after June 26th, allow the 1st Corps to set up within 10 hexes of either the 5th Corps HQ or the Army HQ, with no 1st Corps unit closer than 5 hexes to any Confederate unit.
This gives the Confederate Player 10 VP.
McDowell's First Corps was supposed to move overland from Fredericksburg, and join up with the rest of the Army of the Potomac in front of Richmond. When the Government held back McDowell's Corps to ensure the defense of Washington and the lower Shenandoah Valley, McClellan was certain that this decision cost him the campaign.
3.0 Confederate Special Rules
3.1 Confederate Command Arrangements
The largest existing Confederate command organization is the division. Each division receives orders directly from the Army HQ in the form of Divisional Goals. Each division rolls for all attack stoppage and defensive failure checks separately. Alternatively, the Confederate player may form Wings to control multiple divisions at once.
The exception to the above is the one permanent larger command structure within the Rebel army—Jackson's Valley Army. The Valley Army functions like a permanent wing command (see below) and consists of J-V Division, E-V Division, and W-V Division. these units can be re-assigned per the rules in 3.2.
3.2 Creating Wing Commands
At start, only one multi-divisional organization exists in the Rebel army—Jackson's Valley Army. The Rebel player has the option of issuing Divisional Goals to all other divisions, or of creating a new wing (a corps-equivalent structure) by issuing the necessary orders.
During any friendly Command Phase, the Confederate Army Commander can issue a simple order directly to a division commander assigning him as Wing Commander. This order must specify who commands the new wing, and which divisions now comprise it. It must be accepted like any other order. The Confederate Player can never have more than two wing commands in play at any one time.
Restrictions
- Rank and Seniority: No division commander can be assigned to a wing that would force him to serve under a general with a higher seniority number than his own. For instance, if D. H. Hill is ordered to command the right wing, he could only command divisions whose officers had a seniority value of 5 (D. H. Hill's own seniority rating) or greater. Longstreet, with a seniority of 2, could never serve under D. H. Hill. A divisional commander can serve under a wing commander with an equivalent seniority number. Seniority numbers are printed on the leader counters, next to the leader rating.
- Size of Wing: No Wing can contain more that four infantry divisions at one time. A division can be added to an existing Wing command as needed at a later time, subject to the above limit, but it requires a separate order (issued to the existing Wing commander from the army commander).
- Timing: After the creation order is issued, no orders can be sent to a Wing or its component forces until the creation order is accepted by the new wing commander.
- Administration and Supply: The Left Wing and Right Wing supply wagons are independent at all times, and may supply any Rebel unit. The Wing HQ's are deployed once the specific wing is created. The HQ's are placed in the hex of the new wing commander, and a replacement leader is assigned to that division. Once the Wing commander is designated, he is a Corps commander and no longer commands his old division. The Repl leader is the new division commander.
3.3 Attachments and Detachments
Handle divisional attachment and detachment according to the wing rules above. Brigades can be detached at will, and may be given Divisional Goals. No division can ever have a brigade of another division attached to it.
3.4 Separate Units
3.4a The ANV Artillery. The Confederate player has three separate ANVa artillery units, Each traces command radius to any friendly division commander and acts upon any orders that division has. Actual orders are not needed to switch divisions—tracing radii to another division commander during the command phase realigns the artillery's command structure.
3.4b Stuart's Cavalry. The Confederates have two cavalry brigades, Cav and STb-Cav. Technically, this was really one large Brigade under Stuart. However, as regiments were continually detached for other service, it is shown as two brigades to allow more flexibility. These two units may trace command radii exactly like the above artillery. Additionally, they can be given Divisional Goals for detached missions.
3.5 Stonewall Jackson's Mysterious Ailment
Jackson performed unexpectedly poorly during the fighting around Richmond, quite differently from his recent exhibition in the Valley. This rule is in effect for any scenario, campaign or otherwise, longer than one day's duration. During the Confederate Command Phase of the first daylight turn after any night turn, roll one die. On a 5 or 6, flip Jackson to his four rated side. If he is currently on his four rated side, anything but a 6 will return him to his Zero rated side. He remains at this rating all day, until the next roll is made. Jackson always enters the map or starts all scenarios on his zero rated side.
Some have found this too predictable. Alternatively, roll for Jackson each time he accepts a new order, using the above conditions. If he flips, he remains at that rating until the next order is accepted. Initiative rolls will automatically flip him if a "loose cannon" result occurs.
3.6 Huger vs. Holmes
Two of Huger's units: Wa-Hu, and Wb-Hu; really belong to Holmes' Department of North Carolina they will revert to Holmes' command the instant Holmes arrives on the map, and must move so as to rejoin him. Thereafter, they function as sub-units of the Dept. of North Carolina.
Huger's Division has two wrecked lines on the loss chart: one for the four brigades of Mahone, Wright, Armistead and Ransom (M-Hu, W-Hu, A-Hu and R-Hu) and one for the two units listed above. As long as all six units are under Huger's command, treat the result as cumulative—for instance, Hu Division is not wrecked until any four of the component brigades are wrecked. Once the two 'loaned' brigades revert to Holmes' control, however, only use the top line for Huger's command.
Holmes' loss chart works differently. The Dept NC is a single division, even if the two 'loaned' brigades are not yet within command radius of Holmes. For example, if Holmes arrived on the map and both Wa-Hu (NC) and Wb-Hu (NC) were already wrecked, Holmes would start with two wrecked brigades.
This rule has been changed from Savage Station, because Ransom's brigade, while technically also from Holmes' command, never actually reverted to his command, staying instead with Huger the whole time. Further, the handling of Homes' rather ad-hoc force has been simplified.
3.7 Confederate Minor Variants
3.7a Holmes crosses the James. In any scenario, Holmes and his command can set up within 10 hexes of the ANVa HQ, though not closer than 5 hexes to any Federal unit. For each infantry or artillery unit deployed, the Union gets 1/2 VP, rounded up. Note that in some of the scenarios, two brigades and two artillery units from this command enter play as reinforcements. Those units do not cost VPs, if brought on at their normal time. Units brought on early, or who would not normally enter the game, do cost VPs.
These troops were busy guarding the line south of the James River. Given that no major threat materialized on the south side, these troops could have been massed against McClellan sooner, and in more strength.
3.7b Jackson gets a rest. Allow Jackson to start all scenarios as a four rated leader, and he never has to roll to flip to his zero rated side. This gives the Union 6 VP.
Most historians attribute Jackson's unusually poor showing during the Seven Days to a lack of rest: he was exhausted from the Valley Campaign, and from the almost total lack of sleep he'd gotten on his return to join Lee. Whatever the real reason, here we assume that Jackson is up to his duties.
3.7c Huger keeps his nerve. Normally, Huger is a zero-rated leader. When using this option, deploy Huger as a two rated leader for all scenarios. This gives the Federal 3 VP.
Huger caught most of the blame for Seven Pines, much of it unfair. With many of the details of that battle still unclear at the time of the Seven Days, Huger knew only that his reputation and career were on shaky ground, facts which made him exceedingly cautious about risking any attack that might bring disaster. Had he not been so badly maligned concerning Seven Pines, it is possible that he'd have been more aggressive.
3.7d Richmond Militia. If a Union unit comes within 10 hexes of a Richmond city hex, immediately place the Va Mil unit in either any numbered fort hex, or any Richmond city hex. This unit is independent, but can never move more than 10 hexes from a Richmond city hex. This gives the Union no VPs.
This command represents the force raised from among the vast number of clerks, government workers, and military types already within the city. It was still a small organization in 1862, though by 1863 it would develop into a sizable garrison. Its inclusion prevents the Federals from reaping vast VP awards without a serious attack on Richmond, through raids or 'suicide commandos'.
4.0 General Special Rules
4.1 Building, Destroying, and Rebuilding Bridges
A significant feature of the fighting around Richmond was the importance of two rivers, The Chickahominy and the White Oak Swamp. The bridges crossing these streams became focal points of activity. Bridges can be destroyed and repaired, and in some instances new bridges can be built. Mark destroyed bridges with any counter, or with the destroyed bridge markers issued on our 1997 Christmas Countersheet.
4.1a Existing Bridges. Any unit can destroy an intact bridge or repair a destroyed bridge. For either procedure, the attempting unit must be adjacent to the bridge at the start of the friendly Movement Phase. If successful, place a destroyed marker on a destroyed bridge, or remove the marker from a repaired bridge
- To destroy: Roll one die. A 5 or more destroys it, 4 or less has no effect.
- To repair: Roll two dice. A 12 or more repairs it, 11 or less has no effect.
*The US Engineer unit adds 3 to these rolls.
4.1b Building a new Bridge. A bridge can only be built at a ford. Only the US Engineer unit may build a bridge. The Engineer unit must begin its Movement Phase adjacent to the ford.
- Roll one die. 1-4 no effect, 5-6 builds the bridge.
*Note: the US Engineer unit does not modify this roll.
4.2 Fatigue (optional)
The complete Seven Days covers a full week of action. Even some of the shorter campaign scenarios will cover 2-4 days. Troops require a certain amount of rest to function effectively over such periods, and so some provision for fatigue is needed. The following rules intend to reproduce the effects of fatigue in a relatively simple form. Due to the added bookkeeping required, they are strictly optional. In general, not using these rules will effectively compress the action.
Fatigue is kept track by division. Each division can be in one of three fatigue states: Good, Tired, or Exhausted. Every unit within a given division always has the divisional status (no provisions for units that did less or more than others). For instance, if D.H. Hill's division is exhausted, all five brigades of his division are exhausted.
4.2a Recording Fatigue. Each division (or separate brigade) has a line of boxes on the fatigue record chart. Each turn that any unit of a given division moves, fires, or is fired upon, check off one box. Only check off one box per turn, even if all three apply to one or more units of a division in a single turn. The box is marked off even if only one unit of the division engages in activity causing fatigue. Artillery units never count for this purpose.
Fatigue effects are applied similar to changing fire levels on the Loss Charts. The instant a division enters a new fatigue state, all restrictions of that state apply.
4.2b Effects of Fatigue.
A) Good condition has no effect on a unit. The unit is normal.
B) Tired incurs the following restrictions:
- -2 to all morale checks.
- All straggler checks are always made on the 1&1/2 or more straggler table.
- The unit adds 2 to any forced march straggler die roll.
C) Exhaustion incurs the following restrictions:
- -4 to all morale checks.
- All straggler checks are made on the 1&1/2 or more straggler table, and +1 is added to all such checks.
- The unit cannot force march.
D) All Fatigue boxes filled in...
- It cannot move during the Movement Phase
- It cannot fire during the Offensive Fire Phase
- It can fire during the Defensive Fire Phase
4.2c Recovering from Fatigue. A division "rests" to recover from fatigue. To rest, all non-artillery units of a division cannot move, fire or be fired upon. A resting division cannot have attack or movement orders, nor be part of Wing that has attack or movement orders. It can have defensive orders, or no orders at all. At the end of the turn, a division that successfully rested erases one mark from its line on the Fatigue Record Chart. Units can recover stragglers while resting.
4.2d Night and Fatigue. On full night turns, a unit either incurring or recovering from fatigue does so at twice the normal rate. For example, a unit that moves at night marks off two spaces on its fatigue record instead of one.
4.2e Swamp and Fatigue. Any unit that enters, leaves, or moves through a swamp hex (excluding units in column or mounted and using road movement) accumulate fatigue at twice the normal rate. The effects of night and swamp are cumulative, so that a unit moving into a swamp hex at night would have its fatigue effect quadrupled.
5.0 The Campaign
Due to the nature of the project, there is some natural duplication of units from game to game. What follows is a description of the counters needed to play the campaign of The Seven Days, and which game to take them from.
Union: Combining the countermixes from Gaines Mill and Seven Pines/Savage Station provide all the units needed to play any of the scenarios of the Seven Days, including optional forces, without duplication. (Of course, do not use those units included in Seven Pines/Savage Station strictly for use in Seven Pines, identified by a white stripe across the top of the counter.) The units included in Malvern Hill are duplicates of earlier counters, and included to play Malvern Hill as a stand-alone game.
Confederate: Some counters in Malvern Hill are required to complete the Confederate Order of Battle. Use all the counters for the Confederates in Gaines' Mill and Seven Pines/Savage Station (except the counters unique to Seven Pines, as above, with the white stripe) countermixes with the following exceptions:
Holmes and the Dept. of NC—use the counters in Malvern Hill. The earlier counters were mistakenly all labeled optional. In fact, only a portion of the NC troops are actually optional, and these counters fix that problem.
Huger and Hu Division—use the counters from Malvern Hill. Huger's command includes some 'loaned' units, three brigades from the Dept of NC that in Seven Pines/Savage Station reverted to the Dept of NC control once Holmes came on the map. Actually, one of those units should stay with Huger (R-Hu) and the Malvern Hill countermix corrects the counter ID to reflect that change.
Note that in all other respects, such as strength, morale, etc, the above counters are unchanged from previous versions.
However, there is one counter misprint that needs to be corrected: the F-AH brigade of A P Hill's Division. Gaines' Mill had this brigade with a strength of AAB. This is incorrect, and the unit should have a strength of AB. Malvern Hill corrects the counter, and the loss charts in Malvern Hill reflect the correct morale, strength, and wreck level for this unit.
6.0 Victory
The smaller scenarios have their own victory conditions, reflecting the local tactical situation more than the strategic objectives. The campaign scenarios all use these victory conditions to evaluate those strategic objectives.
The Seven Days was a complicated campaign. Both sides claimed victory—Lee for driving the Union army away from Richmond, and McClellan for 'saving' his army in the face of an overwhelming foe. Likely Lee had the better claim, for McClellan was fleeing a mostly imaginary enemy. Still, the change of base was a substantial accomplishment under the circumstances, and McClellan's shifting to the James caught Lee off-guard for a critical day. Ultimately, these victory conditions try to recreate the diverse nature of the historical claims, and also to recapture some of Lee's dilemma.
6.1 Victory Points for Terrain
Each side is awarded VPs for capture of geographic points on each map. There are three categories for VP awards: points awarded the Union for capture of terrain, and two sets of awards for the Confederates, for use depending on whether or not the Union elects to implement the change of base. Note that all six maps have terrain VPs listed. Not all maps are in play in every scenario, and each scenario will specify which maps are eligible for VP awards.
| Hex | USA Award | CSA Award (regular) | CSA Award (Change of Base option) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Map A | |||
| A12.20 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| A30.23 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| A36.30 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| A26.04 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| A53.09 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| A43.14 |
6.2 Victory Points for Casualties
Both sides receive VPs for inflicting losses on their opponent. Given that both armies were of the same relative size in the overall campaign, both use the same loss chart for awarding VPs. Award each side the following points once if the other sides losses equal or exceed the listed amount. These awards are not cumulative: the awards is only given at the end of the scenario for the total losses to the other side.
| Losses | VP Award |
|---|---|
| 37 | 3 |
| 75 | 5 |
| 112 | 8 |
| 150 | 11 |
| 187 | 15 |
| 225 | 19 |
| 262 | 24 |
| 300 | 29 |
| 338 | 34 |
| 375 | 39 |
| 400 | 50 |
6.3 Victory Points for Wrecked Formations
These points are awarded for wrecking higher echelon formations, or in the case of the Union Train, for each counter eliminated or not properly exited off the map by the end of play July 1st. Awards are made at the game's end, and for divisions wrecked by permanent losses only. Do not count stragglers.
| Confederate | VP Award |
|---|---|
| AH Div | 5 |
| Dept NC | 2 (3 with optionals) |
| DH Div | 4 |
| Hu Div | 4 |
| Jo Div | 2 |
| L Div | 5 |
| Mc Div | 2 |
| Mg Div | 2 |
| E-V Div | 3 |
| J-V Div | 3 |
| W-V Div | 2 |
| Union | VP Award |
|---|---|
| 1-1 (opt) | 3 |
| 2-1 (opt) | 3 |
| 3-1 (opt) | 3 |
| 1-2 | 3 |
| 2-2 | 3 |
| 2-3 | 3 |
| 3-3 | 3 |
| 1-4 | 2 |
| 2-4 | 2 |
| 1-5 | 4 |
| 2-5 | 5 |
| PaR-5 | 3 |
| 1-6 |
6.4 Exiting Units and the Change of Base
No Union units were left on any of the nine maps by the morning of July 2nd—they had all escaped to Harrison's landing. While it would be unrealistic to let the Federals make a dash for the south map edge and win, there must be some reflection of actions off-map to successfully recreate the focal point of the last half of the campaign.
- Units may exit the map only along the south edges of Map H, west of H53.22 or Map I.
- Once gone, no unit may ever return.
- No more than one Union Division may exit the map before 4:00 a.m. June 30th. This division must be given a divisional goal to exit. Train units and the TGD ignore this restriction; they can exit any time.
- Confederate units may exit the map at any time. Once the first Confederate unit exits the map, however, this immediately lifts restriction #3, above.
- 1 VP is awarded for each unwrecked infantry brigade exited in excess of the enemy, to a maximum of 5 VP, no matter how large the actual difference. The TGD and Engineers do count as infantry for this purpose.
- If the Union exits more units than the Confederates, then any train counter exited is worth 1 VP as well. This award does not count towards the 5 VP maximum listed in #5, above, but is in addition to it.
6.5 Determining the Victor
Each scenario will either list its own conditions for measuring each side's success, or in the case of 6.6 and 6.7, list a scale of victory points ranging from positive (pro-Confederate) to negative (pro-Union) which determines the winner and scope of his success.
At the end of play, add up the VPs awarded to each side for the various categories, and then subtract the Union total from the Confederate total. The resulting number, positive or negative, will determine victory.
7.0 Scenarios
Set-Up Notes
7.0a Confederate Wings, if in existence for a given scenario, will be specified in the Confederate orders section. If a wing is not mentioned, it is not yet in being, but may be created after the start of play.
7.0b No units start any scenario with fatigue (if using that option.)
7.0c Units start each scenario with the losses specified in the loss chart for that day. All losses are cumulative. No units start any scenario with stragglers.
7.0d Jackson always starts all scenarios on his "Zero" rated side.
7.1 Scenario 1: June 30th
June 30th found the Union army south of White Oak Swamp, beyond the immediate reach of Lee's army. Accordingly, Lee devised another effort to catch the Army of the Potomac on the march, taking it in flank. This time, Jackson would follow the last Union forces across White Oak, while Longstreet, Magruder, and Huger swung south and west. The roads heading southeast from Richmond spread out in a fan pattern, providing perfect approaches for Lee's intended plan. Huger was to move down the Charles City Road,, Longstreet down the Darbytown Road, and Magruder to come in behind Longstreet for support. Holmes, meanwhile, was to move via the New Market and River Roads to threaten the Malvern Hill area, where it appeared McClellan was heading.
General Information
- First Turn: 4:00 a.m. June 30th.
- Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. June 30th
- Game Length: 33 Turns
- Map Area in Play: Maps H and I
- First Player: Confederate
- Bridges Destroyed: White Oak Bridge
Confederate Information
Set Up: No Confederate units set up on the maps.
Artillery Ammunition: 60
Reinforcements:
| Time | Entry Hex | Units |
|---|---|---|
| 8:00 a.m. | H21.01 | Holmes, W-NC, Da-NC, Wa-Hu(NC), Wb-Hu(NC), 2xNCb |
| 9:00 a.m | I1.02 | Huger, M-Hu, R-Hu, A-Hu, Hu b, ANVa b |
| 9:30 a.m. | I1.17 | W-Hu, Hu b |
| 9:30 a.m. | H1.06 | L Div, AH Div, LW HQ and Supply, ANVa HQ and Supply, Lee, Stb-Cav |
| 11:00 a.m. | I1.29 | Valley HQ and Supply, E Div, J Div, W Div, DH Div, ANVa B, Cav |
| 1:30 p.m. | H1.06 | Mc Div, Mg Div, Jo Div, RW HQ and Supply, ANVa b |
Orders:
Holmes and the Dept of NC are ordered to move to the crossroads at H31.19 and defend.
Huger and Hu Div are ordered to move to the vicinity of I7.10 and defend.
W-Hu and the Hu b have a Brigade Goal to move to Brackett's Ford and defend the crossing.
The Left Wing is in force, commanded by Longstreet, and consists of L Div and AH Div. The Left Wing (LW) has orders to move along the Darbytown Road to the Long Bridge Road, then go east to hex I25.07, deploy into line, and attack the Union Forces around Glendale and Nelson's Farm.
The Valley Army is ordered to enter, deploy along the north side of White Oak Swamp River, and await further orders. DH Div is attached to the Valley Army. Once in play, any unit of the Valley Army that successfully rolls for initiative may exit the map at I1.29 and re-appear 2 turns later at I1.17, cross at Brackett's ford, and move to attack the Union forces defending White Oak Bridge.
Historical note: there were a number of efforts by junior commanders to find ways around the impasse at the bridge, but Jackson ignored them all. While not precisely historically accurate in terms of crossing sites, this rule provides an easy method of allowing the Valley Army to retain something of a credible threat to the Union flank.
The Right Wing is in force, commanded by Magruder, and consists of Mc Div, Mg Div, and Jo Div. The Right Wing (RW) is ordered to move to the Timberlake Store, halt, and await further orders.
Cav is attached to the Valley Army
Stb-Cav is attached to the Left Wing
Union Information
Set Up:
- 2 Corps HQ and Supply: I19.18
- 1-2, 2b: w/i 2 I7.28
- 2-2, 2b, 2b(4): w/i 1 I18.22
- 3 Corps HQ and Supply, Cav-3: I25.17
- 2-3, 3b: w/i 1 I27.14
- 3-3, 2x3b: w/i 2 I18.16
- 5 Corps HQ and Supply, Cav-5, A Pot Supply: w/i 1 I52.10
- 1-5, 5b: w/i 3 I43.10
- 2-5, 5b(3): w/i 4 I49.09
- PaR-5, 5b, Resb - in line between 19.xx and 25.xx, east of xx.14 hexrow.
- 6 Corps HQ and Supply, Cav-6: I12.29
- 1-6, 6b: w/i 2 I13.15
- 1-2-4: w/i 3 I12.29
- 2-6, 6b, 6b(1): w/i 2 I8.30
- 5xResb, Resb(4): with or adjacent to any unit of 1-5 or 2-5.
*note, 1x5b is eliminated due to prior losses.
Artillery Ammunition: 90
Reinforcements: none
Orders:
2 Corps has no orders.
3 Corps has orders to defend the line of the Quaker Road.
6 Corps has orders to defend the White Oak Swamp Bridge crossing.
1-2 Division has a Divisional Goal to support 6th Corps if attacked.
5 Corps has ordered to defend the area of Malvern Hill, and keep the Quaker Road open.
PaR-5 is attached to 3 Corps.
1-6 has a Divisional Goal to defend the 3 Corps flank along the Charles City Road.
1-2-4 is attached to 6 Corps, and traces command to 6 Corps HQ. Treat this unit as if it were a corps attached cavalry brigade for command and wrecked purposes.
Victory
The Confederates win a major victory if he captures any hex of the Willis Church road south of the 20.xx hexrow.
The Confederates win a minor victory if he inflicts more losses than he suffers.
The Union wins a minor victory if he inflicts 1.5 times as many losses as he suffers.
The Union wins a major victory if he fulfills the above, plus both L Div and AH Div are wrecked, not counting stragglers, at the end of the scenario.
Any other result is a draw.
7.2 Scenario 2: Glendale
The historical battle of Glendale (also known variously as Frayser's, Frasier's, or Nelson's Farm) was another testament to things gone wrong. Lee originally planned to throw Huger, Longstreet and AP Hill—almost 30,000 men against McClellan's flank along the Quaker Road while Jackson pinned the Federal 6th Corps along the White Oak Swamp. In fact, Jackson's four divisions and Huger's did little more all day than lob a few cannon shells at the Federals, leaving Hill and Longstreet to carry the fight alone.
The result was bloody but indecisive. Longstreet's combined force made headway, but Federal reinforcements amounting to half of the force opposing Jackson stabilized the tactical situation by nightfall, and The Union army slipped away again. This was perhaps Jackson's worst day in command.
General Information
- First Turn: 3:00 p.m. June 30th.
- Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. June 30th
- Game Length: 11 Turns
- Map Area in Play: Map I, north of hexrow 32.xx
- First Player: Confederate
- Bridges Destroyed: White Oak Bridge
Confederate Information
Set Up:
- ANVa HQ and Supply: I 26.06
- LW HQ and Supply: I24.07
- L Div, AH Div, Stb-Cav: w/i 4 I24.07
- Hu Div (less W-Hu-Div, Hu b(3)): w/i 2 I7.10
- W-Hu, Hu b(3): I 2.17
- Valley HQ and Supply: I2.28
- W Div, E. Div, J Div, DH Div, Cav: w/i 3 I2.28, north of White Oak Swamp River.
Artillery Ammunition: 35
Reinforcements: None
Orders:
The Left Wing is comprised of L Div and AH Div, under Longstreet's command. It has orders to attack west to capture the Quaker Road.
Hu Div has orders to defend in place.
W-Hu and the attached artillery have a Brigade Goal to defend the Brackett's Ford crossing.
The Valley Army, with DH Div attached, has orders to defend the White Oak Swamp Crossing. Any unit of the Valley Army that successfully rolls for initiative may exit the map at I1.29 and re-appear 2 turns later at I1.17, cross at Brackett's ford, and move to attack the Union forces defending White Oak Bridge.
Historical note: There were a number of efforts by junior commanders to find ways around the impasse at the bridge, but Jackson ignored them all. While not precisely historically accurate in terms of crossing sites, this rule provides an easy method of allowing the Valley Army to retain something of a credible threat to the Union flank.
Cav is attached to The Valley Army.
STb-Cav has no orders at start.
Union Information
Set Up:
- 2 Corps HQ and Supply: I19.18
- 1-2, 2b: w/i 2 I7.28
- 2-2, 2b, 2b(4): w/i 1 I18.22
- 3 Corps HQ and Supply, Cav-3: I25.17
- 2-3, 3b: w/i 1 I27.14
- 3-3, 2x3b: w/i 2 I18.16
- PaR-5, 5b, Resb - in line between 19.xx and 25.xx, east of xx.14 hexrow.
- 6 Corps HQ and Supply, Cav-6: I12.29
- 1-6, 6b: w/i 2 I13.15
- 1-2-4: w/i 3 I12.29
- 2-6, 6b, 6b(1): w/i 2 I8.30
Artillery Ammunition: 40
Reinforcements: None
Orders:
2 Corps has no orders.
3 Corps has orders to defend the line of the Quaker Road.
6 Corps has orders to defend the White Oak Swamp Bridge crossing.
1-2 Division has a Divisional Goal to support 6th Corps if attacked.
PaR-5 is attached to 3 Corps.
1-6 has a Divisional Goal to defend the 3 Corps flank along the Charles City Road.
1-2-4 is attached to 6 Corps, and traces command to 6 Corps HQ. Treat this unit as if it were a corps attached cavalry brigade for command and wrecked purposes.
Victory
Frankly, this is not an easy scenario for the Confederate to win. In the end, they won a minor victory, but only poor Union tactical handling and the unexpectedly rapid collapse of McCall's Division gave them that result.
The Confederates win a major victory if he captures any hex of the Willis Church road south of the 20.xx hexrow.
The Confederates win a minor victory if he inflicts more losses than he suffers.
The Union wins a minor victory if he inflicts 1.5 times as many losses as he suffers.
The Union wins a major victory if he fulfills the above, plus both L Div and AH Div are wrecked, not counting stragglers, at the end of the scenario.
Any other result is a draw.
7.3 Scenario 3: Malvern Hill
This scenario recreates the frontal attacks that represented Lee's last effort to defeat the Army of the Potomac before Richmond. Poorly conceived and even more poorly executed, Lee's intentions here were to strike the Federals before they got away completely. His intention was to subdue the Federal line with a powerful artillery bombardment before launching the infantry attacks, but the Federal Reserve artillery was so powerful and effective that the Rebels never really got any effective fire in at all. What was left was a pure infantry attack into the teeth of well sited Federal infantry and artillery. DH Hill put it best when he called it murder, not war.
General Information
- First Turn: 3:00 p.m. July 1st
- Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. July 1st
- Game Length: 11 turns
- Map Area in Play: Map I
- First Player: Confederate
- Bridges Destroyed: None
Confederate Information
Set Up:
- ANVa HQ and Supply: I27.06
- Stb-Cav: w/i 2 I27.06
- Holmes, Da-NC, W-NC, Wa-Hu(NC), Wb-Hu(NC), ANVa b, 2xDept NCb: w/i 1 I46.02
- Hu Div (less Wa-Hu and Wb-Hu): w/i 1 I 36.07
- Right Wing HQ and Supply: I34.07
- Mg Div, Mc Div, Jo Div, ANVa b: w/i 3 I34.07
- Left Wing HQ and Supply: I27.07
- L Div: w/i 2 I27.07
- AH Div: w/i 2 I30.07
- Valley HQ and Supply, Cav: I33.14
- DH Div, ANVa b: w/i 1 I36.11
- W Div: w/i 1 I37.14
- E Div: w/i 1 I34.14
- J Div: w/i 1 I33.13
Artillery Ammunition: 50
Reinforcements: none
Orders:
Dept NC is ordered to defend in place.
Hu Div is ordered to attack south between Crewes Channel (Turkey Run) and Western Run to capture Malvern Hill.
The Right Wing is in play, and commanded by Magruder. The Right Wing consists of Mc Div, Mg Div, and Jo Div. The Right Wing is ordered to attack south between Crewes Channel and Western Run to capture Malvern Hill.
The Left Wing is in play, and commanded by Longstreet. The Left Wing consists of L Div and AH Div. The Left Wing has no orders.
The Valley Army has orders to support the Right Wing's attack. DH Div is attached to the Valley Army.
Stb-Cav has no orders
Cav is attached to the Valley Army.
Historical note: Replicating the actual piecemeal process by which most of these troops went into action would rob the Confederates of virtually all control over every unit. In fact, the brigades went into action mostly one or two at a time. Magruder, for example, asked for support from Ransom, of Huger's division, three times before it was grudgingly given at 7:00 p.m. Incredibly, the first two times Magruder asked for Ransom's help, he was turned down because the request was not properly funneled through Huger, even though Huger was with Ransom at the time the requests were made. It was a bad day for Confederate commanders. The orders above doom the Rebels to bloody frontal attacks, but at least he can employ some measure of coordination here.
Union Information
Set Up:
- A Pot HQ, McClellan: w/i 2 I50.17
- 2 Corps HQ and Supply: I47.13
- 1-2: w/i 1 I45.11
- 2-2, 2x2b, 2b(4): w/i 1 I47.13
- 3 Corps HQ and Supply: I44.13
- All units of 3 Corps: w/i 2 I44.13 (note: 1 gun point is missing from 3 Corps)
- 1-4 Division: w/i 1 I42.11
- 5 Corps HQ and Supply: I46.10
- A Pot Supply: I46.11
- 1-5: w/i 1 I42.08
- 2-5: w/i 5 I47.10
- PaR-5: w/i 1 I51.11
- 5b, 5b(3), 6xResb, Resb(4): stacked with or adjacent to any unit of 1-4, 1-5 or 2-5 Divisions. (note: 2x5b eliminated)
- 6 Corps: all units w/i 2 I50.17 (note: 1 gun point missing from 6 corps).
Artillery Ammunition: 120
Reinforcements: none
Orders:
5 Corps has orders to defend Malvern Hill from attack from the north or west.
1-4 is attached to 5 Corps.
3 Corps is ordered to support 5 Corps
2 Corps is ordered to support 5 Corps or 6 Corps as needed
6 Corps is ordered to defend the line of Western Run from attack to the east.
Victory
Of this battle, D.H. Hill said it wasn't war, it was murder. On that note, be forewarned that this scenario is pretty much a forlorn hope for the Rebels.
The Confederates win a minor victory if he captures hexes I52.10 and I52.11
The Union wins a minor victory if he prevents the above.
The Union wins a major victory if he prevents the above, and Rebel losses are twice as many as Union losses.
7.4 Scenario 4: July 1st.
By dawn on the 1st, the Union Army took up its last position before Richmond—Malvern Hill. Those of you with all nine maps at this point might want to lay them all out a minute just to reflect on the amount of ground McClellan had covered, to end up huddled beside the James on this last little corner of the map. Unquestionably, the Union army was running.
However, it far from defeated. Malvern Hill was a compact position, well supported with artillery, and secure on both flanks. Moreover, virtually the entire army was united again, with only one division of 4th Corps off-map at Harrison's Landing. Any Rebel attack on the Federals here would face significant obstacles.
I have given the Federals McClellan again, even though historically he left the field by 9:45 that morning to visit Harrison's Landing. I have found that stripping the Union of any commander at all allows his opponent to artificially manipulate that situation. I doubt McClellan's presence or absence will make that significant an impact, however, given the situation as it is—the armies are done maneuvering, with no maps left to run to.
General Information
- First Turn: 4:00 a.m. July 1st.
- Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. July 1st
- Game Length: 33 Turns
- Map Area in Play: Map I
- First Player: Confederate
- Bridges Destroyed: None
Confederate Information
Set Up:
- ANVa HQ and Supply, Stb-Cav: I27.06
- Valley HQ and Supply: I1.29
- DH Div, E Div, J Div, W Div, ANVa b, Cav: w/i 3 I1.29, north of White Oak Swamp River.
- Right Wing HQ and Supply: I22.10
- Mc Div, Mg Div, Jo Div, ANVa b: w/i 3 I22.10
- Left Wing HQ and Supply: I26.07
- L Div, AH Div: w/i 4 I26.07
- Huger, M-Hu, A-Hu, R-Hu, W-Hu, Hu b, Hu b(3): w/i 2 I7.10
Artillery Ammunition: 60
Reinforcements:
| Turn | Entry Hex | Units |
|---|---|---|
| 9:00 a.m. | I45.01 | Holmes, Wa-Hu(NC) Wb-Hu(NC), W-NC, Da-NC, 2xDept NCb, ANVa b. |
Orders:
The Valley Army is ordered to cross the White Oak Swamp, move south through Glendale to the Willis Church Road, move south to Western Run, halt and deploy. They do not have orders to attack. DH Div is attached to the Valley Army.
Cav is attached to the Valley Army
The Right Wing is in force, commanded by Magruder. It has orders to move west on the Long Bridge Road to exit the map at hex I29.01. 3 turns after the last unit of the Right Wing has exited, they may start rolling for return. On a roll of 4-6 on one die, the Right Wing enters at hex I29.01, moves via the secondary road to the Garthright house and deploys on the right of the Valley Army. The Right Wing consists of Mc Div, Mg Div, and Jo Div. One ANVa b is attached as well.
The Left Wing is in force, commanded by Longstreet. It has no orders. The Left Wing consists of L Div and AH Div.
Huger's Division has orders to move via Glendale, after the Valley army has passed, and down the Willis Church Road to cross Western Run towards the Garthright house and deploy on the Valley Army's right.
Holmes, when he enters, has orders to move to hex I46.02, halt and defend.
Stb-Cav has no orders.
Historical Note: Magruder's trip down the wrong road was too obvious to leave off, even though the Confederates will likely gnash their teeth repeatedly at the confusion unfolding before their eyes with nothing he can do to stop it. Unfortunately, the road almost all the officers in the Army of Northern Virginia knew as the Quaker Road—a.k.a. the Willis Church Road—was not the road the locals knew as the Quaker Road. Hence, when Lee ordered Magruder to follow Jackson down the Quaker Road and deploy on his right, Magruder's guides directed him towards the Quaker Road they knew—a couple of miles west of the Willis Church Road. This is a fine example of how badly the Confederates lacked for good maps, even a few short miles from their own capitol.
Union Information
Set Up:
- A Pot HQ and Supply: I52.10
- 2 Corps HQ and Supply: I47.13
- 1-2: w/i 1 I45.11
- 2-2, 2x2b, 2b(4): w/i 1 I47.13
- 3 Corps HQ and Supply: I44.13
- All units of 3 Corps: w/i 2 I44.13 (note: 1 gun point is missing from 3 Corps)
- 1-4 Division: w/i 1 I42.11
- 5 Corps HQ and Supply: I46.10
- 1-5: w/i 1 I42.08
- 2-5: w/i 5 I47.10
- PaR-5: w/i 1 I51.11
- 5b, 5b(3), 6xResb, Resb(4): stacked with or adjacent to any unit of 1-4, 1-5 or 2-5 Divisions. (note: 2x5b eliminated)
- 6 Corps: all units w/i 2 I50.17 (note: 1 gun point missing from 6 corps).
Artillery Ammunition: 120
Reinforcements: none
Orders:
5 Corps has orders to defend Malvern Hill from attack from the north or west.
1-4 is attached to 5 Corps.
3 Corps is ordered to support 5 Corps
2 Corps is ordered to support 5 Corps or 6 Corps as needed
6 Corps is ordered to defend the line of Western Run from attack to the east.
Victory
The Confederates win a major victory if he fulfills all the following conditions:
- A) control hexes I52.10, I52.11, and I53.16 at the end of play
- B) have losses equal to or less than the Union
- C) the number of Rebel wrecked brigades is equal to or less than the number of Union wrecked brigades.
The Confederates win a minor victory if at least two hexes of A) and either B) or C) is fulfilled.
The Union wins a minor victory if only one condition is met
The Union wins a major victory if none of the conditions are met.
Any other result is a draw.
7.5 Scenario 5: Glendale to Malvern.
This scenario covers the last two days of the campaign, and represents Lee's final chance to intercept the Federal army in the midst of retreat. McClellan was finishing the move to Harrison's Landing, and the Federal troops were heading to Malvern Hill, where they could cover the last stages of the Union retreat.
This scenario does contain one anomaly; McClellan is present throughout. Historically, he was absent for both Glendale and Malvern Hill, which is why the scenarios covering those specific actions leave the Union bereft of an army commander. To fully represent McClellan's actions in this two day scenario, however, would require a large number of rules for entering and leaving the maps, and have the net effect of making the game completely miserable for the Federals. For a quick method of recreating McClellan's prolonged absences (for those purists among you) limit McClellan to spending no more than 50 command points for the entire scenario.
General Information
- First Turn: 4:00 a.m. June 30th.
- Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. July 1st.
- Game Length: 71 Turns
- Map Area in Play: Maps G, H and I
- First Player: Confederate
- Bridges Destroyed: White Oak Bridge
Confederate Information
Set Up: No Confederate units set up on the maps.
Artillery Ammunition: 120
Reinforcements:
| Turn | Entry Hex | Units |
|---|---|---|
| 8:00 a.m. | H21.01 | Holmes, W-NC, Da-NC, Wa-Hu(NC), Wb-Hu(NC), 2xNCb |
| 9:00 a.m | I1.02 | Huger, M-Hu, R-Hu, A-Hu, Hu b, ANVa b |
| 9:30 a.m. | I1.17 | W-Hu, Hu b |
| 9:30 a.m. | H1.06 | L Div, AH Div, LW HQ and Supply, ANVa HQ and Supply, Lee, Stb-Cav |
| 11:00 a.m. | I1.29 | Valley HQ and Supply, E Div, J Div, W Div, DH Div, ANVa B, Cav |
| 1:30 p.m. | H1.06 | Mc Div, Mg Div, Jo Div, RW HQ and Supply, ANVa b |
Orders:
Holmes and the Dept of NC are ordered to move to the crossroads at H31.19 and defend.
Huger and Hu Div are ordered to move to the vicinity of I7.10 and defend.
W-Hu and the Hu b have orders to move to Brackett's Ford and defend the crossing.
The Left Wing is in force, commanded by Longstreet, and consists of L Div and AH Div. The Left Wing (LW) has orders to move along the Darbytown Road to the Long Bridge Road, then go east to hex I25.07, deploy into line, and attack the Union Forces around Glendale and Nelson's Farm.
The Valley Army is ordered to enter, deploy along the north side of White Oak Swamp River, and await further orders. DH Div is attached to the Valley Army.
The Right Wing is in force, commanded by Magruder, and consists of Mc Div, Mg Div, and Jo Div. The Right Wing (RW) is ordered to move to the Timberlake Store, halt, and await further orders.
Cav is attached to the Valley Army
Stb-Cav is attached to the Left Wing
Union Information
Set Up:
- A Pot HQ, McClellan: w/i I52.10
- 2 Corps HQ and Supply: I19.18
- 1-2, 2b: w/i 2 I7.28
- 2-2, 2b, 2b(4): w/i 2 I19.18
- 3 Corps HQ and Supply, Cav-3: I25.17
- 2-3, 3b: w/i 2 I27.14
- 3-3, 2x3b: w/i 3 I19.16
- 5 Corps HQ and Supply, Cav-5, A Pot Supply: w/i 1 I52.10
- 1-5, 5b: w/i 3 I43.10
- 2-5, 5b(3): w/i 4 I49.09
- PaR-5, 5b, Resb - in line between 19.xx and 25.xx, east of xx.14 hexrow.
- 6 Corps HQ and Supply, Cav-6: I12.29
- 1-6, 6b: w/i 2 I13.15
- 1-2-4: w/i 3 I12.29
- 2-6, 6b, 6b(1): w/i 2 I8.30
- 5xResb, Resb(4): with or adjacent to any unit of 1-5 or 2-5.
*note, 1x5b is eliminated due to prior losses.
Artillery Ammunition: 160
Reinforcements: none
Orders:
2 Corps has orders to support 3 Corps if attacked, and defend the line of the Quaker Road.
3 Corps has orders to defend the line of the Quaker Road.
6 Corps has orders to defend the White Oak Swamp Bridge crossing.
1-2 Division has a Divisional Goal to support 6th Corps if attacked.
5 Corps has ordered to defend the area of Malvern Hill, and keep the Quaker Road open.
PaR-5 is attached to 3 Corps.
1-6 has a Divisional Goal to defend the 3 Corps flank along the Charles City Road.
1-2-4 is attached to 6 Corps, and traces command to 6 Corps HQ. Treat this unit as if it were a corps attached cavalry brigade for command and wrecked purposes.
Victory
Use the Victory point awards listed in rules sections 6.1 (maps H and I only, use Confederate change of base option, and all Vp awards for the Confederates count half) 6.2 and 6.3. Do not use any other VPs.
- Rebel Major Victory: 8 or more VPs
- Confederate Minor Victory: 3 to 7 VPs
- Draw: -2 to 2 VPs
- Union Minor Victory -8 to -3 VPs
- Union Major Victory -9 or less VPs
7.6 Campaign Scenario 6.
This is, of course, the way the Seven Days was meant to be played: the full 9 map monstrosity. Players now have a playing area of unprecedented scope and size to work with, a feature that will really stress the limits of the command system. Enjoy.
General Information
- First Turn: 3 p.m. June 26th.
- Last Turn: 8 p.m. July 1st.
- Scenario Length: 205 Turns.
- Maps used: All
- First Player: Confederate
- Bridges Destroyed: The Upper Trestle Bridge (B51.07) New Bridge (B56.12) Lower Trestle Bridge (B59.18), and White Oak Bridge (I4.29) are all destroyed. All other bridges are intact.
Confederate Information
Set Up:
- AH Div (less B-AH), ANVab: w/i 5 A27.04
- DH Div: w/i 5 A46.12
- L Div: w/i 5 A58.06
- ANVab: A42.15
- ANVa HQ, ANVa Supply, Left Wing Supply, ANVa b: w/i 2 A53.10
- Right Wing HQ and Supply, Mc Div, Mg Div, Jo Div, ANVa b: set up along and within two hexes of the Confederate trench line between E27.03 and E3.03
- Hu Div (including Wa-Hu and Wb-Hu), STb-Cav: Along and w/i 2 of the Confederate trench line between E27.03 and E41.02
Artillery Ammunition: 250
Reinforcements:
| Turn | Entry Hex | Units |
|---|---|---|
| 3pm, June 26th | A1.14 | B-AH |
| 3:30pm June 26th | A1.14 | W-V Div, J-V Div, E-V Div, Valley HQ & Supply, Cav |
| 3:00pm June 29th | D62.14 | Dept NC Div |
Orders:
AH Div—On the turn after B-AH enters or passes through A15.15, AP Hill's Division may cross at the Meadow Bridges and move to Mechanicsville.
DH Div—On the turn after AH Division crosses the Chickahominy River, DH Hill's Division may cross and move to Mechanicsville.
L Div—Longstreet's Division's orders are the same as DH Division, above.
B-AH—has a Divisional Goal to move to Mechanicsville and then to rejoin it's Division.
Valley Army—Move to Shady Grove Road, turn east and move to Hundley's Corners. Halt and await further orders.
Right Wing—is in force, and consists of the Mc, Mg, and Jo Divisions. The Right Wing has orders to defend the Trench line it currently occupies.
Hu Div—Hu Division has a Divisional Goal to defend the Trench line it currently occupies.
Cav—Cav has a Divisional Goal attaching it to the Valley Army.
STb-Cav—STb-Cav has a Divisional Goal attaching it to Hu Div.
Dept NC Div—Dept NC Division has orders to move to the Darbytown Road, halt, and defend. The Dept NC division consists of Holmes, W-NC, Da-NC, 2xDept NCb. All other Dept NC units are optional. Remember that when Dept Nc enters, Wa-Hu and Wb-Hu immediately revert to Holmes' command and must start moving to rejoin the Dept NC.
Union Information
Set Up:
- APot HQ and Supply, Eng, 5xReserve b: w/i 1 E8.32
- 2 Corps: w/i 6 E19.16
- 3 Corps: w/i 6 E26.20
- 4 Corps HQ and Supply, 2-4 (less 1-2-4), 2x4b, Cav-4: w/i 5 F50.03
- 1-2-4, 4b(2): w/i 3 F34.29
- 1-4: w/i 1 E27.23
- 5 Corps HQ: B32.10
- 1-5, Reserve b(4), 5b: w/i 3 A27.31
- PaR-5, 2x5b: w/i 4 A36.32
- 2-5, 5b(3), Reserve b: w/5 B50.12
- 5 Corps Supply, Cav, Cav-5: w/i 5 B32.10
- 6 Corps: w/i 6 E8.23
Artillery Ammunition: 300
Reinforcements: none
Orders:
2 Corps, has orders to defend the line of Union trenches within its set up area.
3 Corps has orders to defend the line of Union trenches within its set up area.
1-4 Division has a divisional goal to support the 3 Corps.
4 Corps has orders to defend the Crossings of the White Oak Swamp.
1-2-4 and the 4b(2) have a Divisional Goal to defend Bottoms Bridge.
5 Corps is ordered to defend the line of Beaver Dam Creek.
2-5 has a Divisional Goal to defend the 5th Corps left flank and prevent a crossing of either the New or Upper Trestle Bridges.
6 Corps has orders to defend the line of Union Trenches within its set up area.
Victory
Use the terrain awards for all maps. The Change of base is not yet implemented. There are no previous losses.
- Rebel Massive Victory: 24 or more VPs
- Rebel Major Victory: 15 to 23 VPs
- Rebel Minor Victory: 6 to 14 VPs
- Draw: -5 to 5 VPs
- Union Minor Victory: -15 to -6 VPs
- Union Major Victory: -25 to -16 VPs
- Union Massive Victory: -26 or less VPs
7.7 Campaign Scenario 7.
This scenario, as was done in the previous games, duplicates the tactical situation in 6.6, above, while preserving the uncertainty of Jackson's arrival.
General Information
- First Turn: 10:00 a.m. June 26th.
- Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. July 1st.
- Scenario Length: 215 Turns.
- Maps used: All
- First Player: Confederate
- Bridges Destroyed: The Upper Trestle Bridge (B51.07) New Bridge (B56.12) Lower Trestle Bridge (B59.18) and White Oak Bridge (I4.29) are all destroyed. All other bridges are intact.
All information is the same as Campaign Scenario #6, above, except for the Confederate reinforcements. Note that the Dept NC Division, scheduled to arrive on June 29th, still does so as in Campaign Scenario #7
Confederate Information
Reinforcements (all arrive A1.14)
- Group 1: B-AH
- Group 2: W-V Div, J-V Div, E-V Div, Valley Army HQ & Supply, Cav
Variable Arrival:
Starting with the 10 a.m. June 26th turn, the Confederate rolls for the arrival of Group 1, above. On each hour turn, the Confederate rolls two dice, and on a 10 or more, may begin entering reinforcements.
Once he has successfully rolled a 10, he may start bringing on his reinforcements. On the turn of the successful roll, B-AH arrives at A1.14, governed by its historical orders. On the turn after B-AH arrives, the Valley Army—as listed above—arrives at A1.14, also governed by its historical orders.
The Confederate may voluntarily delay these arrivals in an effort to deceive the Union, even if he has rolled a 10. Once Jackson or any of his troops arrive, they may roll for initiative without restriction, even if being held off map. Obviously, the Confederate may keep his die roll secret from the Federal.
Orders:
AH Div—On the turn after B-AH enters or passes through A15.15, AP Hill's Division may cross at the Meadow Bridges and move to Mechanicsville.
DH Div—On the turn after AH Division crosses the Chickahominy River, DH Hill's Division may cross and move to Mechanicsville.
L Div—Longstreet's Division's orders are the same as DH Division, above.
B-AH—has a Divisional Goal to move to Mechanicsville and then to rejoin Division.
Valley Army—Move to Shady Grove Road, turn east and move to Hundley's Corners. Halt and await further orders.
Cav—Cav has a Divisional Goal attaching it to the Valley Army.
Victory
Same as 7.6.
Historical Notes
With the successful repulse of Magruder’s Confederates at Savage Station, McClellan’s army had escaped one major trap. That night, the Federals completed their movement south of the White Oak Swamp, leaving Lee north of it and out of position. Further, the head of McClellan’s massive column was reaching the James near Harrison’s Landing, the site of the new supply base.
The Army of the Potomac was not entirely free and clear, however. One Federal Corps—the 4th—was near Harrison’s Landing establishing the new supply base and defending it from any Rebel raids, but the bulk of the army’s massive supply train was still in transit. Accordingly, Union troops halted on the 30th to take up defensive positions which would screen the still-lumbering train on as it made its way to the James.
Franklin’s 6th Corps guarded the rear, with one division holding the White Oak Bridge and another blocking the Charles City Road near Brackett’s Ford. Heintzelman’s 3rd Corps guarded the long eastern flank, taking up a line screening the Quaker Road between Western Run and Riddell’s Shop, connecting with the 6th Corps division (Slocum’s) which was on the Charles City Road. Sumner’s 2nd Corps was split between Franklin and Heintzelman, acting as a general reserve, and the Union 3rd Corps line had been further bolstered by McCall’s Pennsylvania Reserve Division, nominally of the 5th Corps. McCall’s inclusion was an odd choice because of the serious losses that command had suffered at Gaines’ Mill, and as it turned out, they would face another powerful challenge that afternoon.
The remainder of Porter’s 5th Corps secured the Malvern Hill area, connecting the 4th’s Corps at Harrison’s landing with the rest of the army. Hence the army was strung out for several miles, creating a safe passage along the Quaker Road for the last of the supply trains to proceed on to Harrison’s Landing. As long as the trains continued to obstruct the road south, the Army of the Potomac was halted in place and vulnerable to at least one more strike from Lee’s pursuing Rebels.
Lee, of course, was bending all his energies towards organizing that effort. Early on the 30th, Stonewall Jackson arrived at the Williamsburg Road headquarters of Magruder, much to the latter commander’s relief. With Jackson firmly on the south side of the Chickahominy, the Confederates had close to 40,000 troops in the Vicinity of Savage Station, instead of the 15,000 Magruder had fought the battle with the day before.
Lee’s plan for the 30th was to find the Union flank and attack McClellan in transit. With McClellan heading south down the Quaker Road, the rest of the road network emanating out of Richmond suited Lee’s intentions perfectly. Three routes— the River, Darbytown, and Charles City Roads—angled southwest to strike the Quaker Road at various points along it’s southward path, and Lee intended to use all three routes as approaches. Longstreet and A.P. Hill’s combined column, already in transit from the 28th, was to proceed onto the Darbytown Road. Huger, whose command was already astride the Charles City Road, was ordered to move down that avenue. Finally, Holmes’ North Carolina command was ordered to cross the James and proceed down the River Road.
Jackson was to take his men and follow the Union army’s path directly, down to White Oak Swamp Bridge. To him would fall the tasks of rounding up stragglers and pressing the retreating foe in order to bring them to bay. Magruder, his stress evident from the past few days, was simply ordered to move to the Darbytown road and halt behind Longstreet’s column to act as army reserve.
In theory, this plan was excellent. At least one of the converging columns would strike McClellan’s army in flank, while Jackson pressed them from the rear. Lee could then bring the various commands into action from mutually supporting locations, as needed. Unfortunately, coordinating this vast movement over such a large area proved difficult.
Jackson’s column made the best time, and in the end proved the most disappointing failure. By noon, his command halted opposite the ruined White Oak Bridge, facing the Union 6th Corps troops on the far bank. Essentially, Jackson had fulfilled the letter of his instructions: he had found the Federals. Here, however, things become murky. The bridge was out, burned by the Federals, and the site was defended by artillery and infantry. Jackson’s own artillery cut a path through a wooded area to a hillside on the north side of the stream, and by two o’clock p.m. had deployed several Rebel batteries to fire on the Federals. Under cover of this artillery dueling, Jackson sent forward a combined infantry and cavalry force to cross by the ruined bridge and probe the Federal line, which not surprisingly, proved to be solid.
However, at least two enterprising officers discovered alternative sites to the wrecked bridge that would afford hope of crossing in strength. Wade Hampton, commanding one of Winder’s brigades, found a place that could be bridged for infantry, and received permission to do so from Jackson himself. Col. Thomas Munford, commanding the cavalry force that had made the unsuccessful probe, also found a site that offered a good ford, and seemed undefended. Munford sent a courier to Jackson with this news, but never heard a reply.
The lack of reply was because Jackson was asleep! Having proceeded to find the Federals, the initial probe and the artillery exchange seemed to be the extent of his capabilities that day, and Jackson dozed on a log for the rest of the afternoon. Hampton returned at one point to report the footbridge finished, and his brigade ready to move, but Jackson said nothing, and after a few seconds, walked off, still in silence. Mystified, Hampton returned to his command.
A brigade of Huger’s Division, under General Rans Wright, had followed a side road towards Brackett’s ford, and sent word that there were no Federals north of the White Oak and asking for instructions. He, too, got nothing beyond a terse reply that he should rejoin his division. A courier from Longstreet found Jackson equally unresponsive when he arrived to ask for support. Even Jackson’s own officers were confused. Finally, as the day drew to a close, Jackson dozed off at the dinner table with his staff. With the meal over, Jackson’s only words of instruction for the morrow were: “Now gentlemen, let us at once to bed, and rise with the dawn, and see if tomorrow we cannot do something!”
Jackson’s inaction was inexplicable. The most common theory holds that he was simply exhausted beyond endurance, but whatever the reason, his failure to intervene cost Lee a signal victory. More than half of the force facing him at White Oak Swamp—12,000 Federals— ended up marching to support the Union troops attacked by Longstreet near Glendale, and those 12,000 fresh troops were the difference between victory and defeat for the Union troops protecting the Quaker Road.
Most of the other columns ran into problems as well. Huger, with a large, fresh command, had the shortest distance to go. His orders were to proceed down the Charles City Road. He advanced cautiously, fearing a Union attack with almost every step, and detached one brigade (Rans Wright’s mentioned above) to secure his flank north of the White Oak by moving on Brackett’s Ford. Huger’s main force encountered the Federals of Slocum’s 6th Corps division by late morning, and Huger halted at a considerable distance to begin an artillery duel. This proved to be the full extent of Huger’s commitment to the battle that day, even though his command was certainly near enough to support Longstreet. Indeed, by attacking aggressively, Huger could have threatened the Union flank along the Quaker Road and certainly would have pulled attention away from the center, where Longstreet and A.P Hill were fighting unaided. Lee had little overt criticism of Huger after the campaign, but Huger did not command troops under the banner of the Army of Northern Virginia again, a telling critique in and of itself.
Holmes’ column, moving down the River Road towards Malvern Hill itself, was not really expected to do more than confirm the Federal presence and ensure that Lee’s own flank was secure. Holmes did this job capably, if not aggressively: he encountered Federals atop the bluff of Malvern Hill, and retired to a defensive position some distance back. His commitment, too, was limited to a desultory artillery duel throughout the day, with little damage inflicted or received.
Magruder’s men had the most unfortunate experience of the day. Already overstessed by the previous four days, Magruder went looking for the Darbytown Road in order to deploy his command in the Army’s rear as a general reserve. Unfortunately, the Rebel maps were woefully inaccurate, with roads poorly marked at best, which left Magruder trying to puzzle out exactly where Darbytown might be, and locate the Road to it. Unfortunately, all the locals placenames he could find were spelled “Enroughty,” not Darby. The explanation for this seeming mis-match is one of those stories that no one would believe if it were fiction, and no writer could invent.
In fact, the Enroughty name was pronounced “Darby,” and the numerous members of that clan who settled around the Willis Church gave the area the informal name of Darbytown. Prior to emigrating to the new world, the one of the original members of clan Enroughty had lost a legal decision that stripped him of the right to use that name. In a fit of obstinance, the man adopted the name ‘Darby’ but kept the spelling the same. Once in the New World, no one saw any reason to change. In essence, Magruder spent most of the day looking for a road he was already on, and it was only late in the day that a local guide could be found who could confirm this bizarre circumstance and clear up the matter. Magruder’s men marched more than twenty miles, and never got near any of the fighting.
This left the day’s fighting to the already much reduced commands of Longstreet and A.P. Hill, together 12 brigades of about 20,000 troops. Longstreet’s column had moved down the Darbytown Road to the Long Bridge Road, approaching the crossroads at Glendale from the southeast. About midday, Longstreet’s command deployed astride the Long Bridge Road to attack the Federal line arrayed in front of Glendale, and waited for the other forces to come up in support. Lee clearly contemplated a multi-pronged attack from the north, northeast, and southeast. Jackson and Huger, however, rendered this plan inoperative, and finally, about 4:00 p.m., Lee sent Longstreet forward into action alone.
The twelve brigades in Longstreet’s force had already seen heavy action at Gaines’ Mill, and were not in the best shape for a renewed attack, especially an unsupported one. However, the Federals facing them were no better off, and in fact were their old opponents from the previous action: the three brigades of McCall’s Pennsylvania Reserves who had held Porter’s center at Gaines’ Mill. Even worse for Federal fortunes was the fact that while both ends of the line were strongly posted with fresh troops, and a division of the Union 2nd Corps was near in reserve, McCall’s three Federal Brigades held almost a mile of the center of the line without any support at all. Eight of Longstreet’s twelve available brigades were concentrated in the area facing these three Federal units, and while the Rebels were outnumbered overall, local superiority at the point of attack strongly favored Confederate arms.
Not surprisingly, the initial attack drove the Pennsylvanians back quite a distance, overrunning a number of Federal batteries and shattering the Union center. Heavy fighting in the late afternoon found the Rebels reaching the Quaker Road, which, despite the passage of the supply train, still represented the primary escape route for the Federal 3rd, 2nd, and 6th Corps elements massed north of the Rebel breakthrough point. Losses were heavy on both sides, but without reserves, Longstreet’s and Hill’s men could not sustain the effort against the large numbers of fresh Union troops committed to action.
The Union 2nd Corps provided the measure of relief. Two brigades taken from Jackson’s front were rushed to the scene of the fighting and entered the action along with the reserve division of the same corps. These troops proved to be sufficient to drive back the tired Confederates and rescue the threatened center. Shortly after dark the fighting ended. The Rebels had won some temporary successes in the center, but the Union line remained intact and with their retreat route secured.
About 8:30 that night, McClellan rode up to Malvern Hill, site of Fitzjohn Porter’s Headquarters, and demanded the latest information from the battlefield. McClellan had spent most of the day aboard the USS Galena, inspecting the James and potential landing sites for his army, and missed the battle. Sumner’s message was the most encouraging, since it was his 2nd Corps that saved the day, and Sumner reported another victory for the Union. Despite this encouragement, McClellan at once prepared to concentrate all the army at Malvern Hill, meaning another night march for the men who had just finished fighting all afternoon.
The Confederate high command was present at the battle, by contrast—too much of the high command, in fact. President Davis had joined Lee to observe the action, and in fact both the Army commander and Confederate President had come under shelling from Union cannon that afternoon, until ordered off the field by A.P.Hill. However, Lee’s presence was unable to get any of the other commands moving, and the battle of Glendale remained a limited affair, fought spiritedly on both sides by those troops engaged, but seeing little overall direction by either commander.
As July 1st dawned, none of the participants knew it was the last day of fighting, but there was a general sense of frustration in the Confederate camps that too many opportunities had slipped away. Correspondingly, the Federals were convinced they had escaped a great danger. Morning found the Union Army massed around Malvern Hill, together for the first time on a single battlefield. Even one of the 4th Corps divisions was recalled from Harrison’s Landing to strengthen the line.
Malvern Hill was a formidable position. Creeks protected both flanks, and the western side of the hill was further protected by the steep bluffs which gave the site it’s name. The only real approach to the Union position was from due north, over open fields that provided clear fields of fire to the numerous Union guns of the reserve artillery massed in support of the line. Any attacker would have to rely on frontal assaults against more than 100 artillery pieces and plenty of infantry up front and in reserve.
Dawn found Lee and his army still on the field at Glendale, contemplating the next step. Lee assembled Longstreet, Magruder and A. P. Hill to discuss the situation, and shortly after they assembled, Jackson rode up. The White Oak Bridge had finally been rebuilt, and refreshed by a night’s sleep, Jackson was active again. The enemy’s retreat path was clear, and Lee instructed the army to follow the Federals south towards Malvern Hill.
Missing from that initial conference was Huger, who seemed unaware that the Federals had gone. Huger sent out part of his force to try and flank the Union position on the Charles City Road, but was cut short in his tactical maneuvering by a courier from Longstreet, who made clear that the Federals had gone. Shortly thereafter, another courier—this one from Lee—came forward to lead Huger’s division to the front.
There was a feeling among most of the Rebel commanders that the Federals were beaten. The retreat of the night before had left supplies, wounded, and stragglers behind, all giving the impression that one more attack would finish the job and utterly rout McClellan’s army. Certainly the Confederate commanders all believed that the Federals had suffered much worse losses than their own forces, when in reality the opposite was true. In any case, the feelings of victory, commingled with the worry that the Federals would “get away” before the job was finished, all conspired to create a sense of Rebel overconfidence that afternoon.
Nor was Lee feeling well. His plans called for Longstreet and A.P. Hill’s battered commands to go into reserve, and for any fighting that day to be borne by Magruder, Huger, and Jackson’s men; all still relatively fresh. However, he specifically asked Longstreet to leave his division and accompany him, in case Lee became incapacitated. How much this illness might have effected events later than day cannot really be determined, but at the very least it likely prevented Lee from making as effective a personal reconnaissance of the Union position as he might of. A year later, after Gettysburg and a similar incapacity, Lee offered to resign, claiming among other things that his illness left him unable to do exactly that.
In any case, Lee’s plans were not nearly as complex as the day before. Magruder, Jackson, and Huger were to advance south down the Quaker Road and a parallel route to find the Union army and attack it. Longstreet’s command was to go into reserve along the Long Bridge Road, and Holmes was to continue to watch the flank along the River Road. By mid- morning, these columns were all in motion and approaching the Union position at Malvern Hill.
Magruder’s guide problems continued, and highlight an ongoing weakness of the Army of Northern Virginia—poor staff work. Lee specified that Magruder’s men fall in behind Jackson’s column marching down the Quaker Road, as shown on the map Lee was using. When Magruder went back to his command and told his guides to take him to the Quaker Road, however, they took him to a route some 2 miles west of where Jackson was moving, also called by the locals the Quaker Road. This route lead to Holmes’ rear area along the River Road, and away from the Federal lines. Longstreet questioned the movement, but when Magruder’s guides insisted that they were going to the correct road, demurred. It was a couple of hours before the mistake was realized and corrected, giving the men of Magruder’s command yet another afternoon of fruitless marching and counter-marching.
Once they reached the Malvern Hill field, few senior Confederates seemed to regard the Union deployment as anything serious. D.H. Hill, for one, cautioned that an attack here could be costly, but Longstreet scoffed at him, echoing the sentiments of most when he said “Don’t get scared now, when we have got him [McClellan] on the run.” Overconfidence seemed to be a staple of the Confederate diet that morning.
Lee’s plan was simple. The only effective avenue of approach was a long open field of a mile or more in length, with the Federals at the far end. Lee intended for his artillery to suppress the Federal guns with a powerful bombardment, and then, on a signal, Armistead’s Brigade would touch off a general advance of fifteen brigades. In many ways it foreshadowed the much more well known charge at Gettysburg twelve months later, down to the troops spearheading the assault, Virginians under Lewis Armistead.
In fact, the plan went awry from the first. Lee envisioned establishing two artillery grand batteries, which would establish a crossfire and drive off or destroy the Union cannon Unfortunately, none of the Rebel guns had much luck deploying, and each Confederate battery tended to get demolished individually as it came forward and unlimbered, meaning that the promised artillery support never materialized. Part of the problem was certainly yet more bad staff work: Jackson’s chief of artillery was sick, seven of the seventeen batteries present with the Valley Army were in the rear replenishing ammunition and were not brought forward; and of the army’s artillery reserve under Pendleton exactly one of the fourteen batteries present there was sent forward. Indeed, Pendleton himself spent most of the day running around trying to get orders: none seemed to be forthcoming. The result was that the most cannon the Rebels got into action at any one time was sixteen guns—hardly the dominant grand battery envisioned by Lee.
The infantry attack proved just as confused. By 3:00 p.m., Lee had decided to shift Longstreet’s command to the east side of Malvern Hill to try an attack from that direction, a movement that would take several hours and delay any battle. Magruder, however, finally brought his command onto the field, hours late, and sent word of his arrival to Lee. At about the same time, Armistead’s command drove in a line of Union skirmishers that had been annoying them, a movement that was accomplished with a great deal of cheering. Magruder reported this small advance as a ‘partial success’ on Armistead’s part in reaching Malvern Hill.
With these two reports in hand, Lee next got word that Union movement could be seen on Malvern Hill itself. Lee concluded that the Federals might be retreating, and sent word to Magruder to attack and press the Union army if it was in fact falling back. Unfortunately, this order arrived on the heels of Lee’s original order for the afternoon attack, by now out of date but looming large in Magruder’s hands.
Magruder’s judgment was almost certainly questionable in any case. He was still suffering from fatigue and stress, and the two days of getting lost certainly did not help. the medicine he was taking for his nerves was opium based, all of which added up to a disaster in the making. All of these elements added up to Magruder ordering a full attack on the Union line. Clearly Lee’s intent was not to do so, and in fact, when Lee met with Magruder after the fact, asked “General Magruder, why did you attack?”
Not surprisingly, the attack proved a fiasco. D. H. Hill’s famous quote— ”It was not war, it was murder”—summed up the extent of the disaster. Magruder’s men were actually behind Huger’s command, so that any attack would logically seemed to require Huger’s participation as well. Huger, however, saw things differently, denying the use of his men (except for Mahone’s Brigade, who’s commander ignored his superior and volunteered to support Magruder) and leaving the initial attack to a force of two and a half brigades, less than 5000 bayonets total. They advanced piecemeal, and were repulsed. D. H. Hill, however, took this as a sign of the general advance, and sent forward his 8000 men, who also, due to terrain and space considerations, attacked mostly in turn, one brigade at a time.
Ultimately, fifteen Confederate brigades became heavily engaged at Malvern Hill, with almost no success. Six more brigades of Jackson’s Valley Army were also lightly engaged (the entire command, exclusive of D.H. Hill’s attached division, suffered 600 losses) but did not influence the outcome. Parts of fifteen Union brigades took part in the repulse, but only four of them took heavy losses, and the Federals maintained ample reserves throughout the action. Malvern Hill cost Lee 5500 men, while McClellan’s command lost 3200 troops.
When McClellan had become a political candidate in 1864, opposition newspapermen and cartoonists took great delight in representing him as being off the field, aboard the Galena. While this was not true, it might as well have been: McClellan had been aboard the Galena that morning, but had returned to the field by 3:30 p.m., prior to the Confederate attacks, but had gone to the extreme right flank of the army and played no role in the repulse of the assault. Once again, Porter commanded the critical portion of the field. McClellan was unable to defend himself from this charge of absence, however, because in doing so it almost certainly would have come out that the day before, while Glendale raged (a much nearer run thing) he was absent aboard the gunboat. In any case, McClellan’s tactical influence on all of the Seven Days’ battles is notable only for it’s absence.
Despite the victory, the Army of the Potomac retired the next day to Harrison’s Landing, securely entrenched and without vulnerable flanks. Lee’s great gamble had saved Richmond, but failed to do more than bruise the Federals, at a considerable expense in Southern manpower. For his part, McClellan was convinced that the Union army survived only by the thinnest of margins, and would remain quiet in the face of the enemy for the next month or more, until it was finally called back to Northern Virginia to face a resurgent Rebel army there.
Designer's Notes
Malvern Hill represents the culmination of a number of years of work, and my own personal goal to recreate this campaign on a scale that would do it justice. It was the largest campaign of the war, with both armies numbering around 100,000 troops, and though it did not see any one action that was huge in scope, it included at least three actions that would be considered major battles in any context but this one: Gaines’ Mill, Savage Station, and Malvern Hill each involved 50,000 or more troops actively engaged, with thousands more looking on.
The most sobering thing about understanding Malvern Hill is that by the time the game starts, the Union commanding general is all but defeated in his own mind, and that mindset simply isn’t going to happen among Federal players. As such, the scenarios in this game are fairly limited in scope, and try to recreate the tactical decisions of things like White Oak Swamp and Savage Station more than any strategic re-thinking of the campaign at this state. Certainly the full nine-map campaign scenarios allow that, so those of you with the space, have at it.
Recently, Avalon Hill published On to Richmond, the latest in Joe Balkoski’s series of operational ACW games. In that game, the designers commented that they felt that Lee’s numbers were under reported, and that the Rebel army really had numeric parity with McClellan. Players have already asked my what my game shows, and how much it jives with this research.
First of all, the full Rebel strength in these games is about 83,000 infantry and cavalry, including the troops that were deployed around the southside of the James to prevent a surprise Union move against Richmond from that flank. These men were certainly part of the Richmond defensive force, even if they never saw action against the Federal Army of the Potomac during the week in question. Uncounted in those numbers are the almost 10,000 artillerymen hidden in the artillery counters but not explicitly represented as manpower numbers. Essentially, then, the Rebel Army in Malvern Hill counts out at about 93,000 men, not so very far off from On to Richmond’s estimate of 103,000 Rebel Troops. Next, we need to count the 1500 or so Richmond militia organized out of industrial and government workers, and note that the are always several thousand troops included in an army (provosts, train guards, etc.) that never get included in my combat strength numbers, and which will certainly put the overall numbers of Confederate troops within the higher estimate.
On the other hand, I do think On to Richmond’s designers made some mistakes in their force calculations. They noted that A.P Hill’s official report did not seem to count Branch’s large brigade as part of his division when he reported his strength at the beginning of the battle, but a closer look at other returns in May and June of 1862 shows pretty clearly that his strength report is only consistent if Branch was included. I also used the reported regimental strengths as my baseline, (for which I had 60-70% of the units reporting) and feel confident that the numbers in Malvern Hill are a very close estimate of the strength the brigades took into action. Relying more on the overall army returns would indeed reflect higher overall strengths, something that is as true in the Federal army as it is in Lee’s command: By his overall returns McClellan had maybe 120,000 troops in action, but by relying on the regimental reports you get numbers closer to 100,000 than otherwise.
Overall, the numbers discrepancy is not that significant, unless you compare the Rebel numbers with a number of postwar sources. the primary cause of this confusion was William Allen, formerly of Jackson’s staff, who wrote a series of post-war narratives on various Army of Northern Virginia campaigns, and who always downplayed Lee’s numbers to magnify the scope of his tactical genius. Certainly Allen represented Lee as only having about 80,000 men, and less than 70,000 infantry, which is certainly much too low. Historians have repeated Allen’s numbers more often then not, often accepting them as gospel since they only helped Lee’s reputation.
The Malvern Hill maps are perhaps less sure than the other maps in this set. Certainly they represent the terrain in broad terms, and the roads run correctly; but these base maps had more conflicts in them than the more northern maps. For example, the wooded area marked as “The Slash” is really only found on the historical base maps prepared by Ed Bears for the Richmond National Battlefield some years ago, and while its name is indicative of some pretty tangled terrain, I could not find any detail on what this meant, exactly. Anyone comparing these maps with various county maps or USGS maps from the turn of the century, for example, will certainly find discrepancies. My two primary sources were the above mentioned historical base maps, and the Gilmer Maps found in the OR Atlas since they were done closer to the period I needed, but no single map was taken as a dominant source.
If I have taken any one great liberty with history, it is by letting McClellan stay on the map so much when in reality he was off taking boat rides much of the time. A player forced to work without an army commander for much of the game while his opponent has no such handicap works under a very large artificial disadvantage, however, and one that the other guy is often quick to pounce on. Here McClellan is certainly much more likely to be an activist than historically, but I felt that this was better than the alternative. Had McClellan left a designated chain of command in place it would have been easier to handle, but in fact Mac specifically avoided such a designation because he did not trust the senior men—men like Sumner and Heintzelman—to handle the job in his absence. He seemed to feel that no commander was better than a bad commander. In any case, here the Union player has more control that might have been the case historically.
Another, smaller liberty is taken with Wise’s Confederate Brigade. The bulk of this brigade should actually start on the map. Regiments from Wise’s command defended Ball’s and Chaffin’s Bluffs, as well as other points around Richmond. Towards the middle of the Seven Days, Lee assembled Wise’s brigade as a field force and brought it forward to join the field army facing McClellan. I have not actually brought the brigade into play until the time when it was historically called forward by Lee. I did not want to write “breakdown” mechanic for this brigade, especially since players will be quick to note that with it’s poor morale and limited size, Wise’s command will have a minimal impact on play anyway.
The bulk of the scenarios found here are limited by the fact that McClellan is not present, and that the Union army is focused on retreating. This makes for some actions where the Union offensive potential is pretty small. Given the time frame Malvern Hill covers, I am pretty much handcuffed by history in this regard. However, the full campaign is also presented, and here both sides have full freedom of action. The nine maps take up a lot of room, but once deployed, I think players will really enjoy the counter density (or lack thereof) and maneuver room available.
The Seven Days is really aimed at the Confederate player more than the Union. This is because the game allows relatively easy access to Lee’s mindset, but falls short in recreating McClellan’s. Lee understood the enemy he faced and the risks he took in undertaking to maneuver against McClellan’s flank. Conversely, McClellan never did, and lived in fear of an imaginary extra 100,000 Rebels that simply didn’t exist. This imaginary force paralyzed the Federal commander, and the sole focus of McClellan’s planning was in managing a successful retreat in order to ‘save’ the Army of the Potomac. I have yet to meet a player who does not have the benefit of hindsight here, or who is willing to remain as passive as McClellan did. The players all know that those extra 100,000 men are imaginary, and tend to think much more aggressively as a result. Any efforts I could make to keep the Federals from using the advantage of this hindsight would essentially wreck the game by straight- jacketing the Union response.
On the other hand, hindsight tells us that Lee’s risks were lower than he supposed, since McClellan did imagine the Rebels as much stronger than they were. However, Lee saw a movement towards Richmond as a very real possibility, which is true enough in the game. Hence, there is a much more realistic pressure on the Rebel player, something I am delighted that the game produces. Swinging north of the Chickahominy in the early days will definitely expose the Rebel line south of that river to a sudden lunge, one that can be fatal even with McClellan’s various anti- initiatives and Corps attack stoppage bonuses.
Scenario Starting Strengths
Confederate Losses
| Unit | Start 26 Str | 26 Loss | 27 Str | 27 Loss | 28 Str | 28 Loss | 29 Str | 29 Loss | 30 Str | 30 Loss | 1 Str | 1 Loss | End Str |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| H-W-V | 19 | (-) | 19 | (5) | 14 | (-) | 14 | (-) | 14 | (-) | 13 | (1) | 13 |
| L-W-V | 17 | (-) |
Design Note: A study of the returns for the ANV of the 7 days shows the loss of 20,614 men, or 206 strength points. The discrepancy of 8 SP is not an error. The above total does not reflect losses among the artillery (which are obviously counted differently) nor a couple of brigades who were engaged on a given day but had too few losses to merit reducing their strength; nor, finally, the several hundred losses suffered on June 25th at King’s School House (also known as Oak Grove.) Not every man lost had tactical significance to the game. As noted concerning US losses, likely these figures are under-reported as well, but they represent the best numbers available.
Union Losses
| Unit | Start 26 Str | 26 Loss | 27 Str | 27 Loss | 28 Str | 28 Loss | 29 Str | 29 Loss | 30 Str | 30 Loss | 1 Str | 1 Loss | End Str |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 Corps | |||||||||||||
| 1-1-2 | 19 |
Design note: The Union Official losses report casualties of 15,849, or 158 strength points. Obviously, the margin of difference here is much less than that of the Confederate reports versus game losses, above. The primary reason for that is that the consolidated returns seem to under-report some losses. For instance, the Union Cavalry at Gaines MIll seem to have lost more men than shown on the Gaines Mill return, which is likely due to the confusion of the Union retreat after the battle. Even after deducting the losses at Oak Grove (King’s School house) on June 25th (about 600 men) I still reached these substantially higher numbers. Mostly, where I had brigade reports with numbers, I went with those figures rather than the consolidated returns.
Overall, incorrect reporting of losses was not that uncommon. In his study of Cedar Mountain, Robert Krick arrived at significantly higher losses than were originally reported, and he wrote that he felt most Civil War engagements would reflect this pattern. On the whole, I feel that US losses were under-reported by at least a 1000 men.
Loss Charts
The booklet prints a Confederate and a Union loss chart for each scenario start date (printed pages 10-23 and 24-37); this PDF contains only one Confederate chart (printed pages 10-11) and one Union chart (printed pages 24-25). They are reproduced below as printed. Each row gives Unit ID, brigade/leader name, Morale rating, then the fire levels (e.g. AB, A, B, C) each with its row of loss boxes; a check mark shows the box marked on the printed chart. Divisional lines show the division and its leader with their wrecked-level boxes.
Confederate Loss Chart—The Seven Days
Unit ID Brigade Morale Fire Levels
A-AH Anderson C AA ❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Ar-AH Archer B AB ❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏✔ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
B-AH Branch B AAB ❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
F-AH Field B AB ❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏✔❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
G-AH Gregg B AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
P-AH Pender B AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
AH Div AP Hill ❏❏❏❏✔❏❏
A-DH Anderson C AA ❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
C-DH Colquitt C AB ❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏✔❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
G-DH Garland B AA ❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Ri-DH Ripley C AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Ro-DH Rodes B AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏✔❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
DH Div DH Hill ❏❏❏✔❏❏
A-Hu Armistead B AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏✔❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
M-Hu Mahone C AB ❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏✔❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
R-Hu Ransom B AAA ❏❏❏❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏✔❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
W-Hu Wright C AA ❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Hu Div Huger ❏❏✔❏❏
Wa-Hu Walker B AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏✔ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Wb-Hu Walker C AB ❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏✔❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Hu (NC) Huger ❏✔❏
A-Jo GT Andrsn B AB ❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏✔❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
T-Jo Toombs C AB ❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏✔❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Jo Div Jones ❏❏✔
A-L Anderson B AA ❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏✔❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
F-L Featherston B AB ❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏✔ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
K-L Kemper B AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏✔❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
P-L Pickett A AAB ❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏✔❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Pr-L Pryor C AB ❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏✔❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
W-L Wilcox C AA ❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏✔ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
L Div Longstreet ❏❏❏❏✔❏❏
K-Mc Kershaw C AB ❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏✔❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
S-Mc Semmes B AA ❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏✔❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Mc Div McLaws ❏❏✔
C-Mg Cobb C AAA ❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
G-Mg Barksdale A AA ❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏✔❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Mg Div Magruder ❏❏✔
E-E-V Elzey B AB ❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏✔❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Ta-E-V Taylor B AA ❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Tr-E-V Trimble C AAA ❏❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏✔❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
E-V Ewell ❏❏✔❏
F-J-V Fulkerson B A ❏❏❏ B ❏❏✔❏ C ❏❏❏
J-J-V Jones B AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏✔❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
La-J-V Lawton B AA ❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Lb-J-V Lawton C AB ❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏✔❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
W-J-V Stonewall A A ❏❏ B ❏❏❏✔ C ❏❏❏
J-V Winder ❏❏❏✔❏❏
H-W-V Hood A AA ❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏✔❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
L-W-V Law B AA ❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏✔❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
W-V Whiting ❏❏✔
Da-NC Daniel C AA ❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
W-NC Wise D AB ❏❏ A ❏❏❏✔❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Wa-Hu Walker B AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏✔ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Wb-Hu Walker B AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏✔❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Optionals:
Dr-NC Drayton C AAB ❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏✔ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
E-NC Evans B AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏✔ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
M-NC Martin C AAB ❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
NC Holmes ❏❏✔❏❏
NC w/ optionals ❏❏❏❏✔❏❏❏
Cav Stuart C B❏ C ❏❏❏✔❏❏❏❏❏❏❏
STb-Cav Stuart C C ❏❏❏❏✔❏❏❏❏❏
Union Loss Chart—The Seven Days
Unit ID Brigade Morale Fire Levels
1-1-1 Kimball B AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-1-1 Ferry C AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-1-1 Tyler C AAB ❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏✔ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
4-1-1 Carroll C AAB ❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
1-1 Shields ❏❏✔❏❏
1-2-1 Tower B AAA ❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏✔❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-2-1 Duryea C AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-2-1 Hartsuff C AAB ❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-1 Ricketts ❏❏✔❏
1-3-1 Auger B AAA ❏❏❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏✔❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-3-1 Patrick C AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-3-1 Gibbon A AAB ❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
4-3-1 Doubleday B AA ❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏✔❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-1 King ❏❏❏✔❏
Cav-1 Bayard D A ❏❏❏ B ❏❏✔❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏❏❏❏❏❏❏❏
1-1-2 Caldwell B AA ❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-1-2 Meagher A AA ❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏✔❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-1-2 French C AAA ❏❏❏❏❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏✔❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
1-2 Richardson ❏❏✔❏
1-2-2 Sully C AAA ❏❏❏❏❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏✔❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-2-2 Burns B AAA ❏❏❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏✔❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-2-2 Dana C AAA ❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏✔❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-2 Sedgwick ❏❏✔❏
1-2-3 Grover C AAB ❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏✔❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-2-3 Sickles B AAB ❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-2-3 Carr B AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-3 Hooker ❏❏✔❏
1-3-3 Robinson C AAB ❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏✔❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-3-3 Birney C AAA ❏❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏✔❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-3-3 Berry C AAA ❏❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏✔❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-3 Kearny ❏❏✔❏
Cav-3 Averell D C ❏❏❏✔❏❏❏❏❏
1-1-4 Howe B AAB ❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-1-4 Abercombie C AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏✔ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-1-4 Palmer B AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
1-4 Couch ❏❏✔❏
1-2-4 Naglee C AA ❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏✔❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-2-4 Wessells D AA ❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏✔ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-2-4 Wessells-2 C AB ❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏✔❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-4 Peck ❏✔❏❏
Cav-4 Gregg D C ❏❏✔❏❏❏❏
1a-1-5 Martindale B AA ❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏✔❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
1b-1-5 Martindale C AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏✔❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-1-5 Griffen B AAA ❏❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-1-5 Butterfield B AAB ❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏✔❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
1-5 Morell ❏❏❏✔❏
1-2-5 Buchanan A AAB ❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏✔❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-2-5 Lovell B AAB ❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏✔ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-2-5 Warren C A ❏❏❏❏✔ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-5 Sykes ❏❏❏✔
1a-PaR Reynolds B AA ❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏✔❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
1b-PaR Reynolds C AB ❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏✔❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-PaR Meade B AAA ❏❏❏❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏✔❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-PaR Seymour C AAA ❏❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏✔❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
PaR-5 McCall ❏❏❏✔❏
Cav-5 Farnsworth D C ❏❏❏✔❏❏❏❏
1-1-6 Taylor C AAA ❏❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏✔❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-1-6 Bartlett B AAA ❏❏❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏✔❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3-1-6 Newton C AAA ❏❏❏ AAB ❏❏❏❏❏ AA ❏❏✔❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
1-6 Slocum ❏❏✔❏
1-2-6 Hancock C AAB ❏❏ AA ❏❏❏❏❏ AB ❏❏✔❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2a-2-6 Brooks B AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏❏✔❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2b-2-6 Brooks B AA ❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3a-2-6 Davidson B AA ❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
3b-2-6 Davidson B AA ❏❏❏ AB ❏❏❏❏❏ A ❏✔❏❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
2-6 Smith ❏❏❏✔❏❏
Cav-6 McReynolds D C ❏❏❏✔❏❏❏❏❏
Cav Cooke D A❏ B ❏❏❏❏❏✔ C ❏❏❏❏❏❏❏❏❏❏
Eng Woodbury D AB ❏❏❏❏ A ❏❏✔❏❏❏ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
TGD Casey C A ❏❏❏❏✔ B ❏❏❏ C ❏❏❏
Fatigue Charts
The booklet prints Confederate and Union fatigue charts (printed pages 38-49); this PDF contains one of each (printed pages 38-39). Every line of the chart has the same layout: Normal, 4 groups of 5 boxes (20 boxes); Tired, 2 groups of 5 boxes (10 boxes); Exhausted, 3 groups of 5 boxes plus 3 boxes (18 boxes).
Confederate Fatigue Charts—The Seven Days
One line for each of: AH Div; DH Div; L Div; Hu Div; Jo Div; M Div; Mg Div; E Div (Valley Army); J Div (Valley Army); W Div (Valley Army); Dept of NC Div; Cav (ANVa); STb-Cav (ANVa).
Union Fatigue Charts—The Seven Days
One line for each of: 1 Div, 1 Corps; 2 Div, 1 Corps; 3 Div, 1 Corps; Cav, 1 Corps; 1 Div, 2 Corps; 2 Div, 2 Corps; 1 Div, 3 Corps; 2 Div, 3 Corps; Cav, 3 Corps; 1 Div, 4 Corps; 2 Div, 4 Corps; Cav, 4 Corps; 1 Div, 5 Corps; 2 Div, 5 Corps; PaR Div, 5 Corps; Cav, 5 Corps; 1 Div, 6 Corps; 2 Div, 6 Corps; Cav, 6 Corps; Cav, A Pot; Eng, A Pot; TGD, A Pot.
Order of Battle and Counter Manifest
Confederate Order of Battle
Army of Northern Virginia
- R.E. Lee
- ANVa HQ
- ANVa Supply Train
- ANVa Artillery (3x 5-rated)
- Cav Brigade
- STb-Cav Cav Brigade
- Va Mil Inf Brigade
AP Hill’s Division
- AP Hill
- AH Div Artillery (2x 5-rated)
- Anderson’s Brigade (A-AH)
- Archer’s Brigade (Ar-AH)
- Branch’s Brigade (B-AH)
- Field’s Brigade (F-AH)
- Gregg’s Brigade (G-AH)
- Pender’s Brigade (P-AH)
DH Hill’s Division
- DH Hill
- DH Div Artillery (1x 4-rated, 1x 5-rated)
- Anderson’s Brigade (A-DH)
- Colquitt’s Brigade (C-DH)
- Garland’s Brigade (G-DH)
- Ripley’s Brigade (Ri-DH)
- Rodes’ Brigade (Ro-DH)
Huger’s Division
- Huger
- Hu Div Artillery (1x 5-rated, 1x 3-rated)
- Armistead’s Brigade (A-Hu)
- Mahone’s Brigade (M-Hu)
- Ransom’s Brigade (R-Hu)
- Walker’s Brigade (two parts: Wa-Hu, Wb-Hu)
- Wright’s Brigade (W-Hu)
Jones’ Division
- Jones
- Jo Div Artillery (1x 5-rated)
- Anderson’s Brigade (A-Jo)
- Toombs’ Brigade (T-Jo)
Longsteet’s Division
- Lonstreet
- L Div Artillery (2x 5-rated)
- Anderson’s Brigade (A-L)
- Featherston’s Brigade (F-L)
- Kemper’s Brigade (K-L)
- Pickett’s Brigade (P-L)
- Pryor’s Brigade (Pr-L)
- Wilcox’s Brigade (W-L)
McLaws’ Division
- McLaws
- Mc Div Artillery (1x 5-rated)
- Kershaw’s Brigade (K-Mc)
- Semmes’ Brigade (S-Mc)
Magruder’s Division
- Magruder
- Mg Div Artillery (1x 5-rated)
- Cobb’s Brigade (C-Mg)
- Barksdale’s Brigade (G-Mg)
Jackson’s Valley Army
- Jackson
- Valley HQ
- Valley Supply Wagon
Ewell’s Division
- Ewell
- E Div Artillery (1x 4-rated)
- Elzey’s Brigade (E-E-V)
- Taylor’s Brigade (Ta-E-V)
- Trimble’s Brigade (Tr-E-V)
Jackson’s Division
- Winder
- J Div Artillery (1x 5-rated)
- Fulkerson’s Brigade (F-J-V)
- Jones’ Brigade (J-J-V)
- Lawton’s Brigade (two parts: La-J-V. Lb-J-V)
- Stonewall Brigade (W-J-V)
Whiting’s Division
- Whiting
- W Div Artillery (1x 2-rated)
- Hood’s Texas Brigade (H-W-V)
- Law’s Brigade (L-W-V)
Wing Commands
- Left Wing HQ
- Right Wing HQ
- Left Wing Supply Wagon
- Right Wing Supply Wagon Malvern Hill Module CWB #13
Department of North Carolina
- Holmes
- Dept NC Artillery (4x 5-rated)
- Daniel’s Brigade (Da-NC)
- Drayton’s Brigade (Dr-NC)
- Evans’ Brigade (E-NC)
- Martin’s Brigade (M-NC)
- Wise’s Brigade (W-NC)
Union Order of Battle
Army of the Potomac
- McClellan
- A Pot HQ
- A Pot Supply Train
- Army Reserve Artillery (6x 5-rated, 1x 4-rated)
2 Corps
- Sumner
- 2 Corps HQ
- 2 Corps Supply
- 2 Corps Artillery (2x 5-rated, 1x 4-rated)
1-2 Division
- Richardson
- Caldwell’s Brigade (1-1-2)
- Meagher’s Brigade (2-1-2)
- French’s Brigade (3-1-2)
2-2 Division
- Sedgwick
- Sully’s Brigade (1-2-2)
- Burns’ Brigade (2-2-2)
- Dana’s Brigade (3-2-2)
3 Corps
- Heintzelman
- 3 Corps HQ
- 3 Corps Supply
- 3 Corps Artillery (2x 5-rated, 1x 3-rated)
- Averell’s Cavalry Brigade (Cav-3)
2-3 Division
- Hooker
- Grover’s Brigade (1-2-3)
- Sickles’ Brigade (2-2-3)
- Carr’s Brigade (3-2-3)
3-3 Division
- Kearny
- Robinson’s Brigade (1-3-3)
- Birney’s Brigade (2-3-3)
- Berry’s Brigade (3-3-3)
4 Corps (part)
1-4 Division
- Couch
- Howe’s Brigade (1-1-4)
- Abercrombie’s Brigade (2-1-4)
- Palmer’s Brigade (3-1-4)
2-4 Division (part)
- Naglee’s Brigade (1-2-4)
5 Corps
- Porter
- 5 Corps HQ
- 5 Corps Supply
- 5 Corps Artillery (3x 5-rated, 1x 3-rated)
- Farnsworth’s Cavalry Brigade (Cav-5)
1-5 Division
- Morell
- Martindale’s Brigade (2 parts: 1a-1-5, 1b-1-5)
- Griffin’s Brigade (2-1-5)
- Butterfield’s Brigade (3-1-5)
2-5 Division
- Sykes
- Buchanan’s Brigade (1-2-5)
- Lovell’s Brigade (2-2-5)
- Warren’s Brigade (3-2-5)
Pennsylvania Reserves Division
- McCall
- Reynolds’ Brigade (2 parts: 1a-PaR-5, 1b-PaR-5)
- Meade’s Brigade (2-PaR-5)
- Seymour’s Brigade (3-PaR-5)
6 Corps
- Franklin
- 6 Corps HQ
- 6 Corps Supply
- 6 Corps Artillery (2x 5-rated, 1x 2-rated)
- McReynolds’ Cavalry Brigade (Cav-6)
1-6 Division
- Slocum
- Taylor’s Brigade (1-1-6)
- Bartlett’s Brigade (2-1-6)
- Newton’s Brigade (3-1-6)
2-6 Division
- Smith
- Hancock’s Brigade (1-2-6)
- Brooks’ Brigade (2 parts: 2a-2-6, 2b-2-6)
- Davidson’s Brigade (2 parts: 3a-2-6, 3b-2-6)