Gaines Mill: The Battles of the Seven Days, June 1862, Volume 1
Gaines Mill: The Battles of the Seven Days, June 1862, Volume 1 Rulebook
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Introduction
A number of the rules below cover situations more likely to arise in later releases of The Seven Days. For instance, The Union engineer unit does not appear in any of the scenarios of Gaines Mill. These rules are included to provide continuity throughout all these releases, as well as to give players room for experimentation. If a given rule seems needless at this time, don't worry, it will have later application.
A Complete Copy of Gaines Mill Includes
- 1x Box
- 1x CWB Series Rulebook (2nd ed, revised)
- 1x Game Specific Rulebook
- 2x Dice (one red, one white)
- 3x 22x 34" Maps
- 1x 280-counter countersheet
- 1x Registration Card
- 1x Current Price List
- Assorted Advertising Flyers
1.0 Terrain and Map Notes
1.1 Swamp and Wooded Swamp Hexes
Shift one column left on the Fire Combat Table if one or more firers in a combat are in a swamp (or wooded swamp) hex. There is no additional penalty if more than one such unit fires to a given combat.
Note: Speaking of "Swamps," Boatswain's "Swamp" in the southeast corner of Map B is actually the stream following along the name, not the swamps in the vicinity. Go figure.
1.2 Extreme Slopes
There are no Extreme Slopes on the Gaines Mill Maps (even where they would typically be) due to the tidewater nature of the terrain.
1.3 Use of Tracks
Because these maps must mate with the rest of The Seven Days on-map tracks and admin materials have been omitted so as to not interfere with either linkage or full use of the available terrain. Losses are kept track of only on the Loss Charts (no Casualty Tracks) and Artillery Ammunition must be tracked on paper (no Artillery Ammunition Tracks). Furthermore, the Terrain Key and such are on the Player's Aide Card along with the Turn and Day Records. This required one-color printing for these, but we assume the standard elevation color scheme (and most of the common terrain symbols) to be obvious to experienced and inexperienced players alike.
2.0 Union Special Rules
2.1 Acting Army Commanders
If McClellan becomes a casualty, replace him with the highest ranking corps commander according to the following:
- McDowell (if using the First Corps optional rules)
- Sumner
- Porter
- Franklin
If replacement officer is not in play (but not a casualty himself), he enters the game via any map's south map edge two turns after McClellan's loss. The only way McClellan can become a casualty is if Union Option 5.1b was used.
2.2 Historical McClellan Restrictions
These (less 2.2c) remain in effect even if McClellan becomes a casualty.
2.2a Union Anti-Initiative Ratings. For any attempt that would require Union troops to attack, McClellan has an anti-initiative of -2. For orders attempts involving simple movement or defense, McClellan has no anti-initiative. No other Union leader has an Anti-Initiative Rating.
2.2b McClellan's Paranoia. McClellan was convinced that the Rebel army greatly outnumbered his forces. Therefore, he was extremely cautious about any aggressive move his army made and was always alert to an enemy counterattack.
To reflect this fear, subtract 2 from any Corps Attack Stoppage check. Do not apply this modifier to Defensive Stoppage Checks when using the Defensive Orders rules.
2.2c McClellan's Absence. Throughout the fighting north of the Chickahominy, McClellan remained south of the river. McClellan never enters the map and the Union player can only issue orders from the army commander's off-map location. All orders are aide-delivered. Calculate the delivery of these orders as if they were issued from the south edge of either Map B or C and add one extra turn to the result.
2.3 Attachments and Detachments
The player cannot voluntarily order a Union Corps to attach units from another corps. Some scenarios will call for such attachments, but these are beyond the player's control. A corps can give up to one division a Divisional Goal (other divisions of the corps cannot leave corps command radius while another division of the corps has a Divisional Goal). Individual brigades, except as noted below, cannot be voluntarily attached or detached. Some scenarios call for a brigade to set up with divisional goals, but, again, this is beyond the player's control.
2.4 Union Separate Brigades
All of the following brigades can be given Divisional Goals. If wrecked, these units check morale modified to -6, not -4.
2.4a Corps Attached Cavalry. The two Union corps' cavalry brigades (three when counting the optional Cav-1 of the 1st Corps) have no divisional affiliation. The brigades attached directly to the various corps trace command radius directly to the corps HQ as if they were divisions. They can be detached, and do not count as the corps' division on a Divisional Goal. Cavalry cannot be attached to a different Corps.
2.4b The Army Cavalry. The Cavalry brigade attached directly to the army HQ (Cav) can be given orders by the Army commander himself. It can also be attached to a corps. This brigade (and Eng, see below) can roll for initiative, as if it had a leadership rating of 2. It is NOT considered independent, and must always have orders, or be attached to a corps.
2.4c The Engineer Brigade. The Engineer brigade (Eng) is handled exactly like the Union army cavalry brigade (Cav). More importantly, it greatly aids the process of destroying and rebuilding bridges. See the special rules concerning bridges, 4.1.
2.4d The Artillery Reserve. There are artillery units directly attacked to the army (Reserve). These units can always trace command directly to any Union Corps HQ, and act on the orders of that Corps HQ, at any time. They do not need orders to change HQs, they merely need to be able to trace command radius to the chosen Corps HQ.
2.5 Designating a Wing Commander
In any scenario, the Union Player can designate up to one Wing Commander to control portions of his army. This Wing Commander is simply one of the on-map Union corps commanders. McClellan creates a Wing Commander by issuing a simple order to the corps commander and he becomes a Wing Commander when this order is accepted.
The Wing Commander issues orders to the other Union corps commanders under his authority. He can do so only through initiative. (The Wing Commander never uses command points, or issues regular orders.)
In Gaines Mill, FitzJohn Porter, 5th Corps commander, starts all scenarios as a Wing Commander, controlling all units which start or move north of the Chickahominy River.
2.6 Union Minor Variants
2.6a The 1st Corps. In any scenario starting on June 26th, allow the First Corps (all) to arrive at B1.10 and/or B1.30 on the first turn with orders to report to Porter for further instructions.
In any scenario starting after June 26th, allow the 1st Corps to set up within 10 hexes of the 5th Corps HQ, with no closer than 5 hexes of any Confederate unit.
Use of either of the above options give the Confederate player 7 VP.
The Union 1st Corps was supposed to arrive from the north to join McClellan's attack on Richmond, but was held back by Lincoln at the last minute to help defend the lower Shennendoah Valley and Washington DC. McClellan was certain that this decision cost him the campaign.
2.6b McClellan Crosses the River. This option assumes that McClellan took a more personal look at the fighting. McClellan and the Army HQ arrive at B62.16 or B62.10 at 5:00 p.m. June 26th. Porter still retains Wing command authority unless the player issues an order negating it.
This option gives the Confederate player 3 VP.
McClellan was a laissez-faire commander, and at times his distance from the battlefield hurt Union efforts, especially when multiple corps where forced to coordinate efforts on their own.
2.6c Reinforcements from the South Side. In any scenario that calls for the arrival of 1-6 Division, The Union Player can instead bring on all of 6th Corps. When all of 6th Corps is in play, 1-6 is no longer considered attached to 5th Corps, but is instead subject to all orders pertaining to 6th Corps. This option costs the Union player 3 VP.
The same rule can be applied to the 2nd Corps as well with the additional cost of 3 VP.
McClellan constantly claimed that he had insufficient troops to do the job, and after Gaines Mill was over, wired Washington that "a few thousand more men would have done the job." Of course, he said nothing of the 65,000 troops that sat idle while Porter was fighting along Boatswain's Swamp. Here are some of those troops.
3.0 Confederate Special Rules
3.1 Confederate Command Arrangements
The largest Confederate command organization is the division. Each division receives orders directly from the Army HQ in the form of Divisional Goals. Each division rolls for all attack stoppage and defensive failure checks separately. The division commanders of such divisions which have no orders act as the "corps" HQ of their division; in other words, they are "bolted" to the ground when without orders.
An exception to the above is the one permanent larger command structure within the Rebel army: Jackson's Valley Army. The Valley Army functions like a permanent wing command (see below) and consists of J Division, E Division, and W Division. These units can be re-assigned per the rules in 3.2.
3.2 Creating Wing Commands
The Rebel player has the option of simply issuing Divisional Goals to all divisions, or of creating a Wing (a corps-equivalent structure) by issuing the necessary orders.
During any friendly Command Phase, Lee can issue a simple order directly to a division commander assigning him a Wing Command. This order must specify who is to command the new wing, and which divisions it comprises. It must be accepted like any other order before taking effect.
Restrictions:
A) The Confederate player can only establish one wing command at a time, the Left Wing. He must abolish an existing Left Wing (with an order) to form a new one.
B) Each Confederate Leader has a Seniority number printed on his counter. The greater the number, the lower the leader's seniority. Repl leaders always have the lowest possible seniority. No division commander can be assigned to a wing that would force him to serve under a general with a higher seniority number than his own. For instance, if D. H. Hill is ordered to command the right wing, he could only command divisions whose officers had a seniority value of 5 (D. H. Hill's own seniority rating) or greater. Longstreet, with a seniority of 2, could never serve under D. H. Hill. A divisional commander can serve under a wing commander with an equivalent seniority number.
C) No Wing can command more than four divisions of infantry at one time. A division can be added to an existing Wing command as needed at a later time, subject to the above limit, but it requires a separate order (issued to the existing Wing commander) to accomplish the addition.
D) No other orders may be sent to a Wing or its component forces until the creation order is accepted by the new wing commander.
E) The Left Wing supply wagon is independent and can supply any Rebel unit. The Wing HQ is deployed once the wing is created. Place the HQ in the Wing Commander's hex. Replace the Wing Commander with a Repl who takes over temporary command of the Wing Commander's division. Once the Wing commander is designated, he is essentially a Corps commander, while the Repl leader commands his old division (the division's units trace command radius to the Repl, not the Wing Commander).
3.3 Attachments and Detachments
Divisional attachment and detachment occurs within the Wing framework above. Brigades can be detached at will and given Divisional Goals. No division can have another division's brigade attached to it.
3.4 Separate Units
The Confederate player has three separate artillery units (A NVa). These army artillery units can trace command radius to any division commander. The artillery must always trace to a divisional commander (any of them) and can switch divisional commanders traced to at will.
The Confederate player also has Stuart's Cavalry Brigade (Cav) This unit traces command radius like the army artillery. It can also be given Divisional Goals.
3.5 Stonewall Jackson's Mysterious Ailment
Jackson performed unexpectedly poorly during the fighting around Richmond, quite differently from his performance in the Valley just completed. This rule applies to any scenario of more than one day's duration. During the Confederate command phase of the first daylight turn after each night, roll one die, and on a 5 or 6, flip Jackson to his four rated side. If he is currently a Four, anything but a 6 will return him to his Zero rated side. He remains with this rating until the next roll.
Jackson enters the map or starts all scenarios on his Zero rated side.
3.6 Confederate Minor Variants
3.6a Jackson. In contradiction of rule 3.5 above, Allow Jackson to start all scenarios as a Four rated leader. Do not roll for the rating change.
This option gives the Union player 5 VP.
Jackson's performance during the entire Seven Days' campaign was unexpected and quite disappointing. Numerous explanations and justifications have been offered up for this lethargy. Here it is assumed that whatever malaise effected him passed quickly, and he moved with more aggressiveness.
3.6b Extra troops from the Deep South. Allow Holmes and all units of the Department of North Carolina (NC) to set up within 5 hexes of the A NVa HQ in any scenario.
This option gives the Union player 6 VP.
Lee took substantial risks in concentrating his forces against Porter, north of the River. Use of these troops, coming up from Petersburg and points south, would have added to that risk, but might have given Lee the extra strength he needed to assure victory. Later in the campaign, most of these troops joined the Army in time for Malvern Hill.
4.0 General Special Rules
4.1 Building, Destroying, and Rebuilding Bridges
A significant feature of the fighting around Richmond was the importance of two rivers, the Chickahominy and the White Oak Swamp. The bridges crossing these streams became focal points.
In the game, existing bridges can be destroyed and repaired, and in some instances new bridges can be built.
4.1a Existing Bridges. Any unit can destroy an intact bridge, as well as repair a destroyed bridge. For either procedure, the attempting unit must be adjacent to the bridge in question at the start of its Movement Phase. If successful, place any convenient marker on the bridge (to show its destruction), or remove the marker if the bridge is being repaired. Only one roll per bridge per turn is allowed and a roll outside the range below have no effect.
- Die roll to destroy: 5 or more (one die)
- Die roll to repair: 12 or more (on two dice)
*The US Engineer unit adds 3 to these rolls.
4.1b Building a new Bridge. New bridges can only be built at the site of existing fords. Only the US Engineer unit can build a new bridge. The Engineer unit must begin the Movement Phase adjacent to the ford in question. Only one roll per turn is allowed and a roll outside the range below have no effect.
- Die roll to build: 5-6 (one die)
*Note: the US Engineer unit does not add 3 to this roll.
4.2 Fatigue (optional)
The complete Seven Days Campaign Scenario will cover a full week of action. Even some of the shorter campaign scenarios will cover 2-4 days. Troops require a certain amount of rest to function effectively over such periods, and so provisions for fatigue are needed. The following rules intend to reproduce fatigue in a relatively simple form. However, due to the additional bookkeeping required, they are strictly optional. In general, not using these rules will compress the action in time.
Fatigue is kept track by division. Each division is can be in one of three fatigue states: Good, Tired, or Exhausted. Every unit within a given division always has the divisional status (no provisions for units which did less or more than others). For instance, if D.H. Hill's division is exhausted, all five brigades of his division are exhausted.
4.2a Recording Fatigue. Each division (or separate brigade) has a line of boxes on the Loss Chart with which to record Fatigue.
- Each turn that any unit of a given division moves, fires, or is fired upon, check off one box. Only check off one box for the division in a turn, even if all three apply to one or more units in the division.
The box is marked off even if only one unit of the division engages in activity causing fatigue. Artillery units never count for this purpose.
Apply the same rules to the marking of these boxes and to the change of fatigue states involved as you would the normal Loss Charts and their effect on Fire Levels. The instant that the division enters its new fatigue state, all restrictions of state apply.
4.2b Effects of Fatigue.
A) Good condition has no effect on a unit. The unit is normal.
B) Tired incurs the following restrictions:
- -2 to all morale checks.
- All straggler checks are always made on the 1&1/2 or more Straggler Table.
C) Exhaustion incurs the following restrictions:
- -4 to all morale checks.
- All straggler checks are made on the 1&1/2 or more straggler table, and +1 is added to all such checks.
- The unit in question may not force march.
4.2c Recovering from Fatigue. A division "rests" to recover from fatigue. To rest, all non-artillery units of the division cannot move, fire or be fired upon. A resting division cannot have (or be part of a Wing that has) attack or movement orders. It can have defensive orders, or no orders at all.
At the end of a successful resting turn, erase one mark from a box on the division's fatigue record. Units can recover stragglers while resting.
4.2d Night and Fatigue. On night turns (not twilight), a unit either incurring or recovering from fatigue does so at twice the normal rate. For example, a unit that moves at night marks off two spaces on its fatigue record instead of one.
4.2e Swamp and Fatigue. Any unit that enters, leaves, or moves through a swamp hex (excluding units in column or mounted using road movement) accumulate fatigue at twice the normal rate. The effects of night and swamp are cumulative, so that a unit moving into a swamp hex at night would have its fatigue effect quadrupled.
4.3 Set-Up Notes
4.3a The Confederate Wing, if in existence for a given scenario, will be specified in the Confederate orders section. If a wing is not mentioned, it is not yet in being, but can be created after play begins.
4.3b Porter, commander of the Union 5th Corps, starts all scenarios as the Union wing commander.
4.3c No units start any scenario with fatigue (if using that option.)
4.3d Jackson always starts all scenarios on his "Zero" rated side.
5.0 Victory
In one sense, Lee won this campaign by the 27th of June, when McClellan elected to change base, and instead of attacking to capture Richmond. From that point forward, Lee dictated the course of the campaign. Hence, the large sense of victory or defeat is beyond the scope of Gaines Mill, and must wait for all three games. Within the context of the fighting North of the Chickahominy, victory will only be decided on how well each player eludes or fulfills Lee's original short-term objective: The destruction of the Union 5th Corps.
Victory Points are awarded to each player for the following types of objectives: overall casualties, certain terrain hexes, and the wrecking of larger formations.
5.1 Points for Casualties
Each side is awarded the following number of points if the other side's losses equal or exceed the given amount. Such awards are not cumulative; a Union player, for instance, would not get 3 VP for inflicting 46 Confederate losses, and then 10 more VP when Confederate losses reach 93. Instead, only the highest VP award is given. Do not count Stragglers, only hard casualties.
| VP Award | Confed Loss | Union Loss |
|---|---|---|
| 3 | 46 | 37 |
| 5 | 70 | 56 |
| 10 | 93 | 74 |
| 15 | 116 | 93 |
| 20 | 140 | 111 |
| 25 | 163 | 130 |
| 35 | 186 | 148 |
5.2 Points for Terrain
Each side is awarded points for the following hexes, 2 VP for each hex: A35.35, B32.09, B30.29, B42.13, B55.31, C48.02, C56.02
These hexes are marked with a small yellow star on the map.
5.3 Points for Wrecked Formations
Each side is awarded the following VP for wrecking various larger formations. All losses count in determining wrecked status (hard ones as well as stragglers). Any division considered wrecked per the series rules is wrecked for VP purposes.
| Confederate | VPs |
|---|---|
| AH Division | 4 |
| DH Division | 3 |
| L Division | 4 |
| E Division | 2 |
| J Division | 2 |
| W Division | 1 |
| Union | VPs |
|---|---|
| 1-5 Division | 4 |
| 2-5 Division | 3 |
| PaR-5 Division | 4 |
| 1-6 Division | 2 |
| 1-2 Division | 2 |
Each cavalry brigade, Union or Confederate, is worth 1 VP if wrecked.
5.4 Determining the Winner
Each scenario (except 7.1) provides a chart to determine victory. Add up the VP awarded to each side, and then subtract the Union total from the Confederate total. The resultant number is compared to that chart, and where it falls within the ranges on the chart determines the victor and level of success.
6.0 Scenarios
6.1 Bloodbath at Mechanicsville
This scenario covers the frontal attack launched by A.P. Hill as June 26th drew to a close. It was a foolish affair, with the Confederates losing over 1,400 men to the Union's loss of 300. The scenario, with few units and limited map space, is intended to serve as an introduction to the CWB system.
General Information
- First Turn: 4:00 p.m. June 26th.
- Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. June 26th.
- Scenario Length: 9 turns.
- Maps Used: A
- First Player: Confederate
- Bridges Destroyed: none.
Union Information
Set Up:
- 1a-PaR-5: A28.29 ex A27.30
- 1b-PaR-5: A26.30
- 2-PaR-5: A30.30 ex A29.30
- 3-PaR-5: A35.30 ex A34.30 ex A36.30
- Resb (4): A35.30
- 5b, one each in: A34.30, A28.29
- 5 Corps HQ & Supply, 1-5, 5b, 5b(3): w/i 2 A35.35
Artillery Ammunition: 30
Reinforcements: none
Orders:
- PaR-5 is to defend the line of Beaver Dam Creek.
- 3-PaR-5 is to defend the line of Beaver Dam Creek at Ellerson's Mill.
- Overall, 5th Corps is to defend the Beaver Dam Creek position.
Confederate Information
Set Up:
- A-AH: A27.26
- Ar-AH: A29.26
- F-AH: A31.26
- P-AH: A33.26
- B-AH: A28.23
- G-AH: A29.24
- 2x AH Divisional Batteries: w/i 1 A30.22
- DH Division: w/i 2 A32.23
Artillery Ammunition: 10
Reinforcements: none
Orders:
- AH Division is to send A-AH, Ar-AH, F-AH, & P-AH forward in a frontal attack along Beaver Dam Creek.
- DH Division is to send 1 brigade (Ri-DH) forward to join the AP Hill's attack.
- The remaining 6 brigades (2 from AH and 4 from DH) are in reserve, and it takes a successful initiative roll from their respective commanders to commit them to the attack. Only one roll is needed by the commander to commit all the division's reserve brigades.
Victory
The Confederate player wins if he inflicts at least 3/4 of the number of casualties as he suffers. Otherwise, it is a Union victory. Historically, the Confederate lost almost 5 times as many men as did the Union.
6.2 Where's Jackson?
Lee's original plan for the 26th called for Jackson to arrive by 9 a.m., leaving plenty of time to concentrate the bulk of the Rebel army and crush the 5th Corps. Running over 6 hours late, the Valley Army arrived at 3 p.m., whereupon it promptly marched to Hundley's Corner and halted for the night. In the end, only AP Hill got his troops into action, attacking at Mechanicsville. Even late, however, there still might have been time to deal the 5th Corps a deadly blow.
General Information
- First Turn: 3 p.m. June 26th.
- Last Turn: 8 p.m. June 26th.
- Scenario Length: 11 turns.
- Maps Used: A & B
- First Player: Confederate
- Bridges Destroyed: The Upper Trestle Bridge (B51.06) New Bridge (B56.11) and Lower Trestle Bridge (B59.17) are all destroyed. All other Bridges are intact.
Union Information
Set Up:
- 1-5, Resb(4), 5b: w/i 3 A27.31
- PaR-5, 2x 5b: w/i 4 A36.32
- 2-5, 5b(3), Resb: w/5 B50.11
- 5 Corps HQ: B32.09
- 5 Corps Supply, Cav, Cav-5: w/i 5 B32.09
Artillery Ammunition: 40
Reinforcements: none
Orders:
- 5 Corps is to defend the line of Beaver Dam Creek.
- 2-5 is to defend the 5th Corps left flank and prevent any crossing from the New or Upper Trestle Bridges.
Confederate Information
Set Up:
- AH Division (less B-AH), A NVab: w/i 5 A27.04
- DH Division: w/i 5 A46.12
- L Division: w/i 5 A58.06
- A NVab: A42.15
- A NVa HQ, A NVa Supply, Left Wing Supply A NVab: w/i 2 A53.10
Artillery Ammunition: 45
Reinforcements:
- 3pm, June 26th: B-AH at A1.14
- 3:30pm June 26th: W Division, J Division, E Division, Valley Army HQ & Supply, Cav at A1.14
Orders:
- AH Division: On the turn after B-AH enters or passes through A15.15, AP Hill's Division is to cross at the Meadow Bridges and move to Mechanicsville.
- DH Division & L Division: On the turn after AH Division crosses the Chickahominy River, these divisions are to cross and move to Mechanicsville.
- B-AH: Move to Mechanicsville via A15.15 & rejoin division.
- Valley Army: Move to Shady Grove Road, turn east, and move to Hundley's Corners. Halt and await further orders.
- Cav is attached to the Valley Army.
Victory
| Result | VP difference |
|---|---|
| Confederate Major Victory | 10 or more. |
| Confederate Minor Victory | 3 to 9 |
| Draw | 2 to -2 |
| Union Minor | -3 to -8 |
| Union Major | -9 or less |
Historically, the Union won a minor victory, mostly due to Confederate incompetence.
6.3 The 26th of June
This scenario postulates an earlier start on the 26th, including variable entry for Jackson's command.
General Information
- First Turn: 10 a.m. June 26th
- Last Turn: 8 p.m. June 26th
- Scenario Length: 21 turns.
- Maps Used: A & B
- First Player: Confederate
- Bridges Destroyed: The Upper Trestle Bridge (B51.06) New Bridge (B56.11) and Lower Trestle Bridge (B59.17) are all destroyed. All other Bridges are intact.
Union Information
Set Up:
- 1-5, Resb(4), 5b: w/i 3 A27.31
- PaR-5, 2x 5b: w/i 4 A36.32
- 2-5, 5b(3), Resb: w/i 5 B50.11
- 5 Corps HQ: B32.09
- 5 Corps Supply, Cav, Cav-5: w/i 5 B32.09
Artillery Ammunition: 40
Reinforcements: none
Orders:
- 5 Corps is to defend the line of Beaver Dam Creek.
- 2-5 is to defend the 5th Corps left flank and prevent a crossing of the New or Upper Trestle Bridges.
Confederate Information
Set Up:
- AH Division (less B-AH), A NVab: w/i 5 A27.04
- DH Division: w/i 5 A46.12
- L Division: w/i 5 A58.06
- A NVab: A42.15
- A NVa HQ, A NVa Supply, Left Wing Supply A NVab: w/i 2 A53.10
Artillery Ammunition: 45
Reinforcements:
- Group 1: B-AH at A1.14
- Group 2: W Division, J Division, E Division, Valley Army HQ & Supply, Cav at A1.14
Variable Arrival:
Starting with the 10 a.m. June 26th turn, the Confederate player rolls for the arrival of Group 1, above. On each hour turn, the Confederate player rolls two dice, and on a 10 or more begin the reinforcement process.
Once he has successfully rolled a 10, he may start bringing on his reinforcements. On the turn of the successful roll, B-AH (Group 1) arrives. On the turn after B-AH arrives, Group 2 (as listed above) arrives.
The Confederate player can voluntarily delay these arrivals in an effort to deceive the Union player, even if he has rolled a 10 (the roll is secret). Once this 10 is rolled, Jackson (or his leaders) can begin to attempt to get initiative, even if being held off map (ignore any loose cannon results while off-map).
Orders:
- AH Division: On the turn after B-AH enters or passes through A15.15, AP Hill's Division is to cross at the Meadow Bridges and move to Mechanicsville.
- DH Division & L Division: On the turn after AH Division crosses the Chickahominy River, these divisions are to cross and move to Mechanicsville.
- B-AH: Move to Mechanicsville via A15.15 & rejoin division.
- Valley Army: Move to Shady Grove Road, turn east, and move to Hundley's Corners. Halt and await further orders.
- Cav is attached to the Valley Army.
Victory
| Result | VP difference |
|---|---|
| Confederate Major Victory | 10 or more. |
| Confederate Minor Victory | 3 to 9 |
| Draw | 2 to -2 |
| Union Minor | -3 to -8 |
| Union Major | -9 or less |
Historically, the Union won a minor victory, mostly due to Confederate incompetence.
6.4 Across the Chickahominy
This scenario covers the 27th of June.
General Information
- First Turn: 4 a.m. June 27th.
- Last Turn: 8 p.m. June 27th.
- Scenario Length: 33 turns.
- Maps Used: A, B, & C
- First Player: Confederate
- Bridges Destroyed: The Upper Trestle Bridge (B51.06) New Bridge (B56.11) and Lower Trestle Bridge (B59.17) are all destroyed. All other Bridges are intact.
Union Information
Set Up:
- 5 Corps, 2x Resb, Resb (4), Cav: w/i 8 B51.30, but west or south of Boatswain's Swamp.
Artillery Ammunition: 35
Reinforcements:
Any time after any Union infantry unit has been attacked by any Confederate infantry unit, the Union player rolls for variable reinforcements. Roll one die during each subsequent Union command phase, and on a 5 or 6, bring in one variable division.
- On the first successful roll: bring on the 1-6 Division and a Resb.
- On the second successful roll: bring on the 1-2 Division.
- Each unit arrives at B62.26.
Orders:
- 5 Corps is to defend the line of Boatswain's Swamp, and the road exiting at B62.26.
- 1-6 and 1-2 Divisions, when they arrive, are attached to 5th Corps for all purposes.
Confederate Information
Set Up:
- DH Division: w/i 3 B15.26
- W Division, E Division, J Division, Jackson, Valley HQ and Supply, Cav: w/i 5 B6.10
- AH Division: w/i 2 B32.10
- L Division, A NVab: w/i 4 A30.23
- Lee, A NVa HQ and Supply, Left Wing supply: w/i 2 A30.23
Artillery Ammunition: 55
Reinforcements: none
Orders:
- DH Division is to move via Walnut Grove Road to the Beulah Church, and then to Old Cold Harbor and attack the Union forces around Boatswain's Swamp.
- The Valley Army is to move via Walnut Grove Church to Walnut Grove Road, and thence via Beulah Church to Old Cold Harbor, also to attack the Union positions.
- AH Division is to move via the Telegraph Road to New Cold Harbor and attack the Union forces behind Boatswain's Swamp.
- L Division is to move down the River Road, take up positions southeast of New Cold Harbor, and attack the Union position behind Boatswain's Swamp.
Victory
| Result | VP difference |
|---|---|
| Confederate Major Victory | 14 or more |
| Confederate Minor Victory | 4 to 13 |
| Draw | 3 to -2 |
| Union Minor Victory | -3 to -7 |
| Union Major Victory | -8 or less |
Historically, the result was a draw. The Confederate garnered 14 points for terrain and 5 for Union losses, but these were offset by Union awards of 10 points for Confederate losses, coupled with 7 points awarded for wrecking AH and DH divisions.
6.5 Gaines Mill
This scenario focuses on the fighting for Boatswain's Swamp on the afternoon of the 27th, known as the Battle of Gaines Mill.
General Information
- First Turn: 2:30 p.m. June 27th.
- Last Turn: 8 p.m. June 27th
- Scenario Length: 12 turns
- Maps Used: B & C
- First Player: Confederate
- Bridges Destroyed: The Upper Trestle Bridge (B51.06) New Bridge (B56.11) and Lower Trestle Bridge (B59.17) are all destroyed. All other Bridges are intact.
Union Information
Set Up:
- 3-1-5: B53.24 ex B52.24
- 5b: B52.24
- 1a-1-5: B52.25 ex B52.26
- 1b-1-5, 5b: B51.27
- 2-1-5: B50.28 ex B51.28 ex B49.29
- 3-2-5: B48.29
- 2-2-5: B47.31 ex B48.30 ex B47.32
- 5b: B47.31
- 1-2-5: B47.33 ex B47.34
- 5b(3): B47.35
- Pa-5: w/i 1 B53.30
- Cav-5, Cav: B54.28
- 5 Corps HQ and Supply: B55.31
- 2x Resb, Resb(4): w/i 3 B55.31
Artillery Ammunition: 35
Reinforcements:
- 2:30 p.m.: 3-1-6, Resb at B62.26
- 3:00 p.m.: 1-1-6, 2-1-6, Slocum at B62.26
- 5:00 p.m.: 2-1-2, 3-1-2, Repl Leader (for 1-2) at B62.26
Orders:
- 5 Corps is to defend the line of Boatswain's Swamp, and the road leading off at B62.26.
- 1-6 and 1-2 Divisions, as they arrive, are attached to 5 Corps for all purposes.
Confederate Information
Set Up:
- P-L: B52.20
- W-L: B53.21
- F-L, Pr-L: B51.21
- A-L: B50.21
- K-L, Lb: B47.21
- Lb: B48.20
- Ar-AH: B49.24
- F-AH: B48.24
- A-AH: B48.25
- AHb, one each, Limbered, in: B47.24, B46.24
- P-AH: B47.25
- B-AH: B46.25
- G-AH: B46.26
- R E Lee, A NVa HQ, Army Supply, Left Wing Supply: w/i 1 B43.19
- Ri-DH: B44.34
- Ro-DH: C44.01
- A-DH: C44.02
- G-DH: C44.03
- C-DH, A NVab: B43.34
- DHb, one each, Unlimbered in: C43.01, C43.02
- Cav: C41.03
- Valley Supply: B30.08
- Jackson, Valley HQ: B33.25
The following units are in column or limbered:
- Tr-E-V: C41.03
- E-E-V: B35.34
- Ta-E-V: B32.32
- Eb (4): B30.29
- L-W-V: B34.24
- H-W-V: B35.21
- Wb: B32.20
- W-J-V: B31.20
- J-J-V: B29.19
- F-J-V: B30.17
- La-J-V: B31.16
- Lb-J-V: B31.11
- Jb: B32.09
Artillery Ammunition: 50
Reinforcements: none
Orders:
- AH, DH, and L Divisions are to attack the Union line behind Boatswain's Swamp.
- The Valley Army is to march westwards down the Telegraph Road and deploy between the AH and DH Divisions. Once deployed, the Valley Army is to attack the Union line, and drive the Union troops off the south map edge. This order currently has a delay status of D2. Note that the Valley army can finish moving, but may not move into or south of the B45.xx hexrow, and may not attack until the D2 status is resolved.
- Cav is to defend the Old Cold Harbor crossroads.
Victory
| Result | VP difference |
|---|---|
| Confederate Major Victory | 14 or more |
| Confederate Minor Victory | 4 to 13 |
| Draw | 3 to -2 |
| Union Minor Victory | -3 to -7 |
| Union Major Victory | -8 or less |
Historically, the result was a draw. The Confederate garnered 14 points for terrain and 5 for Union losses, but these were offset by Union awards of 10 points for Confederate losses, coupled with 7 points awarded for wrecking AH and DH divisions.
6.6 Campaign Scenario 1: Lee's First Offensive
This Scenario combines the historical events of the first two days, and establishes Jackson's late arrival as a fact.
General Information
- First Turn: 3 p.m. June 26th.
- Last Turn: 8 p.m. June 27th.
- Scenario Length: 51 turns.
- Maps Used: A, B & C
- First Player: Confederate
- Bridges Destroyed: The Upper Trestle Bridge (B51.06) New Bridge (B56.11) and Lower Trestle Bridge (B59.17) are all destroyed. All other Bridges are intact.
Union Information
Set Up:
- 1-5, Resb(4), 5b: w/i 3 A27.31
- PaR-5, 2x 5b: w/i 4 A36.32
- 2-5, 5b(3), Resb: w/i 5 B50.11
- 5 Corps HQ: B32.09
- 5 Corps Supply, Cav, Cav-5: w/i 5 B32.09
Artillery Ammunition: 75
Reinforcements:
- At 9:00 p.m. of June 26th, 1x Resb appears on any south map edge hex.
- Starting with the 4:00 a.m. turn of June 27th, the Union player rolls two dice during each Command Phase.
- The first time he rolls a 10 or more, 1-6 Division and a Resb enters at any hex along the south edge of Maps B or C.
- Upon the second roll of 10 or more, 1-2 Division enters at any hex along the south edge of Maps B or C.
Orders:
- 5 Corps is to defend the line of Beaver Dam Creek.
- 2-5 is to defend the 5th Corps left flank and prevent a crossing of either the New or Upper Trestle Bridges.
- 1-6 and 1-2 are to move to the 5th Corps. Once there, they are attached to that corps.
Confederate Information
Set Up:
- AH Division (less B-AH), A NVab: w/i 5 A27.04
- DH Division: w/i 5 A46.12
- L Division: w/i 5 A58.06
- A NVab: A42.15
- A NVa HQ, A NVa Supply, Left Wing Supply A NVab: w/i 2 A53.10
Artillery Ammunition: 100
Reinforcements:
- 3pm, June 26th: B-AH at A1.14
- 3:30pm June 26th: W Division, J Division, Valley Army HQ & Supply, Cav at A1.14
Orders:
- AH Division: On the turn after B-AH enters or passes through A15.15, AP Hill's Division is to cross at the Meadow Bridges and move to Mechanicsville.
- DH Division & L Division: On the turn after AH Division crosses the Chickahominy River, these divisions are to cross and move to Mechanicsville.
- B-AH: Move to Mechanicsville via A15.15 & rejoin division.
- Valley Army: Move to Shady Grove Road, turn east, and move to Hundley's Corners. Halt and await further orders.
- Cav is attached to the Valley Army.
Victory
| Result | VP difference |
|---|---|
| Confederate Major Victory | 14 or more |
| Confederate Minor Victory | 4 to 13 |
| Draw | 3 to -2 |
| Union Minor Victory | -3 to -7 |
| Union Major Victory | -8 or less |
Historically, the result was a draw. The Confederate garnered 14 points for terrain and 5 for Union losses, but these were offset by Union awards of 10 points for Confederate losses, coupled with 7 points awarded for wrecking AH and DH divisions.
6.7 Campaign Scenario 2: North of the Chickahominy
This scenario duplicates the events of 6.6, but with the earlier start times and variable entry found in 6.3, above.
General Information
- First Turn: 10 a.m. June 26th.
- Last Turn: 8 p.m. June 27th.
- Scenario Length: 61 turns.
- Maps Used: A, B & C
- First Player: Confederate
- Bridges Destroyed: The Upper Trestle Bridge (B51.06) New Bridge (B56.11) and Lower Trestle Bridge (B59.17) are all destroyed. All other Bridges are intact.
All information is the same as 6.6, above, except for the following.
Confederate Information
Reinforcements:
- Group 1: B-AH at A1.14
- Group 2: W Division, J Division, E Division, Valley Army HQ & Supply, Cav at A1.14
Variable Arrival:
Starting with the 10 a.m. June 26th turn, the Confederate player rolls for the arrival of Group 1, above. On each hour turn, the Confederate player rolls two dice, and on a 10 or more begin the reinforcement process.
Once he has successfully rolled a 10, he may start bringing on his reinforcements. On the turn of the successful roll, B-AH (Group 1) arrives. On the turn after B-AH arrives, Group 2 (as listed above) arrives.
The Confederate player can voluntarily delay these arrivals in an effort to deceive the Union player, even if he has rolled a 10 (the roll is secret). Once this 10 is rolled, Jackson (or his leaders) can begin to attempt to get initiative, even if being held off map (ignore any loose cannon results while off-map).
6.8 Scenario Starting Strengths
The following chart provides the starting strengths for the various units at the beginning of each day. All scenarios that begin at anytime on the specified day use the starting strengths given below. Units with no strengths listed start that scenario at full strength. The ending strength column is presented purely for historical interest and has no bearing on any of the scenarios. It represents final strengths of the units.
- All units start 6.1, 6.2, 6.3. 6.6 & 6.7 at full strength
| Confederate Unit | At Start | June 27 | End |
|---|---|---|---|
| A-AH | 18 | 17 | 15 |
| Ar-AH | 13 | 11 | 8 |
| B-AH | 22 | 21 | 17 |
| F-AH | 15 | 12 | 10 |
| G-AH | 23 | 16 | |
| P-AH | 23 | 19 | 16 |
| A-DH | 20 |
| Union Unit | At Start | June 27 | End |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1a-1-5 | 18 | 8 | |
| 1b-1-5 | 16 | 7 | |
| 2-1-5 | 28 | 22 | |
| 3-1-5 | 25 | 19 | |
| 1-2-5 | 22 | 17 | |
| 2-2-5 | 25 | 22 | |
| 3-2-5 | 10 |
Gun Losses
Confederate:
- DH Division lost 1 gun point on June 27.
- W Division lost 1 gun point on June 26.
Union:
- 5 Corps lost 5 gun points on June 27
- 6 Corps lost 1 gun point on June 27.
7.0 Historical Notes
The Seven Days fighting was the culmination of McClellan’s campaign to endrun the Confederate Army and take Richmond. It was also Robert E. Lee’s first major action. Ultimately, McClellan, though not decisively beaten on the battlefield, was repulsed in the effort to capture the Rebel capital, while Lee and the newly renamed Army of Northern Virginia—though not wholly triumphant— began a string of victories that would keep similar Union threats at bay for two more years.
Once McClellan had restored the confidence and organization of the Union Army of the Potomac after Bull Run, political pressure mounted to open a second campaign against the Confederacy. Given that Richmond, the enemy capital, was a mere one hundred miles away, it was the obvious political and military target. Despite such pressure, George B.
McClellan remained a cautious man. It took him almost a year to initiate a new campaign.
The plan as finally conceived, however, had considerable merit. McClellan proposed to use the greater strategic mobility granted him by the Union navy instead of simply smashing his way overland. Initially the plan was for a short end run down Chesapeake Bay, to land near Fredericksburg and place the Union army squarely between the Confederate forces—still near Manassas in Northern Virginia—and Richmond. However, the abrupt withdrawal of the Confederates in early spring pre-empted this move, and McClellan next settled on the concept of sailing all the way to the mouth of Chesapeake Bay and landing on the Virginia Peninsula, near Yorktown. From there, it was only a few days march to the enemy capitol, and the main Rebel army would still be outflanked.
While excellent in concept, the execution of the maneuver proved flawed. McClellan’s vastly superior force ground to a halt in front of Yorktown, where less than 10,000 Confederate troops held a defensive line across the peninsula, and bluffed the self-styled Young Napoleon into taking the line by siege. McClellan spent almost a month entrenching his 100,000 man army and bringing up heavy cannon. Joseph E.
Johnston, the Confederate commander, used this gift of time to great advantage, concentrating all his available forces—almost 70,000 troops—to oppose the ponderous Union army. In the end, just as McClellan was about to begin active operations against the Yorktown line, Johnston retreated.
McClellan pursued, but the limited road network and his by now customary sluggishness resulted only in the limited rear-guard action of Williamsburg, a sharp but inconclusive action. By the end of May, however, The Union army was still poised a few miles east of Richmond, held at bay only by Johnston’s outnumbered Rebels.
McClellan found himself in somewhat of a precarious position, however. The Union First Corps—25,000 troops he had been counting on to move south via Fredericksburg in the wake of the retreating Confederates and link up with the Army of the Potomac outside of Richmond—had been withheld to ensure the safety of the Union Capitol. President Lincoln had stressed to McClellan the ultimate importance of keeping Washington secure at all costs, and required a strong Federal garrison remain behind while the Union army was on the Peninsula. McClellan had in effect, double counted the Union First Corps, including both in his own plans and as part of Lincoln’s garrison. When Jackson launched his Valley campaign to divert Union attention from the Peninsula, the scheme worked better than expected, as Lincoln promptly removed the First Corps and other forces from McClellan’s control to deal with the threat from the Shennendoah. The end result was that the Union Army straddled the Chickahominy River, with three corps north of the waterway waiting for McDowell while two corps deployed south of that river, in the fields around Seven Pines.
Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston was no stranger to political pressures himself. As Johnston’s army retreated ever closer to Richmond, President Davis grew more anxious for an attack against the Federals. At the end of May, with McClellan’s army split in two by the river, Johnston saw his chance, and attacked. Seven Pines (to be covered in depth in Volume Two of The Seven Days) was a mismanaged draw, and mostly worthy of note because of Johnston’s wounding on May 31st and replacement with Robert E. Lee. In Lee, Davis got exactly what he was looking for in a defender of Richmond—an aggressive commander who fully intended to destroy the Union invader through counter-attack.
Still, Lee spent a month preparing his new command. More troops—men Davis had been loath to turn over to Johnston, but willingly gave Lee—were brought forward, and commands were re-arranged. Lee had the men dig substantial defenses south of the Chckahominy, and Jackson was encouraged to make even more disturbance in the Valley.
For his part, McClellan seemed content to sit and wait. In the wake of Seven Pines, the Union army still remained astride the Chickahominy, though now the bulk of the force was south of the stream. Only Porter’s Fifth Corps, three divisions strong, remained north, still extending a nominal hand to McDowell’s First Corps in Fredericksburg.
Finally, McClellan at last initiated his final attack on Richmond, with a skirmish on June 25th at King’s Schoolhouse. This minor affair was destined to be McClellan’s last aggressive action in the campaign, because the next day Lee commenced his own offensive.
On Monday, 23 June, 1862, D. H. Hill rode up to Lee’s Headquarters and was surprised to see Jackson waiting patiently outside. Hill and Jackson were brothers-in-law, and as far as Hill knew, Jackson was still in the Valley confounding Federals. Lee’s plan called for the secret recall of Jackson’s men, newly reinforced to about 25,000 troops, to join with Longstreet and AP Hills’ divisions in crushing the Union Fifth Corps. With the general plan determined, the timing needed to be decided, and with Jackson having the farthest to come, it was decided that he should set the timetable. Jackson, who had ridden almost thirty miles through the night to get to the meeting, was clearly tired. His initial estimate was far to optimistic, for he set the beginning of the attack for June 25th, two days hence. At the urging of both Longstreet and Lee (both claimed credit for the postponement in later writings, but likely it was unanimous conclusion) Jackson set back the advance one day, and the battle was scheduled to begin at 3:00 a.m. on June 26th.
That night, Jackson departed to return to his command, and, upon arriving the next morning, discovered that his force had not marched well. The lead was at Beaver Dam Station, some 25 miles from the scene of the impending action, but the bulk of the command was scattered back over 20 miles. With the inflexible timetable of June 26th fast approaching, Jackson needed to get his force concentrated and moving quickly.
Still, it was not an impossible task. The distance from Beaver Dam Station to Slash Church (the designated jumping-off point for Jackson’s attack, about 5 miles from Mechanicsville) was 25 miles, and the Valley Army’s van had two days to cover the distance. Even the rearmost elements—with some 20 miles further to go—had the benefit of use of the Virginia Central railroad cars to help them along. None-the-less, Jackson was late.
Muddy roads were part of the problem, but as much to blame was Jackson’s ineffective staff, and a general loss of control of the units not directly under his observation. By nightfall on June 25th, Jackson was still short of Slash Church by 5 miles. and advanced the start time to 2:30 a.m. on June 26th to compensate.
June 26th turned out to be a mostly wasted day. Jackson’s arrival at Slash Church was supposed to trigger the advance of Branch’s brigade of A.P. Hill’s Division, who would lead his own, D.H. Hill’s, and Longstreet’s commands across the Chickahominy north of Richmond, march through Mechanicsville, and attack Porter’s front while Jackson hit the Union flank from the north.
Jackson was again delayed, this time by a late start and by Union cavalry which skirmished with his advance. By late morning, with no sign of Jackson, and amid growing impatience, AP Hill sent his troops forward across the river and into Mechanicsville. There they halted and continued the wait. Finally, by 3:00 p.m. with still no sign of Jackson, Hill rashly sent his troops forward to the attack. It was a foolish assault, made frontally against a Union line well sited along Beaver Dam Creek.
Floundering through the swamps, the Confederates were easily repulsed, losing 1400 men to Union losses of less than 400.
For his part, Jackson had arrived north of Mechanicsville that afternoon (about the same time that Hill decided to attack) but simply turned west down Shady Grove Church Road, and, upon reaching the crossroads at Hundley’s Corners around 5:00 p.m., encamped for the night. Jackson’s contribution to the initial phase of Lee’s great counter-offensive had been significant only by his absence.
While Lee was certainly disappointed by the day’s outcome, and especially disappointed with Jackson’s absence, He was too determined a general to give up. Porter seemed to be remaining north of the Chickahominy, and Lee prepared to renew the attack the next day.
That night, McClellan visited Porter at his 5th Corps headquarters, were initially euphoria reigned. Porter indicated that he could hold his current positions, if reinforced. Neither General seemed to be aware of Jackson’s menace to the 5th Corps’ flank, indeed McClellan believed that the troops that attacked Porter that afternoon were Jackson’s, and that the Valley Army was concentrated in his front, not his right rear. Still, by midnight, caution prevailed, and McClellan authorized Porter to retire to a more defensible position along Boatswain’s Swamp, at Gaines Mill.
McCellan’s last instructions to Porter were to hold at all costs, so that McClellan could proceed with the desired operations south of the Chickahominy.
Porter took those instructions to mean that McClellan was going to take the other four corps in the Union Army and attack Richmond directly, while Lee’s army was also divided by the Chickahominy. Indeed, Lee had taken quite a risk, with less than 30,000 men to oppose McClellan’s main body in front of Richmond while the bulk of the Army of Northern Virginia—55,000 men—were concentrated at Mechanicsville and Hundley’s Corners.
Certainly the man Lee chose to conduct this defense—Magruder again, reprising his performance at Yorktown—was a nervous wreck, and would not sleep a wink for more than two days, until June 28th.
McClellan, however, had no such intentions. Paralyzed by faulty intelligence reports, McClellan thought he was outnumbered both north and south of the Chickahominy, and feared to risk any aggressive action. Lee’s gamble paid off.
Lee’s intentions for June 27th duplicated those of the 26th: find Porter’s flank and overwhelm the 5th Corps both frontally and from the rear. Upon finding the Union troops gone from Beaver Dam Creek, Longstreet and AP Hill advanced along the River Road to a point opposite the new line, and prepared to attack. Jackson, now with D. H. Hill added to his force, was directed to find the flank of the Union Army and likewise attack.
Longstreet and AP Hill took up their new positions without delay, and by early afternoon were arrayed in front of Porter’s command.
Jackson, however, was less timely—again.
This time, the delay was due to a miscommunication between the terse General and his guide, a local soldier who knew the country. The plan called for Jackson to move to Old Cold Harbor, and there fall upon the Union flank. However, to the local guide acquired at Walnut Grove Church, Jackson merely said he wanted to go to Old Cold Harbor, without specifying a route. Duly informed, the guide simply took Jackson by the shortest route—via Gaines Mill. This road, however, instead of coming in on Porter’s flank, would lead the Valley Army directly behind AP HIll’s men, and then laterally through New Cold Harbor to Old Cold Harbor.
By mid-afternoon, with Longstreet’s and A.P. Hill’s action to be heard noisily to his front, Jackson realized he was not far enough to the east. Upon further questioning of the guide, he realized what had gone awry, and indicated to the guide where the Valley Army actually needed to be. Forced to counter-march and seek out a detour on country roads crowded with 25,000 men and cannon, delay was inevitable.
This time, Lee had not chosen to wait. At 2:30 AP Hill sent his 6 brigades forward to attack Porter. Savage fighting resulted, as stubborn Confederate infantry made repeated frontal attacks on Porter’s men. At 3:30, Lee widened the fight by committing Longstreet on Hill’s right, hoping all the while that Jackson would be engaged momentarily. Now 12 brigades of Confederates were in action, and a major battle was joined.
For his part, Porter was calm and steadfast.
As Hill opened the action, Porter asked for Slocum’s Division of the 6th Corps, one of the units McClellan had pre-arranged to come to Porter’s aid should the fighting become severe. Slocum came quickly to bolster the Union line, and Porter’s position seemed tenable.
As Longstreet became fully engaged, The first of Jackson’s men finally reached the battle. Ewell’s Division of three brigades arrived at Old Cold Harbor around 3:30 p.m., and Lee sent them into action without delay.
Further, he dispatched Campbell Brown—one of Ewell’s staff officers—to find the rest of Jackson himself and get the Valley Army fully engaged. AP Hill’s men had suffered severely, and Lee feared a counterattack against their vulnerable ranks.
By 4:30 p.m., the fighting had become general. Longstreet’s 6 brigades had launched a series of bloody attacks to divert attention from AP Hill, and both Ewell and D. H. Hill’s Divisions were also engaged. AP Hill had mostly retired from the fight, holding his portion of the line but no longer pressing home attacks. By now Porter was proud of his men, but worried about the repeated pounding. He had committed most of his reserves, and called on McClellan for more troops to shore up the line. Another division, this time from 2nd Corps, was dispatched over the river to Porter’s aid. Whiting’s Division, of the Valley Army, now appeared on the field, but out of place— too far to the right. Whiting’s two brigades, Hood and Law, had come up behind Longstreet’s position and were committed where they arrived. Dusk was closing in, and Lee wanted a final effort before darkness finished the fighting. Whiting’s men were chosen to spearhead a new attack on the Union Center.
It was now approaching 7:00 pm.
Longstreet’s men had been in action about two hours, and in turn were losing effectiveness.
Still, the troops were ready for a final effort, and Longstreet prepared for a full-scale attack to support Hood and Law.
Hood’s Texans always later claimed that they were the first to break through the Union line at Boatswain’s Swamp, crossing a large open field and then up a wooded slope without stopping to fire. Certainly the Union center was ruptured by the fury of the attack, and Hood’s star was fully ascendant from that day onward, but the truth is that large numbers of other troops had a hand in the victory, and the Union position really crumbled from several points at once. Longstreet’s supporting attack certainly helped, with five of his brigades going in to the right of Whiting’s men. Further, renewed efforts by D.H. Hill and Ewell’s Divisions—another eight brigades—to the left overwhelmed Union defenders there.
Porter’s Federal defenders had had enough. Without reserves—unlike Lee, who had enough men to replace the fought-out men of AP Hill’s Division—Porter’s men had fought all afternoon, with heavy losses. This last attack proved too much, and Hood’s spearhead was only the first of multiple penetrations of the line. Suddenly, everyone was retreating, while Union commanders tried to rally the men on new positions.
Porter had no choice but to order a general retreat. The two brigades from Second Corps arrived on the field in time to help stem the tide, but were not committed to trying to restore the original line, obviously an impossibility now. It was in the course of this general collapse that the Union Cavalry commander, Cooke, thought he saw an opportunity. Seeing Union cannon threatened with capture, he ordered the Union cavalry to charge the enemy, which it did promptly. The Cavalry lost heavily, and Cooke maintained that the charge saved a number of guns, but the Union artillerymen claimed that the resultant confusion cost even more guns, since it interfered with the escape of a couple of batteries.
Nightfall allowed Porter to get his men back across the Chickahominy safely. Losses were heavy, but the 5th Corps retreated as a formation, and preserved its combat integrity. Fortunately, however, for the tired men in the ranks, it would not see heavy fighting for the rest of the campaign. McClellan’s reaction is the most interesting, however. He was convinced that larger defeat loomed at any moment, and Lee’s illusory other 100,000 men attacked his front south of the Chickahominy, which had been quiet all day. That night he sent a highly insubordinate telegram to Washington, which reported the state of affairs, his efforts to stave off disaster, and closed with the damning line (addressed to Stanton and President Lincoln) “You have done your best to destroy this army.” Shocked, the telegraph operator at the Capitol omitted the line from the message delivered to the President, and likely saved McClellan’s career from an abrupt ending.
Even so, that part of McClellan’s message that did get through was highly critical. He blamed the defeat on a lack of troops—clearly referring to McDowell’s Corps, withheld at Fredericksburg, and claimed that twenty or thirty thousand more men would have made the difference. Of course, he had 65,000 men sitting idle on the south side of the Chickahominy, some (like Hooker and Kearney even urging immediate attack) but his fear of Lee’s remaining men was to great to allow more than a few brigades to be sent to Porter’s aid.
For Lee’s part, it was another inconclusive battle. Gaines Mill cost the Confederate about 9,000 losses, while the Union lost closer to 7,000 men. Porter had been defeated but not destroyed, and yet another flanking movement had gone awry, converted instead into a bloody frontal attack. Jackson had been the major disappointment on two consecutive days, and worst of all, Magruder was still trying to defend the direct approach to the Rebel Capitol outnumbered two to one. Lee needed a new plan.
For his part, McClellan failed to recognize any of the advantages he still possessed. Most significantly, the Union army was now concentrated and mostly unblooded, all south of the Chickahominy, while Lee had major forces out of position north of that stream.
McClellan, however, always looked to his rear first, and withdrawal to the south had left the Union supply line to White House unguarded.
Certainly a change of base was in order, but McClellan’s final decision went far beyond that—he decided that the whole army must retreat to the James without delay. In essence, he surrendered the initiative completely into Lee’s hands, and was never to get it back.
8.0 Designer's Notes
The first thing that confronted me as I set out to design this project was that McClellan was most often conspicuous by his absence.
Despite the fact that the Union commanding general regarded the fighting on June 27th as the deciding action concerning the survival of his army, he never once crossed the river to have a look at that fighting firsthand. Ergo, any Union player would be hampered by having to rely on written orders emanating from off the south map edge, a substantial handicap.
The next fact that would effect every aspect of the game is the substantial numeric advantage that the Confederate enjoyed—if we only consider the actions north of the Chickahominy. McClellan, having elected not to join Porter himself, also proved quite parsimonious with troops. In future scenarios, where both sides of the Chickahominy are in play, this advantage is offset by the powerful Union numbers advantage south of the River, and will not be a play-balance issue. For Gaines Mill, however, it is something of a problem.
The solution I’ve chosen is to give the Union player fairly cheap troop options. The extra VP amounts have been deliberately reduced for the 1st Corps, 2nd Corps and the 6th Corps options, letting the Federal “buy” extra forces inexpensively. With all options in play, the Union player can field 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th Corps—numbers that quickly negate the Confederate advantage.
Bear in mind that The Seven Days was designed as an integrated project, and all of the smaller scenarios are meant to compliment the larger picture. As such, some of the scenarios are included as historical snapshots of the larger action, and are not always finely balanced of themselves. As a rule of thumb, the Union player in Gaines Mill has the more difficult job on his hands, and should be captained by the more experienced player.
While on the question of numbers, I should mention the discrepancies players might find in the Union totals. While doing the research for this project, I kept finding inconsistencies between the number of effectives that brigade commanders reported and the numbers found in the divisional and corps consolidated returns. I didn’t have numbers from every brigade, but those I did have—if averaged out for the army as a whole— would have produced Union strengths far below those generally assumed for McClellan and the Army of the Potomac.
The are several possible explanations for this shortfall, I think. First, the army had a serious problem with disease, and sickness kept a lot of men out of the ranks—even sickness of a temporary nature. Second, the army at this time had a bad habit of detaching lots of men for rear-area duties that did not remove them from the effective rolls, but kept them out of the firing line. Finally, those brigadiers who did report their numbers tended to stress the paucity of their ranks as a method of highlighting the relative hardships they faced, and my brigade sample was almost certainly skewed downwards by that fact.
The end result of this numbers game is that I did drop the Union effective totals somewhat, to reflect the disease and detachment problems, but not near as much as some of the brigade reports would reflect. What the player will find if he looks is a seeming mistake, sometimes brigade numbers don’t agree for a given action, and the overall totals seem a little too low for infantry effectives. I think, however, that my compromises give a better glimpse of the kind of bayonet strength the Army of the Potomac could call on during any given day of the Seven Days.
This game has a large number of special rules, attributable to the fact that for the first time, the CWB is attempting to recreate more than a couple of days of continuous action.
Also, the nature of the Confederate command structure was so amorphous that simply designating a few wings and letting it go at that misses one of the essential lessons of the campaign—the difficulties of coordinating large forces.
The Confederate command rules were conceived to address these issues. I tried to recreate Lee’s problem—to forge a command structure on the fly with the existing personnel. The leader ranking system points directly to the fact that the army worked on a seniority based system, and higher-ranked officers would not serve under lower-ranking men, no matter the relative merits involved. Hence, the Confederate player can recreate the wing commands he needs to craft a better army, but only within the strict limits set by the bounds of seniority and officers’ honor. Jackson’s command, the Valley Army, was left intact at start due to its already semi-autonomous nature. The other rule I deemed essential was fatigue. Knowing, however, that many of you will find additional record-keeping tiresome, I’ve made the rule optional. Playing without it will simply speed up the action, but not otherwise effect the outcome of the game. In fact, I recommend using it only for the longest scenarios, and ignoring it for the shorter games. Its effect in Gaines Mill is slight, but it will become more important in later games. By the time we are recreating the entire week of the campaign, its value will be apparent.
The Union Engineer, at first glance, serves no useful purpose here. It’s not called for in any scenario. However, its function can be pretty important in the larger game, and I wanted players to have it available in case they wanted to experiment on their own.
Order of Battle and Counter Manifest
Union Forces
Army of the Potomac
Command:
- McClellan
- A Pot HQ
- A Pot Supply
- Cav Cooke
- Eng Woodbury
- Reserve Artillery
- (6x 5-rated, 1x 4-rated batteries)
1 Corps:
- McDowell
- 1 Corps HQ
- 1 Corps Supply
- 1 Corps Artillery (3x 5-rated batteries)
- Cav-1 Baynard
1-1 Division:
- Shields
- 1-1-1 Kimball
- 2-1-1 Ferry
- 3-1-1 Tyler
- 4-1-1 Carroll
2-1 Division:
- Ricketts
- 1-2-1 Tower
- 2-2-1 Duryea
- 3-2-1 Hartsuff
3-1 Division:
- King
- 1-3-1 Auger
- 2-3-1 Patrick
- 3-3-1 Gibbon
- 4-3-1 Doubleday
2 Corps:
- Sumner
- 2 Corps HQ
- 2 Corps Supply
- 2 Corps Artillery
- (2x 5-rated, 1x 4-rated batteries)
1-2 Division:
- Richardson
- 1-1-2 Caldwell
- 2-1-2 Meagher
- 3-1-2 French
2-2 Division:
- Sedgwick
- 1-2-2 Sully
- 2-2-2 Burns
- 3-2-2 Dana
5 Corps:
- Porter
- 5 Corps HQ
- 5 Corps Supply
- 5 Corps Artillery
- (3x 5-rated, 1x 3-rated batteries)
- Cav-5 Farnsworth
1-5 Division:
- Morell
- 1a-1-5 Martindale
- 1b-1-5 Martindale
- 2-1-5 Griffen
- 3-1-5 Butterfield
2-5 Division:
- Sykes
- 1-2-5 Buchanan
- 2-2-5 Lovell
- 3-2-5 Warren
Pennsylvania Reserves (PaR) Division:
- McCall
- 1a-PaR-5 Reynolds
- 1b-PaR-5 Reynolds
- 2-PaR-5 Meade
- 3-PaR-5 Seymour
6 Corps:
- Franklin
- 6 Corps HQ
- 6 Corps Supply
- 6 Corps Artillery (2x 5-rated, 1x 2-rated batteries)
- Cav-6 McReynolds
1-6 Division:
- Slocum
- 1-1-6 Taylor
- 2-1-6 Bartlett
- 3-1-6 Newton
2-6 Division:
- Smith
- 1-2-6 Hancock
- 2a-2-6 Brooks
- 2b-2-6 Brooks
- 3a-2-6 Davidson
- 3b-2-6 Davidson
Confederate Forces
Army of Northern Virginia
Command:
- RE Lee
- A NVa HQ
- A NVa Supply
- A NVa Artillery (3x 5-rated batteries)
- Cav Stuart
- Left Wing HQ
- Left Wing Supply
AP Hill’s Division:
- AP Hill
- A-AH JR Anderson
- Ar-AH Archer
- B-AH Branch
- F-AH Field
- G-AH Gregg
- P-AH Pender
- 2x 5-rated Artillery Batteries
DH Hill’s Division:
- DH Hill
- A-DH GB Anderson
- C-DH Colquitt
- G-DH Garland
- Ri-DH Ripley
- Ro-DH Rodes
- 1x 5-rated Artillery Battery
- 1x 4-rated Artillery Battery
Longstreet’s Division:
- Longstreet
- A-L RH Anderson
- F-L Featherston
- K-L Kemper
- P-L Pickett
- Pr-L Pryor
- W-L Wilcox
- 2x 5-rated Artillery Batteries
The Valley Army
Command:
- Jackson
- Valley HQ
- Valley Supply
Ewell’s Division:
- Ewell
- E-E-V Elzey
- Ta-E-V Taylor
- Tr-E-V Trimble
- 1x 4-rated Artillery Battery
Jackson’s Division:
- Winder
- F-J-V Fulkerson
- J-J-V Jones
- La-J-V Lawton
- Lb-J-V Lawton
- W-J-V Stonewall
- 1x 5-rated Artillery Battery
Whiting’s Division:
- Whiting
- H-W-V Hood
- L-W-V Law
- 1x 2-rated Artillery Battery
Department of North Carolina
- Holmes
- Da-NC Daniel
- Dr-NC Drayton
- E-NC Evans
- M-NC Martin
- W-NC Wise
- 3x 5-rated Artillery Batteries
- 1x 4-rated Artillery Batteries