This Hallowed Ground Rulebook

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

• 1.0 Terrain and Map Notes
  • 1.1 Stone Walls
  • 1.2 The Sunken Road
  • 1.3 Railroad Cut
  • 1.4 Runs
  • 1.5 Slopes and Extreme Slopes
  • 1.6 Sloping Ground
  • 1.7 Boulders (Devil's Den Only)
  • 1.8 Orchards
  • 1.9 Bridges and Fords
  • 1.10 Buildings and the Town of Gettysburg
  • 1.11 Map Assembly
• 2.0 Union Special Rules
  • 2.1 Wing Command
  • 2.2 Hancock
  • 2.3 Union Reserve Artillery
  • 2.4 Union Special Leaders
  • 2.5 Attachments and Detachments
  • 2.6 Lockwood's First Separate Brigade
  • 2.7 Sickles the Incredible
  • 2.8 Berdan's Sharpshooters
  • 2.9 Union Minor Variants
• 3.0 Confederate Special Rules
  • 3.1 Confederate Anti-Initiatives
  • 3.2 Leader Replacements
  • 3.3 Confederate Special Leaders
  • 3.4 Attachments and Detachments
  • 3.5 Stuart's Cavalry Division
  • 3.6 Cavalry Action: East
  • 3.7 Confederate Minor Variants
• 4.0 General Special Rules
  • 4.1 Jenny Wade
  • 4.2 Rain
  • 4.3 Breastworks
• 5.0 Victory
  • 5.1 Points for Terrain
  • 5.2 Points for Losses
  • 5.3 Points for Wrecked Formations
  • 5.4 Determining Victory
• 6.0 Scenarios Set Up Notes
• Short Scenarios—one map or less
  • 6.1 Battle for Barlow's Knoll
  • 6.2 McPherson's Ridge
• Medium Scenarios—two maps
  • 6.3 The First Day
  • 6.4 Crisis at the Crossroads
  • 6.5 Little Round Top
  • 6.6 Culps Hill
  • 6.7 Pickett's Charge
• Large Scenarios—Three or more Maps
  • 6.8 The Second Day
  • 6.9 The Whole Union Line Ablaze
  • 6.10 The Third Day
  • 6.11 The Fourth Day
  • 6.12 The Battle of Gettysburg
  • 6.13 The Battle of Gettysburg—4 Maps
• Designer's Notes
• Historical Notes
  • Doles and his Georgians
  • Ewell's Fatal Hesitation
  • Slocum on July 1st
  • Greene on the Other Hill—Culp's Hill, July 2nd
  • Longstreet and Gettysburg
  • To Flank or Not to Flank: Captain Johnston's Recon
  • Meade versus Sickles
  • Hunt versus Hancock
  • Lee and Gettysburg
• Bibliography
• Officer Seniority List
• Artillery Unit Listing
• Losses and Scenario Starting Strengths
  • Union Forces
  • Confederate Forces
• Confederate Reinforcement Schedule
• Union Reinforcement Schedule

1.0 Terrain and Map Notes

1.1 Stone Walls

There are a large number of stone walls on the map. They don't have a large effect, but were used as impromptu breastworks. However, some common sense needs to be used here. Only one player can use a given stone wall at a time. The player adjacent to a given stone wall "first" (i.e., set up there or arrived at the wall before the other player) gets the benefit. In virtually every case, who "owns" the stone wall should be obvious. Stone walls have no direction—they "work" both ways.

1.2 The Sunken Road

The Sunken Road protective hexsides are all hexsides around a Sunken Road hex except those the road runs through (or would run through upon extension if the hex is at either end of the road). The Sunken Road is not the same as a Trench hex.

1.3 Railroad Cut

Units cannot fire across Railroad Cut hexsides from the lower side; units can fire through such hexsides from the top with no penalty.

1.4 Runs

There are a number of in-hex water features on the map referred to as "Runs". These are provided for historical reference and a visual "cue" for terrain elevations. They have no effect on play, since at this point these streams were militarily insignificant. Streams and Creeks that run along a hexside DO have significant game effects, and should not be confused with the in-hex Runs. The "Run" designation is applied to a water feature because of its in-hex nature, ignore historical stream names in this determination.

1.5 Slopes and Extreme Slopes

Three features represent elevation change. The thin contour lines represent simple elevation changes and are not Slope hexsides. The thick contour lines are slopes. Crossing one of the thick lines constitutes crossing a regular Slope hexside, while crossing two (or more) of them along a single hexside constitutes crossing an Extreme Slope. The contour lines are drawn to generally conform to the hexsides, but do not follow them ridgidly. It is usually obvious when (and how many) contour lines are crossed from one hex to another. Should an ambiguity exist, a unit's movement can be assumed to follow a straight path from approximate hex center to approximate hex center. There is no additional effect (beyond already being an Extreme Slope) for having more than two thick contour lines into a hex.

Design Note: Contour lines represent a departure for us from the map graphics that have become the CWB standard. However, I chose to use contour lines instead of the more common hexside symbols for a number of reasons. First, the change in scale added a lot of slope symbols, taxing and possibly exceeding the abilities of the computer. Second, we needed ways to reduce visual clutter from that shown on the playtest maps. Finally, we liked the look of Rick's base artwork, and wanted to maintain the natural feel he showed.

1.6 Sloping Ground

In addition to the hexside Elevation, Slope and Extreme Slope features, there is a Sloping Ground hex. Sloping Ground more accurately reflects steep hillsides. These symbols do not effect line of sight.

1.7 Boulders (Devil's Den Only)

Any unit that moves into or through a Boulder hex is automatically Shaken. Such units must remain Shaken (or worse) as long as they remain in these hexes—they cannot recover to Normal, nor can they accept any BL result.

1.8 Orchards

Ignore one Orchard hex in any hex along an LOS. Two or more Orchard hexes block LOS normally. As always, ignore the terrain of the firer and target unit hexes in LOS determination. Any hex that contains one or more complete Orchard tree symbols is an Orchard hex.

1.9 Bridges and Fords

Wherever a Pike, Road, Railroad, or Trail (all called "road" here for simplicity) crosses a Creek, or Stream, the road negates the water feature for units using the road's movement rates. Assume that virtually all of these crossings are bridges. Fords exist only in the couple of locations where an actual Ford symbol exists.

1.10 Buildings and the Town of Gettysburg

The densely marked hexes within the town of Gettysburg identify the only hexes of that type. The "edge" of this "urban" area is easy to tell. All other buildings are for historical interest and have no effect.

1.11 Map Assembly

The maps are designed to fit together in a sort of triangular arrangement, with A, B, and C along the top row and D and E in the center on the second row. The offset of D and E toward the middle of the other three maps should be noted—any attempt to make the edges of D flush left with A will fail miserably!

2.0 Union Special Rules

2.1 Wing Command

Before Meade arrives, the Union forces are under a Wing Commander (Reynolds had been given authority over the 1st, 3rd and 11th Corps the day before). Before Meade arrives, the Wing Commander functions as army commander in most respects (Reynolds is exempt from 10.6). The Wing commander uses orders, and cannot use initiative. He does not command his own corps, rather the senior available divisional commander does and orders from the Wing Commander to his own corps (via the acting Corps Commander) follow normal order acceptance procedures. Reshuffle the commanders within the Wing Commander's corps according to the Seniority list (same process as filling in for a casualty).

When Reynolds is the Wing Commander, he has one important difference, he has no formal HQ (his HQ is in the saddle, as it were). He (alone) is exempt from the Army Command rules (10.6). Should Reynolds stop being Wing Commander for any reason other than the arrival of Meade, place a Div Goal HQ marker in the hex of his successor to Wing Command. This HQ marker represents the Acting Army HQ and all the rules regarding the army HQ and the army commander (10.6) apply to any Wing Commander other than Reynolds.

A Wing Commander is also known as the Acting Army Commander. This assignment is temporary—lasting only until Meade arrives. Should Meade later become a casualty, normal command succession takes place (the new army commander is a real one, not a Wing Commander).

The Senority Lists provide order of rank for all leaders. With the exception noted in 2.2 below, no leader can serve under a leader of lesser rank.

2.2 Hancock

When Meade learned of Reynolds' death, he turned to another corps commander in whom he had great trust to hurry to the scene and take command—Winfield Scott Hancock. If Reynolds becomes a casualty while Wing Commander, Hancock will arrives four hours (16 turns) later at entry area K and becomes the Wing Commander. If this requires Hancock to arrive after his normal entry time, have him arrive normally instead. In the interim between Reynold's loss and Hancock's arrival, the next senior corps commander present (unfortunately, this means Howard...) becomes the Wing Commander. Hancock replaces him when he arrives.

Exception: if Slocum or Sedgwick is Wing Commander, ignore this rule.

2.3 Union Reserve Artillery

The Union artillery reserve is an Army Reserve formation with the Regimental Sub-Series Rules, section 10.5a, part D applying to Army Reserves in effect.

2.4 Union Special Leaders

A number of leaders have special effects, to better represent their actions. Three of these men were Union artillery officers; while one was not a solder at all, but the town constable.

2.4a Hunt. Henry Hunt was on Meade's staff as Chief of Artillery, and it is largely due to his influence that Union artillery was so well prepared for the battle. For example, he insured that the Union army had so much extra artillery ammunition available as to be ready to fight for another three days even after this battle!

Any artillery within 2 hexes of Hunt can combine fire at a single target as a group, ignoring the restriction that no more than three batteries may fire at a single target.

Hunt can roll for initiative and effect any Union artillery unit, regardless of their corps organization. For example, Hunt could roll initiative and if successful, attach the 3rd Corps artillery to the 1st Corps. Hunt can only effect 6 batteries at one time, but he can reassign or issue orders to another 6 batteries as often as he successfully rolls initiative. These orders may be acted on once initiative is rolled, regardless of the unit's distance from Hunt (he does not need to be stacked with them and so on).

Hunt can automatically (no die roll) reassign any Union batteries he is stacked with at the start of a turn. He can do this in addition to any re-assignment via initiative and these batteries do not count against the 6 per turn limit.

2.4b Tyler. Tyler commands the Artillery Reserve. He is subject to the normal command rules, and has authority only over units in the Artillery Reserve.

Reserve Artillery within 2 hexes of Tyler can combine fire at a single target as a group, ignoring the restriction that no more than three batteries may fire at a single target.

2.4c McGilvery. Freeman McGilvery is an unsung hero of the battle. Technically, he was in command of the 1st Volunteer Artillery Reserve Brigade, but he was Tyler's ranking subordinate. It was his forceful action that stabilized the Federal line in the aftermath of the 3rd Corps defeat on July 2nd. McGilvery assembled a ragtag force of artillery (some 16 guns from various batteries) and held a defensive line with little or no infantry support.

Any Artillery within 2 hexes of McGilvery can combine fire at a single target as a group, ignoring the restriction that no more than three batteries may fire at a single target.

On a successful initiative roll, McGilvery may assume command of up to 6 Union batteries from any Union formation and give them orders. This initiative must still take the form of an order, and this force is not independent, but any previous orders or assignments are superseded for the units in question. McGilvery may never effect more than 6 batteries at a time. He may dissolve his ad-hoc command during any command phase by allowing the batteries in question to return to their normal chain of command, and on a subsequent turn (not the same command phase) he may roll for initiative to take command of up to 6 more batteries. All batteries in his command must be within normal brigade command radius of McGilvery—and must be within that radius when the initiative roll is made to form the ad-hoc artillery command.

2.4d John Burns. John Burns was the seventy year old town constable, an War of 1812 Veteran, and apparently nobody to fool with. He joined the Union troops on July 1st and fought most of the day with them. He was lightly wounded three times, but didn't leave the field. He seemed to hold a personal grudge against the Confederates for running off his cows the week before.

Burns provides a normal leader morale bonus for any Union unit he stacks with. While he is handled as any leader, he cannot roll for initiative (or effect command in any other way), and cannot help to rally routed units. Roll for leader loss normally, but Burns ignores wounds (roll of 12 on the dice) and there is no Victory Point cost for losing Burns. The only other restriction is that he has only 6 movement points, not 12 like other leaders. He is—after all—a seventy year old man on foot. In any July 1 Scenario, Burns starts in hex B33.18 and is free to move on turn one. He is completely independent. If he has not already been killed, he is automatically removed from play at 6:00 p.m., July 1.

2.5 Attachments and Detachments

2.5a Divisions. No Union division with a regular corps assignment—such as Wadsworth's 1st Division a regular part of 1st Corps—can be attached to another corps. If using any of the various options that call for extra Union troops, each of those optional divisions (Naglee and French) can be attached to any Union corps, but never more than one division per corps. Any Union division can be detached and given a Divisional Goal.

2.5b Brigades and Regiments. No Union brigade or regiment can ever be assigned to act as part of another division or brigade. Up to one Union brigade per division can be detached and given a divisional goal. Any optional troops in play already have nominal divisional assignments, and must follow these rules when in play. Regiments are never allowed to be detached or attached.

2.5c Scenario Specific Rules. Some scenarios will detach or attach various units in direct violation of the above. Only these "illegal" detachments are allowed, in which case any orders for them will be spelled out in detail.

Design Note: Obviously, there were times when the army left units behind on detached duty, to guard trains or a flank. Hence the provision for 2.5c above. Also, there are numerous times when regiments from one corps were sent to another sector to provide reinforcements. However, to grant this freedom while remaining within historical limitations would add to the record-keeping burden for very little gain.

2.6 Lockwood's First Separate Brigade

The regiments of this brigade trace command radii normally to their brigade commander. However, Lockwood has no divisional commander, and instead traces his command radius directly to the 12th Corps HQ, with a normal divisional radius of 12 movement points.

Design Note: These three regiments were sent to the Army of the Potomac as a reinforcement from the Washington garrison at the end of June, and only joined the 12th Corps at the last minute. Given the convoluted nature of the 12th Corps command, whereby Slocum retained "wing" command and let Williams run the Corps, this left Ruger to command the 1st Division. Lockwood was senior to Ruger but much less experienced, and Slocum did not want to replace a veteran divisional commander with a green one in the middle of a major battle.

2.7 Sickles the Incredible

In addition to the regular Loose-Cannon rules, Sickles treats any Distorted Acceptance Table result as a Loose Cannon result.

Design Note: Sickles was a crony of Hooker, whom Meade had just replaced, and was further convinced of his own military prowess in the aftermath of Chancellorsville, where he felt his command had been needlessly exposed by professional officers (read: West Pointers) and badly cut up. He was likely to second-guess Meade's orders as happened on July 2nd when he advanced to the Peach Orchard position.

2.8 Berdan's Sharpshooters

The Union has three semi-independent units. The 1st US SS and the 2nd US SS—nominally part of the 2/1/3 brigade—are instead always able to act independently provided they stay within 15 hexes (not movement points) of any 3rd Corps leader. Similarly, the 1st Mass SS (nominally part of the 2nd Division 2nd Corps) can act independently provided it remains within 15 hexes of any 2nd Division, 2nd Corps leader. However, this last unit was also unique in that they carried rifles with heavy telescopic sights—normally left in the wagons on the march—which made it a true sniper unit. If this unit joins in firing on a hex with a leader in it, that leader is killed on a 2, and wounded on a 11 or 12. Alternatively, this unit may "fire" on any hex containing an enemy leader up to 8 hexes away, given a clear LOS. No roll on the Fire Combat Results Table is needed: roll two dice; 2 kills the target leader, a 12 wounds him. If more than one leader is in the hex, roll for each leader.

2.9 Union Minor Variants

2.9a 2/3/5 Brigade. When the 3/5 Division (Crawford's Division) arrives, let this brigade arrive with it. This option gives the Confederates 2 VPs.

This division was one of those serving in the Washington's defenses, even though it was veteran infantry. As the Union Army moved north, two brigades of this command were sent forward. The remaining brigade could easily have been sent along as well.

2.9b 12 Corps Early Arrival. Allow 12 Corps to arrive at 12:30 p.m., July 1st, entry area F, with its historical orders. Ind/12 (Lockwood's Brigade) still arrives at its normal time. This option gives the Confederates 6 VPs.

Slocum's Original orders for July 1st were to march to Two Taverns, and halt to be within supporting distance of Reynolds. Two Taverns was only a few miles from Gettysburg, (and only a short distance from the east map edge) and Slocum halted there about 11:30 a.m. However, confusion and a lack of initiative from Slocum did not get the 12 Corps onto the field until after 4:00 p.m.

2.9c French's Division. Add French's Division to the Union Army. It arrives at 8:00 a.m. July 2nd, entry area E. Upon arrival, the Union player must either assign it to a corps, or move it directly to the Army HQ to await further orders. This option gives the Confederates 3 VPs.

This divison is really the Harper's Ferry's garrison, along with the remnants of Milroy's Valley troops, defeated by Ewell at Winchester in June. During the battle, this force remained at Frederick, Maryland, and joined the army to follow Lee back to Virginia. Historically, these troops were incorporated into the 1st and 3rd Corps on July 14th, with French taking command of 3rd Corps.

2.9d Naglee's Division. Naglee's Division enters at 9:00 a.m., July 2nd, entry areas E or F. Upon arrival, this unit is subject to the same rules as French's Division above. This option gives the Confederates 2 VPs.

This is a composite command drawn from the Baltimore, Washington, and Fort Monroe garrisons. These troops were assembled in central Maryland in early July, and were incorporated directly into the Army of the Potomac by mid-month. Naglee (the District of Virginia's commander) assumed the Harper's Ferry District's command on July 10th.

2.9e An End to File Closing. Allow 6 US/R/1/Cav to arrive with the rest of its brigade, and at full strength. Allow 12 and 15 Vt to arrive with 3/3/1. Allow 7 Ind/2/1/1 to arrive with 2/1. Allow 41 NY, 61 Ohio, 75 Ohio, and 154 NY to arrive with their 11 Corps commands, or arrive at full strength. This option gives the Confederates 3 VPs.

All these units could have been with their commands at the start of the action, which might have helped the July 1st battle. The two regiments of Stannard's Brigade (3/3/1) were left behind at Emmitsburg to guard baggage for the 1st Corps. The 15th was ordered by General Sickles to move to Gettysburg, but on arrival there during the day on the 2nd, was promptly sent back to Emmitsburg by Stannard. Emmitsburg remained a sensitive point throughout the battle because of fears of a Rebel flanking move in that direction.

2.9f Buford does not Withdraw. Ignore the withdrawal of Buford and the two brigades of 1/Cav. They remain in play. This option gives the Confederates 3 VPs.

Buford wanted to rest and refit his command, which had been doing hard service since late June. Pleasonton agreed to send him back to Westminster, but failed to ensure that other cavalry were sent to replace 1/Cav's flank guard duties. This sloppy staff work exposed the Federal left at a dangerous time.

3.0 Confederate Special Rules

3.1 Confederate Anti-Initiatives

Lee has a -1 anti-initiative rating. No other leader (on either side) has an anti-initiative rating.

3.2 Leader Replacements

Leaders (including Lee) are replaced according to the Seniority Lists. No leader can serve under a lower ranking leader.

3.3 Confederate Special Leaders

3.3a Major General Trimble. Isaac Trimble went north with the army after recovering from a serious wound, and did not have a command. However, he replaced the wounded Pender as divisional commander on July 2nd. Use him to replace any divisional commander who has either become a casualty or been promoted to corps command. Once used, Trimble functions normally as a division commander in all respects, and cannot subsequently replace any other division commander. Of course, should the Confederate player be so careless as to lose all the other senior officers of a corps that Trimble was serving in, Trimble could be promoted to corps commander. Such a player has taken the phrase "leading from the front" too literally.

3.3b Alexander. Where the Union gets no less than three special artillery leaders and a town cop, the Confederates get only one—Lt. Colonel E. Porter Alexander. Alexander was Longstreet's chief of reserve artillery, nominally commanding just his own corps artillery battalion. However, not only did he routinely assume direction of Eshleman's Battalion, but he also acted here as a de-facto tactical corps artillery commander as well, exerting considerable influence over the divisional battalions. Longstreet placed a great deal of trust in this excellent officer.

Any artillery units within 4 hexes of Alexander can fire at a single target as a group, ignoring the restriction that no more than two batteries may fire at a single target.

Alexander can roll for initiative and issue orders to any Confederate batteries in the 1st Corps. He can command any and all batteries of the 1st Corps as a separate command, with the batteries tracing radius directly to him as if he were a brigade commander, and with normal divisional radius traced from him back to 1st Corps HQ. A separate order—generated either via normal channels or via successful initiative rolls from Longstreet or Alexander himself—is required to establish this grand battery, and the order is assumed to take force immediately. The units to be included in this separate command can be anywhere on the map at the moment it is established—then, these units must move so as to be within normal command radii of Alexander.

3.4 Attachments and Detachments

3.4a Divisions. Each Confederate corps can attach up to one extra division from another corps as the player chooses. Such an order may only come from the Army commander. Corps Commanders cannot use initiative to poach divisions from other corps. Once accepted, the division must immediately start moving to join the new command and is subject to that command's orders. In addition, any number of divisions can be detached and assigned divisional goals.

3.4b Brigades and Regiments. Brigades and regiments cannot be attached to other commands. Up to one brigade per division can be detached and given divisional goals. No regiments can be detached.

3.4c Sceanrio Specific Rules. Some scenarios call for units to be detached or attached in violation of these rules. In all cases, this is the only time that this is allowed.

3.5 Stuart's Cavalry Division

While technically only a division, Stuart's command numbered seven brigades totalling around 11,000 men. All of Stuart's brigades can be given Divisional Goals. Brigades not assigned Divisional Goals trace radii normally to the Cavalry HQ. Use the division to a corps HQ radius of 12 MPs. That there is no "higher" HQ that Stuart must trace to.

Any Confederate cavalry brigade can be attached to a corps, and upon acceptance of the appropriate order (or successful initiative roll by the cavalry brigade leader or Stuart, not the attaching corps commander) must move to and trace command radii to the new corps HQ.

3.6 Cavalry Action: East

At any time after Stuart arrives, the Confederate player can send Stuart and up to four unwrecked brigades off the east map edge. These units may exit any Map C edge hex, and are removed from play for the remainder of that day. This movement requires an accepted order or initiative on Stuart's part. The Confederates cannot send a wrecked brigade.

If Stuart leaves, the Union player must immediately send the same number of cavalry brigades off the east edge of Map C or E, less one. For example, if Stuart takes 4 Brigades, the Union must send at least 3. The Union player need not issue orders for this departure, but if he fails to get the brigades off the east map (C or E) edge within 4 turns of the last Confederate Brigade exit, he gives the Confederates 4 VPs. If either the 1/3/Cav or 2/3/Cav Brigades have not yet entered play they can count as part of the Union's brigade requirement. A wrecked Union Cavalry Brigade cannot be used.

At 4:00 a.m. the next day, all exited brigades return, with orders to join the Army HQ and await further orders. Confederate Cavalry returns at any hex of map C north of the C20.xx hexrow, while Union Cavalry returns at any hex of map C south of the C35.xx hexrow.

This whole process can only be executed once per game and only in scenarios where all maps are in play (even if folded to generate a four map campaign surface).

3.7 Confederate Minor Variants

3.7a Pickett's Division at Full Strength. When P/1 Division arrives, allow C/P/1 and J/P/1 to arrive with it. This option gives the Union 2 VPs.

These brigades were retained around Richmond to help defend the capitol. Lee wanted them to rejoin for the move north.

3.7b An End to File Closing. Add the following regiments to their brigades when those brigades first arrive: 1 NC Bn and 54 NC regiment, from A/E/2; 13 VA and 58 VA Regiments, from S/E/2; and 44 NC Regiment, of P/H/3. This option gives the Union 2 VPs.

These units were left behind in Virginia to perform guard duties. All told, they number about 1500 men, and might well have proved handy in Pennsylvania.

3.7c Ransom's Division. Allow the R/1 Division to enter at 8:00 a.m. July 2, entry area A. This option gives the Union 3 VPs.

These troops were from North Carolina, but had previously served with Longstreet's command in the Army of Northern Virginia in 1862. They were among the men Lee wanted for the invasion.

3.7d Robertson and Jones. Allow R/Cav to enter at 1:00 p.m. July 3rd, at area A. Allow Jo/Cav and Chew/Arty/Cav to enter at 11:30 a.m. July 3rd, entry area K. R/Cav gives the Union 1 VP. Jo/Cav and Chew give the Union 1 VP.

Both these brigades were called forward on June 30th to help cover the Army's right flank. Jo/Cav fought a successful action against the 6th US Cavalry at Fairfield, and tried to defend Fairfield Gap against Union horsemen. Both units could easily have been brought forward.

3.7e Fireball Lee. This option allows the Confederates to replace the 2-rated Lee with the 4-rated Lee. Further, ignore Lee's anti-initiative rating. This option gives the Union 4 VPs.

For whatever reasons, Lee was not at his best at Gettysburg. Various explanations have been advanced—ranging from his health to recalcitrant subordinates. This option assumes that Lee was in top form.

3.7f DH Hill's Corps. Allow all or part of Hill's Corps to arrive at 4:00 p.m. July 2. Hill's Corps contains three divisions, plus Hill, the Corps HQ, and supply units. Each division of Hill's Corps gives the Union 2 VPs. The use of Hill, Corps HQ, and supply give the Union a further 2 VPs.

Lee really hoped that as he moved north, Richmond would bring troops out of the Carolinas under Beauregard and menace Washington from the south. That plan was never to be and we could not represent it meaningfully here. However, Lee also felt that the more strength he was given, the more damage he could do the to Union war effort. These troops were readily available in the Carolinas and Hill was the natural choice for corps command. Certainly it would have been a major risk to send this force to join Lee, but it was a risk that was taken in 1864, when Richmond was threatened.

3.7g Buckner's Division. Allow Buckner's Division (B Division) to enter at Noon, July 2nd, entry area A. This option gives the Union 3 VPs.

These men were in East Tennessee at the time. Buckner assumed command that summer, and by August had taken the division to join Bragg (allowing Burnsides' 9th Corps to occupy Knoxville). These troops could have moved north instead.

3.7h Jackson Lives!. Replace Ewell with Jackson as 2nd Corps' commander. Treat Ewell like Trimble. Further, ignore Lee's Anti-initiative rating. This option gives the Union 3 VPs.

Thunder At The Crossroads was elaborate in its Jackson scenarios. However, this is the one almost everyone used. We assume that Jackson was not mortally wounded by his own men at Chancellorsville. I would be careful about stacking him with North Carolinians, however, because it is not wise to tempt fate...

3.7j Old Nemesis—Hooker and McClellan. Replace Meade with either Hooker or McClellan. Hooker yields the Union 3 VPs, McClellan gives them 2 VP. Meade resumes command of 5th Corps, and Sykes returns to command the 2/5 division. Treat Ayres like Trimble. If McClellan is chosen, however, all Union troops always get an additional +1 shift on the Morale Table.

Only true unreconstructed Rebels will chose this option in conjunction with the "Fireball Lee" and "Jackson Lives" options above, but I suspect there are some of you out there. In any case, Here we can assume that the Lincoln administration was either unwilling to change commanders in mid-campaign (Hooker) or returned the man whom the army had the most confidence in (McClellan).

4.0 General Special Rules

4.1 Jenny Wade

What Gettysburg game is really complete without this selfless heroine, killed in her own kitchen while baking bread? In all cases, set up Jenny in hex B39.22. She may never move, and John Burns may never enter this hex while she lives. (Burns seemed to dislike her—perhaps because she was the only resident who, even dead, got as much or more attention as he did.) If that hex is ever fired on, roll for leader loss for Jenny normally and remove her if she is killed or wounded. If she is killed, the Union gets 1 VP, if wounded 0 VP.

The Good Jenny. Place Jenny Blue side up. No additional rules to that above.

The Naughty Jenny. Of course, folks being folks, there will always be the darker rumors that "baking bread" was a euphemism, if you know what I mean. Burns being the town cop, and Jenny being the town "baker," this might explain their animosity as well. In that case, use any Jenny rule you deem appropriate, apply the below if you like (hate mail for the below should be directed at Dean, rather than Dave, as he put these rules in here):

a) Place Jenny Red side up as the 'bakery' is open for business.

b) Any Confederate unit that enter's B39.22 is "locked" in place for a number of turns equal to the strength of the regiment. If other regiments enter the hex, they too are "locked", but their time does not begin until all earlier arrivals have "worked" through their "locked" period. Each leader entering the hex is "locked as well, one full turn per leader and leaders go to the head of the line (postponing the finishing of regiments already there...be sure that leaders are handled in rank order. See f) regarding General Lee.

c) A Locked Confederate regiment cannot move, can fire (see below), and is still subject to normal Morale results. A Locked Regiment fires with its normal strength minus one SP.

d) Jenny has no effect on Union units.

e) If a unit (either side) routs from or through Jenny's hex, remove Jenny from play.

f) Should the player allow General Lee to be part of b) above (you cad), roll one die after Lee has his turn. 1-2 Lee dies of a heart attack, 3-6 he survives. Repeat this roll each time Lee becomes Locked. One would expect the Reb player to show more respect than that...

God help the Rebs (and Jenny) if an army corps moves through her hex...

4.2 Rain

At 2:30 p.m. on July 4th, it starts to rain. Once the rain begins, visibility drops to three hexes for all purposes, and all non-road movement costs 1 extra movement point per hex for all units except cavalry, HQs and leaders. Once begun, the rain lasts until the game's end.

4.3 Breastworks

Breastwork use at this time was very limited, as it was not a customary practice to entrench heavily. However, such works did have impact on Culps Hill as the Union 12 Corps did fortify.

Each player can create breastworks in any hex with a friendly unit, provided it meets the following criteria:

1. The hex must be a Forest or Rocky hex (or any combination).

2. One of the commanders for the entrenching unit must have successfully rolled for initiative expressly for the purpose of entrenching, and no leader can roll more than three times per GAME. If one leader fails, a subordinate is allowed to roll in turn to see if his units can entrench. Hence, a corps commander could roll, and if he fails, then any divisional or brigade leaders could still roll—as long as no one rolls more than three times per game. The army commander can NEVER issue orders to entrench.

3. It takes three full hours (12 turns in the day) to build breastworks. During that time, constructing units cannot move, fire, be in any morale state worse than shaken, or recover stragglers. If they do any of those things, construction is paused, but the turns accumulated are not lost. Record how long each hex has been under construction, and resume construction when all the criteria are again met.

Breastwork Effects:

A) Breastworks have three hex facing, the same frontal hexes as the constructing unit. Once emplaced, the facing cannot be changed.

B) Breastworks have the same effect as being behind a stone wall.

C) Breastworks effects are not cumulative—if a breastwork is built along a stone wall, there is no additional benefit to the unit.

5.0 Victory

In most scenarios, the winner is determined through Victory Points, awarded as described below based on losses, terrain, and damage to enemy formations.

Each side totals up its victory points (VPs), and then the two totals are compared to determine the victor. Generally, the higher total wins, with the degree of success determined by the difference in the totals.

All losses are cumulative for the scenarios. For those scenarios that start in the middle of the battle, pre-game loss totals are given which should be added to the on-map tracks for each side. This effect is designed so that the battle is not fought in a vacuum, but rather that each side carry a certain amount of historical baggage into the action.

5.1 Points for Terrain

Each side receives victory points for holding various terrain hexes at the scenario's end. A side is defined as holding a VP hex by having troops in it, or having been the last to move through it, at the game's end. There are VP hexes on all 5 maps, with some VP hexes being worth more to one side than the other. In any scenario, only award VPs for hexes on maps in play. For example, in Scenario 6.3, only maps A and B are used. Hence, no VPs would be awarded on maps C, D or E.

Hex	Confederate Award	Union Award
A5.13	1	2
A46.10	1	2
B10.09	1	1
B14.26	1	1
B33.11	1	1
B43.23	3	3
B46.29	2	3
C13.17	1	0
C37.01	1	1
C44.25	2	0
D5.25	1	1
D12.03	1	3
D39.13	1	0
E8.31	3	1
E20.02	3	3
E31.27	3	0
E43.26	3	0
E62.06	3	1

5.2 Points for Losses

Each side receives victory points for total losses inflicted on the enemy. Each loss should be recorded on the loss track provided. In some instances, scenarios will start with previous losses, and those losses should be recorded on the loss track before play begins. Keep track of permanent losses here, not stragglers. VPs are awarded as per the chart below. Obviously, VPs for Confederate losses would be awarded to the Union, and vice versa.

VP	Union losses	Confederate losses
0	1-79	1-64
1	80-159	65-124
3	160-249	125-194
5	250-324	195-259
7	325-409	260-324
10	410-494	325-389
13	495-574	390-454
16	575-659	455-519
20	660-749	520-594
25	750+	595+

If the Rebel is using 3 or more optional divisions (R/1, B Div, H/H, T/H or J/H) both sides should use the Union losses VP awards column.

5.3 Points for Wrecked Formations

Victory Points are also awarded for wrecking larger formations. All kinds of losses count when determining wrecked formations, including stragglers. These VPs are meant to measure the combat readiness (or lack thereof) at any given time, not necessarily the longer term ramifications of them.

Award 1 VP for each wrecked enemy Infantry Brigade.

Award 1 VP for each wrecked enemy Cavalry Regiment.

VPs are awarded for inflicting significant damage on enemy Corps. A wrecked Corps is determined by adding up the number of wrecked brigades within it—if it equals or exceeds the minimum number listed below, award the opposing player the corresponding VP number.

In some instances, units have withdrawn before the game's end. Any such unit that leaves still counts for VP purposes with the status it had when it departed. A unit that was wrecked when it was withdrawn is not assumed to recover stragglers and un-wreck.

Confederate VPs for wrecked Union formations:

Formation	Threshold	VP
1 Corps	5 of 7 Brigades	5 VP
2 Corps	6 of 10 Brigades	5 VP
3 Corps	4 of 6 Brigades	4 VP
5 Corps	5 of 8 (or 9) Brigades	5 VP
6 Corps	5 of 8 Brigades	5 VP
11 Corps	4 of 6 Brigades	3 VP
12 Corps	4 of 6 Brigades	3 VP
Each Cavalry Brigade wrecked	—	1 VP
Fr Division	2 of 3 Brigades	1 VP
Na Division	2 of 3 Brigades	1 VP

Union VPs for wrecked Confederate formations:

Formation	Threshold	VP
1 Corps	6 of 11 brigades	10 VP
1 Corps	or 7 of 13 Brigades	11 VP
1 Corps	or 8 of 15 Brigades	12 VP
2 Corps	7 of 13 Brigades	10 VP
3 Corps	7 of 13 Brigades	10 VP
Each Cavalry brigade wrecked	—	1 VP
H Corps	7 of 12 Brigades	8 VP
B Div	2 of 3 Brigades	2 VP

5.4 Determining Victory

There are two kinds of victory conditions. Some scenarios have specific conditions, and the above VP awards are ignored. Other scenarios use these VP awards. If so, total up each side's victory points, and subtract the Confederate total from the Union total. This will yield a number, either positive (more Union points) or negative (more Confederate points.) Comparing the number found above to the victory levels determines the winner and his degree of success.

Finally, each scenario lists who won it historically and by how much.

6.0 Scenarios Set Up Notes

1. All leaders, if not specifically listed in a given hex, can set up stacked with or adjacent to any subordinate unit. If none of that leader's forces are in play, neither is the leader.

2. Some units are listed with a number in parenthesis immediately following the unit designation. That is the unit's current strength.

3. Set up notation will take one of four forms:

A) Units will be listed in a specific hex. place these units in that hex.

B) A formation will be followed by two or more hexes, and then a listing of any understrength units in that formation (only the understrength units are so listed—all set up. unless specified otherwise, even if not in that list). The units can be placed in any or all of the hexes; but all hexes listed must be occupied.

C) A formation will be listed as "w/i X" a hex. All units of that formation are placed anywhere within that many hexes, inclusive, of that hex.

D) Units of a formation can set up with any unit of another formation. These units must set up stacked with a unit of that formation.

4. Most scenarios will designate previous losses, even if not needed for victory. This allows players to start scenarios as alternate campaign starting points. If you do, use the final victory conditions listed in 6.12. Players can disregard tracking losses if not needed for a scenario's victory conditions.

5. Leader losses and promotions will be specified in the set-ups. Deploy appropriate Replacement Leaders if needed.

6. Stragglers are present to be recovered ONLY if listed for a specific brigade in a given scenario. Otherwise, assume all stragglers have already been recovered.

7. Previously wrecked regiments are listed for certain brigades. These boxes should be marked off before play begins.

8. Use only victory points awarded for terrain on maps in play.

9. The Confederate Playerturn is always first.

Short Scenarios—one map or less

6.1 Battle for Barlow's Knoll

This scenario looks at the 11th Corps fight north of town, where Early's Confederate Division, supported by Doles' excellent brigade, handily defeated Barlow and Schurz' divisions. It is a good introduction to the system, though play favors the Confederates.

General Information

Map Area: Map B north of hexrow 31.xx, east of hexrow xx.15. First Turn: 3:15 p.m. July 1 Last Turn: 5:30 p.m. July 1 Total Game Length: 10 Turns.

Union Information

Set Up: 1/3/11 157 NY—B18.16 45 NY—B16.16 61 Ohio—B15.18 74 Penn—B14.20 82 Ill, I 1Ohio/11 Corps—B 17.20 13 NY Battery—B17.21 2/3/11 (58 NY(2))—w/i 1 25.22 1/1/11 54 NY—B15.28 68 NY—B14.27 153 Penn, G 4US/11 Corps—B14.26 2/1/11 25 Ohio—B13.26 107 Ohio—B13.25 75 Ohio(5), 17 Conn—B15.25 11 Corps HQ and Supply, Schurz—B26.19

Orders: 11 Corps is to defend the ground between Rock Creek and Oak Ridge, north of town; subject to the specific restrictions listed below:

No unit of 1/3/11 can move east of the Carlisle Road until 4:00pm.

2/3/11 is the Corps reserve, and cannot move for two turns unless initiative is rolled for. From 3:45pm on, it is free to move anywhere in play.

1/11 Division is to defend Blocher's Knoll.

A Repl Leader commands 1/3/11, Schimmelfennig commands the 3/11 Division, and Schurz commands the 11 Corps.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Artillery Ammunition: unlimited. Previous Losses: None

Reinforcements: 1/2/11 and K 1Ohio/11 Corps arrive at B31.22 at 4:15 p.m. 1/2/11 is attached to 1/11 for command purposes.

Confederate Information

Set Up: Do/R/2 21 Ga—B10.18 44 Ga—B10.20 4 Ga—B10.21 12 Ga—B10.22 G/E/2 60 Ga—B10.26 31 Ga—B10.27 13 Ga—B11.28 61 Ga—B11.29 38 Ga—B11.30 26 Ga—B12.31 Garber, Green, Crngton/Arty/E/2—w/i 1 B14.32 H/E/2 5 La—B8.29 6 La—B8.30 9 La—B9.31 7 La—B9.32 8 La—B10.32 A/E/2—w/i 1 B8.33

Orders: Do/R/2 and E/2 are to attack and clear the area north of town, between Rock Creek and Oak Ridge

26 Ga is to stay with and support the Arty/E/2 batteries.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Artillery Ammunition: unlimited. Previous Losses: None

Reinforcements: None.

Victory:

The Confederates win a massive victory if there are no Union troops north of hexrow 25.xx by 4:15 p.m.

The Confederates win a major victory if there are no Union troops north of hexrow 29.xx by the game's end, Union losses are at least 1.5 times as many as Confederate losses, and there are at least 10 wrecked Union regiments.

The Confederates win a minor victory if two of the three conditions for major victory are met.

The Union wins a minor victory if only one of the Confederate major victory conditions is met.

The Union wins a major victory if none of the Confederate major victory conditions are met.

The Union wins a massive victory if none of the Confederate major victory conditions are met, and he still retains control of Blocher's Knoll at the game's end.

Historical outcome: The Confederates won a major victory.

6.2 McPherson's Ridge

This scenario examines an action that tends to be overlooked: the fierce fighting Pender did against the Union First Corps along McPherson's and Seminary Ridges. Generally overshadowed by the 11th Corps' collapse, Pender's men were successful in breaking the final Union line and driving the battered 1st Corps back into town, from which the Confederates were recalled for fear of confusion in the streets.

It is a little awkward due to having to fight it on the seam of Maps A and B, but with careful back folding you can reduce the play area to one-map size. I included it because it so rarely gets any close look.

Some brigades listed below do not set up with all their units. Ignore any units not listed.

General Information

Map Area: Eastern 1/2 Map A, Western 1/2 Map B First Turn: 2:00 p.m. July 1st Last Turn: 5:30 p.m. July 1st Total Game Length: 15 Turns

Union Information

Set Up: 1 Corps HQ and Supply—B26.10 Reynolds is dead, Doubleday(3/1) commands Corps 1/1/1 6 Wisc(4)—B23.10 7 Wisc(6)—B24.02 2 Wisc(5)—B25.02 24 Mich(8)—B26.02 19 Ind(5)—B27.03 2/1/1 147 NY(4), 95 NY(4)—B21.11 56 Penn(3), 76 NY(5)—B20.10 84 NY(4)—B19.11 Wadsworth—B24.07 1/2/1—all units w/i 1 B22.13 2/2/1 11 Penn, 97 NY—B17.12 88 Penn, 83 NY—B16.11 12 Mass—B15.12 90 Penn—B15.13 1/3/1—Repl Leader, Rowley commands 3/1 Division 121 Penn—B34.04 80 NY—B32.04 142 Penn—B29.05 151 Penn—B27.05 2/3/1 143 Penn—B23.07 149 Penn—B23.06 150 Penn—B23.05 1 Corps Artillery E&L 1 NY—B30.04 B 4US—B25.10 5 Maine—B28.09 B 1 Penn—B29.10 2 Maine—B27.10 1/1/Cav 8 Ill—A39.34 12 Ill, 8 NY(11), 3 Ind(5), A 2US, Buford, Gamble—w/i 1 B33.15

Orders: 1 Corps is to defend the line of Seminary and McPherson's Ridges from attack from the west.

6 Wisconsin is to support the artillery by the Railroad Cut.

1/Cav Division is to support the 1 Corps flank along the Fairfield Road, and prevent the Confederates from flanking the Union line to the South.

8 Ill Cav is to defend the forward line of the Fairfield road, and to retire to Seminary Ridge and join the rest of its brigade if attacked.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Artillery Ammunition: unlimited, no units have stragglers, and there are 20 previous losses. 2/1/1 has one regiment wrecked.

Reinforcements: None

Confederate Information

Set Up: 2 Corps HQ and supply—B7.07 R/R/2—w/i 1 B4.08 D/R/2 53 NC—B8.10 43 NC—B8.09 32 NC—B8.08 45 NC—B8.07 2 NC Bn—B8.06 I/R/2 12 NC, 23 NC—B10.08 20 NC—B10.09 5 NC—B10.10 O/R/2 12 Ala—B10.11 6 Ala—B 10.12 26 Ala—B10.13 5 Ala—B9.13 3 Ala—B9.11 Arty/R/2 Fry—B10.09 Page—B10.12 Reese—B10.13 Carter—B9.11 ANVa HQ, 3 Corps HQ and supply—A16.29 D/H/3 55 NC(7)—B15.33 42 Miss(5)—A16.32 2 Miss(4)—A17.32 B/H/3 55 Va—A20.32 47 Va—A21.32 40 Va—A22.31 22 Va Bn—A23.31 P/H/3 26 NCb—A27.31 26 NCa—A28.30 11 NC—A29.31 47 NC—A31.31 52 NC—A32.30 A/H/3 14 Tenn(2), 5 Ala Bn—A34.29 13 Ala(3)—A35.30 1 Tenn(3)—A36.29 7 Tenn(3)—A37.29 Arty/H/3—w/i 3 A31.27 L/P/3 28 NC—A29.23 37 NC—A30.22 33 NC—A31.22 7 NC—A32.21 18 NC—A33.21 P/P/3 14 SC—A24.25 12 SC—A25.25 13 SC—A26.24 1 SC—A27.24 S/P/3 34 NC—A18.28 13 NC—A19.28 16 NC—A20.27 38 NC—A21.27 22 NC—A22.26 T/P/3 35 Ga—A13.30 45 Ga—A14.29 49 Ga—A15.29 14 Ga—A16.28 Arty/P/3—w/i 2 A15.27 P/3 Corps Arty—w/i 3 A17.29 M/3 Corps Arty—w/i 1 A18.32

Orders: 2 Corps is to attack and clear the line of Oak and McPherson's Ridges south to the Railroad Cut.

3 Corps is to attack and clear Seminary Ridge west of town. Heth is to clear McPherson's Ridge, with Pender in support and ordered to take Seminary Ridge after McPherson's Ridge is cleared.

D/H/3 is to support the artillery along Cashtown Pike.

L/P/3 is to protect the Confederate flank along the Fairfield Road between Herr Ridge and McPherson's Ridge.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Artillery Ammunition: unlimited. D/H/3 has 6 stragglers and two wrecked regiments, A/H/3 has 4 stragglers and 3 wrecked regiments. There are 18 previous losses.

Reinforcements: None.

Victory:

Confederate Massive—fulfill all the following conditions; A) inflict 1.5 times as many losses on the Union as they lose, B) wreck at least 5 brigades of Union 1 Corps, C) no Union units remain on Oak or Seminary Ridges north of Fairfield Road by 5:00 p.m. turn, and D) have no more than 4 Rebel brigades wrecked.

Confederate Major—fulfill at least 3 of the above conditions

Confederate Minor—fulfill 2 or less of the above conditions.

Union Minor—The Confederates fulfill only 1 of the above conditions

Union Major—The Confederates fulfill none of the above conditions

Union Massive—The Confederates fulfill none of the above, and suffer at least 1.5 times as many losses as the Union.

Historical outcome: The Confederates won a major victory, fulfilling all conditions but A.

Medium Scenarios—two maps

6.3 The First Day

This scenario covers the fighting on July 1st, with two Federal corps trying to hold off portions of two Confederate corps as they approach from the north and west. The historical action played itself out as a delaying action as the Union troops managed to successfully keep the Confederates off the hills south of town, near the Cemetery.

General Information

Map Area: Maps A and B First Turn: 8:00 a.m. July 1st Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. July 1st Total Game Length: 49 Turns

Union Information

Set Up: 1/1/Cav 8 NY—B26.05 8 Ill—A14.26 12 Ill—B22.05 3 Ind—B19.06 2/1/Cav 6 NY—B16.06 9 NY—B14.07 17 Penn—B11.09 Buford, A 2US Battery—B23.05

Orders: 1/Cav Division is to defend McPherson's Ridge until the arrival of 1st Corps.

8 Ill Cav (1/1/Cav) is to delay the Confederate advance as long as possible, withdrawing to McPherson's Ridge, where it will rejoin its command.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Artillery Ammunition: 100, no previous losses.

Reinforcements:

Area	Time (variable time)	Units	Orders
B62.08	9:00 a.m.	Reynolds, 1 Corps HQ, Wadsworth 1/1 (minus 7 Ind/2/1/1) 2 Maine Battery/1 Corps Arty	1
B62.08	10:00 a.m.	Howard, 11 Corps HQ	2
B62.08	10:00 a.m.	Doubleday B 4US, 5 Maine, EL 1 NY batteries/1 Corps Arty	3
B62.08	10:30 a.m.	Robinson, 2/1, 1 Corps Supply	3
A62.24	10:45 a.m.	1/3/1, B 1Penn/1 Corps Arty	4
B62.08	10:45 a.m.	2/3/1	4
B62.22	11:45 a.m. (11:00)	Schurz, 3/11 (58 NY/2/3/11 has strength 2) I 1 Ohio Battery/11 Corps Arty	3
B62.08	12:00 a.m. (11:30)	Barlow, 1/11 (minus 41 NY/1/1/11 and 75 Ohio/2/1/11 has strength 5) G 4US battery/11 Corps Arty	3
B62.22	12:30 (12:00)	K 1 Ohio, 13 NY, I 1 NY batteries/11 Corps Arty	3
B62.22	1:15 p.m. (12:15)	Von Steinwher, 2/11, 11 Corps Supply (154 NY/1/2/11 has strength 4)	5
B62.08	5:00 p.m. (4:00)	7 Ind/2/1/1	3
B62.35	4:15 p.m. (11:30 a.m.)	Slocum, 12 Corps HQ and Supply	6
B62.35	4:30 p.m. (*)	Williams, 1/12, F 4US, M 1NY batteries/12 Corps Arty	7
B62.08	5:30 p.m. (4:30)	Sickles, 3 Corps HQ and Supply, Birney 1/1/3, 2/1/3, E 1 RI, 2 NJ Batteries/3 Corps Arty	8
B62.35	5:00 p.m. (*)	Geary, 2/12, F PennLt, K 5US Batteries/12 Corps Arty	3
-	5:00 p.m. (-)	add 2 SP each to 58 NY/2/3/11 & 75 Ohio/2/1/11 add 1 SP to 154 NY/1/2/11	-
B62.08	6:30 p.m. (5:00)	3/3/1	3

Order explanations:

1. 1 Corps is to move to McPherson's Ridge and defend the McPherson's Ridge—Seminary Ridge—Oak Hill line. Reynolds assumes wing command.

2. 11 Corps is to defend the 1 Corps right flank north of town, between Oak Hill and Rock Creek.

3. These units are ordered to join their command.

4. 1/3/1 and B 1 PennLt/1 Corps Artillery are to follow the road north along Willoughby Run to the Fairfield road, cross the Run and move north to join the rest of the Corps. 2/3/1 is to move to join the corps.

5. 2/11 Division is to halt and defend Cemetery Hill.

6. Move to Cemetery Hill and defend.

7. Roll 2 dice. On a roll of 8+, 1/12 Division and the attached artillery enters with orders to join 12 Corps. Otherwise, this force does not arrive.

8. Move to join acting army commander and await further orders.

Confederate Information

Set Up: No Confederate units start on-map.

Orders: as per Reinforcement Schedule.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Artillery Ammunition: 125, no previous losses.

Reinforcements: As given in the Reinforcement Schedule between 8:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. July 1st. Treat Arrival Hex D as hex B2.35. Ignore the arrival of S/E/2, at 3:00 p.m. July 1st. All orders remain as given in the Reinforcement Schedule.

Victory:

Result	VP
Union Massive	10+ VP
Union Major	5 to 9 VP
Union Minor	0 to 4 VP
Draw	-4 to -1 VP
Confederate Minor	-8 to -5 VP
Confederate Major	-13 to -9 VP
Confederate Massive	-14 or less VP

Historical outcome: The Confederates won a major victory with -10 VPs.

6.4 Crisis at the Crossroads

This scenario covers the fighting that represented the bulk of the action on July 1st: The Afternoon Engagement.

General Information

Map Area: Maps A and B First Turn: 2:00 p.m. July 1st Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. July 1st Total Game Length: 25 turns

Union Information

Set Up: Set up as per Scenario 6.2, adding the following units: Howard, Div Goal HQ A—B43.23—Howard is Wing commander, Div Goal HQ A is the Acting Army HQ 11 Corps HQ, Schurz—B26.19—Schurz(3/11) commands Corps 1/11 (less 41 NY/1/1/11) G 4US Battery/11 Corps—w/i 2 B23.25 2/11, I 1NY, K 1Ohio Batteries/11 Corps, 11 Corps Supply—w/i 3 B43.23 1/3/11—w/i 1 3 B20.17—Repl Leader, Schimmilfennig commands 3/11 Division 2/3/11, 13NY, I 1Ohio Batteries—w/i 2 B23.19 2/1/Cav—w/i 3 B29.29

Note: These units set up with this strength—58 NY/2/3/11 (2), 75 Ohio/2/1/11 (5), 154 NY/1/2/11 (4).

Orders: Orders are as given in Scenario 6.2, plus:

11 Corps is to defend the Union line north of town, subject to the below.

1/11 is to advance to Blocher's Knoll and defend that position.

2/11 is to defend Cemetery Hill.

3/11 is to maintain a line between Oak Ridge and the 1/11

2/1/Cav is to screen the York Pike from any enemy advance.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: As given in Scenario 6.2, except that Artillery Ammunition: 90.

Confederate Information

Set Up: The Confederates set up as in Scenario 6.2 Additionally, the following units are set up: Do/R/2 21 Ga—B10.18 44 Ga—B10.20 4 Ga—B10.21 12 Ga—B10.22 O/R/2 1 NC Bn SS—B10.15 FL/Cav 1 Md Bn—B5.16

Orders: All orders are as given as in Scenario 6.2

Doles is to defend the line between Oak Hill and Rock Creek, and keep the 11th Corps from attacking Rodes' flank as Rodes advances. (Technically, Doles advanced to join Early in the attack on Blocher's Knoll under his own initiative).

Both the 1 NC Bn SS/O/R/2 and the 1 Md Bn/FL/Cav start out of command. These units have a combined divisional goal to defend Rodes' Division's right flank east of Oak Hill, and connect with Doles' Brigade. They may not move south of Blocher's Run. 1 Md Bn/FL/Cav is attached to 2nd Corps for command purposes.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: As given in Scenario 6.2, except that now Artillery Ammunition: 100.

Reinforcements: Use the reinforcement schedule for all units listed to arrive between 2:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., July 1. If using the variable entry rules, for those units which would have started rolling before the scenario's start, begin rolling on the first turn.

Victory:

Result	VP
Union Massive	10+ VP
Union Major	5 to 9 VP
Union Minor	0 to 4 VP
Draw	-4 to -1 VP
Confederate Minor	-8 to -5 VP
Confederate Major	-13 to -9 VP
Confederate Massive	-14 or less VP

Historical outcome: The Confederates won a major victory with -10 VPs.

6.5 Little Round Top

This scenario covers the fighting between Longstreet's Confederate 1st Corps and elements of four Union corps—2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 6th. This engagement made famous such names as Devils Den, the Peach Orchard, and of course, Little Round Top.

General Information

Map Area: Maps D and E First Turn: 3:30 p.m. July 2nd Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. July 2nd Total Game Length: 19 turns

Union Information

Set Up: 3 Corps HQ and Supply—D6.32 Birney—D13.31 1/1/3 105 Penn, K 4US battery/3 Corps—D2.27 57 Penn, E 1RI Battery/3 Corps—D3.27 114 Penn—D4.26 63 Penn, 68 Penn—D5.26 141 Penn—D7.27 2/1/3 1 US SS—D2.25 2 US SS—D25.29 4 Maine—D20.31 124 NY, 4 NY Battery/3 Corps—D19.31 86 NY—D18.30 20 Ind—D17.30 99 Penn—D16.30 3 Maine, 2 NJ Battery/3 Corps—D7.28 3/1/3 110 Penn—D14.29 5 Mich—D13.29 17 Maine—D12.29 40 NY—D11.29 3 Mich, C&F Penn Lt/1 Vol/Arty Reserve—D6.26 1/2/3 Note: 26 Penn, 1 Mass, 11 Mass and 16 Mass are not in play. 11 NJ—D2.29 12 NJ—D1.28 2/2/3 73 NY—D3.28 71 NY—D4.27 74 NY—D5.27 120 NY, Humphreys—D4.29 70 NY, 72 NY—D5.29 3/2/3 2 NH—D7.25 7 NJ, G 1 NY Lt Battery/4 Vol/Arty Res—D6.27 115 Penn, 8 NJ—D9.32 5 NJ, 6 NJ—D8.32 D 1 NY Battery/3 Corps—D12.31 9 Mass Battery/1 Vol/Arty Res—D8.30 5 Mass Battery/1 Vol/Arty Res, McGilvery—D8.29 15 NY Lt Battery/1 Vol/Arty Res—D7.29 5 Corps HQ and Supply—E3.14 Artillery/5 Corps—w/i 1 E3.14 1/5 Division—w/i 3 E3.12 2/5 Division—w/i 3 E3.16 3/5 Division—w/i 3 E2.18

Orders: 3 Corps is to defend the forward line of the Peach Orchard, Wheatfield, and Houck's Ridge. 3 Maine/2/1/3 is attached to 1/1/3.

5 Corps is to support the 3 Corps. That order is in D4 status; begin rolling on the 4:00 p.m. turn.

All the Artillery Reserve batteries are attached to 3 Corps.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Artillery Ammunition: unlimited. Ignore previous losses.

Reinforcements: At 4:30 p.m., 1/2 Division appears at hex E1.05. 1/2 Division is attached to 3 Corps. At 6:30 p.m., 6 Corps (less 3/2/6) arrives at hex E2.18. The 6 Corps is to establish a defensive line along the Taneytown Road from behind the Round Tops to the M. Fry house (hex E6.17) and support the defense of Little Round Top as needed. 6 Corps is to attack to clear the line of the Taneytown road, if needed.

Confederate Information

Set Up: Longstreet, 1 Corps HQ and Supply—D12.17 L/H/1 48 Ala—D27.21 44 Ala—D26.21 15 Ala—D25.21 47 Ala—D24.21 4 Ala—D23.22 B/H/1 2 Ga—D26.19 17 Ga—D25.19 20 Ga—D24.19 15 Ga—D23.20 A/H/1 59 Ga—D22.20 11 Ga—D21.20 8 Ga—D20.19 9 Ga—D19.19 Note: 7 Ga is not in play. Tex/H/1 5 Tex—D21.22 4 Tex, Hood—D20.21 1 Tex—D19.21 3 Ark—D18.20 Arty/H/1 Bachman—D18.21 Garden—D19.22 Latham—D20.22 Reilly—D28.22 K/M/1 15 SC—D16.21 7 SC—D15.21 3 SC—D14.21 2 SC—D13.21 3 SC Bn—D12.21 8 SC—D11.21 S/M/1 53 Ga—D16.19 51 Ga—D15.19 50 Ga—D14.19 10 Ga—D13.19 McLaws—D7.20 B/M/1 21 Miss—D5.20 17 Miss—D4.20 13 Miss—D3.21 18 Miss—D2.20 W/M/1 16 Ga—D6.18 18 Ga—D5.18 Cobb Lgn—D4.18 Phllps Lgn—D3.18 24 Ga—D2.18 Arty/M/1 Fraser—D15.22 McCarthy—D13.22 Carlton—D12.22 Manly—D11.22 A/1 Corps Arty Battalion Parker—D9.22 Taylor—D8.21 Moody—D5.21 Gilbert—D4.21 Jordan, Woolfolk—w/i 2 D10.17 E/1 Corps Arty Battalion—w/i 2 D10.17 Hart/Arty/Cav, Black Cav/1 Corps—w/i 2 D10.17

Orders: The 1 Corps is to attack and clear the enemy to its front, including capturing Little Round Top and cutting the Taneytown Road between the north map edge and Little Round Top.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Artillery Ammunition: unlimited. Ignore previous losses

Reinforcements: There are no reinforcements.

Victory:

Confederate Massive—occupy 3 or more hexes of the Taneytown Road north of the 18.xx hexrow.

Confederate Major—Fulfill the following conditions: A) inflict 1.5 times as many losses as they take, B) Capture Devils Den, Little Round Top, and the Peach Orchard, C) wreck more Union brigades then there are wrecked Confederate brigades.

Confederate Minor—fulfill two of the above conditions.

Draw—fulfill only one condition.

Union Minor—no conditions fulfilled.

Union Major—no conditions fulfilled, and Confederate losses are at least 1.5 times Union losses.

Union Major—As above for Union Major victory, and in addition have twice as many wrecked Confederate brigades as there are wrecked Union brigades.

Historical outcome: The Rebels won a minor victory, failing to fulfill B.

6.6 Culps Hill

This is the companion piece to the above, covering the other end of the line while Longstreet was smashing the Federals to the south. Ewell's Confederate 2nd Corps was supposed to deliver a similar attack against the other Union flank. This attack, however, was rather less solidly delivered. There is very little Confederate artillery in this scenario—this effect is intentional. Union cannon had pretty much overwhelmed the Rebel guns that were moved forward in support earlier that afternoon, and long range fire from Seminary Ridge was very ineffectual.

General Information

Map Area: Map B east of xx.15, west half Map C. No Confederate unit may move south of B50.xx unless east of Taneytown Road. First Turn: 7:00 p.m. July 2nd Last Turn: 9:00 p.m. July 2nd Total Game Length: 9 turns

Union Information

Set Up: 1 Corps HQ and Supply, Newton—B49.25 Reynolds is dead, Newton (3/6) commands corps. 1/1/1—w/i 1 B46.27 2 Wisc(1), 6 Wisc(4), 7 Wisc(3), 19 Ind(2) 24 Mich(3) 2/1/1—w/i 1 B45.29 76 NY(3), 84 NY(2), 95 NY(3), 147 NY(3), 56 Penn(2) 1 Corps Artillery 2 Maine(3)—B49.24 5 Maine—B46.26 E+L 1 NY—B45.24 B 1 Penn(3)—B44.23 B 4 US(4)—B44.22 11 Corps HQ and Supply—B45.22 1/1/11 41 NY—B45.26 54 NY(2), 68 NY(2)—B44.25 153 Penn(6)—B43.25 2/1/11—note, Barlow wounded, Ames commands Division 17 Conn(6)—B43.25 75 Ohio(6)—B42.24 25 Ohio(2)—B41.24 107 Ohio(6)—B41.23 1/2/11 27 Penn(5)—B45.21 134 NY(4), 154 NY(1)—B45.20 73 Penn—B44.20 2/2/11 33 Mass—B45.26 55 Ohio—B43.21 73 Ohio—B42.21 136 NY(9), Smith—B41.22 1/3/11—Repl Leader 82 Ill(4), 45 NY(2), 157 NY(2)—B46.19 74 Penn(5) B47.19 61 Ohio—B48.18 2/3/11 75 Penn(2), 82 Ohio(2)—B49.19 58 NY, 119 NY(2)—B50.18 26 Wisc(5)—B51.19 11 Corps Artillery G 4 US—B46.21 13 NY(3)—B45.22 I 1 NY(5)—B43.23 I 1 Ohio(5)—B43.22 K 1 Ohio—eliminated. 12 Corps HQ and Supply, Slocum—B52.27 3/2/12 60 NY—B45.31 102 NY—B46.31 78 NY—B47.31 149 NY—B48.30 137 NY—B49.31 12 Corps Artillery F 4 US—B53.27 K 5 US—B54.27 M 1 NY—B60.29 E Penn Lt—B60.30 A 1 Md Lt (from 4 Vol/Arty Reserve)—B61.31

Breastworks—B46.26, B46.27, B45.28, B44.28, B44.29, B44.30, B45.31, B46.31, B47.31, B48.30, B49.31, B49.32, B50.32, B51.32, B52.31

Orders: 1 Corps is to defend the north face of Culps Hill and support 3/2/12 as needed.

11 Corps is to defend Cemetery Hill.

3/2/12 is to defend Culps Hill and Spangler's Knob, to prevent the Confederates from seizing the Baltimore Pike.

12 Corps (all that is left is artillery) is to support 3/2/12 and help defend the Baltimore Pike.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Ammunition is unlimited. Ignore previous losses. The following brigades have these numbers of wrecked regiments: 1/1/1—4, 2/1/1—4, 1/1/11—2, 2/1/11—1, 1/2/11—2, 1/3/11—2, 2/3/11—3.

Reinforcements: At 7:30, the following units appear in hex B53.18: 71 Penn and 106 Penn of 2/2/2, Carroll, 7 W Va, 4 Ohio, 14 Ind of 1/3/2

These units may be attached to any 1, 11 or 12 Corps command and trace normally to that commander once attached. They may move to join their commands as they enter.

Confederate Information

Set Up: 2 Corps HQ and Supply—B31.27 Rodes/2 Division Do/R/2—B36.18 and B37.18 4 Ga(6), 12 Ga(5), 21 Ga(5), 44 Ga(6) I/R/2—B39.17 Repl Leader, 5 NC(4), 12 NC(2), 20 NC(3), 23 NC(1) R/R/2—B41.16 and B42.15 2 NC(4), 4 NC(3), 14 NC(5), 30 NC(4) O/R/2—B36.17, B37.17, and B38.16 3 Ala(6), 5 Ala(2), 6 Ala(7), 12 Ala(5), 26 Ala(5) D/R/2—B39.16, B40.15, and B41.15 2 NC Bn(1), 32 NC(7), 43 NC(8), 45 NC(8), 53 NC(3) Arty/R/2—not in play Early/2 Division H/E/2—B37.23 and B37.24 8 La(5) A/E/2—B34.25, B34.26 and B34.27 6 NC(8), 21 NC(8) G/E/2—w/i 1 B29.26 13 Ga(3), 26 Ga(5), 31 Ga(4), 38 Ga(4), 60 Ga(5), 61 Ga(4) S/E/2 and Arty/E/2—not in play Johnson/2 Division J/J/2—w/i 1 C41.01 W/J/2—w/i 1 C45.01 S/J/2—w/i 1 C49.01 Arty/J/2—w/i 1 C42.03 Crpntr(3), Raine(2), Brown(3), Dement(3) Swl/J/2—not in play

Orders: Johnson/2 Division is to attack and capture Culps Hill and Spangler's Knob.

Early/2 Division is to attack Cemetery Hill.

Rodes/2 Division is to attack Cemetery Hill. This order is currently in D6 status; begin rolling on the first turn.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Ammunition is unlimited. Ignore previous losses. The following brigades have this number of wrecked regiments: I/R2—4, O/R/2—1, D/R/2—2, G/E/2—1.

Reinforcements: None

Victory:

Confederate Major—capture both Cemetery and Culps Hills.

Confederate Minor—capture at least one of the above.

Union Major—hold both hills.

No other conditions are possible.

Historical outcome: The Union won a major victory, holding both hills.

6.7 Pickett's Charge

Perhaps the most famous charge in American History, the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble attack (more accurately known, perhaps, as Longstreet's Second Attack) proved a bloody failure. However, never let that stop you: here is a scenario that recreates the whole thing.

This is a very counter-intensive scenario. Some units—especially Confederate artillery—set up out of command range. In general, such units can remain out of command and fire normally, provided they do not move. Some brigades set up without all their units—those units are intentionally omitted. By the 3rd day, both armies were somewhat disorganized, and I decided to let the set-up reflect that condition rather than rationalize it out for game purposes. I think players who do set this scenario up are more interested in the history of the event rather than a competitive gaming scenario.

Finally, for those players who just find the thing too overwhelming, you can omit all the Union 12 Corps and all of Johnson's Confederate Division plus attached brigades.

General Information

Map Area: Map B First Turn: 1:00 p.m. July 3 Last Turn: 6:00 p.m. July 3 Total Game Length: 21 Turns

Union Information

Set Up: 1 Corps HQ and Supply—Newton (3/6) commands Corps—B49.25 1/1/1 6 Wisc(4) 24 Mich(3) 5 Maine/1 Corps Artillery—B46.26 19 Ind(2), 7 Wisc(3), 2 Wisc(1)—B46.27 2/1/1 56 Penn(2), 84 NY(2), 76 NY(3)—B45.28 95 NY(3), 147 NY(3)—B44.28 7 Ind—B44.29 1/2/1—Repl Leader 104 NY(2), 107 Penn(2), 94 NY(3), 16 Maine(1), 13 Mass(2)—B49.22 2/2/1 90 Penn(2), 12 Mass(3), 88 Penn(4), 9 Mass/1 Vol/Arty Reserve(2)—B47.20 97 NY(3), 83 NY(2), 11 Penn(2), 1 NH/3 Vol/Arty Reserve—B47.22 1/3/1—Repl Leader 121 Penn(1), 142 Penn(3)—B58.19 80 NY(3), 151 Penn(3), C 4US/1 Reg/Arty Reserve—B59.19 2/3/1—Repl Leader 150 Penn(3), 149 Penn(2), 143 Penn(4)—B60.20 3/3/1 13 VT(12)—B61.19 14 VT—B62.19 16 VT—B60.18 1 Corps Artillery 2 Maine/1 Corps(3)—B49.24 E&L 1 NY/1 Corps—B45.24 B 4US/1 Corps(4), 5 NY/2 Vol/Arty Reserve—B44.22 F/G 1 Penn/3 Vol/Arty Reserve—B44.23 2 Corps HQ and Supply—B56.21 (1/2 Division is not in play) 1/2/2 82 NY(4), 9 Mich/1/HA/Cav—B58.17 15 Mass(3), 1 Minn(2)—B57.18 19 Maine(8)—B56.17 2/2/2 69 Penn(5), 106 Penn(4)—B53.18 72 Penn(7), A 4 US/2 Corps—B52.18 71 Penn—B52.17 3/2/2 20 Mass(4), 7 Mich, B 1 NY/2 Corps—B55.18 59 NY(2), B 1 RI/2 Corps—B54.18 19 Mass, 42 NY—B54.19 -/2/2 Mass SS—B48.20 1/3/2 8 Ohio(3)—B47.19 14 Ind(3)—B45.24 4 Ohio, 7 W Va(4)—B46.24 2/3/2 14 Conn(2), 1 Del(4), A 1RI/2 Corps—B51.19 12 NJ(8)—B50.18 108 NY, 126 NY(7) (from 3/3/2)—B48.19 3/3/2 111 NY(3), I 1US/2 Corps—B49.19 39 NY(4), 125 NY(7)—B50.20 2 Corps Artillery F&K 3US/1 Reg/Arty Reserve—B50.19 C 5US/1 Reg/Arty Reserve—B51.21 1 NJ/4 Vol/Arty Reserve—B57.21 3 Corps HQ and Supply—B61.22 Birney commands corps (2/1/3, 2/2/3, and 3/2/3 brigades are not in play) 1/1/3—Repl Leader, Ward commands 1/3 Division 105 Penn(3), 57 Penn(2), 114 Penn(2), 63 Penn(4), 68 Penn(3), 141 Penn(1)—B61.20 3/1/3 3 Mich(4), 5 Mich(2), 110 Penn(2)—B62.20 17 Maine(4), 40 NY(6)—B62.21 1/2/3 12 NH(2), 26 Penn(3), 11 NJ(3)—B59.22 16 Mass(3), 11 Mass(3), 1 Mass(4)—B59.23 3 Corps Artillery 1 NY/6 Corps—B57.19 C&F Penn Lt/1 Vol/Arty Reserve—B60.17 K 1NY/4 Vol/Arty Reserve—B58.20 11 Corps HQ—B44.22 11 Corps Supply—B49.23 1/1/11 54 NY(2), 68 NY(2), 41 NY(2)—B44.25 153 Penn(6)—B43.25 2/1/11—Repl Leader, Ames commands 1/11 Division 17 Conn(4), 25 Ohio(1)—B42.24 75 Ohio(4)—B41.24 107 Ohio(5)—B41.23 1/2/11 73 Penn(5), 154 NY(1)—B45.20 27 Penn(4), 134 NY(3)—B44.20 2/2/11 33 Mass(9)—B45.26 55 Ohio(5)—B43.21 136 NY(8)—B42.21 73 Ohio(4)—B41.22 1/3/11—Repl Leader 61 Ohio(6), 74 Penn(5)—B46.20 82 Ill(4), 157 NY(2), 45 NY(2)—B45.21 2/3/11 75 Penn(2), 58 NY, 119 NY(2)—B44.21 82 Ohio(2), 26 Wisc(5), I 1 Ohio/11 Corps(5)—B43.22 11 Corps Artillery K 1 Ohio/11 Corps—eliminated G 4 US/11 Corps, H 1 Ohio/3 Vol/Arty Reserve—B46.21 13 NY/11 Corps(3), C W Va/3 Vol/Arty Reserve—B45.22 H 1US/1 Reg/Arty Reserve—B45.23 I 1 NY, 11 Corps(5)—B44.21 A Pot HQ and Supply, Arty Reserve HQ, Meade, Hunt, Tyler—B52.21 Batteries still in Artillery Reserve: 3 NY/6 Corps, G 1RI/6 Corps, C 1 RI/6 Corps, B 1Penn/1 Corps—w/i 1 B53.25 12 Corps HQ and Supply—B49.26 1/1/12 123 NY—B52.29 20 Conn(4), 145 NY—B53.30 5 Conn, 3 Md—B54.29 46 Penn(3)—B55.31 3/1/12 107 NY—B55.30 3 Wisc—B55.32 2 Mass(1)—B55.33 13 NY(4)—B55.34 27 Ind(4)—B56.34 1/2/12 5 Ohio—B50.29 147 Penn(4)—B51.29 29 Ohio, 7 Ohio(4)—B50.28 28 Penn—B49.29 66 Ohio(4)—B44.30 2/2/12 29 Penn(5)—B49.30 109 Penn, 111 Penn(2)—B48.30 3/2/12 137 NY(4)—B47.31 78 NY(2), 149 NY(3)—B46.31 102 NY(3), 60 NY(4)—B45.31 Ind/12 1 Md PHB—B48.29 150 NY(9)—B47.30 1 Md ES(7)—B46.30 1/3/6 65 NY, 82 Penn—B49.26 23 Penn—B50.26 122 NY(7)—B51.27 67 NY—B52.27 77 NY (from 3/2/6)—B61.29 12 Corps Artillery F 4US/12 Corps—B53.27 K 5US/12 Corps—B54.27 M 1 NY/12 Corps—B60.29 E, Penn Lt/12 Corps—B60.30 A Md Lt/4 Vol/Arty Reserve—B61.31

Optional: Breastworks in hexes: B46.26, B46.27, B45.28, B44.28, B44.29, B44.30, B45.31, B46.31, B47.31, B48.30, B49.31, B49.32, B50.32, B51.32, B52.31

Orders: 1 Corps is to defend the north flank of Culps Hill with 1/1. 2/1 and 3/1 are to support 2 Corps as needed.

2 Corps is to defend the line of Cemetery Hill.

3 Corps is to support 2 Corps as needed. Only 1/3 Division is in play, and 1/2/3 is attached to 1/3 Division.

6 Corps: 1/3/6 is attached to 12 Corps. The 3 6 Corps artillery in hex B53.25 are part of the artillery reserve, and not yet assigned to a corps. 77 NY of 3/2/6 is to defend the 12 Corps artillery on Powers Hill.

11 Corps is to defend Cemetery Hill

12 Corps is to defend the Culps Hill line and the Baltimore Pike

66 Ohio/1/2/12 is attached to 3/2/12

In all cases where artillery from another corps or the Artillery Reserve is listed to set up with units of a given Corps, or under the heading of that Corps' artillery, those artillery units are attached to the appropriate Corps for all purposes.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Ammunition is unlimited. Previous losses: 390. The following brigades have the listed number of stragglers: 1/1/12—2, 3/1/12—5, 1/2/12—3, 2/2/12—2, 3/2/12—6, Ind/12—4. The following brigades have this number of wrecked regiments: 1/1/1—4, 2/1/1—4, 1/2/1—5, 2/2/1—3, 1/3/1—4, 2/3/1—3, 1/2/2—2, 1/1/3—5, 3/1/3—1, 1/2/3—4, 1/1/11—3, 2/1/11—2, 1/2/11—2, 1/3/11—2, 2/3/11—3, 2/2/12—1, 3/2/12—3

Reinforcements: None

Confederate Information

Set Up: ANVa HQ and Supply—B26.09 1 Corps HQ and Supply—B54.04 K/P/1 24 Va, 11 Va—B62.04 1 Va, 7 Va—B61.05 3 Va—B60.05 G/P/1 8 Va—B59.05 18 Va—B58.05 19 Va—B57.06 28 Va—B56.06 56 Va—B55.06 A/P/1 14 Va—B59.03 9 Va—B58.03 53 Va—B57.04 57 Va—B56.04 38 Va—B55.04 Artillery/P/1 Macon, Stribling—B60.10 Blount, Caskie, Alexander (leader)—B61.10 Artillery/M/1 Carlton—B59.10 Manly, Fraser(2)—B58.09 McCarthy—B57.09 A/1 Corps Woolfolk—B54.08 E/1 Corps Richardson—B62.09 3 Corps HQ and Supply—B49.03 Wx/A/3 9 Ala(4), 11 Ala(4)—B62.07 8 Ala(6)—B61.07 10 Ala(4), 14 Ala(4)—B60.07 L/A/3 2 Fla(3), 5 Fla(4), 8 Fla(2)—B59.08 Wr/A/3 2 Ga Bn(1), 3 Ga(5)—B54.04 22 Ga(4), 48 Ga(4)—B53.05 P/A/3 12 Miss—B41.08 16 Miss—B40.08 19 Miss(6)—B39.09 48 Miss(4)—B38.09 M/A/3 6 Va, 41 Va(5)—B37.10 61 Va—B36.10 16 Va, 12 Va(6)—B35.11 Artillery/A/3 Ross, Wingfield—B47.09 Patterson—B46.09 A/H/3—Repl Leader 1 Tenn(4), 13 Ala(4), 14 Tenn(3)—B50.05 7 Tenn(4), 5 Ala Bn—B49.06 P/H/3—Repl Leader, Pettigrew commands H/3, Heth wounded 52 NC(7)—B48.06 47 NC(10)—B47.07 26 NCa(3), 26 NCb(3)—B46.07 11 NC(8)—B45.08 D/H/3 55 NC(9)—B44.08 2 Miss(6), 42 Miss(7)—B43.09 11 Miss—B42.09 B/H/3 22 Va Bn, 40 Va(4)—B41.10 47 Va, 55 Va(4)—B40.10 Artillery/H/3 Maurin, Moore—B51.09 Grandy, Lewis—B50.03 S/P/3—Repl Leader, Trimble commands P/3 Division 16 NC(5)—B50.04 22 NC(5)—B49.05 34 NC(5)—B48.05 13 NC(2), 38 NC(2)—B47.06 L/P/3 7 NC(5)—B46.06 37 NC(7)—B45.07 28 NC—B44.07 18 NC—B43.08 33 NC—B42.08 T/P/3 14 Ga(6), 35 Ga(5)—B45.14 45 Ga(6), 49 Ga(5)—B44.14 P/P/3—Repl Leader 1 SC R—B43.15 1 SC(5), 14 SC(5)—B42.15 13 SC(5), 12 SC(4)—B41.16 Artillery/P/3 Ward, Brown—B53.08 Wyatt, Graham—B39.10 P/3 Corps Artillery Brander, Zimmerman(3)—B38.10 Johnston—B37.11 McGraw, Marye—B36.11 M/3 Corps Artillery Hurt b, Wallace(3)—B28.10 Johnson, Rice—B26.10 Hurt a—B10.09 2 Corps HQ and Supply—B31.31 R/R/2 4 NC(3), 30 NC(4)—B40.16 2 NC(4), 14 NC(5)—B39.17 I/R/2—Repl Leader 5 NC(4), 12 NC(2), 20 NC(3), 23 NC(1)—B38.17 Do/R/2 4 Ga(6), 12 Ga(5)—B37.18 44 Ga(6), 21 Ga(5)—B36.18 (D/R/2 and O/R/2 set up with J/2 Division) Artillery/R/2 Page(2)—B28.16 Carter—B28.15 Fry—B24.11 Reese—B23.12 H/E/2 5 La(3), 6 La(3), 7 La(4)—B33.22 9 La(5), 8 La(5)—B33.23 A/E/2—Repl Leader 21 NC(6)—B33.24 6 NC(6)—B33.25 57 NC(5)—B33.26 G/E/2 31 Ga(4), 38 Ga(4)—B29.25 13 Ga(3), 26 Ga(5)—B29.26 60 Ga(5), 61 Ga(4)—B29.27 (S/E/2 sets up with J/2 Division) J/J/2—hexes B43.32, B44.32, B45.33 42 Va(1), 21 Va(2), 44 Va(2), 25 Va(4), 48 Va(2), 50 Va(1) W/J/2—hexes B46.33 and B47.33 1 La(2), 2 La(2), 10 La(1), 14 La(2), 15 La(2) S/J/2—hexes B48.32, B49.32, B50.32 1 Md Bn(1), 3 NC(5), 10 Va(2), 23 Va(3), 37 Va(2) (1 NC—not present.) Swl/J/2—hexes B47.34, B48.33, B49.34 2 Va(6), 4 Va(1), 5 Va(5), 27 Va(2), 33 Va(2), S/E/2—hexes B51.33, B51.34 31 Va(3), 49 Va(2), 52 Va(3) D/R/2—B42.32, B43.33, B44.33 2 NC Bn(1), 32 NC(3), 43 NC(6), 45 NC(8), 53 NC(2) O/R/2—B46.34, B45.34 3 Ala(4), 5 Ala(2), 6 Ala(3), 12 Ala(3), 26 Ala(3) (1 NC Bn SS—not present) D/2 Corps Artillery Watson, Smith—B34.11 Cunningham, Griffin—B31.11

If a given Confederate unit is not listed, it is not in this scenario, even if others of its command are. For instance, only one of A/1 Corps artillery batteries is on-map, and the artillery for E/2, J/2. and N/2 Corps are not in play. If not called for, that unit is not used.

Part of 2 Va of Swl/J/2 and 1 NC of S/J/2 were both off map to the east. Here I have consolidated everything so that the 1 NC is off-map, and the 2 VA is in the game.

Orders: 1 Corps, with H/3 and P/3 Divisions attached, is to attack the Union line south of Cemetery Hill and capture at least 5 hexes of the Taneytown Road north of the 55.xx hexrow. This attack will be proceeded by an 8 turn bombardment by all guns that can fire. A/3 Division is to support the 1 Corps attack.

M/A/3 and P/A/3 are detached from A/3, and is to support and defend the Confederate artillery in front of their position.

T/P/3 and S/P/3 are detached from P/3, with divisional goals to defend the line of the Sunken Road.

2 Corps is to defend in place.

J/2, with S/E/2, D/R/2 and O/R/2 attached, is to defend in place.

Any artillery unit that sets up outside legal command range may fire normally throughout the game provided it does not move. If any such unit does move, it is immediately subject to the normal command radius rules.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Ammunition is unlimited. Previous losses: 336. The following units have the listed number of stragglers: J/J/2—9, W/J/2—5, Swl/J/2—4, D/R/2—4, O/R/2—5, S/E/2—4. The following units have this number of wrecked regiments: S/J/2—4, W/J/2—4, Swl/J/2—2, J/J/2—5, G/E/2—1, S/E/2—1, D/R/2—3, I/R/2—4, O/R/2—4, P/H/3—2, S/P/3—2, L/A/3—1, Wr/A/3—3.

Reinforcements: None.

Victory:

No points are awarded for wrecked higher formations in this scenario, only award points for losses, terrain on map B, and wrecked brigades.

Result	VP
Union Massive	15+ VP
Union Major	9 to 14 VP
Union Minor	3 to 8 VP
Draw	0 to 2 VP
Confederate Minor	-5 to -1 VP
Confederate Major	-10 to -6 VP
Confederate Massive	-11 or less VP

Shift two levels in Confederate favor if the Confederate 1 Corps objective is fulfilled at the game's end.

Historical outcome: The Union won a major victory with a 12 VP margin.

Large Scenarios—Three or more Maps

6.8 The Second Day

The morning of July 2nd presented something of a dilemma to both commanders, who spent that time pondering possible attacks and defenses. In the end, Meade chose to defend, while Lee settled on attacking. With the bulk of both armies on-map but not yet too badly bloodied, it is a situation rife with possibilities.

General Information

Map Area: All First Turn: 4:00 a.m. July 2nd Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. July 2nd Total Game Length: 65 turns

Union Information

Set Up: A Pot HQ and Supply, Meade, Hunt, Cav HQ, Pleasonton—B52.21 1 Corps HQ and supply—B49.25 Reynolds killed, commanded by Newton (3/6) 1/1/1—w/i 1 B46.27 2 Wisc(1), 19 Ind(2), 24 Mich(3), 6 Wisc(4), 7 Wisc(3) 2/1/1—w/i 1 B45.29 56 Pa(2), 95 NY(3), 84 NY(2), 147 NY(3), 76 NY(3) 1/2/1—Repl Leader—B48.23 16 Maine(1), 13 Mass(2), 94 NY(3), 107 Penn(2), 104 NY(2) 2/2/1—w/i 1 B49.23 90 Penn(2), 11 Penn(2), 97 NY(3), 88 Penn(4), 83 NY(2), 12 Mass(3) 1/3/1—Repl Leader—B50.21 80 NY(3), 121 Penn(1), 142 Penn(3), 151 Penn(3) 2/3/1—Repl Leader—B49.22 143 Penn(4), 149 Penn(2), 150 Penn(3) 3/3/1—w/i 1 B52.22 1 Corps Artillery 2 Maine(3)—B49.24 5 Maine—B46.26 E&L 1 NY—B45.24 B 1 Penn(3)—B44.23 B 4US(4)—B44.22 2 Corps—w/i 10 E42.10 3 Corps HQ and Supply—E2.06 Birney—E6.03 1/1/3—w/i 1 E7.03 2/1/3—w/i 1 E4.05 Humphreys—D6.32 1/2/3—w/i 1 D8.31 2/2/3—w/i 1 D4.32 3 Corps Artillery E 1RI, 2 NJ, K 4US—w/i 1 B62.22 11 Corps HQ and Supply—B45.22 1/1/11 68 NY(2), 41 NY—B45.25 54 NY(2), 153 Penn(6)—B44.24 2/1/11—Repl Leader—Ames promoted to division, Barlow wounded 25 Ohio(2), 17 Conn(6)—B43.24 75 Ohio(6)—B42.23 107 Ohio(6)—B41.23 1/2/11 27 Penn(5)—B45.21 154 NY(1), 134 NY(4)—B45.20 73 Penn—B44.20 2/2/11 33 Mass—B43.21 73 Ohio—B42.21 136 NY(9)—B41.22 55 Ohio—B43.22 1/3/11—Repl Leader 82 Ill(4), 157 NY(2), 45 NY(2)—B46.19 74 Penn(5)—B47.19 61 Ohio—B48.18 2/3/11 75 Penn(2), 82 Ohio(2)—B49.19 58 NY, 119 NY(2)—B50.18 26 Wisc(5)—B51.19 11 Corps Artillery G 4US—B46.21 13 NY(3)—B45.22 I 1 NY(5)—B43.23 I 1 Ohio(5)—B43.22 K 1 Ohio—eliminated. 12 Corps HQ and Supply—B52.27 1/12 Division, F 4US, M 1 NY artillery—in line along road between E7.32 and E1.34 Geary—E12.08 1/2/12, K 5US, E Penn Lt Artillery—w/i 3 E17.04 2/2/12—w/i 2 E2.13 3/2/12—w/i 2 E12.06 Tyler, Arty Reserve HQ, 1 Reg/Arty Reserve, 4 Vol/Arty Reserve—w/i 10 E42.10 Buford, 1/Cav (less R/1/Cav) A 2US/2/HA/Cav(5)—w/i 10 D14.28 8 NY(11), 3 Ind(5)

Orders: 1 Corps is to Defend Culps Hill and Cemetery Hill.

2 Corps is to move to the right of 11 Corps and defend the line of Cemetery Ridge. The Corps HQ should move to B54.20

3 Corps is to defend the line between the 2 Corps right flank and Little Round Top.

11 Corps is to defend Cemetery Hill.

All units of 12 Corps are to rejoin their corps and move to Culps Hill and defend it.

1/Cav is to screen the Union right flank along the Emmitsburg Road.

The Artillery Reserve is to move to join Army HQ and await further orders.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Artillery Ammunition: 300. Previous Losses: 165. The following units have this number of wrecked regiments: 1/1/1—4, 2/1/1—4, 1/2/1—5, 2/2/1—3, 1/3/1—4, 2/3/1—3, 1/1/11—2, 2/1/11—1, 1/2/11—2, 1/3/11—2, 2/3/11—3.

Reinforcements: As per normal July 2nd Reinforcement Schedule.

Confederate Information

Set Up: ANVa HQ and Supply—B26.09 1 Corps HQ and Supply—A30.23 M/1 Division—in line or unlimbered on road between A40.17 and A31.23 H/1 Division (less L/H/1 and Bachman/Arty/H/1)—in line or unlimbered on road between A16.28 and A10.20 2 Corps HQ and Supply, 1 Md Bn/FL/Cav, 35 Va Bn/Jo/Cav—w/i 1 B31.22 Do/R/2 4 Ga(6)—B33.22 12 Ga(5)—B33.21 21 Ga(5)—B33.20 44 Ga(6)—B33.19 O/R/2 3 Ala(6)—B29.17 1 NC Bn SS, 5 Ala(2)—B29.16 26 Ala(5)—B29.15 12 Ala(5)—B29.14 6 Ala(7)—B29.13 I/R/2—Repl Leader 5 NC(4)—B33.18 12 NC(2), 20 NC(3), 23 NC(1)—B33.17 R/R/2 14 NC(5)—B33.16 2 NC(4)—B33.15 30 NC(4)—B33.14 4 NC(3)—B33.13 D/R/2 32 NC(7)—B29.22 43 NC(8)—B29.21 45 NC(8)—B29.20 53 NC(3), 2 NC Bn(1)—B29.19 Artillery/R/2, N/2 Corps—w/i 5 B32.20 Page(2) H/E/2 5 La, 6 La—B34.27 9 La—B34.28 7 La, 8 La(5)—B34.26 A/E/2 6 NC(8)—B34.29 57 NC—B34.30 21 NC(8)—B34.31 G/E/2—w/i 3 C13.15 13 Ga(3), 26 Ga(5), 31 Ga(4), 38 Ga(4), 60 Ga(5), 61Ga(4) S/E/2—w/i 3 C13.15 Artillery/E/2—w/i 5 B31.27 Green(1), Garber(1) J/2 Division—w/i 6 C31.05 D/2 Corps Graham—w/i 5 B31.27 Cunningham, Watson, Smith, Griffen—w/i 5 B32.20 3 Corps HQ and Supply—B36.01 P/3 Corps artillery—w/i 10 B36.01 Zimmerman(3) M/3 Corps artillery—w/i 10 B36.01 Wallace(3) A/3 Division—in line or unlimbered on road between A17.29 and A28.23 L/P/3—w/i 2 B36.11 7 NC(5), 37 NC(7) T/P/3—w/i 2 B40.09 P/P/3—w/i 2 B35.09 1 SC(5), 12 SC(4), 13 SC(5), 14 SC(5) S/P/3—Repl Leader—w/i 1 B38.08 13 NC(2), 16 NC(5), 22 NC(5), 34 NC(5), 38 NC(2) Artillery/P/3—with any unit of P/3 P/H/3—Repl Leader, Heth is wounded, Pettigrew commands H/3—w/i 2 B45.07 11 NC(8), 26 NCa(3), 26 NCb(3), 47 NC(10), 52 NC(9) A/H/3—Repl Leader—w/i 1 B47.07 1 Tenn(4), 7 Tenn(4), 14 Tenn(3), 13 Ala(4) B/H/3—w/i 1 B50.05 22 Va Bn(4), 40 Va(4) D/H/3—w/i 2 B44.04 55 NC(9), 42 Miss(7), 2 Miss(6) Arty/H/3—with any unit of H/3. Je/Cav—w/i 2 B7.34

Orders: No units have any orders

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Artillery Ammunition: 225. Previous Losses: 129. The following units have this number of wrecked regiments: G/E/2—1, D/R/2—2, I/R/2—4, O/R/2—1, P/H/3—2, S/P/3—2

Reinforcements: As per the normal July 2nd Reinforcement Schedule.

Victory:

Result	VP
Union Massive	20+ VP
Union Major	13 to 19 VPs
Union Minor	6 to 12 VPs
Draw	-5 to 5 VPs
Confederate Minor	-12 to -6 VPs
Confederate Major	-19 to -13 VPs
Confederate Massive	-20 or less VPs

Historical outcome: The historical battle was a draw, with a Union margin of 1 VP.

6.9 The Whole Union Line Ablaze

This scenario just focuses on the actual fighting of the 2nd, which didn't really commence until late afternoon. It is really a combination of Little Round Top and Culps Hill, and as such will be very active as the bulk of both armies became involved in this fighting.

General Information

Map Area: Map B, west half map C, Map D Map E First Turn: 4:00 p.m. July 2nd Last Turn: 9:00 p.m. July 2nd Total Game Length: 21 Turns

Union Information

Set Up: A Pot HQ, Cav Corps HQ, Meade, Pleasonton, Hunt—B52.21 1 Corps HQ and Supply—B49.25 Reynolds killed, commanded by Newton (3/6) 1/1/1—w/i 1 B46.27 2 Wisc(1), 19 Ind(2), 24 Mich(3), 6 Wisc(4), 7 Wisc(3) 2/1/1—w/i 1 B45.29 56 Pa(2), 95 NY(3), 84 NY(2), 147 NY(3), 76 NY(3) 1/2/1—Repl Leader—B48.23 16 Maine(1), 13 Mass(2), 94 NY(3), 107 Penn(2), 104 NY(2) 2/2/1—w/i 1 B49.23 90 Penn(2), 11 Penn(2), 97 NY(3), 88 Penn(4), 83 NY(2), 12 Mass(3) 1/3/1—Repl Leader—B50.21 80 NY(3), 121 Penn(1), 142 Penn(3), 151 Penn(3) 2/3/1—Repl Leader—B49.22 143 Penn(4), 149 Penn(2), 150 Penn(3) 3/3/1—w/i 1 B52.22 1 Corps Artillery 2 Maine(3)—B49.24 5 Maine—B46.26 E&L 1 NY—B45.24 B 1 Penn(3)—B44.23 B 4US(4)—B44.22 2 Corps HQ and Supply—B54.19 1/2—w/i 3 B61.20 2/2—w/i 5 B56.19, east of the XX.17 hexrow. 3/2—w/i 2 B49.20 2 Corps Artillery B 1 RI—B54.18 A 4US—B51.18 A 1RI—B50.18 I 1US—B47.21 B 1NY—B57.19 3 Corps HQ and Supply—D6.32 Birney—D13.31 1/1/3 105 Penn, K 4US battery/3 Corps—D2.27 57 Penn, E 1RI Battery/3 Corps—D3.27 114 Penn—D4.26 63 Penn, 68 Penn—D5.26 141 Penn—D7.27 2/1/3 1 US SS—D2.25 2 US SS—D25.29 4 Maine—D20.31 124 NY, 4 NY Battery/3 Corps—D19.31 86 NY—D18.30 20 Ind—D17.30 99 Penn—D16.30 3 Maine, 2 NJ Battery/3 Corps—D7.28 3/1/3 110 Penn—D14.29 5 Mich—D13.29 17 Maine—D12.29 40 NY—D11.29 3 Mich, C&F Penn Lt/1 Vol/Arty Reserve—D6.26 1/2/3 26 Penn—B59.11 11 Mass—B60.10 16 Mass—B61.09 1 Mass—B62.08 11 NJ—D2.29 12 NJ—D1.28 2/2/3 73 NY—D3.28 71 NY—D4.27 74 NY—D5.27 120 NY, Humphreys—D4.29 70 NY, 72 NY—D5.29 3/2/3 2 NH—D7.25 7 NJ, G 1 NY Lt Battery/4 Vol/Arty Res—D6.27 115 Penn, 8 NJ—D9.32 5 NJ, 6 NJ—D8.32 D 1 NY Battery/3 Corps—D12.31 9 Mass Battery/1 Vol/Arty Res—D8.30 5 Mass Battery/1 Vol/Arty Res, McGilvery—D8.29 15 NY Lt Battery/1 Vol/Arty Res—D7.29 5 Corps HQ and Supply—E3.14 Artillery/5 Corps—w/i 1 E3.14 1/5 Division—w/i 3 E3.12 2/5 Division—w/i 3 E3.16 3/5 Division—w/i 3 E2.18 11 Corps HQ and Supply—B45.22 1/1/11 68 NY(2), 41 NY—B45.25 54 NY(2), 153 Penn(6)—B44.24 2/1/11—Repl Leader—Ames promoted to division, Barlow wounded 25 Ohio(2), 17 Conn(6)—B43.24 75 Ohio(6)—B42.23 107 Ohio(6)—B41.23 1/2/11—w/i 1 B43.21 27 Penn(5), 154 NY(1), 134 NY(4) 2/2/11—w/i 2 B42.22 136 NY(9) 1/3/11—Repl Leader—w/i 1 B46.20 82 Ill(4), 157 NY(2), 45 NY(2), 74 Penn(5) 2/3/11—w/i 1 B45.20 75 Penn(2), 82 Ohio(2), 119 NY(2), 26 Wisc(5) 11 Corps Artillery G 4US—B46.21 13 NY(3)—B45.22 I 1 NY(5)—B43.23 I 1 Ohio(5)—B43.22 K, 1 Ohio—eliminated. 12 Corps HQ and Supply—B52.27 1/1/12 123 NY, 3 Md—B49.32 20 Conn, 145 NY—B50.32 46 Penn, 5 Conn—B51.32 3/1/12 107 NY, 13 NY—B52.31 2 Mass—B54.32 3 Wisc, 27 Ind—B55.33 Ind/12 1 Md PHB—B56.32 150 NY—B57.32 1/2/12 28 Penn, 7 Ohio—B47.29 147 Penn, 5 Ohio—B48.29 29 Ohio, 66 Ohio—B49.30 2/2/12—B49.31 3/2/12 78 NY—B44.30 102 NY—B45.31 60 NY—B46.31 139 NY—B47.31 137 NY—B48.30 12 Corps Artillery F 4US—B53.27 K 5US—B54.27 M 1NY—B60.29 E Penn Lt—B60.30 A 1 Md Lt/4 Vol/Arty Reserve—B61.31 (attached to 12 Corps) Arty Reserve HQ, A Pot Supply—E5.12

The following units set up w/i 4 E5.12 and are unassigned. Some reserve batteries have already been assigned, they can be found in the above set up. 1 Reg/Arty Reserve—C 5US, C 4US, H 1US, F/K 3US 2 Vol/Arty Reserve—all 3 Vol/Arty Reserve—C WVa, F/G 1 Penn, H 1 Ohio, 1 NH Lt 4 Vol/Arty Reserve—K 1NY, 1 NJ, 6 Maine 1/HA/Cav (attached to Arty Reserve)—9 Mich, 6 NY, B&L 2 US

Optional: Breastworks in hexes: B46.26, B46.27, B45.28, B44.28, B44.29, B44.30, B45.31, B46.31, B47.31, B48.30, B49.31, B49.32, B50.32, B51.32, B52.31

Orders: 1 Corps is to defend the north face of Culps Hill and support the 11 Corps on Cemetery Hill.

2 Corps is to defend the line of Cemetery Ridge, south of the 11 Corps.

3 Corps is to defend the forward line it now holds, including the Peach Orchard, Wheatfield, and Houck's Ridge. 3 Maine/2/1/3 is attached to 1/1/3.

5 Corps is to move to support 3 Corps and help defend Little Round Top. This order is currently in D4 status; begin rolling at 4:00 p.m.

11 Corps is to defend Cemetery Hill.

12 Corps is to defend Culp's Hill.

The Arty Reserve has no orders.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Artillery Ammunition: 250. Previous losses: 165. The following units have this number of wrecked regiments: 1/1/1—4, 2/1/1—4, 1/2/1—5, 2/2/1—3, 1/3/1—4, 2/3/1—3, 1/1/11—2, 2/1/11—1, 1/2/11—2, 1/3/11—2, 2/3/11—3.

Reinforcements: As per the Reinforcement for July 2nd, after 4:00 p.m.

Confederate Information

Set Up: ANVa HQ and Supply—B26.09 Longstreet, 1 Corps HQ and Supply—D12.17 L/H/1 48 Ala—D27.21 44 Ala—D26.21 15 Ala—D25.21 47 Ala—D24.21 4 Ala—D23.22 B/H/1 2 Ga—D26.19 17 Ga—D25.19 20 Ga—D24.19 15 Ga—D23.20 A/H/1 59 Ga—D22.20 11 Ga—D21.20 8 Ga—D20.19 9 Ga—D19.19 7 Ga—D32.17 Tex/H/1 5 Tex—D21.22 4 Tex, Hood—D20.21 1 Tex—D19.21 3 Ark—D18.20 Arty/H/1 Bachman—D18.21 Garden—D19.22 Latham—D20.22 Reilly—D28.22 K/M/1 15 SC—D16.21 7 SC—D15.21 3 SC—D14.21 2 SC—D13.21 3 SC Bn—D12.21 8 SC—D11.21 S/M/1 53 Ga—D16.19 51 Ga—D15.19 50 Ga—D14.19 10 Ga—D13.19 McLaws—D7.20 B/M/1 21 Miss—D5.20 17 Miss—D4.20 13 Miss—D3.21 18 Miss—D2.20 W/M/1 16 Ga—D6.18 18 Ga—D5.18 Cobb Lgn—D4.18 Phllps Lgn—D3.18 24 Ga—D2.18 Arty/M/1 Fraser—D15.22 McCarthy—D13.22 Carlton—D12.22 Manly—D11.22 A/1 Corps Arty Battalion Parker—D9.22 Taylor—D8.21 Moody—D5.21 Gilbert—D4.21 Jordan, Woolfolk—w/i 2 D10.17 E/1 Corps Arty Battalion—w/i 2 D10.17 Hart/Arty/Cav, Black Cav/1 Corps—w/i 2 D10.17 2 Corps HQ and Supply—B31.31 35 Va Bn/Jo/Cav, 1 Md Bn/FL/Cav—w/i 2 B31.31 Do/R/2 4 Ga(6)—B33.22 12 Ga(5)—B33.21 21 Ga(5)—B33.20 44 Ga(6)—B33.19 O/R/2 3 Ala(6)—B29.17 1 NC Bn SS, 5 Ala(2)—B29.16 26 Ala(5)—B29.15 12 Ala(5)—B29.14 6 Ala(7)—B29.13 I/R/2—Repl Leader 5 NC(4)—B33.18 12 NC(2), 20 NC(3), 23 NC(1)—B33.17 R/R/2 14 NC(5)—B33.16 2 NC(4)—B33.15 30 NC(4)—B33.14 4 NC(3)—B33.13 D/R/2 32 NC(7)—B29.22 43 NC(8)—B29.21 45 NC(8)—B29.20 53 NC(3), 2 NC Bn(1)—B29.19 Artillery/R/2, Griffin/D/2 Corps artillery—w/i 5 B30.15 Page(2) H/E/2 5 La, 6 La—B34.27 9 La—B34.28 7 La, 8 La(5)—B34.26 A/E/2 6 NC(8)—B34.29 57 NC—B34.30 21 NC(8)—B34.31 G/E/2—w/i 3 C13.15 13 Ga(3), 26 Ga(5), 31 Ga(4), 38 Ga(4), 60 Ga(5), 61 Ga(4) S/E/2—w/i 3 C13.15 Artillery/E/2—w/i 3 C13.15 Green(1), Garber(1) S/J/2, J/J/2, W/J/2—w/i 6 C31.05 Swl/J/2—not in play Arty/J/2 Brown—C34.01 Crpntr—C35.01 Dement—C37.01 Raine—C38.01 N/2 Corps Artillery—w/i 1 B25.14 D/2 Corps Artillery Graham—w/i 1 C15.16 Watson—B24.11 Smith—B28.10 Cunningham—B31.11 Je/Cav—Repl Leader—w/i 2 B16.28 3 Corps HQ and supply—B46.06 Anderson—B51.05 Wx/A/3 8 Ala—D1.23 10 Ala—B61.04 11 Ala—B60.04 14 Ala—B58.05 9 Ala—B57.06 L/A/3 5 Fla—B55.05 2 Fla, 8 Fla—B54.05 P/A/3 16 Miss—B47.11 19 Miss—B48.10 48 Miss—B49.10 12 Miss—B46.09 Wr/A/3 48 Ga—B47.08 3 Ga—B48.07 22 Ga—B49.07 2 Ga Bn—B49.09 M/A/3 6 Va—B44.08 12 Va—B43.09 16 Va, 41 Va—B42.09 61 Va—B41.10 Arty/A/3 Patterson—A62.34 Ross—B46.09 Wingfield—B45.10 L/P/3—w/i 2 B36.11 7 NC(5), 37 NC(7) T/P/3—w/i 2 B40.09 P/P/3—w/i 2 B35.09 1 SC(5), 12 SC(4), 13 SC(5), 14 SC(5) S/P/3—Repl Leader—w/i 1 B38.08 13 NC(2), 16 NC(5), 22 NC(5), 34 NC(5), 38 NC(2) Arty/P/3—with any of the above units. H/3 Division—Heth wounded, Pettigrew commands division—w/i 5 B30.03 P/H/3—Repl Leader 11 NC(8), 26 NCa(3), 26 NCb(3), 47 NC(10), 52 NC(9) A/H/3—Repl Leader 13 Ala(4), 1 Tenn(4), 7 Tenn(4), 14 Tenn(3) B/H/3 22 Va Bn(4), 40 Va(4) D/H/3 2 Miss(6), 42 Miss(7), 55 NC(9) P/3 Corps Artillery Zimmerman, Marye—B44.09 Brander, Johnston—B43.10 McGraw—B42.10 M/3 Corps Artillery—w/i 3 B37.12

Orders: 1 Corps is to attack and clear the enemy to its front, including capturing Little Round Top and cutting the Taneytown Road.

Hart/Arty/Cav is attached to 1 Corps.

35 Va Bn/Jo/Cav, 1 Md Bn/FL/Cav are attached to 2nd Corps.

J/2 Division is to attack and capture Culps Hill and Spangler's Knob.

E/2 Division is to attack Cemetery Hill.

G/E/2 is to rejoin its division. S/E/2 and Arty/E/2 are to defend the army's rear from any threat from the east.

R/2 Division is to attack Cemetery Hill. This order is currently in D6 status; begin rolling at 5:30pm.

Je/Cav has no orders.

A/3 is to attack the left of the Union 3rd Corps and Cemetery Ridge.

M/A/3 is to defend Seminary Ridge and the artillery positioned there.

The rest of 3 Corps has no orders.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Artillery Ammunition: 175. Previous Losses: 129. The following units have this number of wrecked regiments: G/E/2—1, D/R/2—2, I/R/2—4, O/R/2—1, P/H/3—2, S/P/3—2

Reinforcements: As per the Reinforcement Schedule.

Victory:

Result	VP
Union Massive	23+ VP
Union Major	16 to 22 VPs
Union Minor	9 to 15 VPs
Draw	2 to 8 VPs
Confederate Minor	-9 to -3 VPs
Confederate Major	-16 to -10 VPs
Confederate Massive	-17 or less VPs

Historical outcome: The battle was a draw with a Union margin of 4 VPs. The difference in score between this scenario and 6.8 is that the Rebel does not get 3 VP for terrain on maps not in play, and so the levels above have been adjusted accordingly.

6.10 The Third Day

Not simply a replay of the Pickett's Charge scenario on a broader canvas, this scenario starts at dawn, before the famous charge was decided on. Instead, it gives us an interesting look at Lee's other offensive plans on July 3rd, to renew the attack on the flanks. When, for a variety of reasons, those plans failed, Lee settled on attacking the Union center.

General Information

Map Area: All First Turn: 4:00 a.m. July 3rd Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. July 3rd Total Game Length: 65 Turns

Union Information

Set Up: A Pot HQ, Cav HQ, Meade, Hunt, Pleasonton—B52.21 1 Corps HQ and Supply—Newton (3/6) commands Corps—B49.25 1/1/1 6 Wisc(4) 24 Mich(3) 5 Maine/1 Corps Artillery—B46.26 19 Ind(2), 7 Wisc(3), 2 Wisc(1)—B46.27 2/1/1 56 Penn(2), 84 NY(2), 76 NY(3)—B45.28 95 NY(3), 147 NY(3)—B44.28 7 Ind—B44.29 1/2/1—Repl Leader 104 NY(2), 107 Penn(2), 94 NY(3) 16 Maine(1), 13 Mass(2)—B49.22 2/2/1 90 Penn(2), 12 Mass(3), 88 Penn(4)—B47.20 97 NY(3), 83 NY(2), 11 Penn(2), 1 NH/3 Vol/Arty Reserve—B47.22 1/3/1—Repl Leader 121 Penn(1), 142 Penn(3)—B58.19 80 NY(3), 151 Penn(3), C 4US/1 Reg/Arty Reserve—B59.19 2/3/1 150 Penn(3), 149 Penn(2), 143 Penn(4)—B60.20 3/3/1 13 VT(12)—B61.19 14 VT—B62.19 16 VT—B60.18 1 Corps Artillery 2 Maine/1 Corps(3)—B49.24 E&L 1 NY/1 Corps—B45.24 B 4US/1 Corps(4), 5 NY/2 Vol/Arty Reserve—B44.22 F/G 1 Penn/3 Vol/Arty Reserve—B44.23 2 Corps HQ and Supply—B56.21 1/1/2—Repl Leader 5 NH(2), 61 NY(1), 81 Penn(2), 148 Penn(5)—E1.06 2/1/2 28 Mass(2), 69 NY(1), 88 NY(1), 63 NY, 116 Penn—E2.06 3/1/2—Repl Leader 57 NY(3), 66 NY(2)—E3.07 52 NY(2), 140 Penn(5)—E4.06 4/1/2 2 Del(4), 64 NY(2), 53 Penn(1), 143 Penn(2) 27 Conn—E5.06 1/2/2 82 NY(4), 9 Mich/1/HA/Cav—B58.17 15 Mass(2), 1 Minn(3)—B57.18 19 Maine(8)—B56.17 2/2/2 69 Penn(5), 106 Penn(4)—B53.18 72 Penn(7), A 4 US/2 Corps—B52.18 71 Penn—B52.17 3/2/2 20 Mass(4), 7 Mich, B 1 NY/2 Corps—B55.18 59 NY(2), B 1 RI/2 Corps—B54.18 19 Mass, 42 NY(3)—B54.19 -/2/2 Mass SS—B48.20 1/3/2 8 Ohio(3)—B47.19 14 Ind(3)—B45.24 4 Ohio, 7 W Va(4)—B46.24 2/3/2 14 Conn(2), 1 Del(4), A 1RI/2 Corps—B51.19 12 NJ(8)—B50.18 108 NY, 126 NY(7) (from 3/3/2)—B48.19 3/3/2 111 NY(4), I 1US/2 Corps—B49.19 39 NY, 125 NY(7)—B50.20 2 Corps Artillery F&K 3US/1 Reg/Arty Reserve—B50.19 C&F Penn Lt/1 Vol/Arty Reserve—B61.18 5 Mass/1 Vol/Arty Reserve(4)—B62.18 McGilvery, 15 NY/1 Vol/Arty Reserve—E1.06 2 Conn/2 Vol/Arty Reserve—E2.06 6 Maine/4 Vol/Arty Reserve—E4.06 G 1 NY/4 Vol/Arty Reserve—E5.06 1 NJ/4 Vol/Arty Reserve—B57.21 3 Corps HQ and Supply—E8.10 Birney commands Corps, Sickles wounded 1/1/3—Repl Leader—E8.07, E8.08 57 Penn(2), 63 Penn(4), 68 Penn(3), 105 Penn(3), 114 Penn(2), 141 Penn(1) 2/1/3—Repl Leader, Ward commands 1/3 Division—E9.07, E9.08 20 Ind(5), 3 Maine(1), 4 Maine(3), 86 NY(5), 124 NY(4), 99 Penn(3), 1 USSS(5), 2 USSS(3) 3/1/3—E10.08, E10.09 17 Maine(4), 3 Mich(4), 5 Mich(2), 40 NY(6), 110 Penn(2) 1/2/3—E5.08, E5.09 1 Mass(4), 11 Mass(3), 16 Mass(3), 12 NH(2), 11 NJ(3), 26 Penn(3) 2/2/3—E6.07, E6.08 70 NY(3), 71 NY(3), 72 NY(4), 73 NY(4), 74 NY(3), 120 NY(4) 3/2/3—E7.08, E7.09 2 NH(3), 5 NJ(2), 6 NJ(3), 7 NJ(4), 8 NJ(2) 3 Corps Artillery 4 NY/3 Corps(3), K 4US/3 Corps(4), 2 NJ 3 Corps, D 1NY/3 Corps—w/i 3 E8.10 E, 1RI/3 Corps—eliminated. 5 Corps HQ and Supply—E19.07 1/1/5 18 Mass(2), 118 Penn—E23.03 1 Mich(2), 22 Mass(2)—E24.02 2/1/5 9 Mass—E12.05 4 Mich(4), 32 Mass(3)—E11.05 62 Penn(4)—E10.05 3/1/5—Repl Leader 16 Mich(4), 83 Penn(5)—E12.06 44 NY(6)—E11.06 20 Maine(5) E10.06 1/2/5 6 US(3), 14 US(7)—E16.04 3 US(5)—E17.04 4 US(2), 12 US(6)—E18.03 2/2/5 11 US(3), 17 US(2)—E18.04 2 US(3), 7 US(1), 10 US(1)—E17.05 3/2/5 140 NY(6)—E19.03 91 Penn, D 5US/5 Corps Artillery—E20.02 155 Penn—E21.03 146 NY(8)—E22.03 1/3/5 6 Penn Res—E7.03 13 Penn Res(5)—E8.03 1 Penn Res(7)—E9.03 2 Penn Res(4)—E10.02 3/3/5 9 Penn Res—D25.35 10 Penn Res—D25.34 5 Penn Res—D26.33 11 Penn Res(6)—D27.34 12 Penn Res—D28.34 5 Corps Artillery C 1 NY/5 Corps—E31.10 3 Mass/5 Corps, L 1 Ohio/5 Corps—w/i 2 E19.07 I, 5 US/5 Corps—eliminated 6 Corps HQ and Supply—E16.07 Wright—E11.07 1/1/6—w/i 1 E8.06 2/1/6 95 Penn, 96 Penn—E14.04 5 Maine, 121 NY—E15.05 3/1/6 119 Penn—E30.09 6 Maine—E30.10 49 Penn—E31.11 5 Wisc—E31.12 2/2/6 3 Vt—E29.08 4 Vt—E29.07 2 Vt—E28.07 5 Vt—E27.07 6 Vt—E27.08 3/2/6 77 NY—B61.29 43 NY—C58.04 7 Maine—C57.05 33 & 49 NY—C57.06 61 Penn—C56.06 1/3/6—w/i 1 E14.08 122 NY(7) 2/3/6—w/i 1 E14.06 37 Mass(10) 3/3/6—Repl Leader, Wheaton commands 3/6 Division, Newton commands 1 Corps 98 Penn, 102 Penn—E11.03 93 Penn, 62 NY(4)—E12.03 139 Penn—E13.04 6 Corps Artillery 1 Mass/6 Corps—E29.06 F 5US/6 Corps, D 2US/6 Corps, G 2US/6 Corps—w/i 2 E16.07 The rest of 6 Corps artillery sets up with Arty Reserve. 11 Corps HQ—B44.22 11 Corps Supply—B49.23 1/1/11 54 NY(2), 68 NY(2), 41 NY(2), B44.25 153 Penn(6)—B43.25 2/1/11—Repl Leader, Ames commands 1/11 Division 17 Conn(4), 25 Ohio(1)—B42.24 75 Ohio(4)—B41.24 107 Ohio(5)—B41.23 1/2/11 73 Penn(5), 154 NY(1)—B45.20 27 Penn(4), 134 NY(3)—B44.20 2/2/11 33 Mass(9)—B45.26 55 Ohio(5)—B43.21 136 NY(8)—B42.21 73 Ohio(4)—B41.22 1/3/11—Repl Leader 61 Ohio, 74 Penn(5)—B46.20 82 Ill(4), 157 NY(2), 45 NY(2)—B45.21 2/3/11 75 Penn(2), 58 NY, 119 NY(2)—B44.21 82 Ohio(2), 26 Wisc(5), I 1 Ohio/11 Corps(5)—B43.22 11 Corps Artillery G 4 US/11 Corps, H 1 Ohio/3 Vol/Arty Reserve—B46.21 13 NY/11 Corps(3), C W Va/3 Vol/Arty Reserve—B45.22 H 1US/1 Reg/Arty Reserve—B45.23 I 1 NY, 11 Corps(5)—B44.21 K 1 Ohio/11 Corps—eliminated 12 Corps HQ and Supply—B49.26 1/1/12 46 Penn—B55.31 5 Conn, 3 Md—B54.29 20 Conn, 145 NY—B53.30 123 NY—B52.29 3/1/12 107 NY—B55.30 3 Wisc—B55.32 2 Mass—B55.33 13 NJ—B55.34 27 Ind—B56.34 1/2/12 66 Ohio—B44.30 147 Penn—B51.29 5 Ohio—B50.29 7 Ohio, 29 Ohio—B50.28 28 Penn—B49.29 2/2/12 29 Penn—B49.30 109 Penn, 111 Penn—B48.30 3/2/12 137 NY(6)—B47.31 78 NY, 149 NY(4)—B46.31 60 NY(3), 102 NY(3)—B45.31 Ind/12 1 Md PHB—B51.27 150 NY—B50.26 12 Corps Artillery F 4US/12 Corps—B53.27 K 5US/12 Corps—B54.27 M 1NY/12 Corps—B60.29 E Penn Lt/12 Corps—B60.30 A Md Lt/4 Vol/Arty Reserve—B61.30 Cav Corps HQ, Pleasonton—B52.21 2/Cav Division, E&G 1US/2/HA/Cav—w/i 5 C46.30 Arty Reserve HQ, A Pot Supply, Tyler—E3.14

The following units are all part of the Arty Reserve, and set up w/i 5 E3.14: B 1 Penn/1 Corps(3), C 1RI/6 Corps, G 1 RI/6 Corps, 3 NY/6 Corps, 1 NY/6 Corps, 6 NY/1/HA/Cav, B&L 2US/1/HA/Cav, C 5US/1 Reg/Arty Reserve(3), 9 Mass/1 Vol/Arty Reserve(2), K 1NY/4 Vol/Arty Reserve

Optional: Breastworks in hexes: B46.26, B46.27, B45.28, B44.28, B44.29, B44.30, B45.31, B46.31, B47.31, B48.30, B49.31, B49.32, B50.32, B51.32, B52.31

Orders: 1 Corps is to defend Culps Hill and support the 2nd Corps.

2 Corps is to defend the line of Cemetery Ridge.

3 Corps has no orders.

5 Corps is to defend the Round Tops.

1/1/5 is to defend the gap between Little and Big Round Tops.

3/3/5 is to defend Big Round Top.

6 Corps is to support the 5 Corps.

2/6, with 3/1/6 attached, is to defend the south flank of the Union army astride the Taneytown Road.

3/2/6 is to defend the Union right flank along Rock Creek.

77 NY/3/2/6 is to support the 12 corps Artillery on Powers Hill.

11 Corps is to defend Cemetery Hill.

12 Corps is to defend Culps Hill and recapture the breastworks.

66 Ohio/1/2/12 is attached to 3/2/12.

Cav Corps has no orders.

2 Cav Division is to defend the ground between Brinkerhoff Ridge and the east map edge.

The Artillery Reserve has no orders.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Artillery Ammunition: 275. Previous Losses: 367. The following unit has these stragglers: 3/2/12—4. The following brigades have this number of wrecked regiments: 1/1/1—4, 2/1/1—4, 1/2/1—5, 2/2/1—3, 1/3/1—4, 2/3/1—3, 1/2—2, 2/1/2—3, 3/1/2—1, 4/1/2—2, 1/1/3—5, 2/1/3—2, 3/2/3—2, 2/1/5—1, 2/2/5—4, 1/1/11—3, 2/1/11—2, 1/2/11—2, 1/3/11—2, 2/3/11—3.

Reinforcements: As per reinforcement schedule for 3 July.

Confederate Information

Set Up: ANVa HQ and Supply—B26.09 1 Corps HQ and Supply—D19.22 Black Cav/1 Corps, Hart/Arty/Cav—w/i 10 D19.22 P/1 Division—in line along road between A28.23 and A16.29 B/M/1—Repl Leader—D9.31, D8.31, D7.32 13 Miss(6), 17 Miss(4), 18 Miss(2), 21 Miss(5) S/M/1—Repl Leader—D10.30, D11.30 10 Ga(4), 50 Ga(4), 51 Ga(4), 53 Ga(6) W/M/1—D12.29, D13.29, D14.28 16 Ga(4), 18 Ga(5), 24 Ga(4), Cobb Lgn(3), Phllps Lgn(4) K/M/1—w/i 3 D7.26 2 SC(5), 3 SC(6), 3 SC Bn(3), 7 SC(6), 8 SC(4), 15 SC(6) Arty/M/1—w/i 3 D12.25 Fraser(2) A/H/1—Repl Leader—w/i 2 D26.19 8 Ga(3), 9 Ga(3), 11 Ga(2), 59 Ga(7) B/H/1—w/i 1 D19.31 2 Ga(5), 15 Ga(6), 17 Ga(5), 20 Ga(4) Tex/H/1—w/i 2 D22.27 1 Tex(7), 4 Tex(6), 5 Tex(4), 3 Ark(6) L/H/1—Repl Leader, Law commands H/1, Hood wounded. 48 Ala(5)—D26.27 44 Ala(6)—D27.28 4 Ala(5)—D28.28 47 Ala(6)—D29.29 15 Ala(7)—D30.28 Law—D22.27 Arty/H/1—w/i 4 D21.25 Reilly(5) A/1 Corps, Alexander—w/i 4 D5.26 Gilbert(3), Woolfolk(3) E/1 Corps—w/i 4 D5.26 2 Corps HQ and Supply, 35 Va Bn/Jo/Cav—B31.31 R/R/2 4 NC(3), 30 NC(4)—B40.16 2 NC(4), 14 NC(5)—B39.17 I/R/2—Repl Leader 5 NC(4), 12 NC(2), 20 NC(3), 23 NC(1)—B38.17 Do/R/2 4 Ga(6), 12 Ga(5)—B37.18 44 Ga(6), 21 Ga(5)—B36.18 (D/R/2 and O/R/2 set up with J/2 Division) Artillery/R/2—w/i 2 B30.16 Page(3) H/E/2 5 La(3), 6 La(3), 7 La(4)—B33.22 9 La(5), 8 La(5)—B33.23 A/E/2—Repl Leader 21 NC(6)—B33.24 6 NC(6)—B33.25 57 NC(5)—B33.26 G/E/2 31 Ga(4), 38 Ga(4)—B29.25 13 Ga(3), 26 Ga(5)—B29.26 60 Ga(5), 61 Ga(4)—B29.27 (S/E/2 sets up with J/2 Division) Artillery/E/2—w/i 2 B26.22 Green(1), Garber(1) Johnson—B48.34 J/J/2—B43.32, B44.32, B45.33 21 Va(2), 25 Va(4), 42 Va(1), 44 Va(2), 48 Va(2), 50 Va(1) W/J/2—B46.33, B47.33 1 La(2), 2 La(4), 10 La(3) S/J/2 (except 1 NC)—B48.32, B49.32, B50.32 1 Md(6), 3 NC(10), 10 Va(4), 37 Va(4) 1 NC/S/J/2(7)—B52.34 Swl/J/2 2 Va—B51.33 4 Va—B50.33 33 Va, 27 Va—B49.34 5 Va—B48.33 Arty/J/2—w/i 3 C39.05 Raine(2), Crpntr(3), Dement(3), Brown(3) S/E/2—w/i 1 C43.03 D/R/2—B42.32, B43.33, B44.33 2 NC Bn(1), 32 NC(7), 43 NC(8), 45 NC(8), 53 NC(3) O/R/2—B45.34, B46.34 3 Ala(6), 5 Ala(2), 6 Ala(7), 12 Ala(5), 26 Ala(5) N/2 Corps Artillery Millidge—B28.11 Kirkpatrick, Massie—B29.11 D/2 Corps Artillery Cunningham—B32.11 Smith—B31.11 Watson—B25.12 Griffin—w/i 1 B30.16 Graham—w/i 2 B26.22 3 Corps HQ and Supply—B40.06 Anderson—B51.04 Wx/A/3 8 Ala(6)—B62.06 9 Ala(4), 10 Ala(4)—B61.07 11 Ala(4), 14 Ala(4)—B60.07 L/A/3 2 Fla(3), 5 Fla(4), 8 Fla(2)—B57.08 Wr/A/3 22 Ga(4), 2 GaBn(1)—B54.05 48 Ga(4)—B53.06 3 Ga(5)—B52.06 P/A/3 19 Miss(6), 48 Miss(4)—B51.06 16 Miss—B50.05 12 Miss—B49.06 M/A/3 12 Va—B48.05 61 Va—B48.06 41 Va—B47.07 6 Va—B46.07 16 Va—B45.08 Arty/A/3 Patterson—B56.06 Ross—B46.07 Wingfield—B45.08 T/P/3—B45.14, B44.14 14 Ga(6), 35 Ga(5), 45 Ga(6), 49 Ga(5) P/P/3—B43.15, B42.15, B41.16 1 SC(5), 12 SC(4), 13 SC(5), 14 SC(5) S/P/3—Repl Leader 34 NC(5)—B44.10 16 NC(5)—B43.11 22 NC(5)—B42.11 13 NC(2), 38 NC(2)—B41.12 L/P/3—Repl Leader, Lane commands P/3, Pender killed. 18 NC—B40.12 33 NC—B39.13 28 NC—B38.13 37 NC(7)—B37.14 7 NC(5)—B36.14 Arty/P/3 Graham—B40.11 Brown—B46.10 Ward—B47.10 Wyatt—B47.07 H/3—w/i 6 B35.03 A/H/3—Repl Leader 13 Ala(4), 1 Tenn(4), 7 Tenn(4), 14 Tenn(3) B/H/3 40 Va(4), 55 Va(4) D/H/3 2 Miss(6), 42 Miss(7), 55 NC(9) P/H/3—Repl Leader, Pettigrew commands division, Heth wounded 11 NC(8), 26 NC a(3), 26 NC b(3), 47 NC(10), 52 NC(9) P/3 Corps Artillery Marye—B41.10 Johnston—B42.09 McGraw—B43.09 Zimmerman(3), Brander—B44.08 M/3 Corps Artillery Hurt a, Hurt b—B34.11 Johnson—B35.11 Rice—B36.10 Wallace—B37.10 Cav HQ, Stuart—C14.14 FL/Cav, H/Cav—w/i 5 of C14.14 C/Cav—w/i 2 C5.09 Je/Cav—Repl Leader—w/i 1 B15.29 Arty/Cav Moorman, Griffin, Breathed, McGregor—with any of H/Cav, FL/Cav, or C/Cav

Orders: 1 Corps is to send H/1 Division around the south end of Big Round Top to attack the Taneytown Road and Big Round Top from the south. M/1 Division will attack Little Round Top when H/1 is ready.

P/1 is to join 1 Corps.

Hart/Arty/Cav is attached to 1 Corps.

2 Corps is to defend in place.

J/2 Corps is to attack and capture the rest of Culps Hill.

S/E/2, D/R/2, and O/R/2 are attached to J/2.

3 Corps has no orders.

The Cavalry has no orders.

35 Va Bn/Jo/Cav is attached to 2 Corps.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Ammunition: 200. Previous Losses: 293. The following unit has these stragglers—J/J/2—9. The following units have this number of wrecked regiments—Tex/H/1—1, A/H/1—3, B/M/1—2, J/J/2—5, G/E/2—1, S/E/2—1, D/R/2—2, I/R/2—4, O/R/2—1, P/H/3—2, S/P/3—2, L/A/3—1, Wr/A/3—3.

Reinforcements: As Per the Reinforcement Schedule for 3 July.

Victory:

Result	VP
Union Massive	25 or more VPs
Union Major	15 to 24 VPs
Union Minor	5 to 14 VPs
Draw	-4 to 4 VPs
Confederate Minor	-14 to -5 VPs
Confederate Major	-24 to -15 VPs
Confederate Massive	-25 VPs or less

Historical outcome: The Union won a major victory, with a margin of 20 VPs.

6.11 The Fourth Day

While the Army of Northern Virginia was badly bloodied by the previous three days' fighting, it was not yet defeated. Lee, realizing he could no longer attack, still hoped to save something from the battle by provoking Meade into attacking him. Further, any retreat would need time to get the wounded away, and an immense train of suffering men was started south that morning. When Meade declined to attack, Lee finally retreated.

All units should use the July 4th strengths found in the Consolidated Loss Chart.

General Information

Map Area: All. First Turn: 4:00 a.m. July 4th Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. July 4th Total Game Length: 65 Turns

Union Information

Set Up: A Pot HQ, Cav Corps HQ, Meade, Pleasonton, Hunt—B52.21 1 Corps HQ—B49.25, all units w/i 10 B49.25 2 Corps HQ—B55.22, all units w/i 10 B55.22 3 Corps HQ—E8.10, all units w/i 10 E8.10 5 Corps HQ—E16.04, all units w/i 12 E16.04 6 Corps HQ—E19.07, all units (except 3/2/6) w/i 12 E19.07 3/2/6—w/i 3 C57.05 11 Corps HQ—B44.22, all units w/i 5 B44.22 12 Corps HQ—B49.26, all units w/i 10 B49.26 2/Cav, 2/3/Cav, E&G 1US/2/HA/Cav, M 2US/1/HA/Cav—w/i 10 C46.30 3/Cav (less 2/3/Cav), R/1/Cav, E 4US/1/HA/Cav, K 1US/2/HA/Cav—w/i 10 D41.18. 9 Mich/1/HA/Cav, 6 NY/1/HA/Cav, B&L 1US/1/HA/Cav—with Arty Reserve Arty Reserve HQ, A Pot supply—E3.14, all units w/i 10 E3.14, OR set up with any Infantry Corps.

Optional: Breastworks in hexes: B46.26, B46.27, B45.28, B44.28, B44.29, B44.30, B45.31, B46.31, B47.31, B48.30, B49.31, B49.32, B50.32, B51.32, B52.31

Orders: 1 Corps is to defend the east side of Culps Hill and support 2 and 11 Corps.

2 Corps is to defend Cemetery Ridge.

3 Corps is to support 2 Corps.

5 Corps is to defend Big and Little Round Tops. One Brigade may set up on Big Round Top, and has a divisional goal to defend Big Round Top.

6 Corps is to support 5 Corps. 3/2/6 has a divisional goal to defend the Union flank east of and close to Rock Creek.

11 Corps is to defend Cemetery Hill.

12 Corps is to defend Culps Hill and Spangler's Knob.

Cav Corps has no orders.

2/Cav is to defend the ground west of Brinkerhoff Ridge.

2/3/Cav is attached to 2/Cav.

3/Cav is to defend the Union flank astride Emmitsburg Road.

R/1/Cav is attached to 3/Cav.

Those batteries of 1/HA/Cav assigned to the Arty Reserve are attached to the Arty reserve.

Arty Reserve has no orders. Any Arty Reserve battery that sets up with an infantry corps can start attached to that infantry corps.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Artillery Ammunition: 250. Previous Losses: 433. The following units have this number of wrecked regiments: 1/1/1—4, 2/1/1—3, 1/3/1—4, 2/3/1—3, 1/2—2, 2/1/2—3, 3/1/2—1, 4/1/2—3, 1/1/3—5, 2/1/3—2, 3/1/3—1, 1/2/3—4, 2/2/3—3, 2/1/5—1, 2/2/5—4, 1/1/11—4, 2/1/11—2, 1/2/11—2, 1/3/11—2, 2/3/11—3.3/1/12—1.

Reinforcements: As per July 4.

Confederate Information

Set Up: A NVa HQ and Supply—A17.29 1 Corps HQ—D9.17, all units w/i 15 D9.17, and west of the Emmitsburg Road. 2 Corps HQ—B19.10, all units w/i 15 B19.10, and west of the Bxx.15 hexrow. 3 Corps HQ—B49.03, all units w/i 15 B49.03, and west of the Bxx.10 hexrow. Cav—anywhere on map A. 35 Va Bn/Jo/Cav—with 2 Corps.

Orders: 1 Corps is to defend the line of Emmitsburg Road, the southern extension of Seminary Ridge, and connect with the 3 Corps.

2 Corps is to defend the line of Oak and Seminary Ridges, north of the Seminary.

3 Corps is to defend the line of Seminary Ridge between 1 and 2 Corps.

Cav has no orders.

35 Va Bn/Jo/Cav is attached to 2 Corps.

I/Cav is to escort the wounded off the map. It must leave map A via entry hex A on or after 3:30 p.m. Failure to leave gives the Union 10 VP.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Artillery Ammunition: 125. Previous Losses: 461. The following units have this number of wrecked regiments: Tex/H/1—1, B/H/1—1, A/H/1—3, B/M/1—2, K/P/1—1, A/P/1—5, G/P/1—4, S/J/2—1, W/J/2—1, Swl/J/2—1, G/E/2—1, D/R/2—2, I/R/2—4, O/R/2—1, P/H/3—3, D/H/3—3, A/H/3—3, L/P/3—2, S/P/3—2, Wx/A/3—4, L/A/3—3, Wr/A/3—3.

Reinforcements: None.

Victory:

Result	VP
Union Massive	30 or more VPs
Union Major	20 to 29 VPs
Union Minor	11 to 19 VPs
Draw	0 to 10 VPs
Confederate Minor	-10 to -1 VPs
Confederate Major	-19 to -11 VPs
Confederate Massive	-20 or less VPs

Historical outcome: The result was a draw, with a Union margin of 10 VPs.

6.12 The Battle of Gettysburg

This is the whole thing—Gettysburg, from July 1st to the 4th.

General Information

Map Area: All First Turn: 8:00 a.m. July 1st Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. July 4th Total Game Length: 286 Turns.

Union Information

Set Up: 1/1/Cav 8 NY—B26.05 8 Ill—A14.26 12 Ill—B22.05 3 Ind—B19.06 2/1/Cav 6 NY—B16.06 9 NY—B14.07 17 Penn—B11.09 Buford, A 2US Battery—B23.05

Orders: 1/Cav Division is to defend McPherson's Ridge until the arrival of 1st Corps.

8 Ill Cav (1/1/Cav) is to delay the Confederate advance as long as possible, withdrawing to McPherson's Ridge to rejoin its command.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Artillery Ammunition: 800. No previous losses.

Reinforcements: As per the Reinforcement Schedule.

Confederate Information

Set Up: No Confederate Units start on-map.

Orders: As per Reinforcement Schedule.

Ammunition and Previous Losses: Artillery Ammunition: 550. No previous losses.

Reinforcements: As per Reinforcement Schedule.

Victory:

Result	VP
Union Massive	28 or more VPs
Union Major	16 to 27 VPs
Union Minor	6 to 15 VPs
Draw	-5 to 5 VPs
Confederate Minor	-15 to -6 VPs
Confederate Major	-26 to -16 VPs
Confederate Massive	-27 VPs or less

Historical outcome: The Union won a minor victory with a margin of 10 VPs.

6.13 The Battle of Gettysburg—4 Maps

This option presents the battle reduced by 20% so it will fit on a 4x8 table. By backfolding maps A and C to use only the inner half-map area of each, you get the equivalent of a four map game without a major loss of play area. While I prefer the extra amount of elbow room the full five maps provide, this four map version is quite workable with only minor adjustments.

General Information

Map Area: east half map A, west half map C, all of map B, D, E. First Turn: 8:30 a.m. July 1st Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. July 4th Total Game Length: 284 Turns.

Union and Confederate Information: all as in scenario 6.12, above.

Changes needed:

Only a few changes are needed to play this four-map version. They include revised entry hexes, and some changes to VP hexes for ground that falls outside the playing area.

Entry Hexes:

Entry hex A is now hex A9.18. Entry Hex E is now C13.18. Entry hex F is now C41.18, and entry hex L is A44.18.

Victory Point Hexes:

These changes render three victory point hexes outside the map area in play: A5.13, A46.10, and C44.25. Instead; for A5.13 use hex A9.18, for hex A46.10 use hex A44.18, and for C44.25 use hex C41.18.

Reinforcement Schedule changes:

All units scheduled to enter the game at any of the changed entry hexes arrive two turns after their scheduled time. For variable reinforcements, begin rolling two turns after their scheduled time. For commands ordered to halt before entering the new playing area, use the following revised orders:

Union: 5 Corps—advance to C39.15 and defend. No unit can advance west of the Cxx.10 hexrow. 2/Cav—move to hex C41.18 and defend. No unit may move further than 5 hexes west of the west map edge of map C.

Confederate: Pender is ordered to advance to Herr Ridge, halt, form a line facing east, and await further orders.

It is strongly recommended that players automatically exercise the Cavalry Action: East option and that the Confederate player must use C/Cav, FL/Cav, H/Cav, and Je/Cav.

Designer's Notes

My overall philosophy in designing This Hallowed Ground has been discussed openly in the years of steady work on this and other designs of mine, here I'll focus on the details instead. Suffice to say that I wanted to create a regimental game that both captured the best of the Civil War, Brigade Series, and recaptured some of my own love of both the battle that I first discovered in Terrible Swift Sword the 1976 SPI design. While little of TSS can be found here except some thematic elements, it was my original inspiration.

One of the first decisions I had to make was how much detail to invest in the artillery. Clearly more detail was needed than could be found in the CWB, and yet it still remained a supporting arm. I did not want cannons to dominate the system nor the required housekeeping chores. Artillery types were consolidated early on, with most rifled guns being lumped together for simplicity. The fact that the 3 inch rifle and the 10 lb. Parrott are the same gun, as far as shell and bore diameter are concerned made this much simpler—the diameter on a Parrott is 3 inches and, by 1863, both guns fired the same ammunition. The minor differences in range and firepower are very slight.

Once the 10lb Parrott and the 3 Inch Ordinance rifle were placed on the same footing, only about 15% of the batteries in the game—virtually all of them Confederate—contained mixed gun types. For simplicity's sake, these guns were further swapped between batteries (usually within the battalion) to reduce gun types to one per battery. This actually mirrors Confederate field practices, where battalion commanders often grouped guns by type. We find a lot of this cross-battery grouping especially on July 3rd.

Almost axed were the two Whitworths. While much has been made of their breechloading capabilities, these guns never sealed well around the breech and this greatly reduced their effectiveness. In fact, later in the war the Confederate gunners welded the breaches shut and fired them as muzzle-loaders. Here they are given their long range, but are not very useful, especially given that they can't fire canister.

The Howitzers were left in, because while they fired similar ammo loads to the Napoleon, their range was substantially less effective. The Union army replaced its howitzers with Napoleons well before Gettysburg, but the Confederates—who could never get enough Napoleons—were stuck using both the 12 and 24 pounder varieties.

The bulk of artillery rules work to give the Union a substantial advantage over their opponents. Coupled with the powerful Union artillery reserve, the Federals will clearly dominate most artillery duels. While frustrating for the Rebel, he should remember that even so, artillery is a limited arm, and will not by itself be decisive.

Artillery detail is simplified to the level that the tactical commanders paid attention to anyway—were the guns rifled or smoothbore. Some overzealous players might take great pains to maximize artillery use, including a massive amount of long range "sniping" to produce the odd result. Not only is this a roadblock to effective playing time, it is significantly ahistorical as well. Civil War gunners were discouraged from such sniping as a waste of ammo, and I have gone to great pains to render this kind of gaminess moot here. Artillery was a supporting arm, and I do not want the details of this technical arm to overwhelm the game's play.

Another decision was to significantly abstract supply. Supply wagons are limited to the corps and army trains for simplicity, and to avoid undue tactical flexibility. While divisional trains did exist, the tendency of players to use them too far forward negated much of the intent of the low and out of ammo rules. Limiting re-supply to the much slower and fewer corps trains made resupply harder—a positive development. The intention of the supply rules is to force players to pull units out of the line when they develop an ammunition shortage and send them back to the trains (not vice versa). Detailed regimental accounts and O.R. reports are full of examples of units whose ammo ran short were pulled out of the line—often at critical times—to get resupplied.

There are no cavalry supply wagons for either army. This reflects the more scattered nature of mounted operations, and that cavalry tended to carry less ammo anyway. Jenkins' men, for instance, took only 10 rounds apiece into the battle. Restricted resupply will limit deep independent operations.

The July 3rd cavalry battlefield lies a few hexes off the east edge of Map C. However, virtually all the non-optional cavalry units did spend time on the maps, except perhaps Custer's Brigade. The problem is that going another half or full map east there was cost-prohibitive, and we were unable to do that. However, there is nothing really compelling about why that cavalry engagement happened on the Low Dutch Road—had Stuart turned south a little sooner, the fighting would have been along Brinkerhoff Ridge. In effect, I have ignored that last half-map and let the players fight it out on the existing map area. The option to send Stuart's men off-map more fully replicates the historical event, although it removes the players from the tactical resolution process.

While this is a big game, I have created as many scenarios for two maps (or less) as possible. Seven of the twelve scenarios fit this category, giving all players a chance to enjoy this game. It is also worth noting that while the basic framework of the options and scenarios is taken from Thunder, there are some differences. I dropped the options and counters for better rated Ewell and Hill because it did not seem worth the effort, and most of that option was still recaptured by changing Lee's rating anyway. I did away with the Jackson Lives! Scenario, instead simply offering up Jackson as a replacement commander for the existing 2nd Corps in lieu of Ewell. It was my experience that no one played the game with the revised two-corps structure assumed in the old scenario, and that reducing the Confederate player to only two corps was a serious hindrance anyway. Given that it required a whole new reinforcement schedule, new loss charts for the Confederate army, and significant changes to the order of battle that the player must remember or write down (since printing alternate counters for this obscure option was out of the question) I ditched it.

Many of the scenarios are quite detailed in set-up. Early on, I chose to add the detail because I thought enough gamers would be interested, and because so much data is available on troop positions. The set ups are optimized enough to make sure things like command radius are addressed, but not much otherwise. Of course, the problem with such detail is that many of these later 2nd and 3rd Day scenarios will take time to set up. While I feel that many will tackle these scenarios precisely because of that detail, others would prefer a quick solution. I suggest that each side place their various HQs in the listed hexes, and then place that HQ's troops within 10 hexes of the HQ. This will not recreate all the nuances, but will get the units in approximately the right locations and greatly speed up the process.

Most of the troops from the Confederate options are here, despite hefty additions to the counter mix, because I feel that they are a critical component in adding uncertainty to what is perhaps the most familiar situation in wargaming. While not the measure of Lee's men, the troops represented in Hill's Corps and in Buckner's Division where still good troops, capable of heavy fighting. Besides, many of these units have never had a counter in a wargame, and I love trotting out obscure units. Proper use of the variable forces can also balance a game between players of differing skill or experience.

Again with the intention of preserving uncertainty, I included the variable entry times for most reinforcements. However, gone is the elaborate process used to create variable locations—another process that was almost never used, and not worth the verbiage. The hard-core among you can dig out Thunder II and use that system, if you really want, since the forces and locations are the same. For real excitement, however, I suggest putting all the reinforcement leaders in a cup, and when a division or corps is called for on the schedule pull one out blindly. That will certainly mix things up.

Most of the scenarios determine victory through the familiar mix of VPs for losses, terrain, and wrecked formations. In some scenarios, this was too elaborate a procedure, but for the most part the victory conditions are part of an integrated system. I design victory conditions that reflect the course of events up to that time—it is up to the player to change history. Hence, any Union player that starts the July 2nd scenario has to live with the consequences of the July 1st defeat. I think that the game remains remarkably balanced—just remember that the game is four days long, not three.

Victory conditions are one of those items that never satisfy everyone. Points for losses and wrecked formations tend to be self explanatory as being a reliable measure of the relative damage inflicted on the enemy. In a departure from my usual philosophy, I have included stragglers (players familiar with the CWB are aware that in my games, stragglers almost never count when determining wrecked formations) because I found that including them gave a better sense of the relative damage done to formations at that instant. Certainly straggler recovery will ultimately lessen that impact, as units recover, but in the meantime, there is a much greater range of temporary vulnerability, a better measure of success.

Terrain victory points are more abstract, and players sometimes dislike the seeming arbitrariness of my choices. I use terrain-based VPs to recreate two things. The relative importance the actual participants placed on the ground around them, and as a relative measure of how aggressive each side has been. Hindsight tells us that army destruction was very likely impossible in the Civil War, and that a defensive mindset might be more tactically rewarding. However, the men in charge of those armies did believe in the offense, and I need a goad to encourage players into similar mindsets if I want to recreate the history. Further, despite being arbitrary, much of the measure of a Civil War victory was in who held the ground after the fight. 135 years of hindsight might tell us that Cemetery Hill was no more critical than any other hill in Adams County, but on July 3rd, 1863, holding it was very important to the men that were there. So yes, those terrain objectives might well be somewhat arbitrary—but they work towards the victory conditions as a whole.

The final map is the product of a unique collaboration. Dean Essig, of course, does all our final artwork. However, wargaming has no better map expert on Gettysburg than Rick Barber, whose love of the field and artistic talents made him a natural choice to do the base maps. Better yet, Rick, always interested in improving any Gettysburg cartography, quickly offered to help. The result is the best map so far on the battle, done at a scale of 110 yards to the hex. Rick's own game on the subject, Summer Storm, by Clash of Arms shows off his work as well, and is unique because it covers even more of the field. Both of these mapboards are essentially the same map, done by Rick at differing scales. We are thankful that Rick agreed to help, and improved the final result immeasurably.

Some of the details on the map require some discussion. Players will note the inclusion of a number of small streams—those running through hexes, as opposed to along hexsides—have no real effect on play. they are included primarily to help orient up from down, as they give a clear representation of where the natural landfall lies. Most of these streams are mere trickles, easily crossed by all units.

Second, we chose early on to only include the stone fences, since those actually had a tactical effect. They made inviting ready-made breastworks, and were used as such by the troops. However, other types of fences—post & rail and worm fences, mostly—provided no real cover and were too easily dismantled to have an effect on movement, and so were omitted. For those of you wondering why some of the stone walls appear and disappear seemingly at random, rest assured that they are usually connected to other fences that failed to make the cut.

Third is the use of slope hexes. This feature helps avoid the layer-cake syndrome typical of games with elevation contours, where going up a slope is difficult but moving laterally on the face of such steep hillsides is made artificially easy, since slopes are only usually only hexside features. In fact, moving laterally was as hard or harder than going straight up these hills, and so Rick added slope hexes to address this anomaly.

Fourth are the profusion of rocky hexes—dozens of hexes. The effect of these is minor, but important, in the stationing of artillery. These hexes don't effect movement much—they provided no impediment at all to infantry or cavalry—artillery and wagons could almost always find ways around the outcroppings. When under pressure—and especially when retreating in the face of the enemy—artillery had less time to find those safe paths. Hence, a battery leaving in a hurry was more likely to break axles or wheels, rendering their guns out of action even if they escaped. This is all shown with the modifier to the Gun Loss Table for Rocky ground.

The boulder hexes around Devils Den were so different as to warrant their own feature. The rugged nature of these vast rocks made forming a line or fighting effectively difficult. There is some combat advantage to holding this ground—given the amount of natural cover—but control will be difficult.

Overall, players will find that most features are not great movement hindrances, so that what at first glance looks like difficult terrain, is easily memorized. I feel that this is an important aspect to ease of play, and wanted to avoid massive terrain gridlock while still preserving the outstanding detail and subtle effects of the ground itself that Rick captured in his artwork.

Of course, all movement is a bit of an abstraction, and nothing illustrates that more fully than the problem I confronted in tracing the movement of the Union First Corps from Emmitsburg Road to McPherson's Ridge on the morning of July 1st. Historically, the First Corps left the Emmitsburg Road near the Codori Barn and moved directly across country to Seminary Ridge and then to support Buford out on McPherson's Ridge. Clearly, this seemed faster to the men at the time. However, the better march rates over roads will mean that staying on the road is faster. At first glance, imposing additional penalties for moving through town seemed in order, but this proved unacceptable becuase it would ahistorically delay the Eleventh Corps, and frankly, the town was not so confusing that a column could not follow a main road. Certainly the First Corps forced marched across those fields, but they could just as easily have forced marched along the road as well, still leaving the road as the faster route. In the end, several reasons made the cross country route seem logical to the men on the scene, all of them hard to replicate in a game.

First, Reynolds' staff and escort opened gaps in the numerous fences along the historical route. However, the basic cross-country movement rates already take this into account, in that they are already slow. A basic infantry unit can move only 660 yards in 15 minutes (1.5 mph), not a speedy march. One of the reasons for this sluggishness are those self-same impediments found in fields and pastures that simply cannot be accounted for in a playable game.

Second, the player has the huge advantage of hindsight, being able to compare the two routes objectively and determine the fastest—the men on the ground simply made the best decision they could without such a birds-eye view. They chose the direct route. It is simply impossible to take that foresight away from the player.

Third, the men of the corps were fresh (they had been on the road only about an hour) and fully capable of extreme exertion as they ran across those fields. They would likely not have been as quick arriving had they been marching four hours instead. This nicely contrasts the known, immutable qualities of a cardboard counter versus the variable capabilities of real troops. As gamers, we are forced to reduce movement to averages in order to play in a managable fashion—rolling a die for every unit every turn to determine it's movement allowance creates yet another logistical nightmare that I want no part of.

Historical purists among you will quickly note that the cross-country route is not going to be taken very often. However, the arrival times and movement rates have been calculated out so that the Union infanty will arrive on McPherson's Ridge at about the right time (give or take 15 minutes) and so history, in the larger sense, has been preserved. After writing a half-dozen special rules and trashed them each in turn, as they proved to create as more problems than they fixed, I have contented myself with ignoring this minor movement abstraction and getting on with the game.

OOB NOTES

The 2nd New Jersey Battery (Artillery 3 Corps) was also known as Battery B, 1st New Jersey Light Artillery. There are references to both names in the Official Records, without any explanation or indication of a name change at some point.

102 Penn (3/3/6) was in Westminster guarding trains for the battle. On the 3rd, a detachment of 103 officers and men were sent forward with some ammunition trains, and were sent into the line.

41 NY, (1/1/11) left 200 men near Emmitsburg, detached on a reconnaissance expedition. They did not rejoin the unit until after the battle. the remainder of the regiment itself was late arriving, and did not see action on July 1.

75 Ohio (2/1/11) had left a detachment of 104 men at Emmitsburg, these men did not rejoin the unit until after the day's fighting on July 1st.

154 NY (1/2/11) left a detachment of 52 men at Emmitsburg, who did not rejoin the unit until after the day's fighting on July 1st.

61 Ohio (1/3/11) also left 104 men behind at Emmitsburg, who did not rejoin the regiment until July 2nd, 8 am.

58 NY (2/3/11) was escorting divisional trains from Emmitsburg, and did not arrive until the afternoon of July 1st. It was not engaged on the first day.

3 WV Cavalry (2/1/CAV) has been omitted because it only had about 50 men on the field and they were acting as couriers for the division. It did not fight as a formed unit. Similarly, a number of provost and HQ escort units were omitted, to prevent players from pulling them away from their historical duties (which are for the most part, not overtly modeled) to create "extra" commands.

The 6 US Cavalry of the R/1/Cav was almost an optional, since it isn't in play until the 4th. On the 3rd, the 6th US was detached to Fairfield in an ill-advised effort to seize Rebel supply wagons, and was not with Merritt's Brigade during the South Cavalry Field action that day. They ran into Jones' Confederate Cavalry Brigade at Fairfield and were cut to pieces, which is why they set up on the 4th so badly reduced. Their losses, however, are not figured into the various loss totals for VP purposes.

BG Alfred T. T. Torbert (commander of 1-1-6 brigade) holds the distinction of being the only officer at Gettysburg who had simultaneously held both Union and Confederate commissions. He was an officer of the 5th Infantry at the outbreak of the Rebellion, and applied for leave when the cataclysm occurred. He was commissioned as an officer in the C.S.A. artillery in March, but subsequently returned to the Union ranks on April 17th, 1861. His native state was Delaware, and one suspects that he had originally anticipated the secession of that slave state, which of course never materialized. This oddity did not seem to have hurt his Union army career—he would later become a high-ranking cavalry officer under Sheridan.

1 NC Bn SS were technically independent, attached directly to the 2nd Corps HQ of the ANV. Their exact status was nebulous, since they were likely the Corps provost, and most accounts and orders of battle don't even mention them. When I did the original order of battle research for the counters, I had virtually no information on them, and I made an assumption that if they would have seen action at all, it would have been alongside O'Neal's Brigade of Rodes' Division on the 1st day. O'Neal's brigade did detach a battalion of skirmishers to their east to link with Doles, and I assumed that this would be a natural place for these North Carolinians, as well. Also, there is no evidence they were actually armed with Sharps rifles. However, I really liked having them so armed in TSS. Consider this my General Loutsch counter.

Later research has shown most of the above to be wrong. Unfortunately, this was after the counters were printed. The battalion actually saw no action, as it spent most of the battle guarding the 2nd Corps supply train, and it was originally from Avery's Brigade in Early's Division, not Rodes. Astute players will note that there is already an optional unit for A/E/2 labelled the 1 NC Bn, an R4 unit. This is likely the same unit.

I suggest doing one of three things. A) play as is. The inclusion of 2 extra strength points, even B armed, is not likely to effect the game much, and this unit can easily represent the Alabama Bn of Sharpshooters commanded by Major Blackford that O'Neal did detach. B) use the 1 NC Bn SS/O/R/2 as a permanent train guard, and ignore the opional 1 NC Bn/A/E/2. C) Make the 1 NC Bn SS/O/R/2 an optional unit, substituting it for the 1 NC Bn/A/E/2, and bring the SS unit into play only when using that option. Mea Culpa.

Similarly, A number of Confederate brigades had provisional battalions formed by taking a few men from each regiment and using them to handle most of the specialized skirmishing duties. All of these units were called sharpshooters, but the do not represent extra strength missing from the brigades, but simply a redistribution of strength within the brigades. With their primary duty being skirmishing, they really have no real role at this scale, so they were ignored.

35 Va Bn Cavalry—commonly known as White's Commanches. These men were excellent cavalry, though undisciplined even by Army of Northern Virginia standards. Ewell specifically requested them to accompany his Corps early in June, and they spent little time with their parent brigade during the campaign. Nominally, they were issued rifled muskets, but despised the things and proudly reported them all "lost on campaign" when they returned to Virginia. Hence, here they have pistols.

There are two regiments labeled "1 SC" in the game: a unit in P/P/3 and an optional unit in J/P/1. This is not a mistake—there were in fact two 1st South Carolina Regiments. That in P/P/3 was technically known as the 1 SC (Provisional Army) while that in J/P/1 was known as the 1 SC Volunteers. Both served with great distinction.

Black's Cavalry Regiment (1 Corps)—This unit was a scratch force of stragglers and returning wounded that was placed under command of Col. John L. Black (1 SC Cavalry, wounded at Brandy Station) as they moved north. They spent much of the battle supporting Longstreet's Corps, and on the 3rd skirmished against Merritt's Federals on the right flank. The unit was dissolved and the men returned to their various commands after the battle. While Col. Black was personally very capable, and a number of the men in this unit were solid veterans, Black himself was very happy to get shut of the bulk of this scratch command and return to his own regiment, since too many of the men here were skulkers and stragglers.

A number of CSA regiments are shown with smoothbore muskets instead of rifled weapons. While it has generally been assumed that the CSA troops all carried rifles by this time, this was not the case. There were still smoothbores in the ranks in all the divisions, as evidenced by ammunition relics recovered on the field. A lack of comprehensive CSA information, however, has precluded specific units carrying such weapons from being identified. All of the regiments shown here as carrying smoothbores did indeed carry them at some point, though they may have been replaced by rifles in that specific unit by July of 1863. However, these units were deemed representative of the arms mix in the CSA force at this time, and suffer accordingly.

Errata

A small number of counters were omitted or messed up with the first set we printed, they appear as replacements on one of the countersheets (we printed the counters in two batches, allowing us to correct some errors before release.) The following counters are effected: The 147 Penn/1/2/12 replaces the 148 Penn of that brigade—Throw the 148 Penn/1/2/12 away. Note that there is a real 148 Penn in 2nd Corps. The 26 Penn/1/2/3 replaces the same unit that has no strength. Throw the incomplete unit away.

Two units are additions, inadvertently omitted when we printed them the first time. These units are added to their brigades: 7 Mich/3/2/2 Union, 8 SC/K/M/1 Confederate.

A number of CSA units have the wrong state silhouette—we will replace these with a future replacement sheet. None of these errors effect play, just state pride. For those of you who are interested, they are:

13 Ala- A/H/3 2 NC Cav—C/Cav 1 SC Cav—H/Cav Cobb Lgn- H/Cav—should be Georgia JD Lgn- H/Cav—should be Mississippi Phillips Lgn- H/Cav—should be Georgia.

Historical Notes

The story of Gettysburg has been told many times, and often in overwhelming detail. Between the words of the participants—found in both the Official Records and countless postwar sources—and the historians who sought to understand later, the interested reader has no problem finding out more. With that in mind, I have chosen not to retell the story again. Instead, I have decided to recount some of the lesser-known actions of the battle; incidents and heroes that, even in this much described fight, too often get mentioned only in passing. Also, like any great event, controversies swirl almost as fiercely as the actual fighting, and prove longer-lived, so I will touch on some of the more notable ones from Gettysburg.

Doles and his Georgians

Any tour of the 11th Corps fight north of town on July 1st usually takes Gettysburg visitors to Barlow's Knoll, (called Blocher's Knoll before the fight) where Confederate General John Gordon's 1,500 Georgians attacked Union General Francis Barlow's 1st Division, 11th Corps in a bloody frontal attack. Gordon Lost 500 men in less than 30 minutes, but Barlow's command, only about 2500 strong—one of the weaker Federal divisions at Gettysburg, was shattered. Gordon's Brigade, victorious, halted and let the rest of Early's division pursue the retreating Federals back into town.

What is generally less well known is that Gordon's men were not the only Georgians involved. General George Doles' Brigade of four Georgia regiments, detached from Rodes' Division to screen the Confederate left while the rest of Rodes' men attacked Oak Ridge, played more than a minor role.

In fact, Doles' overall performance is one of the stellar brigade—and brigadier—performances of the entire battle. Numbering a bare 1,300 men, Doles was initially charged with facing two entire Federal divisions in the open plain east of Oak Ridge—the First and Third Divisions of the Union 11th Corps, some 5,500 men, deployed north of town. Doles' small command had to cover almost a mile of open ground, stretching to connect with Early's Division arriving west of Rock Creek. The only support Doles could count on was a battalion of Alabama sharpshooters from O'Neal, another of Rodes' brigadiers, These skirmishers likely numbered no more than 150 men, and spread themselves out in an extended line across Doles' front.

Doles' deployment had neutralized the Union 11th Corps, leaving the men of the 1st Corps to fight the rest of Rodes' Division alone on Oak Ridge. Most brigade commanders would be quite satisfied to have checkmated two enemy divisions with only one brigade, but Doles, in contact with Early and seeing Gordon's deployment, elected to attack.

Leaving only the thin skirmish line in place to face the Union 3rd Division, 11th Corps, Doles marched his formed brigade laterally across the 11th Corps front to a point near the Carlisle Road, and proceeded to join in Gordon's attack, striking Barlow's flank just as Gordon crested the knoll to their front. Under pressure from two sides, it is not surprising that Barlow's command folded, though not without some fierce action, as Gordon's losses attest. However, after the action that cleared the knoll, Doles pivoted to deal with the next Union threat: the belated approach of Krzyzanowski's Brigade of the 3rd Division, coming to support Barlow.

Doles redeployed quickly to meet this threat, and took advantage of the rolling terrain to ambush Krzyzanowski's command. As the lead of the brigade crossed the Carlisle Road, it was attacked front and flank by two of Doles' regiments and suffered heavily. Very quickly, the brigade collapsed in disorder and retreated, pressed by Doles' Georgians.

With the collapse of Barlow's Division and the rout of Krzyzanowski, three of the four Union Brigades deployed north of town were out of action. The 11th Corps line was hopelessly shattered, and attempts to reform north of town proved impossible. The final action was a sharp fight near the brickyard, on the north edge of town between Union Col. Coster's First Brigade, Second Division, 11th Corps—sent forward from the reserve on Cemetery Hill to try and cover the 11th Corps retreat—and two more of Early's brigades, Hays' and Avery's. Doles, still not content, pursued the Union troops into the town and further savaged the 3rd Division of the 11th Corps.

Doles' maneuvering across the front of the deployed 11th Corps was not only dazzling, but also indicated just how much the senior leadership failed 11th Corps. Barlow's choice of the knoll proved flawed, exposed to being flanked on both sides and beyond support of the rest of his corps. Brigadier General Alex. Schimmelfennig, commanding the Union 3rd Division, must bear a heavy responsibility for his passivity in the face of Doles' movement, for by not reacting with any of his division, Schimmelfennig allowed Doles to strike Barlow's flank unhindered. Worse, when reserves were finally sent, not only were they too late to help Barlow, but Krzyzanowski's men blundered almost blindly into an ambush and contributed little to the defense. Finally, Major General Carl Schurz—in command of 11th Corps with the elevation of Howard to Wing Command—did nothing to recall Barlow from his exposed position before the storm broke or to coordinate help between his two divisions north of town after action began.

Remarkably, Doles' losses were moderate, despite sharp actions against Barlow, Krzyzanowski, and pursuing the 3rd Division into town—219 men out of the 1,323 engaged. This works out to about 16.6 %, just about half of Gordon's 33% losses in his frontal attack. Doles and his brigade's exploitation of the gap between the two Federal divisions was instrumental, in a remarkably short time, in shattering the 11th Corps defense. His adept handling of his command is on par with the best performances of any brigadier during the battle, and far surpasses most.

Ewell's Fatal Hesitation

Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell has been, next to Longstreet, "the man who lost the battle" in history's eyes. It was Ewell, historians have contended, who gave away the battle when he failed to press the advantage and capture Cemetery Hill on July 1st, after the defeat of the Union 1st and 11th Corps. Jackson, runs the corollary, would not have stopped, and the bloody failures of the next two days would not have happened.

This argument provides a handy vehicle for the transference of blame from Lee. It's also an argument that simply cannot stand up to a close look at the tactical situation that afternoon. In fact, there were a number of reasons why Ewell halted, and none of them had anything to do with hesitation or indecision. Ewell did reach a decision—a reasonable one under the circumstances.

The chief reason—so often overlooked—for the halt is that Lee ordered Ewell to stop. At about 4:00 p.m., Lee sent a courier to Ewell with verbal instructions. The first part of this message has been repeated often: Take Cemetery Hill "if practicable." At first glance, that order gave Ewell all the latitude he needed, and hence any failure was of his own making. However, the next part of that message actually limited Ewell's real choices considerably, since it went on to order Ewell to be careful "not to bring on a general engagement."

This last instruction was really the crux of the matter. It is critical here to recall that one Federal Division—unengaged and unrouted—held Cemetery Hill, supported by 40 cannon from two Union corps. Further, the rest of the Union force was rallying around that division. Far from undefended, Cemetery Hill had at least 2000 unrouted defenders, well supported. A hastily flung brigade or two on Ewell's part were simply not going to clear the hill: only a coordinated effort by both of his divisions was going to do the trick, and one wonders how Ewell was supposed to launch a corps-sized attack against an established Union line without 'bringing on a general engagement.'

Worse yet, from Ewell's perspective, was the fact that his two divisions were not ready to make any such effort with anything like their full strength. As Jubal Early entered the fight, he left one of his brigades out along the York Pike to screen against any potential Union threat from that direction. That brigade commander—William Smith, who Early seems to have discounted as a soldier, but whom had to be treated well as he was the newly elected Governor of Virginia—soon sent an excited report that Union forces were menacing the Rebel rear. Even as Early discounted that report to Ewell, however, he did send another brigade to Smith's support just in case. This left only two brigades—at most 2500 men—in Early's Division available to attack.

Robert E. Rodes' command was no better, and—in fact—much worse off. Where Early's losses had been moderate, Rodes', due to several failures in brigade leadership that day, were considerably heavier. Rodes' five brigades had lost about 1/3 of their strength, not counting the temporary losses due to stragglers, and several brigades were simply unfit for further action. Iverson's North Carolina command had been slaughtered, and refused to serve again under their brigadier. They were temporarily commanded by a staff officer from Ewell's Headquarters, and were completely unfit for further action. Daniel and O'Neals commands had also bled heavily, and were not up to a serious effort. Rodes could really only call on full efforts from two of his five brigades, both of whom had already seen significant action. Rodes took 7500 men into action, and lost at least 2500. Stragglers probably doubled this number, leaving no more than 2500 to 3000 men at best ready to attack.

Not surprisingly, given these kinds of numbers, Ewell's first thought was of help from A.P. Hill's Third Corps. While two of Hill's divisions were heavily engaged, a third division was up, and had not yet seen action. Ewell felt that with an attack coming from the west in support, he could take Cemetery Hill. Lee again entered the picture here, however, expressly denying Hill permission to join in an attack, and further expressly denying the use of Hill's remaining fresh division—Anderson's - claiming it was needed as an army reserve.

With less than half his force available, with orders from Lee not to bring on a new battle, and with help from Hill specifically denied, Ewell chose not to press the attack. Both of his divisional commanders concurred, agreeing that without support, any attack on their part would be a bloody failure. Rodes' words were the most telling—he called the idea absurd in his official report.

Had Lee really wanted Cemetery Hill, he could have taken it, but that attack would have required both Rebel Corps to make a significant effort. Lee was not ready to widen the engagement, fearing the unknown positions of the Union corps not yet engaged, and so chose not to press the advantage. Ewell can be blamed for many things at Gettysburg, but a fatal hesitation on the evening of July 1st is not one of them.

Slocum on July 1st

The basic story of the First Day's battle is well known: the better part of two Rebel Corps converged on two Union Corps, and outnumbered and outflanked, the Federals were driven back to Cemetery Hill. Numbers were important here, since the Union 1st and 11th Corps mustered about 20,000 men, with 2900 Federal horsemen in support; while the Confederates brought 28,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry into action, and another 7200 men—Anderson's Division—on the field but not engaged. In effect, Lee won the race to concentrate, despite his uncertainty about the size of the enemy he engaged.

However, another full Union Corps should likely have been on the field. Henry Slocum's 12th Corps, 8000 men strong. The 12th Corps' orders for the 1st brought them to the hamlet of Two Taverns, a couple of miles southeast of Gettysburg along the Baltimore Pike. There the corps was to halt, in supporting distance of Reynolds—who had been ordered to Gettysburg—and await developments. Further, Slocum had orders to establish contact with Reynolds in case trouble developed, and to make sure 12th Corps Headquarters was familiar with not only the main roads but also the secondary routes to Gettysburg, with the clear implication of going to support the Union 1st Corps. By 11:00 a.m. that morning, the 12th Corps had completed its short march, and was resting in the fields around Two Taverns, within no more than an hour's march to Gettysburg.

Why, then, wasn't the story of the First Day one of three Union Corps defending the ridges west and north of town, instead of merely two? What happened to keep the 12th Corps out of action during the whole of that critical afternoon?

Slocum's orders were part of the problem. On the morning of July 1st, Slocum received the Pipe Creek Circular, Meade's famous contingency order which presaged a retreat to behind Pipe Creek, Maryland where a very defensible position was already scouted out. That order called for Slocum to hold at Two Taverns and retreat down the Baltimore Pike, so as not to uncover an excellent road to enemy forces. Reynolds and Howard were to retire towards Emmitsburg and Taneytown. The flaw in that plan is that Reynolds never got that order, and his advance to Gettysburg precipitated the battle, so that the Pipe Creek circular was essentially invalidated before it ever took force. Meade understood this, and had pretty much ignored the Pipe Creek order by that afternoon. Slocum, however, never received any countermanding order, so he stayed put. Slocum remained at Two Taverns even after aides reported the sounds of significant firing at Gettysburg, indicating a large action. The 12th Corps commander, never a fountain of initiative, decided not to move to the sound of the guns. He cannot really be blamed for this, given that he had orders not to go forward, but he did nothing to try and clarify the situation either, which he could have done by sending messengers to both Gettysburg and Meade at Taneytown.

A share of the blame, however, must reside with Oliver O. Howard, who assumed command after Reynolds' death. Howard was fully aware of Slocum's proximity; he had been alerted to the 12 Corps movements by Meade's orders of the night before, those same orders that sent his own and Reynolds' men to Gettysburg. Further, by midday Howard knew he faced two corps, a force considerably larger than his own. Howard sent several messages to Slocum reporting on events, but none of them mentioned either Reynolds' loss or the full tactical situation.

About 3:00 p.m., Slocum did finally send an aide forward, and based on this report, Slocum began moving his Corps towards Gettysburg, with the intention of moving up on Howard's right flank north of town. En route, Slocum finally received a message from Howard—sent around 4:00 p.m.—that indicated the extent of the action and explicitly asked for help. Of course, by this time, the 11th Corps line was shattered and the 12th Corps could not possibly reach Howard in time to reverse the crisis.

The most damage to Slocum's reputation, however, was done when he initially refused to come forward to Cemetery Hill and take charge of the situation. As senior officer present, he would have superseded even Hancock (who had been sent forward by Meade to replace Reynolds) and Slocum seems not to have wanted to bear that responsibility. He told one subordinate that he did not want to be responsible for a situation not of his own making, which doesn't speak well for his sense of duty. In any case, he did reach Cemetery Hill around 6:00 p.m., whereupon Hancock turned over command.

Slocum's lack of initiative does not speak well of him as a corps commander. Meade certainly wanted him to go to Gettysburg, as evidenced by the message Meade sent to both Slocum and the 5th Corps commander, George Sykes, to move to Gettysburg after Meade learned of Reynolds' fall. Unfortunately, given the distance it had to cover, this message did not reach Slocum until almost 4:00 p.m., after the 12th Corps was finally moving and too late to have any further effect. Slocum's failure to act also contrasts sharply with that of Sickles, 3rd Corps commander. Sickles also had conflicting orders to guard Emmitsburg, but upon learning of the Gettysburg fighting he left a portion of his command behind to guard that point and hurried four brigades forward. Despite being much further away, 3rd Corps arrived on the field only shortly after Slocum. Sickles earned his own just share of censure later in the battle, but he deserves credit for making what was a difficult decision on the afternoon of July 1st.

Slocum left the Army of the Potomac that September to go west with his corps, and never returned to the Eastern Theater. He spent the rest of the war on rear-area garrison duty, which ironically wasn't the result of his actions at Gettysburg, but rather because he refused to serve directly under Joseph Hooker, who had been placed in charge of the move west.

Greene on the Other Hill—Culp's Hill, July 2nd

The grand scale of many military actions is often hard to grasp—thousands of men surging back and forth across bloody fields creates a scale that staggers most individuals. It is no surprise, then that some actions seem to reduce all this chaos to focused clarity, and those actions become somehow larger than life. Certainly the story of one regiment holding the 'end of the line' against a powerful opponent seeking to turn the army's flank and unravel the entire Union position seems to epitomize the efforts of both armies.

No, this is not a segue into Little Round Top. Joshua Chamberlain and the 20th Maine or William Oates of the 15th Alabama hardly need more press—the phenomenal success of the Killer Angels and the movie Gettysburg have turned that once-forgotten corner of Little Round Top into the most visited sight on the field. (And made a fictional character—Buster Kilrain—the most asked-about participant of the battle.) Instead, this is about the defense of Culp's Hill, where one Union brigade stood firm against the better part of a Confederate division.

The action on Culp's Hill is by nature a lot harder to grasp. Where Little Round Top provides a panorama over a natural amphitheater where some of the toughest fighting of the war happened, Culp's Hill's heavily wooded slopes obscure any larger picture. In even sharper contrast, Longstreet's Rebel First Corps struck the Union army a powerful body-blow, generating terrific fighting and huge numbers of troops locked in the struggle; while Ewell's efforts were at best sporadic and haphazard, involving no more than three brigades in action at any one time, out of the eleven in his corps. It is fortunate for the Union cause that Ewell never managed a better effort, because Culp's Hill was left virtually undefended at a critical moment, thanks to confusion in the Federal command.

This confusion initially stemmed from George Meade's Pipe Creek Circular, the plan that called for a retreat to a pre-planned defensive position that was issued early on the first, but never really implemented due to the collision of the armies that morning. In it, Henry Slocum—the 12 Corps commander—was named as the Commander of the Right Wing. With the abeyance of the Pipe Creek orders, there was no right wing to command, but Slocum ignored that and spent most of the battle considering himself promoted, leaving the actual details of corps command to the senior divisional commander in 12 Corps, Alpheus S. Williams. This choice gave 12 Corps two commanders, a situation of which Meade was not aware.

Meade compounded the problem on the evening of July 2nd, when in response to the powerful Confederate attack on the Union 3rd and 5th Corps, he called for reserves from other parts of the line. Meade asked for at least a division from 12 Corps, more if the men could be spared. Slocum quickly reacted to send Williams and his two brigades towards the threatened sector almost immediately, and an hour later, pulled out the other division (under John Geary) and sent it off as well. Even worse, Slocum assumed that Williams would retain overall charge of the corps and guide Geary, while Williams assumed that Slocum would take charge of the remaining force, leaving him free to rush to 5 Corps' support. The result was that Geary, left without guides in the quickly gathering dark, did not know where Williams was heading and simply marched southeast along The Baltimore Pike until he was well past Rock Creek. At some point, Geary realized he was off course and halted, eventually returning in the night to his own lines, but the lead two brigades of this division were effectively lost to the Union forces that night.

Only one brigade of the 12 Corps was left to hold the line after the departure of Geary and Williams; that of Brigadier General George S. Greene, commanding the 3rd brigade in Geary's 2nd Division. Greene was a man of strong opinions, who had insisted his troops would entrench Culps Hill, feeling that "lives were more important than theories." Now his five regiments had to shift left and try to cover the half-mile length of the 12 Corps line. As they did so, they heard the enemy approach.

Edward Johnson's Rebels were the ones advancing. Specifically, three brigades of Johnson's command; those of John M. Jones and George H. Stuart, and Nicholl's Louisiana Brigade, led here by Col. Jesse Williams since the wounding of the brigade commander at Chancellorsville. One brigade, the famous "Stonewall" Brigade that had once been Jackson's own, was detached to cover the Confederate left flank out on Brinkerhoff Ridge, and hence absent from the coming fight. Still, on the face of things, the Rebels had good odds: 4750 Confederates were climbing Culps Hill to face only 1424 Union defenders in Greene's command.

The resulting encounter, however, typifies why Civil War night actions were rarely successful. It was dusk when Johnson's Rebels started, and full dark in amongst the thick tree cover of Culps Hill before they made contact with the Yankees. Greene's skirmishers were rapidly driven in, and soon his entire command found itself battling gamely against enemy attacks. The combination of breastworks and darkness, however, obscured the true nature of the Union opposition from the attackers, and many Rebels felt sure that they were facing superior numbers of Federals.

The most endangered point was Greene's open right flank, stretched to cover the works abandoned by the other 12 Corps units. On the far right was Col. David Ireland's 137th New York infantry, who's tactical circumstances oddly mimicked those being played out on the more famous Little Round Top flank, had he but known. Ireland's men fought for the first thirty minutes against troops to their front, but then pressure from the open flank forced the 137th to refuse their line. After a few minutes, under crossfire from front and flank, the 137th fell back a short distance to a better vantage, where support briefly materialized in the form of the 71st Pennsylvania, a 2 Corps regiment sent over to aid the threatened 12 Corps. Unfortunately, the 71st just as suddenly withdrew, ordered off in another direction. This left the 137th alone again, and now taking fire from three directions, since the Rebels had worked men into their rear. At that point, Ireland realized he could not hold the works in the face of a much stronger enemy and retired to the foot of Culps Hill in the direction of Baltimore Pike.

Ireland's stand, however, had blunted the Rebel flanking move, and allowed the rest of Greene's line to withstand as many as four separate charges against its front. Greene's men retained their breastworks and a firm hold on Culps Hill. About 9:00 p.m., other Federals finally arrived to help the thin Union ranks, in the form of almost 800 men from 1 and 11 Corps in a total of seven small but much welcomed regiments. As these men strengthened Greene's line, the 137th moved up to behind Greene's main position to rest and re-supply.

Greene's stand had convinced the Rebel brigadiers that the Culps Hill works were held in much greater force than was actually present, and only Steuart's Confederate Brigade captured significant portions of the Union line, those which were undefended. By 10:00 p.m. or so, Geary's men started to return, and later Williams' Division also came back, having been largely unneeded on the other flank. Finding their works taken, these men took up positions along the Baltimore Pike and prepared to retake the entrenchments at dawn.

In their reports, both Slocum and Williams gave Greene credit for staving off disaster with his valiant stand on Culps Hill. Unfortunately, the departure of 12 Corps for the Western Theater that fall meant that Meade never saw those reports until after his own was written, and hence made no mention of the action in his official report. This lapse was unfortunately regarded as an intentional slap at the 12 Corps effort, and caused a permanent rift in relations between Meade, Slocum, and Williams. It also had the unhappy effect of largely obscuring the action to modern visitors.

Longstreet and Gettysburg

If Gettysburg has one crowning controversy, it is that of Longstreet and the famous "dawn attack." After the war, ex-Confederates accused James Longstreet of being too slow at Gettysburg, and disobeying his commander's order to attack at dawn. This failure, ran the argument, cost the South the battle and the war. It sparked a war of words that lasted as long as the participants lived, some thirty years or more, and this false charge was affecting Civil War scholarship well into the 1920's and 1930's. Nor was the slander confined to Gettysburg: Longstreet's whole career was attacked and redefined with the idea of 'explaining' this failure—Longstreet was for many years defined as the epitome of the grasping, overly ambitious bumbler.

More recent historians have revived Longstreet's battered reputation to a large extent. The "dawn attack" order never existed, and was in fact invented in 1872 by Lee's Chief of Artillery, William N. Pendleton, in an address given at Washington and Lee University two years after Lee's death. It is almost a complete fabrication. All of Lee's four principle staff officers denied the order's existence when first asked about it. A number of former Confederates active in the veteran's arena labeled it—mostly privately—an unfortunate lapse in Pendleton's memory. Had Longstreet let the matter drop, almost certainly it would have been forgotten soon after.

However, Longstreet was a bit of pariah after the war, having become both a Republican and a critic of General Lee. In the 1870's, when he started writing for various publications, his accounts were marred with blunt criticism of his fellow officers, with some errors of recall, and with some unseemly self-aggrandizement. His accounts of Gettysburg portrayed Lee as both indecisive and almost irrational at that battle, hardly in keeping with the image a number of Virginians were trying to craft of the Army of Northern Virginia's greatest commander. The centerpiece of that movement became the Southern Historical Society, whose first papers where first published in 1876. The SHS was run by Jubal Early and the Rev. William Jones, both Virginians, and they became the main vehicle for attacking Longstreet and refuting his writing.

As a sorry side note to this whole affair, it should be noted that after Lee's death there began a mercenary effort to gain control of Lee's reputation for monetary purposes. Several factions wished to write 'official' biographies of Lee, and at least two competing monument associations sprang up to raise funds for erecting a monument to Lee. Each of these factions fought for control of Lee's memory, but all of the parties involved reacted very negatively to any attack on the reputation of what had become their meal ticket. While not all of the men involved were in it for the money, there was enough petty squabbling between factions to demonstrate a clear financial, rather than respectful, motive in most of them. Jones wrote what was easily the most worshipful and least trustworthy of these 'official' biographies, but Armistead L. Long's work, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, is also of this ilk.

This feud lasted as long as the participants lived. Early, ever vindictive, fueled much of it, but Longstreet's final word—From Manassas to Appomattox, published in 1895—shows his own bitterness. In it Longstreet portrayed himself as the real genius behind Lee, and give fullest expression to such absurd claims as Lee promising him not to attack in any battle in Pennsylvania. With this book, Longstreet went a long way towards convincing many historians that Early and the SHS were right in their attacks on the 1st Corps commander.

Ironically, just as modern scholarship has largely rescued Longstreet's reputation, it has also provoked a modern backlash. The movie and book The Killer Angels has played a huge role in this, for it popularized Longstreet as a modern man and thorough soldier adrift in a sea of useless romanticism.

In the battle, of course, Longstreet's role is not so clear-cut. He urged Lee to maneuver on the evening of July 1st, to swing around the Union flank and take up a defensive position that would force Meade to attack. Lee rejected this concept; in truth it was likely impossible without the presence of the main Confederate cavalry and with no clear picture of the Federal army's dispositions. He reiterated this plan the next morning, but Lee was adamant about staying. Later, Longstreet muddied the historical waters by claiming that Hood's suggestion of moving around Big Round Top was what he himself had proposed to Lee. Contemporary evidence suggests that Longstreet's move to the right was much more ambitious in nature and would have involved driving the army deep into Maryland—much more of an operational than a tactical move.

The actual march to the flank was also engendered controversy. Displeased with the rejection of his suggestion and Lee's insistence on the tactical offensive that day, Longstreet did little to verify if the intended route to the Union flank was screened from Union discovery, as Lee instructed. Instead he relied on Captain Johnston, who had made a reconnaissance that morning. Unfortunately, Johnston's route was unreliable, and time was lost in countermarching. The charge of deliberate delay against Longstreet, however, seems excessive—his pace was as rapid as Jackson's similar march at Chancellorsville—and his rapid redeployment to new attack positions once the Federals were discovered to be not where they were supposed to be suggests an effort to comply, rather than delay. In fact, had Longstreet wanted to drag his feet, the unexpected Union deployments would likely have been the perfect excuse for canceling the attack. That Longstreet did not cancel suggests that he was in fact trying to follow Lee's orders to the best of his ability, rather than seeking to derail the plan.

The most inexplicable event of the battle was Longstreet's failure to meet with Lee on the night of the 2nd, and his unilateral shifting of troops around Big Round Top on the morning of the 3rd instead of renewing the attack at dawn. Longstreet insisted he never got Lee's orders that night, which is likely true, but still does not explain the fact that he was launching a unilateral attack on his own initiative without even informing his commanding officer. Worse, he never seems to have inquired about Pickett's Division that morning, and he had to have known that without fresh troops, his sending of half his force behind Big Round Top would put that force out of immediate support and place it in considerable jeopardy if the attack failed. Not surprisingly, once Lee discovered the movement, and how it rendered co-ordination between Longstreet's and Ewell's corps impossible, he canceled Longstreet's efforts.

This left only Pickett's Charge, an attack that Longstreet protested vigorously. The most important claim made against Longstreet in connection with this event was that Lee's staff accused him of withholding the troops that were supposed to support Pickett, and thus rendering the charge a suicidal waste. Those supporting troops, of course, were Hood's and Mclaws' Divisions, both of which were withheld with Lee's express approval to defend the vulnerable Confederate flank, and their movement forward could only have spelled disaster for the Army of Northern Virginia.

In the end, it is hard to fault Longstreet for anything concrete at Gettysburg. He carried out his duties as ordered by Lee. However, he was clearly unhappy with those orders, and there was a certain quality missing from his performance. The sense of initiative and even anticipation of his commander's intentions was missing from James Longstreet—qualities that previously had made him Lee's most trusted subordinate and first among equals in the Army of Northern Virginia. Longstreet would display those qualities again, and never lost his commanding officer's trust, but there is little doubt that this extra spark was not present at Gettysburg.

To Flank or Not to Flank: Captain Johnston's Recon

Discussion of the Confederate right flank on the 2nd of July inevitably focuses on Longstreet's actions, especially the "dawn attack" charge. As described above, modern historians have long since refuted the charge, proving that not only was the order never issued, but that there was no fleeting window of vulnerability for Longstreet to have exploited anyway, since Federal forces were in the area in strength all day. What has been obscured by this focus on the high command, however, is the reason Lee chose to strike that flank in the first place: the scouting mission of one of Lee's engineer aides, Captain Samuel Johnston. What Johnston saw, or rather failed to see, created the false expectation in Lee of finding a vulnerable Union flank and striking it in a dramatic blow.

Many historians have noted Johnston's mission; less, however, have noted how badly misinformed it left Lee as to the state of the Union line in that area. (As usual, Harry W. Pfanz's monumental Gettysburg: The Second Day proves the exception. He has an excellent overview of Johnston's mission.) Had Johnston not somehow missed so many Federals, he would likely have informed Lee that the Union left was held in force.

Johnston was sent out at dawn, accompanied only by Major John J. Clarke, of Longstreet's staff, and one or two other men. Much has been made of Lee's lack of cavalry having a decisive impact on the army's scouting: here, however, things would have been little different even had Stuart been present, since in sending Johnston forward on his lonely mission Lee was deliberately evoking his own experiences in just such missions in the Mexican War.

Johnston's journey traversed ground that would soon be famous. Riding south along Willoughby Run, the party crossed that creek near the Pitzer school and came up the back side of the ridge that would later serve as Confederate Major General Lafayette McLaws' staging ground for his afternoon assault. There, coming out of the woods at a point opposite the Sherfy Peach Orchard, the party crossed the Emmitsburg Road and headed for Little Round Top. Undoubtedly they crossed the Wheatfield, made their way down Houck's Ridge and into Plum Run Valley, and finally climbed most of the way up the bare western face of Little Round Top. Having gone far enough up to satisfy themselves that the hill was empty, they returned back to Plum Run Valley and turned south, slipping through the narrow gap between Devils Den and the foot of Big Round Top. From there, they headed west again across the open fields to Emmitsburg Road and back to Lee.

The only Federals Johnston reported seeing were two cavalry pickets making their leisurely way northwest along the Emmitsburg Road, spotted at the very end of the ride. Hence, Johnston told Lee that the rest of the ground he covered, up to and including Little Round Top, was open and clear of Union troops.

Why Johnston did not see any Federals is impossible to explain. Buford' Cavalry Division was camped along the Emmitsburg Road right at the Peach Orchard. Just to the north, and set back from the Emmitsburg Road, were the men of the Union 3rd Corps. Since Humphrey's two brigades did not arrive at the 3rd Corps bivouac until after midnight, almost certainly large numbers of stragglers were still working their way up the Emmitsburg Road at dawn. On Little Round Top itself, Johnston had to miss several regiments from Geary's Division of the Federal 12th Corps by minutes, and had he gone to the top, he would have at least seen the camp signs that would have indicated recent occupation. Several hundred yards behind Little Round Top Johnston should have noticed, or at least heard, the Union 2nd Corps beginning their movement up the Taneytown Road to Cemetery Ridge. The 10,000 men of the corps, plus the added volume from three battalions of the Artillery Reserve, would have created a lot of noise as they awoke. Upon returning, Johnston re-crossed the Emmitsburg Road, likely missing the head of the last two brigades of the 3rd Corps on their way to join the army from Emmitsburg.

In essence, Johnston completely missed seeing or hearing the men of two Federal Corps plus a cavalry division that camped directly across his path. Certainly the morning was foggy, especially in the lower ground where 3rd Corps camped, but this excuse really obscures the larger problem: The point of Johnston's mission was not to get to a spot and back without being seen; it was instead to determine what force, if any, was holding that ground. His whole purpose in going on the mission was to find those Federal forces just described. As such, it was a failure.

Ironically, given the extent of Johnston's failure to find any Federals, the Union obliged later that day by shifting troops to create exactly that opportunity that Lee thought Johnston found, but did not exist until well after Johnston left the area. Buford's Cavalrymen were withdrawn, and with them the patrols that covered both the Emmitsburg Road and the ground as far west as Pitzer's School. Had they been in place when Longstreet began to march, they certainly would have discovered that movement much sooner. Additionally, Sickles peremptorily advanced his corps to the forward line of the Emmitsburg Road and took up a position that was simply too long and too far forward for him to effectively defend. Isolated from the rest of the army, and strung out without any reserves, Sickles' Corps made itself ripe for destruction just as Longstreet was finally approaching his attack positions. Without those two Federal errors, Longstreet would have found a well defended Union line, backed with strong reserves, and anchored on Little Round Top. An attack against that position would have been much less likely to achieve any success, and probably would have been nothing more than a bloody failure.

Meade versus Sickles

Major General Daniel E. Sickles, of course, had a much different view of the advance of his corps: One that he labored for years afterward to make the official view of the battle of Gettysburg. It was Sickles' contention that his advance saved the army from Meade's uncertainty, and indeed had he not moved forward to the Peach Orchard, Gettysburg would have been recorded as only the latest in a string of Federal defeats.

Sickles was predisposed to dislike Meade for a number of reasons. First, Sickles was a partisan of the outgoing administration, being a friend of the Hooker-Butterfield crowd that dominated the Army headquarters when Hooker assumed command that winter. A number of officers in the army found the high living and loose morals of its new commander and his clique objectionable, and Meade was one of those disapproving. When Hooker was relieved at the end of June, Sickles almost certainly, as a friend of Hooker, resented the change. Second, Sickles had developed a strong dislike of West Pointers. As a political appointee, Sickles proved to have no little military talent himself, and found the caution and clannishness of most West Pointers overbearing, especially as time proved many West Pointers just as incapable of leading large armies as anyone else. Meade, who had all of the traditional favoritism of Military Academy graduates towards others of his own, tended to talk down to political generals like Sickles. A fine example of this can be seen in the rebuke Meade sent Sickles on June 30th, complaining that the 3rd Corps was too slow in a move to Emmitsburg, that it straggled too much, and that its baggage train blocked other troops. Sickles resented what he felt was an unwarranted rebuke from his new commander.

It is not surprising that when Dan Sickles woke up on the morning of July 2nd to survey the ground that had been allotted his corps to defend, he was dissatisfied. Sickles' portion of Cemetery Ridge was no ridge at all, but low ground around Plum Run that was dominated by the high ground along the Emmitsburg Road some 800 yards to his front. Later, Sickles would make the comparison to his position at Hazel Grove at the battle of Chancellorsville two months before—He had given up high ground there and watched Rebel artillery maul his corps through a long day of shelling.

Unfortunately, Sickles either ignored or lacked the experience to understand offsetting advantages which made this position unlike Hazel Grove. First, any Rebel artillery that chose to advance and attack Sickles from the Peach Orchard area would be dominated in turn by Union artillery crossfire from Little Round Top, Cemetery Hill, and Sickles' own guns, exposing the Confederates far more than the 3rd Corps. Second, anchored firmly on the Round Tops, the 3rd Corps had a secure flank. Third, both the natural falling away of the ground and several clumps of tree cover served to conceal the extent of the Union line, a fact nicely illustrated by the misinformation that Lee got concerning this flank all day.

After the war Sickles went to great lengths to show that Meade ignored his concerns, and that Meade never gave him specific orders as to where to place his troops. Unfortunately, both these charges are false, and seem to be deliberate lies concocted by Sickles to salvage his reputation. In fact, Meade started the morning by touring Sickles portion of the line, and a staff officer drew a sketch map of the ground that 3rd Corps was to defend. A division of the Union 12th Corps—Geary's—held the ground that 3rd Corps was to occupy, including the summit of Little Round Top, but Sickles made no effort to coordinate with Geary or survey the ground he held. Sickles claimed that Geary had no real position, but instead was simply massed in a field, a charge Geary refuted soundly in a postwar account. Finally, as Sickles persisted in his complaints, Meade sent his artillery chief, Henry Hunt, to give the ground a second look.

Sickles later insisted that Hunt's tentative approval of his point of view justified the advance of the 3rd Corps, yet this was another gross distortion of the facts. Hunt only tentatively approved the advanced position as suitable for offensive actions, and that it would require at least two corps to hold the ground. Hunt noted that for defensive purposes, the ground Sickles held was just as good as that of the Peach Orchard. This distinction is important, but has tended to get lost in the mythology of the battle, where Hunt's 'approval' was always a strong justification for Sickles' advance. Since Meade was not looking to offensive action on that flank, Hunt himself regarded Sickles' advance as dangerous and unnecessary.

Sickles did advance, and was duly shattered by Longstreet's attack. The next justification for moving forward was presented as 'saving' the Union left, by creating a breakwater that dissipated the force of Longstreet's attack before it reached the critical high ground of the Round Tops. This particular line of reasoning is completely spurious. It is impossible to see how an unsupported, overextended line, placed beyond the immediate reach of the rest of the army and with both flanks exposed was superior to a line half its length, anchored firmly on both flanks, and well supported by another Union corps in its immediate rear as reserves. Further, advancing to the Peach Orchard did nothing to disrupt Longstreet's original attack that would not have occurred anyway. Lee's concept of the Union left was already hopelessly misguided. Had Sickles' line stayed where it was there would have been no less disruption to Confederate plans, and possibly there could have been a lot more. Had Sickles stayed put, Longstreet would have found a Union corps on his flank, not his front, and would have had much more unpleasant tactical decisions to make.

Had Dan Sickles not been a wounded hero, suffering a leg wound during the course of the afternoon's fighting that ultimately resulted in amputation, he likely would have been court-martialed. Certainly Meade would have relieved him of command of 3rd Corps. However, Sickles wasted no time in hurrying back to the familiar Washington scene to state his case, and Meade, content that Sickles was no longer a corps commander in the Army of the Potomac, let events stand.

Meade probably regretted that decision. Following the campaign, congressional hearings were held to determine why Lee's army escaped back into Virginia after the battle. Those hearings, among other things, laid the first seeds of what later became Sickles' main charge against Meade. Meade's Chief of staff was Butterfield, who had been Hooker's chief of staff. Meade intended to replace Butterfield, but could not find a replacement in the midst of an active campaign. At the hearings, Butterfield produced a curious document; an order purporting to be a retreat order issued by Meade on the morning of July 2nd. Meade knew nothing of the order, and in fact it had been prepared by Butterfield as a contingency. Meade had only authorized the order in the vaguest of terms, and certainly had no intention of retreating on the morning of the 2nd.

This became the crux of Sickles' postwar justifications for his advance. Sickles asserted that Meade was retreating, and only the advance of the 3rd Corps saved the army from a grave mistake, in effect forcing Meade to stay and fight the battle. In fact these charges first arose while the war was still on, as anonymous articles in various papers—all signed "Historicus"—made the charges. At first, Meade was incensed, and—suspecting that "Historicus" was Sickles—asked Halleck to arrest Sickles, then recuperating in New York. No arrests were made, and Meade next decided to ignore what he regarded as charges no one would believe anyway.

Meade's silence allowed Sickles to frame the debate unopposed, before Meade made a few halting and limited efforts to clear his name. These proved largely unsuccessful, and Meade's death in 1872 further prevented a full rebuttal. Sickles lived until 1914, serving in congress and in many public posts, and was instrumental in preserving the battlefield as a national park, which he tended to regard as his own. When once asked why there was no statue of himself on the field, he replied, "the whole park is my monument."

The final note to Sickles career was one fittingly strange. Appointed head of the New York monument commission in 1886, a 1912 audit of that organization's books revealed that $28,000 was missing, with Sickles as the nominal culprit. When Sickles could not provide an explanation, he was deposed and a warrant was sworn out for his arrest. Only the subscription of friends and admirers raised the necessary funds to replace the loss, thereby prevent the arrest of the 93-year-old war hero. It is actually unlikely that Sickles took the money, especially since in his later years he rarely took active part in the commission's work, leaving that to younger members, but legend has it that the Excelsior Brigade monument on the field, which was intended to have a bust of Sickles—their first brigade commander—as its centerpiece, was not completed because Dan took the money needed for the sculpture, leaving only a blank spot on the monument.

Hunt versus Hancock

One of the stranger feuds to erupt after the war was between Henry Hunt, Meade's head of artillery, and Winfield Scott Hancock, commander of the Union 2nd Corps. Essentially, the two men fell out over artillery tactics, and issues of control.

Hunt was technically in charge of all artillery in the Army of the Potomac, though as the army changed commanders, this post alternated between one of tactical importance and purely administrative duties. Hooker, for example, tended to use Hunt administratively. Meade, however, gave Hunt a great deal of tactical latitude, one of the reasons the Federal artillery proved so effective at Gettysburg.

Central to Hunt's tactical philosophy was the Union army reserve artillery, five 'brigades' (equivalent to a Confederate artillery battalion) of batteries that could be used to reinforce any sector as needed. Hunt was also instrumental in creating a 'secret' ammunition supply train, containing an extra 20 rounds of ammunition for every gun in the army, and not on the official army books. Both the artillery reserve and the supply train allowed Hunt to mass firepower quickly at critical moments. Guns from the artillery reserve played important roles at every crisis point on the 2nd and 3rd days, ample justification of Hunt's work.

As an infantry corps commander, however, Hancock rightly assumed that guns assigned to his command were under his direction. While this issue of control was not normally a critical one, things came to a head during Pickett's Charge. Hunt regarded the charge as a great opportunity, and in later years asserted that the it could have been stopped before it ever got to the Union infantry line had the artillery been handled properly.

During the great cannonade preceding the charge, Hunt was adamantly opposed to allowing more than a bare handful of guns to return fire, knowing full well that a large attack had to be coming, and wanting to preserve the bulk of the ammunition for that attack. Hunt's worst fear during the charge is that just as the enemy infantry appeared, he would have to replace many batteries whose long range ammunition had been expended, or leave them in line without adequate long range firepower. Hunt spent most of the cannonade riding along the line, telling batteries to slow or stop their fire, ensuring they had adequate ammunition for what was coming.

Hancock did the opposite. Fearing for the morale of the troops, he wanted the Union cannon to return a vigorous fire letting the infantry enduring the barrage that their side was still in the fight. At his orders, many batteries fired far faster than Hunt wanted them to.

In fact, it is hard to determine who was right. When the Union guns at the Angle and on Cemetery Hill were withdrawn—because they needed more ammunition and because they had been beaten up by the barrage—the Confederates took that as a sign of success and sent forward their own infantry. Union morale remained high throughout the barrage, probably mostly because the Rebel fire was inaccurate and the front line troops suffered very little from it. However, the Union guns were indeed short of long range ammunition, and the three Confederate Divisions managed to advance all the way to the Union line, preserving their order until the last few hundred yards.

Hunt remained quite bitter over what he saw as just another example of high ranking officers in the army not understanding the effectiveness of artillery, and wasting its potential. In later years, much of the wrangling between these two men—who remained vigorous long after the war and who both wrote much about their service—was reduced to conflicting claims of who actually had authority over the cannon. Hunt maintained that he was the artillery chief, and controlled the guns, while Hancock rightly pointed out that he was the corps commander charged with the defense of that portion of the line and so all the troops in it where under his command.

Their is even a minor counterpoint to this feud: The question of who decided to silence the Union guns. After the war a number of men claimed that the decision to halt the fire of many of the Union cannon was a deliberate one designed to provoke the Rebels into attacking. Hunt himself comes near to making this claim in his account of the battle found in Battles and Leaders, but a number of other officers also tried to lay claim to conceiving the idea after the war. I think this concept of "the lure" is overdrawn, and while the Union guns did fall silent due to ammunition shortages, the thought of doing so deliberately to provoke a Rebel attack is more rooted in hindsight than anything else. Certainly the Rebels ceased fire soon after and began the infantry advance, At the time, however, there was the real prospect of enduring a period of Rebel cannonade without having any response, which cannot have been a happy thought to most of the participants.

Lee and Gettysburg

No single aspect of the battle has generated more words in print that of Lee's role during the battle. Most of that writing has been an effort to explain away Lee's defeat in terms of failures of others, and certainly none of the Rebel commanders escapes censure entirely. However, the fact is that most of the decisions that cost the South victory were made by Lee, and simply claiming failure of his subordinates is not fair to them. While there is simply no space to cover Lee's role in the battle completely, a summary is in order.

The initial decision to move to Gettysburg was Lee's, despite charges that A.P. Hill thrust his command rashly forward and began the battle against Lee's wishes. In fact, Hill sought out and got Lee's permission to advance on the morning of the 1st—Lee was interested finding out what Union force was in the town. Lee likewise informed Ewell that Gettysburg was a possible concentrating point, and once Hill told Ewell he was going there, the 2nd Corps commander's choice to go to Gettysburg as well only made tactical sense.

Lee also maintained an unusually tight leash on the afternoon fighting. After Hill's initial clash that morning, Lee halted the attack. When Ewell arrived along Oak Hill the first thing he did was send a message to Hill (Ewell was not aware that Lee was present) informing him that he was on the field and coming into action. At that point, had Lee wanted not to renew the fighting, he certainly could have stopped Ewell in a matter of minutes. After Ewell was heavily engaged, however, Lee allowed Hill to commit two of his divisions—Heth and Pender—to clearing the ridges west of town in support of Ewell's attack. Lee still kept things on a close rein, however, expressly limiting Hill's entry into to the town, denying Hill the use of Anderson's large division of his own corps (which was held back as army reserve) and refusing to send Hill forward to support Ewell in an attack on Cemetery Hill. Lee was rarely so active on a field of battle as at Gettysburg, and the overall tactical direction was very much his.

However, with the end of action on July 1st, Lee failed to make any significant decision about his intentions for the next day. He sent officers out on some limited scouting missions that evening, and the next morning dispatched more men, among them Captain Johnston described above. Upon their return, he conferred with Longstreet and Hill, but still failed to make a final decision about when and where to attack. In fact, Lee's next trip was off to the other flank to see Ewell again, to see if an attack were possible on that portion of the line. Reversing an earlier opinion, this time Ewell felt that he could attack the northern end of the Federal line, and so Lee finally returned to Longstreet and Hill to at last make a firm decision: he would attack both flanks.

It was 11:00 a.m. before that decision was finally reached, however, and the eighteen hours between the cessation of action the night before and the final decision to strike that morning allowed most of the Union army to gather and deploy. It took a further five hours for Longstreet's two divisions to come up and deploy, hours that did not run smoothly for the Army of Northern Virginia. Longstreet's march was slowed by poor choice of approaches and a time-consuming countermarch. Once in place, Longstreet's attack column discovered that none of the information they had been provided with about Federal dispositions was at all correct.

Once it finally commenced, the Second Day's action proved to be both the best and worst of the army. Longstreet's attack was impressive, delivered with power and skill, but Hill and Ewell faltered badly, never employing their whole commands. Lee must have been gravely disappointed with the result, though at the time, he never let on. After the war, however, he was recorded as claiming that Gettysburg was lost because he could not get his whole force into action at once, and singling out Ewell for much of that problem.

July 2nd did not bring victory, though to the men in the Confederate army it doubtless appeared to be closer than it actually was. Lee was convinced that he had come within a hairsbreadth of breaking the Federals, and that one more push would finish the job. He issued orders to renew the attack on the flanks at dawn.

Why that original plan never came together is another of those obscured mysteries of the battle. Lee did not meet with Longstreet that night, nor did Longstreet seek out Lee to report and receive orders. Lee's orders for a dawn attack reached Ewell easily enough, but Longstreet never got them, nor did anyone notice that they were not delivered. As a result, the dawn on July 3rd found Ewell attacking, but Longstreet was instead shifting troops around the south end of Big Round Top to try a tactical flanking move instead. That move would take hours, and there was no hope of getting ready in time to support Ewell. Lee had lost simultaneity again, and despairingly, he canceled both attacks. At that point Ewell was in turn attacked, as the Federal 12th Corps tried to regain its captured trenches, provoking Lee to a rare display of anger and impatience.

With his efforts at both flanks stymied, and with Pickett still not up to support Longstreet (Pickett had arrived the afternoon before, too late to enter action, and reported to Lee. Lee did not send him on to Longstreet, and Longstreet never sent him orders the next morning to come forward. We cannot know for sure, but likely Longstreet assumed that Pickett was being retained as an army reserve, while Lee assumed that Longstreet would simply take command of this last division of his corps without explicit instructions.) Lee finally settled on what would become the most controversial decision of his career: to attack the Federal center in a massive infantry attack.

Initially Lee ordered Longstreet to bring up Pickett and use all of the Confederate 1st Corps for the attack. Longstreet quickly pointed out that not only Hood's and McLaws' Divisions badly battered, but if they moved from their existing positions on the flank, the Union army could easily attack that now exposed flank in turn. Lee agreed, and next attached two of Hill's divisions to Longstreet instead, neither of whom had been in action the day before.

Thus was born Pickett's Charge. Longstreet did not want to command, believing that it was doomed, but Lee insisted. The attack, of course, proved to be the disaster Longstreet feared it would be. The Rebel artillery largely failed to drive off the Union guns, and in fact most of the Confederate shells overshot the Union line entirely, leaving it essentially undamaged when the infantry advanced.

Pickett's repulse made it clear that the Confederate army was not ready for further offensive action, but Lee still chose to stay another full day on the field, as if hoping for a Federal counterstroke that could be bloodied in turn. When that reposte did not come, Lee finally ordered the retreat on the 4th, preceded by a torturously long wagon train of the wounded who could be moved. By the 9th, Lee's army was entrenched along the swollen Potomac River in Maryland, and on the 14th, finally slipped back into Virginia after the river subsided to crossable levels.

Despite less than perfect—or in some cases, even inadequate—performances from his subordinates, Lee must bear a large share of the blame for the defeat. It was his hand that controlled events on the first day, as well as those of the following two days. The flawed decision not to take Cemetery Hill and finish the Federal defeat on July 1st cannot be seen as anyone's but Lee's himself, and Pickett's Charge must rank as one of the poorest tactical decisions of the war. The attacks on the 2nd might have succeeded had they been delivered properly, but, as can be seen, nothing was really working properly for the Army of Northern Virginia in July of 1863.

Bibliography

There are thousands of books on this battle, and it would be impossible to list all of them. I have chosen to list only the works critical to the making of this game, and by extension, those works that I think are the best on the subject.

Archer, John M. The Hour Was One Of Horror. Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Thomas Publications. 1997.

Archer's work is very narrow focus, covering the fight for East Cemetery Hill on the evening of the 2nd. However, it added some greatly appreciated detail to the maps, and provides a first class account and tour of this portion of the battle. At $10.00, it is a bargain.

Alexander, Edward P. Military Memoirs of a Confederate. New York, De Capo Press, 1993. Reprint of 1907 Edition.

Alexander was Longstreet's most trusted artilleryman, and bore heavy responsibilities at Gettysburg. His memoirs are remarkably free of personal animosity, and he displays a remarkably insightful analysis of military events.

Buel, Clarence C. and Johnson, Robert U. eds. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. New York. Thomas Yoseloff, inc., 1956. Volume 3.

This book contains a large number of accounts by participants, including detailed accounts of the three days by Henry Hunt, the Union chief of artillery. The one volume abridgment of this set is not really a great replacement, and I recommend getting the four volumes to anyone with an interest in the battle and the war.

Busey, John W., and Martin, David G. Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg. Hightstown, New Jersey: Longstreet House, 1986.

This critical secondary source represents the best overall numbers available on strengths and losses. Some sources might have more detailed data on specific units,—especially for Pickett's charge—but I retained these numbers throughout for consistency's sake. Almost a game in a book, at least as far as OOB goes.

Coates, Earl J. and Thomas, Dean S. An Introduction to Civil War Small Arms. Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Thomas Publications, 1990.

This is a general overview of weapons used in the war. It proved most useful in helping to determine which Confederate Units might have carried smoothbores into the battle.

Coddington, Edwin. Gettysburg: A Study in Command, Dayton, Ohio: Morningside Press, 1983. Reprint of 1958 edition

Still the best single work on the campaign and battle. Coddington used extensive primary source material, much of it previously unused, and highlighted what Meade and the Union army did right, rather than what Lee and the Confederates did wrong.

Desjardin, Thomas A. Stand Firm Ye Boys From Maine. Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Thomas Publications, 1995.

The best single nonfiction account of that most famous of actions—the 20th Maine on Little Round Top. Desjardin's book paints a clear picture of what did and did not happen on that hill during the afternoon of July 2nd. Using sources from both sides, the narrative is clear, concise and easily followed. Further, Desjardin discusses how the legend of the battle changed and altered the way the battle itself was remembered.

Gallagher, Gary W. ed. The First Day at Gettysburg. Kent, Ohio. Kent State University Press, 1992.

The Second Day at Gettysburg. Kent, Ohio. Kent State University Press, 1993.

The Third Day at Gettysburg and Beyond. Chapel Hill, North Carolina. University of North Carolina Press. 1994.

All three of these essay collections provide a detailed look at specific aspects of the battle, by a variety of noted authors. They range from a first class look at Ewell's tactical choices on the 1st, to a quite poorly written piece on Longstreet that resurrects much of the anti-Longstreet myth that so many modern writers have disproved. As such, the scholarship can be uneven, but the views are interesting.

Gettysburg Magazine. Dayton, Ohio. Morningside Press. Published biannually.

With 18 issues to date, and each issue containing over 100 pages with no advertising, many of these issues filled critical gaps. The writing and history are first rate, with many of the park's professionals authoring articles.

Gettysburg Discussion Group. www.arthes.com/gdg.html or www.gdg.org

The GDG is an amazing resource. With a website and a mailing list of around 800 members, it is the place to go to get a question answered. Participants include members of the Licensed Guides, Park Service Employees, historians of many stripes, and all varieties of folks interested in the battle. Unlike many unregulated forums, the discussion on the GDG is not only informative, but also civil. The Website is currently home to a lot of material on the battle, both published and previously unpublished, and the plans for the group include establishing an archive of primary source material that will be completely available on-line. While you can join the mailing list and visit the website for free, a nominal fee for membership is appreciated and furthers the archival work of the group. Every year in June, the members meet at Gettysburg for a weekend of tours and battlefield tramping.

Ladd, David L. and Audrey J. eds. The Bachelder Papers. Dayton, Ohio. Morningside Press, 1994. 3 Vols.

These three books are unique. The represent thousands of primary source accounts accumulated by the first park historian, John B. Bachelder in correspondence with the actual participants. They are invaluable, but hard to use, in that the accounts often contradict one another. Bachelder was commissioned by Congress to write a history of the battle and prepare a map series of troop movements, which was the purpose behind collecting these accounts. In fact, he used very little of these documents: he became disillusioned concerning all the conflicts and contradictions within these pages and instead wrote his history almost exclusively from the official reports. Edwin Coddington was the first historian to really use the collection extensively, in his own monumental book on the battle.

Ladd, David L. and Audrey J. John Bachelder's History of the Battle of Gettysburg. Dayton, Ohio. Morningside Press, 1997.

This is the official history Bachelder was commissioned to print. As such, it is virtually a reprint of the various official reports found in the Official Records, simply organized chronologically instead of by unit. However, it contains facsimiles of Bachelder's troop movement maps, which are invaluable. A full set of those from Morningside will run you $250.00, so in comparison this book is quite a deal at $40.00. Also, I found that having the pertinent parts of the OR arranged chronologically saved me much flipping between books. All in all, not a great read, but a useful reference.

Longacre, Edward. The Cavalry at Gettysburg. Lincoln, Nebraska. University of Nebraska Press, 1986.

This book is adequate, and being the only detailed look at cavalry operations, fills a niche; but it remains wanting in some areas. Better stuff is forthcoming, and likely will supersede this work as the standard on cavalry action as a whole in the campaign.

Martin, David G. Gettysburg July 1. Conshohocken, Pennsylvania: Combined Books. 1995. Revised edition.

The most current look at the first day's fighting. The first edition had some spelling and typographical errors, but nothing that marred the overall history. A very detailed account, this book will likely require some background reading before diving in.

Nesbitt, Mark. Saber and Scapegoat. Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. Stackpole Books, 1994.

This is a well written defense and history of Stuart in the campaign. Definitely an apologia for Stuart, but an excellent account of his ride. I found it most useful in tracking the sometimes obscure movements of the Cavalry between their arrival on the field and the famous action on July 3rd. Unlike Longacre's book, Nesbitt does not cover those cavalry not immediately with Stuart, and only touches on the Federal horsemen where they concern JEB.

Nye, Wilbur Sturtevant. Here Come the Rebels. Dayton, Ohio. Morningside Press, 1988. Reprint of 1965 edition.

A very unusual book, Nye's work traces only the course of Ewell's 2nd Corps up to the day of battle. He does not cover much about Gettysburg itself, but the book was invaluable in determining the location and arrival of many of the minor supporting forces for 2nd Corps, including the movements of Jenkins' Brigade. He includes detailed accounts of Winchester and Stephenson's Depot, likely the only book-length treatment of these two little known actions around.

Pfanz, Harry W. Gettysburg, The Second Day. Chapel Hill, North Carolina. University of North Carolina Press, 1987.

Gettysburg: Culp's Hill & Cemetery Hill. Chapel Hill, North Carolina. University of North Carolina Press, 1993.

Both of the above books recount the full second day's action in more detail then you'll ever want to know. Pfanz was park historian for many years, and the detail and insight in these works makes them definitive. They are both regiment by regiment accounts, describing actions and engagements in great detail. The first book is the best narrative on Longstreet's attack and the very confusing give and take fighting in places like Devil's Den and the Wheatfield extant, while the second work untangles the very fragmented series of actions that characterize Ewell's engagements (and non-engagements) against the northern Union flank on the night of the 2nd and morning of the 3rd.

Piston, William G. Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant. University of Georgia, 1987.

Piston's book is more an analysis of the post-war controversy rather than Longstreet's actions during the war, but it is outstanding in that regard. As can be expected, Piston spends a lot of time on the "dawn attack order" myth. There is no better book for understanding the degree of distortion the story of Gettysburg has undergone over the years.

Rollins, Richard, ed. Pickett's Charge: Eyewitness accounts. Redondo Beach, California. Rank and File Publications, 1994.

This is an excellent assembly of first person accounts of the charge from all angles. Both the Union and Confederates are well represented, and much time is spent on the planning and artillery bombardment.

Shue, Richard S. Morning at Willoughby Run. Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Thomas Publications. 1995.

A very focused work, covering only the initial cavalry action and infantry fighting on the 1st. Well done, and very helpful in determining the exact sequence and timing for the initial entry of troops from both sides.

Stewart, George R. Pickett's Charge. Dayton, Ohio. Morningside Press, 1983. Reprint of 1959 edition.

Still the best overall account of the famous charge. A number of other books have been written about the attack, but mostly they have focused only on Pickett's Division. Where Rollins' book, above allows the participants to speak, Stewart's book establishes the best cohesive narrative for the fight.

Thomas, Dean S. Ready...Aim...Fire! Arendtsville, Pennsylvania. Thomas Publications, 1981.

Subtitled "Small Arms Ammunition in the Battle of Gettysburg" this work documents not only what types of ammunition were found where, but also contains a complete ordnance report for the Union army, which makes determining weapon types for the Federals simple. (This same report is used by permission in Busey and Martin's Regimental Strengths and Losses.) Generally, the ammunition patterns helped to determine which Confederate units might have carried smoothbores, in conjunction with the Civil War Small Arms book listed above, by this author and Earl Coates.

Tucker, Glenn. Lee and Longstreet at Gettysburg. Dayton, Ohio. Morningside Press, 1982. Reprint of 1968 edition.

While Tucker's other book on Gettysburg has been superseded by time, this one remains an excellent look at the relationship and movements of both Lee and Longstreet. It is one of the seminal works in disproving the "dawn attack" myth that so dominated attacks on Longstreet for many years. Tucker is also one of the better writers on the subject, and his book is very easy to read.

War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. 128 Volumes. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901.

The indispensable primary source. The three parts of Volume 27, covering the battle, contain the official reports and correspondence of the participants.

Officer Seniority List

These lists include optional leaders as well as leaders which might not be in play at a specific moment for other reasons (not yet arrived, etc.). In all cases, use the highest ranking leaders in an organization to take over for a killed or otherwise removed leader restricted to only those leaders listed which are in play at that moment. If a higher ranking leader arrives later, reorganize the command according to the list below given that the higher ranking leader is now in play.

Union Army

MG George G. Meade

MG Henry Slocum — 12th Corps

• BG Alpheus S. Williams
  • BG Henry H. Lockwood
  • BG Thomas H. Ruger
  • Col. Archibald L. McDougall
• BG John W. Geary
  • BG George S. Greene
  • BG Thomas L. Kane
  • Col. Charles Candy

MG John Sedgwick — 6th Corps

• MG John Newton
  • BG Frank Wheaton
  • BG Alexander Shaler
  • Col. Henry L. Eustis
• BG Horatio G. Wright
  • BG Joseph J. Bartlett
  • BG David A. Russell
  • BG Alfred T. T. Torbert
• BG Albion P. Howe
  • BG Thomas H. Neill
  • Col. Lewis A. Grant

MG John F. Reynolds — 1st Corps

• MG Abner Doubleday
  • BG Thomas A. Rowley
  • BG George J. Stannard
  • Col. Roy Stone
• BG James Robinson
  • BG Henry Baxter
  • BG Gabriel Paul
• BG James Wadsworth
  • BG Solomon Merideth
  • BG Lysander Cutler

MG Oliver O. Howard — 11th Corps

• MG Carl Schurz
  • BG Alexander Schimmelfennig
  • Col. W. Krzyzanowski
• BG Adolph Von Steinwehr
  • Col. Charles Coster
  • Col. Orland Smith
• BG Francis C. Barlow
  • BG Adelbert Ames
  • Col. Leopold Von Gilsa

MG Daniel Sickles — 3rd Corps

• MG David B. Birney
  • BG John Henry Hobart Ward
  • BG Charles K. Graham
  • Col. P. Regis de Trobriand
• BG Andrew A. Humphreys
  • BG Joseph B. Carr
  • Col. William R. Brewster
  • Col. George C. Burling

MG Winfield S. Hancock — 2nd Corps

• BG John Gibbon
  • BG William Harrow
  • BG Alexander S. Webb
  • Col. Norman J. Hall
• BG John C. Caldwell
  • BG Samuel K. Zook
  • Col. Edward Cross
  • Col. Patrick Kelly
  • Col. John R. Brooke
• BG Alexander Hays
  • Col. Samuel S. Carroll
  • Col. Thomas A. Smyth
  • Col. George L. Willard

MG George Sykes — 5th Corps

• BG Samuel W. Crawford
  • Col. William McCandless
  • Col. Horatio G. Sickel
  • Col. Joseph W. Fisher
• BG James Barnes
  • Col. William S. Tilton
  • Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer
  • Col. Strong Vincent
• BG Romeyn B. Ayres
  • BG Stephen H Weed
  • Col. Hannibal Day
  • Col. Sidney Burbank

MG Alfred Pleasonton — Cavalry

• BG Judson Kilpatrick
  • BG Elon J. Farnsworth
  • BG George A. Custer
• BG John Buford
  • BG Wesley Merritt
  • Col. William Gamble
  • Col. Thomas Devin
• BG David McM. Gregg
  • Col. John B. McIntosh
  • Col. J. Irvin Gregg

MG William H. French — Other

• BG William H. Morris
  • BG John R. Kenly
  • Col. Benjamin F. Smith
• BG Henry M. Naglee
  • BG Henry S. Briggs
  • BG Francis B. Spinola
  • Col. John W. Horn

Confederate Army

General Robert E. Lee

LTG James Longstreet — 1st Corps

• MG Lafayette McLaws
  • BG J. B. Kershaw
  • BG Paul J. Semmes
  • BG William Barksdale
  • BG W. T. Wofford
• MG John B. Hood
  • BG Evander M. Law
  • BG Jerome B. Robertson
  • BG George T. Anderson
  • BG Henry L. Benning
• MG George E. Pickett
  • BG Richard B. Garnett
  • BG Lewis T. Armistead
  • BG James L. Kemper
  • BG Micah Jenkins
  • BG Montgomery D. Corse

MG Robert Ransom

• BG John R. Cooke
• BG Matt W. Ransom

LTG Richard S. Ewell — 2nd Corps

• MG Edward Johnson
  • BG George H. Steuart
  • BG James A. Walker
  • BG John M. Jones
  • Col. J. M. Williams
• MG Jubal A. Early
  • BG Harry T. Hays
  • BG John B. Gordon
  • BG William Smith
  • Col. Isaac E. Avery
• MG Robert E. Rodes
  • BG Junius Daniel
  • BG George Doles
  • BG Stephen D. Ramseur
  • BG Alfred Iverson
  • Col. Edward A. O'Neal

LTG Ambrose P. Hill — 3rd Corps

• MG Richard H. Anderson
  • BG Cadmus M. Wilcox
  • BG William Mahone
  • BG A. R. Wright
  • BG Carnot Posey
  • Col. David Lang
• MG Harry Heth
  • BG James J. Pettigrew
  • BG James J. Archer
  • BG Joseph R. Davis
  • Col. J. M. Brockenbrough
• MG William D. Pender
  • BG James H. Lane
  • BG Eward L. Thomas
  • BG Alfred M. Scales
  • Col. Abner Perrin

MG J.E.B. Stuart — Cavalry Division

• BG Wade Hampton
• BG Beverly H. Robertson
• BG Fitzhugh Lee
• BG Albert G. Jenkins
• BG William E. Jones
• BG John D. Imboden
• Col. J. R. Chambliss

LTG Daniel H. Hill — Hill's Corps

• MG Samuel Jones
  • BG John Echols
  • Col. John Wharton
  • Col. John McCausland
• MG W. H. C. Whiting
  • BG Henry A. Wise
  • BG James G. Martin
  • BG Thomas L. Clingman
  • BG Alfred H. Colquitt
• BG William B. Taliferro
  • BG Nathan G. Evans
  • BG Hugh W. Mercer
  • BG Joseph Finegan
  • BG Johnson Hagood
  • Col. George P. Harrison
• MG Simon B. Buckner
  • BG Archibald Gracie
  • BG William Preston
  • Col. Robert C. Trigg

Artillery Unit Listing

In lieu of the normal unit manifest, This Hallowed Ground lists only its artillery units (below). Why? These are the only units not fully listed already in the various manifests in this game which could alone choke a horse!

Union Artillery

1 Corps Artillery: 2 Maine, 5 Maine, E&L 1 NY, B 1 Penn, B 4 US

2 Corps Artillery: B 1 NY, A 1 RI, B 1 RI, I 1 US, A 4 US

3 Corps Artillery: 2 NJ, D 1 NY, 4 NY, E 1 RI, K 4 US

5 Corps Artillery: 3 Mass, C 1 NY, L 1 Ohio, D 5 US, I 5 US

6 Corps Artillery: 1 Mass, 1 NY, 3 NY, C 1 RI, G 1 RI, D 2 US, G 2 US, F 5 US

11 Corps Artillery: 13 NY, I 1 NY, I 1 Ohio, K 1 Ohio, G 4 US

12 Corps Artillery: M 1 NY, E Penn Lt, F 4 US, K 5 US

1 Regular Arty Bde: C 5 US, F&K 3 US, H 1 US, K 5 US, 1 Horse Artillery Bn, 9 Mich, 6 NY, B&L, 2 US

2 Volunteer Arty Bde: B&L 2 US, M 2 US, C 3 US, C 4 US, E 4 US, E&G 1 US, 2 Horse Artillery Bn, K 1 US, A 2 US

3 Volunteer Arty Bde: C W.Va Lt, F/G 1 Penn, H 1 Ohio, 1 NH, C&R Penn Lt, 5 Mass, 9 Mass, 15 NY

4 Volunteer Arty Bde: 6 Maine, 1 MD, 1 NJ, G 1 NY, K 1 NY, 2 Conn Lt, 5 NY, 9 NY, C&F 1 Penn Lt, B 1 Conn Hvy, M 1 Conn Hvy, 3 Volunteer Arty Bde, 1 NH, H 1 Ohio, F&G 1 Penn, C W.Va Lt

Rebel Artillery

1 Corps Artillery: Latham/Hood, Bachman/Hood, Garden/Hood, Reilly/Hood, Manly/McLaws, Carlton/McLaws, Fraser/McLaws, McCarthy/McLaws, Strblng/Pickett, Caskie/Pickett, Macon/Pickett, Blount/Pickett, Squires/E Bn, Rchardsn/E Bn, Miller/E Bn, Norcom/E Bn, Moody/A Bn, Gilbert/A Bn, Woolfolk/A Bn, Jordan/A Bn, Parker/A Bn, Taylor/A Bn

2 Corps Artillery: Crrngtn/Early, Tanner/Early, Green/Early, Garber/Early, Dement/Johnson, Crpntr/Johnson, Brown/Johnson, Raine/Johnson, Reese/Rodes, Carter/Rodes, Page/Rodes, Fry/Rodes, Watson/D Bn, Smith/D Bn, Graham/D Bn, Cunningham/D Bn, Griffin/D Bn, Kirkpatrick/N Bn, Massie/N Bn, Milledge/N Bn

3 Corps Artillery: Ross/Anderson, Patterson/Anderson, Wingfield/Anderson, Maurin/Heth, Moore/Heth, Lewis/Heth, Grandy/Heth, Zimmerman/P Bn, Johnston/P Bn, Marye/P Bn, Brander/P Bn, McGraw/P Bn, Hurt a/M Bn, Hurt b/M Bn, Rice/M Bn, Wallace/M Bn, Johnson/M Bn

Cavalry Artillery: Jackson/Je Cav, McClanahan/I Cav, Breathed, Chew, Griffin, Hart, McGregor, Moorman

Optionals: Peeples, Wolihin, York, Martin, Sturdivant, Southerland, French, Adams, Paris, Walker, Dickenson, Parker, Schultz, Stuart, Bomar

Losses and Scenario Starting Strengths

• Only those units which sustained losses are listed. All other units had no losses. •

"Start" is the unit's starting strength as shown on the counter. "Total loss" is just that, and should not be confused with the final strength of the units, which can be found in the July 4 column. (Certain minor losses on the 4th are ignored.) The number listed under the various scenarios is the unit's starting strength for that scenario. If a unit only has a dash, or is not listed at all, it starts at full strength. Units, which did not suffer losses in the battle are not listed to save space—these always set up at full strength.

In some cases, units have two strengths listed. In example a 7(6) entry, that 6 is the actual starting strength, representing straggler losses as well. This unit could recover 1 SP from stragglers (and become a 7), but it could never recover more than that.

The Union player has several 11 Corps units that START the game at a lower strength than printed. All such units are listed above as #(#), and start at the lower strength. These "losses" are not stragglers, but troop shortages that will later arrive in the Reinforcement Schedule. No such unit should be allowed to regain stragglers past the (#) value until those detachments are added to the units. For example, the 75 Ohio of 2/1/11 has a value of 7(5) listed. The 75 Ohio enters the game with 5. Any losses come off this strength of 5, and no stragglers can be recovered making the unit stronger than 5 until after the 2 SP are added to the 75 Ohio by the Reinforcement Schedule.

Union Forces

Scenario key: 6.3/6.12 columns = Start; 6.1/6.2/6.4 = July 1-pm; 6.5/6.6/6.8/6.9 = July 2; 6.10 = July 3; 6.7 = July 3-pm; 6.11 = July 4; last column = total loss.

1 Corps—Reynolds killed

1/1/1—Meredith

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
19 Ind	6	5	2	2	2	2	4
24 Mich	10	8	3	3	3	3	7
2 Wisc	6	5	1	1	1	1	5
6 Wisc	7	4	4	4	4	4	3
7 Wisc	7	6	3	3	3	3	4

2/1/1—Cutler

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
76 NY	7	5	3	3	3	3	4
84 NY	6	4	2	2	2	2	4
95 NY	5	4	3	3	3	3	2
147 NY	8	4	3	2	2	2	6
56 Penn	5	3	2	2	2	2	3

1/2/1—Paul (wounded)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
16 Maine	6	-	1	1	1	1	5
13 Mass	6	-	2	2	2	2	4
94 NY	8	-	3	3	3	3	5
104 NY	6	-	2	2	2	2	4
107 Penn	5	-	2	2	2	2	3

2/2/1—Baxter

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
12 Mass	5	-	3	3	3	3	2
83 NY	4	-	2	2	2	2	2
97 NY	5	-	3	3	3	3	2
11 Penn	5	-	2	2	2	2	3
88 Penn	6	-	4	4	4	4	2
90 Penn	4	-	2	2	2	2	2

1/3/1—Rowley (arrested)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
80 NY	6	-	3	3	3	3	3
121 Penn	5	-	1	1	1	1	4
142 Penn	7	-	3	3	3	3	3
151 Penn	9	-	3	3	3	2	7

2/3/1—Stone (wounded)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
143 Penn	9	-	4	4	4	4	5
149 Penn	9	-	2	2	2	2	7
150 Penn	8	-	3	3	3	3	5

3/3/1—Stannard

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
13 Vt	13	-	-	12	12	10	3
14 Vt	13	-	-	-	-	11	2
16 Vt	13	-	-	-	-	11	2

1 Corps Artillery

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
2 Maine	6	-	3	3	3	2	4
B 4 US	6	-	4	4	4	2	2
E&L 1 NY	6	-	-	-	-	5	1
B 1 Penn Lt	4	-	3	3	3	2	2

2 Corps—Hancock (wounded)

1/1/2—Cross (killed)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
5 NH	4	-	-	2	2	2	2
61 NY	2	-	-	1	1	1	1
81 Penn	3	-	-	2	2	1	1
148 Penn	8	-	-	5	5	5	3

2/1/2—Kelly

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
28 Mass	4	-	-	2	2	2	2
69 NY	2	-	-	1	1	1	1
88 NY	2	-	-	1	1	1	1

3/1/2—Zook

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
52 NY	3	-	-	2	2	2	1
57 NY	4	-	-	3	3	3	1
66 NY	3	-	-	2	2	2	1
140 Penn	10	-	-	5	5	5	5

4/1/2—Brooke

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
2 Del	5	-	-	4	4	4	1
64 NY	4	-	-	2	2	2	2
53 Penn	3	-	-	1	1	1	2
145 Penn	4	-	-	2	2	2	2

2/2—Gibbon (wounded)

1/2/2—Harrow

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
19 Maine	9	-	-	8	8	5	4
15 Mass	4	-	-	2	2	1	3
1 Minn	7	-	-	3	3	2	5
82 NY	7	-	-	4	4	3	4

2/2/2—Webb (wounded)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
69 Penn	6	-	-	5	5	3	3
71 Penn	5	-	-	-	-	3	2
72 Penn	8	-	-	7	7	4	4
106 Penn	5	-	-	4	4	4	1

3/2/2—Hall

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
19 Mass	3	-	-	-	-	1	2
20 Mass	5	-	-	4	4	2	3
7 Mich	3	-	-	-	-	2	1
42 NY	4	-	-	-	-	3	1
59 NY	3	-	-	2	2	2	1

1/3/2—Carroll

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
14 Ind	4	-	-	3	3	3	1
8 Ohio	4	-	-	-	3	2	2
7 W Va	5	-	-	4	4	4	1

2/3/2—Smyth (wounded)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
14 Conn	3	-	-	-	2	2	1
1 Del	5	-	-	-	4	3	2
12 NJ	9	-	-	-	8	7	2
108 NY	4	-	-	-	-	2	2

3/3/2—Willard

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
39 NY	5	-	-	-	4	3	2
111 NY	8	-	-	4	3	3	5
125 NY	8	-	-	7	7	5	3
126 NY	9	-	-	7	7	5	4

2 Corps Artillery

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
I 1US	6	-	-	-	-	3	3
A 4US	6	-	-	-	-	3	3
A 1RI	6	-	-	-	-	3	3
B 1RI	6	-	-	-	-	3	3

3 Corps—Sickles (wounded)

1/1/3—Graham (wounded)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
57 Penn	4	-	-	2	2	2	2
63 Penn	5	-	-	4	4	4	1
68 Penn	6	-	-	3	3	3	3
105 Penn	6	-	-	3	3	3	3
114 Penn	5	-	-	2	2	2	3
141 Penn	4	-	-	1	1	1	1

2/1/3—Ward

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
20 Ind	8	-	-	5	5	5	3
3 Maine	4	-	-	1	1	1	3
4 Maine	6	-	-	3	3	3	3
86 NY	6	-	-	5	5	5	1
124 NY	6	-	-	4	4	4	2
99 Penn	5	-	-	3	3	3	2
1 US SS	6	-	-	5	5	5	1
2 US SS	4	-	-	3	3	3	1

3/1/3—de Trobriand

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
17 Maine	7	-	-	4	4	4	3
3 Mich	5	-	-	4	4	4	1
5 Mich	4	-	-	2	2	2	2
40 NY	9	-	-	6	6	6	3
110 Penn	3	-	-	2	2	2	1

1/2/3—Carr

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
1 Mass	6	-	-	4	4	4	2
11 Mass	6	-	-	3	3	3	3
16 Mass	5	-	-	3	3	3	2
12 NH	4	-	-	2	2	2	2
11 NJ	6	-	-	3	3	3	3
26 Penn	7	-	-	3	3	3	4

2/2/3—Brewster

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
70 NY	6	-	-	3	3	3	3
71 NY	5	-	-	3	3	3	2
72 NY	6	-	-	4	4	4	2
73 NY	7	-	-	4	4	4	3
74 NY	5	-	-	3	3	3	2
120 NY	8	-	-	4	4	4	4

3/2/3—Burling

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
2 NH	7	-	-	3	3	3	4
5 NJ	4	-	-	2	2	2	2
6 NJ	4	-	-	3	3	3	1
7 NJ	6	-	-	4	4	4	2
8 NJ	3	-	-	2	2	2	1

3 Corps Artillery

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
K 4US	6	-	-	4	4	4	2
E 1RI	6	-	-	0	0	0	6
4 NY	6	-	-	3	3	3	3

5 Corps—Sykes

1/1/5—Tilton

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
18 Mass	3	-	-	2	2	2	1
22 Mass	3	-	-	2	2	2	1
1 Mich	3	-	-	2	2	2	1

2/1/5—Sweitzer

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
32 Mass	5	-	-	3	3	3	2
4 Mich	7	-	-	4	4	4	3
62 Penn	8	-	-	4	4	4	4

3/1/5—Vincent (killed)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
20 Maine	8	-	-	5	5	5	3
16 Mich	5	-	-	4	4	4	1
44 NY	8	-	-	6	6	6	2
83 Penn	6	-	-	5	5	5	1

1/2/5—Day

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
3 US	6	-	-	5	5	5	1
4 US	3	-	-	2	2	2	1
6 US	4	-	-	3	3	3	1
12 US	8	-	-	6	6	6	2
14 US	10	-	-	7	7	7	3

2/2/5—Burbank

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
2 US	4	-	-	3	3	3	1
7 US	2	-	-	1	1	1	1
10 US	2	-	-	1	1	1	1
11 US	6	-	-	3	3	3	3
17 US	5	-	-	2	2	2	3

3/2/5—Weed (killed)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
140 NY	9	-	-	6	6	6	3
146 NY	9	-	-	8	8	8	1

1/3/5—McCandless

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
1 Penn Res	8	-	-	7	7	7	1
2 Penn Res	5	-	-	4	4	4	1
13 Penn Res	6	-	-	5	5	5	1

3/3/5—Fisher

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
11 Penn Res	7	-	-	6	6	6	1

5 Corps Artillery

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
L 5US	4	-	-	0	0	0	4

6 Corps

1/3/6—Shaler

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
122 NY	8	-	-	7	7	7	1

2/3/6—Eustis

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
37 Mass	11	-	-	10	10	10	1

3/3/6—Wheaton

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
62 NY	5	-	-	4	4	4	1

11 Corps—Howard

1/11—Barlow (wounded)

1/1/11—Von Gilsa

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
41 NY	4	-	-	2	2	2	2
54 NY	4	-	2	2	2	2	2
68 NY	5	-	2	2	2	2	2
153 Penn	10	-	6	6	6	5	4

2/1/11—Ames

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
17 Conn	8	-	6	4	4	4	4
25 Ohio	4	-	2	1	1	1	3
75 Ohio	7(5)*	-	6	4	4	4	3
107 Ohio	9	-	6	5	5	5	4

1/2/11—Coster

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
134 NY	8	-	4	3	3	3	5
154 NY	5(4)*	-	1	1	1	1	4
27 Penn	6	-	5	4	4	4	2
73 Penn	6	-	-	5	5	5	1

2/2/11—Smith

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
33 Mass	10	-	-	9	9	9	1
136 NY	10	-	9	8	8	8	2
55 Ohio	6	-	-	5	5	5	1
73 Ohio	7	-	-	4	4	4	3

1/3/11—Schimmelfennig (in Pig Sty)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
45 NY	7	-	2	2	2	2	5
82 Ill	6	-	4	4	4	4	2
157 NY	8	-	2	2	2	2	6
61 Ohio	7(5)*	-	7	6	6	6	1
74 Penn	7	-	5	5	5	5	2

2/3/11—Krzyzanowski

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
119 NY	5	-	2	2	2	2	3
82 Ohio	6	-	2	2	2	2	4
75 Penn	4	-	2	2	2	2	2
26 Wisc	9	-	5	5	5	5	4

11 Corps Artillery

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
I 1 Ohio	6	-	5	5	5	5	1
K 1 Ohio	4	-	0	0	0	0	4
I 1NY	6	-	5	5	5	5	1
13 NY	4	-	3	3	3	3	1

12 Corps—Slocum

1/1/12—McDougall

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
20 Conn	6	-	-	-	5(4)	5	1
46 Penn	5	-	-	-	4(3)	4	1

3/1/12—Ruger

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
27 Ind	7	-	-	-	5(4)	5	2
2 Mass	6	-	-	-	3(1)	3	3
13 NY	7	-	-	-	6(4)	6	1

1/2/12—Candy

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
7 Ohio	6	-	-	-	5(4)	5	1
66 Ohio	6	-	-	-	5(4)	5	1
147 Penn	6	-	-	-	5(4)	5	1

2/2/12—Kane

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
29 Penn	7	-	-	-	6(5)	6	1
111 Penn	4	-	-	-	3(2)	3	1

3/2/12—Greene

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
60 NY	5	-	-	4(3)	4	4	1
78 NY	4	-	-	-	3(2)	3	1
102 NY	5	-	-	4(3)	4(3)	4	1
137 NY	8	-	-	7(6)	6(4)	6	2
149 NY	6	-	-	-	5(4)	5(3)	5

Ind/12—Lockwood

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
1 Md ES	11	-	-	-	9(7)	9	2
150 NY	12	-	-	-	11(9)	11	1

Cav Corps—Pleasonton

1/1/Cav—Gamble

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
3 Ind	6	5	5	withdrawn			1
8 NY	12	11	11	withdrawn			1

R/1/Cav—Merritt

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
6 US	10	-	-	-	-	5	5

1/2/Cav—McIntosh

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
3 Penn Cav	7	-	-	6	6	6	1

1/3/Cav—Farnsworth (killed)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
18 Penn	10	-	-	-	-	9	1
1 Vt	12	-	-	-	-	11	1

2/3/Cav—Custer

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
1 Mich	9	-	-	-	-	8	1
5 Mich	13	-	-	-	-	12	1
6 Mich	10	-	-	-	-	9	1
7 Mich	8	-	-	-	-	6	2

2 HA/Cav Corps

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
A 2 US	6	-	5	withdrawn

Arty Reserve—Tyler

1 Reg

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
F&K 3US	6	-	-	2	2	2	4
C 5US	6	-	-	3	3	3	3

1 Vol

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
5 Mass	6	-	-	4	4	4	2
9 Mass	6	-	-	2	2	2	4
C&F 5 Penn	6	-	-	5	5	5	1

3 Vol

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
F&G 1 Penn	6	-	-	4	4	4	2

Confederate Forces

1 Corps—Longstreet

H/1—Hood (wounded)

A/H/1—Anderson (wounded)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
7 Ga	8	-	-	-	-	7	1
8 Ga	6	-	-	3	3	3	3
9 Ga	7	-	-	3	3	3	4
11 Ga	6	-	-	2	2	2	4
59 Ga	11	-	-	7	7	7	4

B/H/1—Benning

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
2 Ga	7	-	-	5	5	5	2
15 Ga	8	-	-	6	6	4	4
17 Ga	7	-	-	5	5	5	2
20 Ga	7	-	-	4	4	4	3

L/H/1—Law

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
4 Ala	7	-	-	5	5	5	2
15 Ala	10	-	-	7	7	7	3
44 Ala	8	-	-	6	6	6	2
47 Ala	7	-	-	6	6	6	1
48 Ala	7	-	-	5	5	5	2

Tex/H/1—Robertson

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
3 Ark	10	-	-	6	6	6	4
1 Texas	9	-	-	7	7	7	2
4 Texas	8	-	-	6	6	6	2
5 Texas	8	-	-	4	4	4	4

Arty/H/1

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
Reilly	6	-	-	5	5	5	1

B/M/1—Barksdale (killed)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
13 Miss	10	-	-	6	6	6	4
17 Miss	9	-	-	4	4	4	5
18 Miss	5	-	-	2	2	2	3
21 Miss	8	-	-	5	5	5	3

K/M/1—Kershaw

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
2 SC	8	-	-	5	5	5	3
3 SC	8	-	-	6	6	6	2
3 SC Bn	4	-	-	3	3	3	1
7 SC	8	-	-	6	6	6	2
8 SC	6	-	-	4	4	4	2
15 SC	9	-	-	6	6	6	3

S/M/1—Semmes (killed)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
10 Ga	6	-	-	4	4	4	2
50 Ga	6	-	-	4	4	4	2
51 Ga	6	-	-	4	4	4	2
53 Ga	9	-	-	6	6	6	3

W/M/1—Wofford

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
16 Ga	6	-	-	4	4	4	2
18 Ga	6	-	-	5	5	5	1
24 Ga	6	-	-	4	4	4	2
Cobb Lgn	4	-	-	3	3	3	1
Phllps Lgn	5	-	-	4	4	4	1

Arty/M/1

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
McCarthy	4	-	-	-	-	3	1
Fraser	4	-	-	2	2	2	2

A/P/1—Armistead (killed)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
9 Va	5	-	-	-	-	1	4
14 Va	8	-	-	-	-	3	5
38 Va	7	-	-	-	-	2	5
53 Va	9	-	-	-	-	4	5
57 Va	10	-	-	-	-	5	5

G/P/1—Garnett (killed)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
8 Va	4	-	-	-	-	0	4
18 Va	6	-	-	-	-	1	5
19 Va	6	-	-	-	-	3	3
28 Va	7	-	-	-	-	4	3
56 Va	6	-	-	-	-	2	4

K/P/1—Kemper (wounded)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
1 Va	4	-	-	-	-	2	2
3 Va	7	-	-	-	-	4	3
7 Va	7	-	-	-	-	4	3
11 Va	7	-	-	-	-	4	3
24 Va	8	-	-	-	-	5	3

A/1 Corps artillery

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
Gilbert	4	-	-	3	3	3	1
Woolfolk	4	-	-	3	3	3	1

E/1 Corps artillery

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
Miller	3	-	-	-	-	2	1
Norcom	3	-	-	-	-	2	1
Richardson	3	-	-	-	-	2	1

2 Corps—Ewell

J/J/2—Jones (wounded)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
21 Va	5	-	-	4(2)	4(2)	4	1
25 Va	6	-	-	5(4)	5(4)	5	1
42 Va	5	-	-	3(1)	3(1)	3	2
44 Va	4	-	-	3(2)	3(2)	3	1
48 Va	5	-	-	3(2)	3(2)	3	2
50 Va	5	-	-	3(1)	3(1)	3	2

S/J/2—Steuart

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
1 Md Bn	8	-	-	6	4(1)	4	4
1 NC	8	-	-	7	5	5	3
3 NC	11	-	-	10	7(5)	7	4
10 Va	5	-	-	4	3(2)	3	2
23 Va	5	-	-	-	4(3)	4	1
37 Va	5	-	-	4	3(2)	3	1

Swl/J/2—Walker

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
2 Va	7	-	-	-	6	6	1
4 Va	5	-	-	-	2(1)	2	3
5 Va	7	-	-	-	6(5)	6	1
27 Va	3	-	-	-	2	2	1
33 Va	4	-	-	-	3(1)	3	1

W/J/2—Williams

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
1 La	3	-	-	2	2	2	1
2 La	5	-	-	4	3(2)	3	2
10 La	4	-	-	3	2(1)	2	2
14 La	6	-	-	-	4(2)	4	2
15 La	4	-	-	-	3(2)	3	1

Arty/J/2

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
Crpntr	4	-	3 (6.6 only)	3	3	3	1
Raine	4	-	2 (6.6 only)	2	2	2	2
Brown	4	-	3 (6.6 only)	3	3	3	1
Dement	4	-	2 (6.6 only)	3	3	3	1

A/E/2—Avery (killed)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
6 NC	10	-	8	6	6	6	4
21 NC	9	-	8	6	6	6	3
57 NC	6	-	-	5	5	5	1

G/E/2—Gordon

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
13 Ga	6	-	3	3	3	3	3
26 Ga	6	-	5	5	5	5	1
31 Ga	5	-	4	4	4	4	1
38 Ga	7	-	4	4	4	4	3
60 Ga	6	-	5	5	5	5	1
61 Ga	6	-	4	4	4	4	2

H/E/2—Hays

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
5 La	4	-	-	3	3	3	1
6 La	4	-	-	3	3	3	1
7 La	5	-	-	4	4	4	1
8 La	6	-	5	5	5	5	1
9 La	7	-	-	5	5	5	2

S/E/2—Smith

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
31 Va	5	-	-	-	4(3)	4	1
49 Va	6	-	-	-	4(2)	4	2
52 Va	5	-	-	-	4(3)	4	1

Arty/E/2

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
Garber	4	-	1	1	1	1	3
Green	4	-	1	1	1	1	3

D/R/2—Daniel

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
2 NC Bn	5	-	1	1	1	4	1
32 NC	9	-	7	7	5(3)	5	4
43 NC	11	-	8	8	7(6)	7	4
45 NC	12	-	8	8	8	8	4
53 NC	6	-	3	3	3(2)	3	3

Do/R/2—Doles

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
4 Ga	7	-	6	6	6	6	1
12 Ga	6	-	5	5	5	5	1
21 Ga	6	-	5	5	5	5	1
44 Ga	7	-	6	6	6	6	1

I/R/2—Iverson (replaced)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
5 NC	10	-	4	4	4	4	6
12 NC	4	-	2	2	2	2	2
20 NC	8	-	3	3	3	3	5
23 NC	6	-	1	1	1	1	5

O/R/2—O'Neal

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
3 Ala	7	-	6	6	5(4)	5	2
5 Ala	6	-	2	2	2	2	4
6 Ala	8	-	7	7	5(3)	5	3
12 Ala	6	-	5	5	4(3)	4	2
26 Ala	7	-	5	5	4(3)	4	3

R/R/2—Ramseur

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
2 NC	5	-	4	4	4	4	1
4 NC	4	-	3	3	3	3	1
14 NC	6	-	5	5	5	5	1
30 NC	6	-	4	4	4	4	2

Arty/R/2

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
Page	4	-	2	2	2	2	2

3 Corps—Hill

L/A/3—Lang

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
2 Fla	5	-	-	3	3	2	3
5 Fla	6	-	-	4	4	3	3
8 Fla	4	-	-	2	2	1	3

M/A/3—Mahone

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
12 Va	7	-	-	-	6	6	1
41 Va	6	-	-	-	5	5	1

P/A/3—Posey

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
19 Miss	7	-	-	-	6	6	1
48 Miss	5	-	-	-	4	4	1

Wr/A/3—Wright

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
2 Ga Bn	3	-	-	1	1	1	2
3 Ga	9	-	-	5	5	5	4
22 Ga	8	-	-	4	4	4	4
48 Ga	8	-	-	4	4	4	4

Wx/A/3—Wilcox

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
8 Ala	10	-	-	6	6	5	5
9 Ala	6	-	-	4	4	4	2
10 Ala	6	-	-	4	4	3	3
11 Ala	6	-	-	4	4	3	3
14 Ala	6	-	-	4	4	3	3

H/3—Heth (wounded)

A/H/3—Archer (captured)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
5 Ala Bn	3	-	-	-	-	2	1
13 Ala	6	4(3)	4	4	4	2	4
1 Tenn	6	4(3)	4	4	4	2	4
7 Tenn	5	4(3)	4	4	4	3	2
14 Tenn	4	3(2)	3	3	3	1	3

B/H/3—Brockenbrough

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
22 Va Bn	5	-	-	-	-	4	1
40 Va	5	-	4	4	4	4	1
47 Va	4	-	-	-	-	3	1
55 Va	5	-	4	4	4	4	1

D/H/3—Davis

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
2 Miss	10	6(4)	6	6	6	4	6
11 Miss	12	-	-	-	-	6	6
42 Miss	11	7(5)	7	7	7	5	7
55 NC	13	9(7)	9	9	9	7	6

P/H/3—Pettigrew

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
11 NC	12	-	8	8	8	5	7
26 NCa	9	-	3	3	3	2	7
26 NCb	8	-	3	3	3	1	7
47 NC	12	-	10	10	10	8	4
52 NC	11	-	9	9	9	7	4

Arty/H/3

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
Moore	4	-	-	-	3	3	1

P/3—Pender (killed)

L/P/3—Lane

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
7 NC	6	-	5	5	5	3	3
18 NC	7	-	-	-	-	5	2
28 NC	7	-	-	-	-	2	5
33 NC	7	-	-	-	-	4	3
37 NC	8	-	7	7	7	5	3

P/P/3—Perrin

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
1 SC	7	-	5	5	5	5	2
12 SC	7	-	4	4	4	4	3
13 SC	8	-	5	5	5	5	3
14 SC	9	-	5	5	5	5	4

S/P/3—Scales (wounded)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
13 NC	5	-	2	2	2	1	4
16 NC	6	-	5	5	5	4	2
22 NC	7	-	5	5	5	4	3
34 NC	6	-	5	5	5	4	2
38 NC	4	-	2	2	2	1	3

T/P/3—Thomas

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
14 Ga	7	-	-	-	6	6	1
35 Ga	7	-	-	-	5	5	2
45 Ga	7	-	-	-	6	6	1
49 Ga	6	-	-	-	5	5	1

M/3 Corps Artillery

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
Wallace	4	-	3	3	3	3	1

P/3 Corps Artillery

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
Zimmerman	4	-	3	3	3	3	1
Brander	4	-	-	-	-	3	1
Johnston	4	-	-	-	-	3	1

Cav—Stuart

C/Cav—Chambliss

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
9 Va	10	-	-	-	-	9	1

FL/Cav—Fitz Lee

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
1 Va	6	-	-	-	-	5	1
4 Va	11	-	-	-	-	10	1

H/Cav—Hampton (wounded)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
1 NC	8	-	-	-	-	7	1
Cobb Lgn	7	-	-	-	-	6	1

Jo/Cav—Jones (optional)

Unit	Start	Jul 1-pm	Jul 2	Jul 3	Jul 3-pm	Jul 4	Total loss
6 Va	12	-	-	-	-	11	1
7 Va	8	-	-	-	-	7	1

Confederate Reinforcement Schedule

July 1

Area	Time (variable time)	Units	Orders
A	8:00 a.m.	P/3 Corps Artillery Bn, Heth	1
A	8:15 a.m.	A/H/3, D/H/3 (minus 11 Miss/D/H/3)	1
A	9:00 a.m.	P/H/3, B/H/3	1
A	9:30 a.m.	Pender, P/3 Infantry Division (minus 1 SC R/P/P3 and Arty/P/3), M/3 Corps Artillery Bn	2
C	10:45 a.m. (9:30)	Rodes, I/R/2	3
C	11:00 a.m. (*)	O/R/2, Do/R/2, Arty/R/2	3
C	11:30 a.m. (*)	D/R/2, R/R/2	3
A	Noon (11:00)	A P Hill, 3 Corps HQ and Supply, Arty/P/3, Arty/H/3	4
C	Noon (11:00)	Ewell, 2 Corps HQ and Supply, 1 Md Bn Cav/FL/Cav	5
A	1:30 p.m. (12:00)	Lee, A NVa HQ	-
D	2:30 p.m. (1:30)	Early, G/E/2, H/E/2, A/E/2, Arty/E/2, 17 Va Cav/Je/Cav, 35 Va Cav Bn/Jo/Cav	6
D	3:00 p.m. (*)	S/E/2	7
A	4:00 p.m. (3:00)	Anderson, A/3 Infantry Division, A NVa Supply	8
D	5:00 p.m. (4:00)	Je/Cav (less 17 Va Cav, already arrived)	9
A	7:00 p.m. (5:30)	Johnson, J/2 Infantry Division, D/2 Corps, N/2 Corps Artillery Bns.	10
A	7:00 p.m. (5:30)	11 Miss/D/H/3, 1SC R/P/P/3	10
A	8:30 p.m. (7:00)	Longstreet, 1 Corps HQ and Supply, McLaws, M/1 Infantry Division	11
A	Midnight (11:00)	Hood, H/1 Infantry Division (minus L/H/1, Bachman/Arty/H/1)	10

July 2

Area	Time (variable time)	Units	Orders
A	7:00 a.m. (6:00)	Hart, Griffin, Moorman/Arty/Cav, Black/1 Corps (Cavalry)	12
A	8:00 a.m. (7:00)	Alexander, A/1 Corps Artillery Bn, E/1 Corps Artillery Bn	10
A	8:00 a.m. (7:30)	OPTIONAL: Ransom, R/1 Division	10
A	11:30 a.m. (10:00)	L/H/1, Bachman/Arty/H/1	10
A	Noon (11:00)	OPTIONAL: Buckner, B Division	13
E	2:00 p.m. (12:00)	Stuart, Cav HQ, C/Cav, FL/Cav, H/Cav, Breathed, McGregor/Arty/Cav	13
A	4:00 p.m. (3:00)	Pickett, P/1 Infantry Division	13
A	4:00 p.m. (3:30)	OPTIONAL: Hill, H Corps (all or part, see rules)	13

July 3

Area	Time (variable time)	Units	Orders
A	11:00 a.m. (10:00)	I/Cav	13
K/L	11:00 a.m. (10:30)	OPTIONAL: Jo/Cav (less 35 Va), OPTIONAL: Chew/Arty/Cav	13
L	1:00 p.m. (11:00am)	OPTIONAL: R/Cav	13

Order Explanations

1. Heth's Division is to attack along the Chambersburg Pike and capture Gettysburg.

2. Pender's Division is to move to Whisler's Ridge, halt and form a battleline facing east, and await orders. They can advance only to Herr Ridge and can support Heth if his division is attacked, but are not to engage enemy units beyond Herr Ridge.

3. Rodes' Division is to move west to Oak Ridge and then south along it's crest to attack the Union flank on the Chambersburg Pike, and to clear Seminary Ridge north of the RR cut. Doles' Brigade (D/R/2) is to protect Rodes' flank between Oak Hill and Rock Creek.

4. 3 Corps is to defend the line of Herr Ridge when it arrives. Both Heth and Pender automatically (no matter what their order status) assume this order and move to join the 3rd Corps when it arrives.

5. The 2nd Corps is to attack and capture Gettysburg.

6. Early's Division is to attack the Union forces north of, and capture, the town.

7. Smith's Brigade (S/E/2) is to move to the York Pike, vicinity hex C14.15, and defend against any attack from the east.

8. Anderson is to move to Herr Ridge, halt, and establish a defensive line. He is not subject to any 3rd Corps order currently in force.

9. Je/Cav is attached to the 2nd Corps, and is to move to join 2nd Corps.

10. Move to join Corps/Division/Brigade, as appropriate.

11. Longstreet is to move 1st Corps into a defensive line on Herr Ridge south of A28.23 and defend.

12. These 3 artillery units from Stuart's Cav must immediately be assigned to a corps HQ on arrival, and subsequently act as if they were artillery for that corps. Once Stuart arrives, they can either stay with their existing corps assignment or return to Cavalry HQ control at the player's option. The Black Cavalry unit is attached directly to 1 Corps, and moves to join that corps.

13. This command is to move to Army HQ and await further orders.

Note, when using the H Corps option, Pickett and P/1 Division arrive with H/1 Division.

Units whose optional arrival times are marked (*) always arrive the same number of turns after the arrival of the most recent unit in their division or corps. Do not roll separately for variable arrival.

Units with more than one entry hex listed—K/L, for example—can enter at either hex at the owning player's option.

Union Reinforcement Schedule

July 1

Area	Time (variable time)	Units	Orders
J	8:00 a.m.	Reynolds, 1 Corps HQ, Wadsworth, 1/1 (minus 7 Ind/2/1/1) 2 Maine Battery/1 Corps Arty	1
J	9:00 a.m.	Howard, 11 Corps HQ	2
J	9:00 a.m.	Doubleday, B 4US, 5 Maine, EL 1 NY batteries/1 Corps Arty	3
J	9:30 a.m.	Robinson, 2/1, 1 Corps Supply	3
K	10:00 a.m.	1/3/1, 2/3/1, B 1Penn/1 Corps Arty	4
I	10:30 a.m. (10:00)	Schurz, 3/11 (58 NY/2/3/11 has strength 2), I 1 Ohio Battery/11 Corps Arty	3
J	11:00 a.m. (10:30)	Barlow, 1/11 (minus 41 NY/1/1/11, 75 Ohio/2/1/11 has strength 5), G 4US battery/11 Corps Arty	3
I	11:15 (10:45)	K 1 Ohio, 13 NY, I 1 NY batteries/ 11 Corps Arty	3
I	Noon (11:00)	Von Steinwher, 2/11, 11 Corps Supply (154 NY/1/2/11 has strength 4)	5
J	4:00 p.m. (3:00)	7 Ind/2/1/1	3
G	4:00 p.m. (11:30 a.m.)	Slocum, 12 Corps HQ and Supply	6
G	4:15 p.m. (*)	Williams, 1/12, F 4US, M 1NY batteries/12 Corps Arty	7
J	4:30 p.m. (3:30)	Sickles, 3 Corps HQ and Supply, Birney, 1/1/3, 2/1/3, E 1 RI, 2 NJ Batteries/3 Corps Arty	8
G	4:45 p.m. (*)	Geary, 2/12, F PennLt, K 5US Batteries/12 Corps Arty	3
-	5:00 p.m. (-)	add 2 SP each to 58NY/2/3/11 & 75 Ohio/2/1/11, add 1 SP to 154 NY/1/2/11	-
J	5:30 p.m. (4:00)	3/3/1	3
I	7:00 p.m. (6:00)	2 Corps	9
I	8:00 p.m. (7:00)	41 NY/1/1/11	3
I	9:30 p.m. (9:00)	Tyler, Arty Reserve HQ, 1 Reg Brigade, 4 Vol Brigade/Arty Reserve

2 July

Area	Time (variable time)	Units	Orders
I	6:00 a.m. (5:30)	B&L 2US, 6 NY, 9 Mich/1/HA/Cav	11
F	7:30 a.m. (6:30)	5 Corps (minus 3/5 Division)	12
G	8:00 a.m. (7:00)	Ind/12 (minus 1MdES)	3
G/H	8:00 a.m. (7:30)	OPTIONAL: French's Division	8
G/H	9:00 a.m. (8:00)	OPTIONAL: Naglee's Division	8
-	8:00 a.m. (-)	add 2 SP to 61 OH/1/3/11	-
I	9:00 a.m. (8:00)	McGilvery, 1 Vol Brigade, 2 Vol Brigade, 3 Vol Brigade, A Pot Supply	3
J	9:00 a.m. (8:00)	3/1/3, 3/2/3, 4 NY, D 1NY/Arty/3 Corps	3
I	11:00 a.m. (-)	WITHDRAWL: Buford, 1/1/Cav, 2/1/Cav, A 2US/2/Ha/Cav	13
F	Noon (11:30)	3/5 Division	3
F	12:30 p.m. (11:30)	2 Cav Division, E&G 1US/2/HA/Cav	14
G	4:30 p.m. (4:00)	6 Corps (minus 102 Penn/3/3/6)	15

3 July

Area	Time (variable time)	Units	Orders
G	7:00 a.m. (6:00)	1 Md ES/Ind/12, 102 Penn/3/3/6	3
G	7:30 a.m. (6:30)	Kilpatrick, 1/3/Cav, E 4US/1/HA/Cav	16
G	7:30 a.m. (6:30)	2/3/Cav, M 2US/1/HA/Cav	17
J	Noon (11:30)	Merritt, R/1/Cav (minus 6 US) K 1US/2/HA/Cav	18
J	6:00 p.m. (5:00)	6 US/R/1/Cav (strength 5)	3

4 July

Area	Time (variable time)	Units	Orders
I	10:00 a.m. (9:00)	C 3US/2/HA/Cav	19

Order Explanations

1. 1 Corps is to move to McPherson's Ridge, and defend McPherson's Ridge—Seminary Ridge—Oak Hill line. Reynolds assumes wing command.

2. 11 Corps is to defend the 1 Corps right flank north of town, between Oak Hill and Rock Creek.

3. These units are to join their command.

4. 1/3/1 and B 1 Penn Lt/1 Corps Artillery are to move to hex D9.12, then follow the road north along Willoughby Run to the Fairfield road, cross the Run and move north to join the rest of the Corps. 2/3/1 is to move to hex D9.12, then turn east to the Emmitsburg Road, and join the Corps.

5. 2/11 Division is to halt and defend Cemetery Hill.

6. Move to Cemetery Hill and defend.

7. Move to C7.32, move north along Wolf Hill Road to the Hanover Road, advance to Benner's Run, halt and defend.

8. Move to join the acting army commander and await further orders.

9. 2 Corps and the Artillery Reserve each have orders to move to E39.09 halt for the night and defend.

10. The army HQ is to move to any suitable location behind the Union battleline and put in there. The Cav Corps has no orders. Pleasonton and the HQ must move to the selected army HQ position and await further orders.

11. These artillery batteries are to join the Artillery Reserve, and are subject to any orders and all restrictions of the Reserve, until they ordered back to join the Cav Corps again. Treat them like any other Artillery Reserve battery.

12. 5 Corps is to move to C41.20 and defend.

13. Buford and these units must withdraw via the Taneytown Road at this time. Remove these units from the map.

14. Move to C44.25 and defend. This division is responsible for screening the Union army's right flank.

15. Move to Army HQ and await further orders.

16. This force is to move to the vicinity of hex D36.23 and defend. This command is responsible for screening the Union left flank.

17. This force is to move to join the 2/Cav division and support it. Treat 2/3/Cav as a brigade of the 2/Cav division for all command purposes.

18. This force is to move to the vicinity of hex D39.14 and defend. It, along with the 1/3/Cav brigade above, is responsible for screening the Union left flank.

19. This battery is to join 3/Cav Division.

Units whose optional arrival times are marked (*) always arrive the same number of turns after the arrival of the most recent unit in their division or corps. Do not roll separately for variable arrival. Units with more than one entry hex listed—G/H, for example—can enter at either hex at the owning player's option.