Last Chance for Victory: The Battle of Gettysburg Rulebook

Table of Contents

Line of Battle Series Rules (v3.0)
Last Chance for Victory Exclusive Rules
Scenarios

Line of Battle Series Rules (v3.0)

1.0 Basic Components

Important: All rules automatically assume the inclusion of other potentially restricting rules, requirements, unit capabilities and limitations, the Orders units must follow, and applicable Game Rules — rather than endlessly repeating each one.

1.1 Game Scale

Each hex measures 110 yards across the ground and the contour interval is 20 feet.
Each game-turn is 15 minutes during the day and 30 minutes at night.
Infantry and Cavalry units are usually Regiments.
Open Order units are usually Companies or Battalions.
Artillery units are usually Batteries.
Each Infantry or Open Order Strength Point (SP) represents 50 men.
Each Cavalry SP represents 64 men (to account for the horse holders).
Each Artillery SP represents one cannon.
Leaders are individual historical officers.

1.2 The Rules

Each game contains two rulebooks: the "Series Rules," which apply to all LoB games, and the "Game Rules," which contain special rules and scenarios only applicable to that specific game. If there is a conflict, Game Rules trump Series Rules.

Unless a rule specifies actions that must occur, the general assumption is that those actions occur if the player desires them.
Rule numbers in brackets with an "Opt" extension (such as "[7.2 Opt]") are Optional and you can choose them or not as desired. However, if you decide to use a given Optional Rule, you must use all its subordinate rules.

1.3 The Counters

Counters are either "units" or "markers." Units represent actual people or things on the battlefield, while markers designate conditions, game information, or other abstract concepts.

Units come in two basic types:

Combat Units such as Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Open Order.
Non-Combat Units such as Leaders, Wagons, and HQs.

1.3a Unit Strength: Strength Points (SPs). SPs track the number of men (or cannons) available to each Combat Unit. Losses are shown by reducing a unit's remaining SPs. A unit's current number of SPs is its Strength. The number of men (or cannons) represented by each SP is explained in 1.1. Show a Combat Unit's current Strength by either a separate Strength counter or (if there is no marker) its printed Strength. Place Strength markers under the owning unit. Strength markers have four values on each side. Align the unit's current strength in SPs with the unit's Center Front (6.3). Rotate the Strength marker as needed to keep it correct.

1.3b Wrecked Units. Wrecked units are no longer combat effective due to the losses they have sustained. A Wrecked Combat Unit has less than 50% of its printed SPs remaining. Units regaining to at least 50% of their printed SPs are no longer Wrecked at that moment.

Example — Wrecked Determination: A unit with a 6 SP printed strength becomes Wrecked when reduced to 2 SPs. If it has at least 3 SPs, it is not Wrecked.

Wrecked units suffer both the restriction below as well as limitations, modifiers, and effects on several tables.

Only Infantry, Cavalry, Open Order can become Wrecked; Artillery and Non-Combat units never do. Typically, Open Order units are too small to become Wrecked, only a few are big enough to do so. The minimum unit size to become Wrecked is 3 SPs (a 2 SP unit is destroyed before less than 50% of its SPs remain).

Restrictions:

Despite their position in the Stacking Order, Wrecked units cannot make use of a successful Closing Roll. If a roll for a Stack containing one or more Wrecked units succeeds, the Wrecked units do not accompany the rest of the Stack (7.1a). (Exception: Do not apply the Closing Roll restriction to units which become Wrecked during a given Charge.)
Wrecked units cannot use the +1 CRT DRM for having 6 remaining MPs when Firing. Note that the +1 applies if non-Wrecked units make up more than half of the SPs Firing out of that Stack (9.1e).

1.3c Weapon Types. There are two categories of Combat Units — Small Arms and Artillery — based on the Weapon Type they use. Small Arms are rifles, muskets, carbines, pistols, bayonets — including bare hands and impact weapons. Artillery consists of cannons of various types and sizes.

There is a letter and a number printed in the lower left-hand corner of each Combat Unit — this is its Weapon Type and full-strength SPs. The Weapons Characteristics Chart (pg. 55) lists these Weapon types, their maximum range, and any special capabilities they have.

Example — Counter Weapon Values: An Infantry counter with "R5" in the lower left corner would be armed with Rifles and have a full-strength of 5 SPs. Small Arms Rifles (not Rifled Artillery) with a maximum 4-hex range have no special capabilities. Note that while there is an "R" weapon type for Small Arms as well as Artillery, it is easy to determine which one is being used.

1.3d Unit Morale: Ratings and States. Combat Units are rated based on their training, leadership, motivation, unit cohesion, and experience. This gives each unit a 'grade' in the form of its Morale Rating in its counter's lower right-hand corner. Morale Ratings range from A (best) to F (worst). Morale Ratings never change during play. The unit's Morale Rating in combination with its Morale State (temporary levels of excitement or confusion) determine if a unit fights with resolution or falls out of line ineffective.

1.3e Consolidation. Consolidation is the ability of units to 'Brigade' (a term used by units which march and fight together as a single regiment) combining shattered understrength units within an actual Brigade. This reduces map clutter and provides a small bump to the Brigades' lifespan.

Drill Field Note — How do the different arms work together? Your army is made up of two main combat arms: Infantry and Artillery. Cavalry might sometimes be called into action on the battlefield (such as Buford at Gettysburg), but its true usefulness is reconnaissance and screening missions at operational or even strategic levels. Cavalry is exposed and very fragile on the battlefield itself — an expensive waste of their specialized talents and skills.

Infantry formations carry the brunt of the fight using various types of rifles by denying (or seizing) key terrain from the enemy. Infantry continues to execute these missions and suffer these costs to the present day and has always borne the greatest losses doing so.

Long range Artillery fire no longer produces decisive results. The 'Napoleonic Grand Battery' is a thing of the past. Pummeling enemy Artillery so they do not contribute fully has some value, but randomly shelling enemy Infantry lines at great distance generates little effect beyond a few losses and noise. Valuable ammunition must be carefully expended to avoid wastage. In a defense however, Artillery is still very valuable and at short ranges canister fires are particularly deadly.

Using Artillery to help during an Infantry assault requires skill. A position around 10 hexes from the enemy and a bit off to the side allows the guns to hit the enemy line without risking the advancing Infantry columns. Moving to secondary firing positions to maintain support is an art requiring skilled Leaders or at some point the Infantry advance will mask their own guns and block their own supporting fires.

Inevitably, the rule requiring Artillery to Unlimber at least 5 hexes away from enemy units (needed to prevent excessively high — and difficult to replace — crew losses) will preclude very close supporting fires, but good Artillery Leaders will maximize the support they can give.

For this rule, units are divided into 'recipients' (units that absorb SPs from others) and 'donors' (units which give up their SPs to recipients). This is only done for brevity. The owning player determines which unit is which.

Consolidation can only be done in the player's Activity Phase during his Consolidation Segment. Given the below, the player can do this as many times and locations on the map, as desired. Each Consolidation involves only one recipient and one donor. A recipient can only absorb one donor in a single segment (it can absorb any number of donors, but doing so will take multiple turns).

Each Consolidation requires the following:

The recipient will not become over-strength by adding the donor.
The absorption must be complete, using all the donor's strength. No donor can split its remaining SPs between more than one absorbing unit.
The donor cannot be full-strength. It must have lost at least 1 SP below full strength.
The recipient cannot be Wrecked, but the donor can be, i.e. the recipient cannot become "unwrecked" by the absorption of SPs from the donor.
Both units must belong to the same Brigade.
Both units must be the same unit (Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, Open Order) and Weapon type.
Both units must be Stacked together at the moment of Consolidation.
Neither unit can be BL, DG, or Routed.
Remove the donor from play (units removed in Consolidation do not count as Dead for purposes such as Fluke Stoppage, etc.) after giving the recipient all its SPs.
Green units cannot Consolidate with non-Green units, and vice versa.
Multi-unit Regiments are not required to combine within only the parent Regiment.

Attributes not specifically mentioned above do not affect Consolidation.

1.3f Minor Unit Matters.

Yellow Stripe. A Yellow Stripe running diagonally across Mounted units identifies them as "Cavalry," and not Mounted Infantry or something else. Artillery may have a stripe to indicate its attachment to a mounted Organization (aka Horse Artillery).
Split Units. A few units, too large to function as a single counter, are shown with a common unit ID plus "-a" or "-b." They are normal units in all ways and operate independently (separately) from each other.
Consolidated Brigades. A few Brigades are shown as single counters, rather than being split into Regiments, because limited manpower forces them to function as a single "Regiment." Consolidated Brigades have unit IDs listing them as "Bde." They function normally but can count as a Brigade in Reserve for Fluke Stoppage (13.6h).
Linkage. A Formation is Linked if it is normally subordinated to another HQ in battle. This superior HQ is printed on the Linked HQ. Linkage is for historical interest only and has no game effect.

1.4 The Turn Record & Night

Record the current date and time on the Turn Record Track using the Day, Hour, and Minute markers. The exact markers needed will depend on how the turns on the track are presented using the various tracks and the various markers needed. Also, the current Player Turn can be indicated by the Turn Marker's side showing. When the Turn Record reaches the :00 space (on either track), advance the Hour marker. When the midnight hour concludes, advance the Day marker as well.

1.4a Night Turns. While many normal game functions also occur at Night, they generally take longer to do — so the time scale is twice as long. Night Visibility is always two hexes (unless the Visibility is given as one hex) and Command is more difficult (13.5b).

1.4b Visibility. Conditions can place a maximum hex range for Line of Sight (LOS 8.0) called 'Visibility.' Visibility is listed as a number (in hexes, if any) on the Turn Record Track. Night Visibility, for example, is usually one or two hexes. LOSs greater than the current Visibility are always Blocked at that maximum. If a turn's Visibility is not listed, it is unlimited.

Visibility never reduces the minimum range from the enemy required to Unlimber Artillery (4.2a).

1.5 The Map

1.5a Hex Numbers. Each hex has an identifying number, such as 'A13.24.' The letter (A) designates the map itself (if there is more than one). The cardinal number (13) is the hex column, and the decimal (24) identifies the specific hex within that column. To make the grid easier to follow, only each fifth hex contains a printed number (xx.05, xx.10, etc.). This creates a gridline to follow so the eye doesn't enter natural time-wasting spiral search patterns.

1.5b Special Hexes.

Map edge hexes with at least half a hex showing are playable. Those showing less than half a hex are not playable for any purpose.
Reinforcement Entry Hexes have a number or letter inside a circle marking.

1.5c Map Cardinal Directions. For simplicity, each game uses the primary map directions for identification, even though the true north arrow might be tilted to one side. You are looking at the map correctly if most of its type is right reading. In general, North = Top, East = Right, West = Left, and South = Bottom.

1.5d Natural Terrain. The map shows the terrain with as minimal hex grid distortions as possible so you can "see" the true terrain of the battlefield.

1.6 Specialized Terrain Notes

Starting with No Turning Back, each LoB game comes with a Terrain Effects Chart designed for that specific game. It will not include terrain features used in other games (and the exact MP costs shown may be modified for that title). Be sure to use each game's original TEC in conjunction with a v3.0 LoB Terrain Effects Chart.

1.6a Features affecting Elevation & LOS.

Elevation Lines. The thin Elevation Lines show the land's contour heights and are used for Line of Sight (8.0). They are the actual Contour Lines of equal topographical elevation. Do not confuse them with "Slope Lines."
Slope Lines. Slope Lines overprint the Elevation Lines in certain locations to identify areas with steeper ground. Only the thick black lines are Slope lines. Slope Lines by themselves may indicate ground possibly giving a Morale Table advantage and may give an additional movement cost when combined with Inclined Ground. The number of Slope Lines within a given hex (if there is no Inclined Ground symbol) has no effect.
Woods & Line of Sight. The Woods hex symbol adds +3 to the Terrain level applied to any LOS traversing it. Use the printed Woods symbol itself for its physical location, not the hex boundary. It is not a whole hex effect. The Woods hex symbol only affects Movement for the specific cost of Artillery Formation Change. Woods hexsides, however, do not affect LOS but only exist to apply Movement MP costs.
Runs. Runs have no effect on play and only exist as an elevation "cue" — so the player can tell UP versus DOWN more easily.
Crests. Crest lines show minor yet very complex fluctuations of the ground, confirmed by careful in-person field exploration, which change a Unit's (or Obstacle's) height for LOS. Crests are shown with thin dashed red lines.

1.6b Features affecting Movement.

Inclined Ground. Inclined Ground hexes have a brown "fan-shaped" symbol and require an extra MP cost.
- Unlike Slope hexes, the number of Slope Lines within an Inclined Ground hex (0-2 versus 3 or more) determines its Movement cost.
- Inclined Ground is non-directional. The movement's direction, the slanting ground's direction, or the symbol's orientation have no additional meaning or effects.
- Inclined Ground has no effect on LOS.
Creek Hexsides. While Rivers and Creeks follow their natural courses, the blue 'Creek' hexsides show where to apply MP costs and restrictions with respect to the hex grid.
Woods & Movement. The Woods hex symbol has no effect on Movement. Only the Woods hexsides (the green bar symbols) apply MP costs.
Towns. All hexes within the "Town Boundary" are Town hexes. The roads inside a Town are not justified to the hex grid; units stay on their road by "following the Town's grain." The shortest path following this "grain" is correct.
- Intersections. Units using Road Columns (7.0e) must move 'straight' using their Center Front (6.3) hexsides (even for units normally without Facing) until they exit the Town. (Exception: A Road Column can reface once before exiting a Town. If there is more than one unit in the column, each must change direction in the same hex and in the same direction the lead unit did — the conga-line cannot change (7.2c).)
- Deploying and Fighting in Town Hexes. Any units in (or entering) a Town hex while in Line or Unlimbered Formation are automatically DG. If already DG, these units DO NOT become Routed — they remain DG. Units in a Town and DG cannot Rally unless they change out of Line/Unlimbered Formation OR exit Town hexes. If so, they Rally normally.

Design Note — Going Downtown: Towns were very confusing to marching columns. It's hard for us modern people to understand, but marching troops were bewildered by the road net in a town such as Gettysburg (which is hardly a metropolis). The traditional 'shortest distance' wargame zig-zag hex route was effectively impossible for them to follow — changing direction once was about as "fancy" as they could get.

1.6c Features Affecting Combat.

Stone Walls. Stone Walls give the Combat Table a Protection DRM when each of these points is true:
- The Fires are exclusively Small Arms. Neither the Firer nor Target contains Artillery.
- At least one Stone Wall hexside makes up part of the Target's hex.
- The Fires enter the Target hex through a Stone Wall hexside (including its corners) (9.1g).
- The Firer and Target do not occupy hexes joined through a common Stone Wall hexside. (They are not facing each other across the same Stone Wall hexside!)
Rock Ledges. These are outcroppings that only protect units adjacent to their 'downhill' sides.

1.6d Points of Interest. These are minor features such as cornfields, buildings, haystacks, and cemeteries. They are only for historical information and do not affect play.

1.7 Set Up Notes

Use these set up notes as the rules/key of setting up, unless explicitly stated otherwise in the Game-Specific Rules or scenario.

Combat Units can set up in any desired Formation, Facing, and in 'Normal' Morale State. Units never set up with any CBF, Cowardly Legs, or Ammunition Depletion markers.
Leaders set up with their Formation's units — they can be either stacked with them or in a hex needed for CR purposes.
"w/i X" means set up the listed units "at or within X hexes of" that hex.
When a Corps, Division, or Brigade designation is listed in the set up or OOA (1/1/1, F/H, 3 Corps, etc.), it includes all the Formation's subordinate units (of all types).
The Confederate Player is first.
Use the Orders in the chosen scenario.
For RSS games interpret the Orders as follows:
- Orders instructing units to move to an HQ, or another location are Move Orders unless they are requiring movement to the place where they are to Attack or Defend. In those cases, they are Attack or Defensive Orders, but have a Preliminary Movement (13.1d) designated.
- Retain any Acceptance Delay listed and resolve it using the original rules.
- Orders to Defend in a position already held by friendly troops establish a Defensive Position (13.2c) where the front-line is already as far forward as the Position goes and the lateral boundaries match the locations of the non-Open Order troop flanks at start.
- All other Orders are Accepted Attack Orders.
The parenthetical number directly after a unit's name is its current SP strength level. If no SP value is given, the unit is at its full printed strength. A unit's next higher Formation is listed in parentheses after it. (The entry "19 Ind (4), 2 Wisc (1/1/1)" indicates: these are the 19th Indiana and 2d Wisconsin Infantry Regiments; the 19 Ind has 4 SPs at start; the 2 Wisc starts at Full-Strength; both are part of 1st Brigade, First Division, I Corps.)
A unit with "Any" shown as its higher Formation can trace Command Radius (CR) to any friendly Leader or HQ.
A Leader showing "Any" can be used for any Formation, but once assigned he must remain there.
Replacement Leaders are listed as "Repl (1/2/1)" listing his Formation.
Promoted Leaders have their new Formation stated. "Newton (1 Corps)."
Artillery outside Command Radius is assumed to have been Posted.
If you are using [7.2 Opt] be sure to "string out" any Road Columns on the map to give the required Column Length.
If the setup has Unlimbered Artillery stacking with other unit types, the owning player must move his choice of units one hex to ensure that the Unlimbered Artillery is no longer stacked with other types.
Assign needed Reserves (13.2d) before play.
The Stack's largest Combat Unit must be placed on top unless Green Unit(s) are present (4.5). If it isn't on top, move it (6.1b).

1.8 Fog of War

Fog of War stands between the game player's excessive game and historical knowledge and the game's situation.

The enemy can see:

Each hex's top Combat Unit.
Under any Non-Combat Units and markers to see the hex's top Combat Unit.

The enemy cannot see:

Your Orders and plans.
Current Strengths (he is only told the SPs used during a Fire Combat or Charge).

[1.9 Opt] Pre-Set Orders

Each scenario gives Pre-Set Orders applying to Formations on the map or which arrive later. However, you might also create your own Pre-Set Orders to see what happens. Merely write what you want before play begins. The ones you write replace the scenario and OOA provided versions. You can pick and choose the ones you want to do so (though be careful that doing so doesn't leave later orders stranded as they were supposed to be based on the ones you changed — and now they don't make sense!) Once play begins, you may only change orders using the normal procedures.

Take Care with Pre-Set Orders! Remember that instead of starting out with the historical commander's imperfect idea of what was going on — you are going with 100% historical information which was known and fine-tuned for over 160 years, so be careful to test small ideas first and allow this to be done for both sides.

2.0 The Game Turn

Every Game Turn contains two Player Turns, one for each side. Each Player Turn contains three Phases — Command, Activity, and Rally. Execute each Phase and its internal Segments (if any) rigidly according to the Sequence of Play below. The scenario will list one player as the First Player while the other is the Second Player.

In the First Player Turn, the First Player conducts each Player Turn step as the "Phasing" or "Active" Player and the Second Player the "Non-Phasing" or "Inactive" Player. In the Second Player Turn, use the same Phase order with the roles reversed. The Second Player will now be the "Phasing" Player and the First Player is now the "Inactive" Player.

When the Second Player Turn is completed, advance the Turn Record Track markers. The turn is then finished, and you are ready to begin a new turn repeating the cycle of First Player Turn and Second Player Turn.

2.1 Sequence of Play

Each Player Turn, the Phasing Player executes the Sequence of Play for his side doing the Command & Control, Movement, Fires, dice rolling, and bookkeeping needed. The Non-Phasing Player follows along to ensure that all applicable DRMs are used, the table results are correctly applied and rolls for any Opening Volleys (9.2).

In many ways, while playing against each other, the players actually work as a team to ensure the game functions and the rules are followed correctly.

2.1a Outline Sequence of Play.

First Player Turn

Command Phase
- Orders
- Recovery
- Fluke Stoppage
Activity Phase
- Place Reinforcements
- Consolidation (1.3e)
- Movement & Combat
Rally Phase
- Rally
- Rebuilding (Midnight Turn only)

Second Player Turn — Repeat the entire sequence above with the roles reversed.

Game Turn End — Advance Turn marker(s) to show the next Game Turn's Time.

2.1b Narrative Sequence of Play.

Command Phase

Orders (13.0)
- Army Orders. The Army Commander can create (and send) one new Order by making a Command Roll. If the roll is successful, write out the desired Order and determine when it arrives using the Order Delivery Chart.
- Subordinate Orders. Subordinate Leaders make Command Rolls for each arriving Order they obtain or each Order already on hand which has not been Accepted. When an Order is Accepted, the Leader begins to obey or — if need be — Reissue it.
- Arriving Orders. Newly arriving Accepted Orders replace any other Orders for that Formation (be they Accepted or not). Once Accepted from the Army Commander, the subordinate Leader must forward Attack Orders to his involved Divisional Leaders ("Re-issuing," 13.2a). The Divisional Leader must Accept that Attack Order before beginning to act on it.
- Initiative. Subordinate Leaders (only) can also use Initiative to write some limited Order types. The Army Commander, however, cannot use Initiative. Command Rolls for Initiative can be made at any time during the Player Turn (not only in the Command Phase) provided the "one time, one purpose" rule is not violated. This flexibility is to simplify each player's workload and memory demands.

(Important: A Leader can make only one Command Roll per turn and the Leader must be in his own Command Radius to do so. Additionally, that Command Roll must be for only one purpose.)

Recovery (13.7c). Divisions may be required to conduct Recovery for various reasons. Follow the Ending Order (13.6) and the Ending Orders Processes (13.7). When a Recovery step succeeds, the Division begins the next process step immediately in that same Phase. Otherwise, it must wait to attempt Recovery again next Turn.
Fluke Stoppage (13.6h). Every Turn, each Division under Attack Orders must check for Fluke Stoppage on the Fluke Stoppage Table. See also the Grace Period.

Activity Phase

Place the Active Player's Reinforcements for the turn into their Entry Area as listed in the Order of Arrival (OOA).
The Active Player conducts any desired Consolidations (1.3e).
Then the Active Player conducts desired Tasks (2.3) with all, some, or none of his units.

The Active Player rolls all dice in this Activity Phase except Opening Volleys (9.2). The Inactive Player makes those rolls.

Rally Phase (12.1). Follow this order for the Active Player's units (only) in his Player Turn:

Remove Active Player's Sh, BL, and all Cowardly Legs markers.
Flip all Disorganized markers to Shaken. (Exceptions: 1.6b (Towns) and 6.1a (Over-Stacking) do not allow DGs to Rally.)
Roll for each Routed Stack. Each Routed Stack rolls separately (one die plus the Morale Value of one Leader in its hex). If the total is 5 or more, convert the R to DG and change the Stack's Facing and Formation as desired. On any other result, the Stack remains Routed.
Failure to Rally. Routed units that fail to Rally and are w/i 5 hexes of any enemy Combat Unit: retreat until at least 6 hexes from all enemy units (12.1 part 4).
Remove all CBF markers from your units (both Level 1 and Level 2) (4.2l).
Rebuild. On the Midnight turn (only) qualified units (living and dead) can regain one SP they have lost (per unit) (12.2).

2.2 Reinforcements

Reinforcements arrive in the play area according to the list in the Order of Arrival. Reinforcements must arrive in the Entry Area at the time specified. They cannot be delayed. Reinforcements enter at the beginning of the friendly Activity Phase and do so in any desired Formation; however, Artillery must enter Limbered. In your Player Turn, the first unit (with the usual Leaders) are placed in the actual Entry Hex, while the others are thought to form a column extending off the map and enter that hex having "moved" off-map to follow the Stack to their front.

Play Note — Too Many Units Coming On! When a lot of units arrive at once (especially when following [7.2 Opt]), not all can enter the map in a single turn. The excess is lined up off map and continue to enter the next friendly Activity Phase (and later, if needed). If additional units arrive at that Entry Area, line them up behind any still waiting to enter.

2.2a Blocked Entry Areas. If enemy Combat Units occupy an Entry Area, shift left or right (owning player's choice) to the next one available. Continue to shift until finding one that is not enemy occupied. EZOCs and Non-Combat Units do not block Entry Areas.

2.2b "Wide" Entry Areas. Some Entry Areas are shown as Zones of Hexes connected with a Red Bar. Reinforcements may enter normally in any of the Zone's hexes (up to the Stacking Limit). In this case, never apply the Blocked Entry Area rule (2.2a) unless the enemy occupies all the Zone's hexes.

2.2c Removals. If the OOA requires a "Removal," remove the listed units from the game at the beginning of that turn's friendly Activity Phase. Removals are unaffected by their location or situation — just pull them off the map and set them aside out of play.

2.3 The Activity Phase

The Activity Phase is the centerpiece of each Player Turn and when units conduct all their Movements, Fire Combat, Charges, create (or remove) Breastworks, and replenish Artillery Ammunition — all game functions except Command & Control and Rally.

Units can operate individually or as Stacks. It's more efficient if units conduct Tasks together as a Stack. When units operate individually, replace the word "Stack" with "unit" in each rule below. However, units can operate as a Stack only if they begin the Activity Phase in the same hex (7.0d).

All, some, or none of your units conduct their Activities in any desired order.

Units can only do "one Activity per Turn" during which it may do all, some, or none of the Tasks listed below, in any desired order, until they become "Finished." Once Finished, a unit cannot perform any additional Task(s) in that Activity Phase.

(Exceptions: Unfinished units can join a Stack already in progress only if that Stack moves into (or through) their hex. Leaders can join a Stack at any time during the Phase (11.2).)

Possible unit Tasks are:

Change Formation.
Change Facing.
Move.
Fire OR Charge (never both).
Build Breastworks.
Ammunition Replenishment.

Units are Finished when they complete any of these:

Fire.
Fail a Charge execution (the Target doesn't budge).
Run out of MPs or cannot use their remaining MPs.
Do not wish to Fire or move at all.

(Exception: Once a Firing or Charging process begins, it must be completed in its entirety and the unit(s) Finished before other units begin their Activities.)

Interwoven Activities. A player may stop a unit's Activity before Finishing, do some (or all) of another unit's Activity, then go back to Finish the first unit. Do so infrequently to avoid confusion! The maximum possible sequence is: Unit A starts, Unit B starts, then Unit A Finishes. To be clear: Unit C cannot become involved before both Units A and B are Finished!

3.0 Command Basics

Command & Control (the "Orders system") is a filter between 'knowing' what you'd like to do AND the ability to do it in a coordinated manner. Taking advantage of fleeting large-scale opportunities is (and should be) difficult. Once an Army is in motion, momentum will make changing plans difficult and inefficient. Your Army is oddly uninterested in fighting to the last man!

The Command Rules are given in two sections:

3.0 gives a summary of how Command works and how to follow Orders in play. 3.0 is an introduction giving the info needed for playing small scenarios right away.
13.0 explains fully how to issue Orders, what they are, and explains what happens when Orders End. It fleshes out the entire

(This section is illustrated with a diagram of Command Radius "circles" showing how Army, Corps, and Division HQs relay Attack Orders down through the chain of command and how Corps Artillery Battalions are Posted to support an attack.)

Why rule 3.0? The purpose of 3.0 is to get you started following Orders as soon as you can — as many smaller scenarios do not fully involve all the ins and outs of issuing Orders and dealing with them when they end. The scenario spells out those Orders already in effect and is short enough to avoid more complex matters (you certainly can use 13.0 if those matters come up). Work on learning the basics of Command to free your time to concentrate on how units move and fight. Then you can deal with the more advanced portions of Command when you are ready. "Command" denotes a "Formation with its own HQ," it does not mean "to give Orders." It's an object, not the issuance of instructions.

3.1 Commands

"Commands" are each Army's major components. They are typically "Corps," but smaller Formations could be Commands as well. A Command can be identified as the lowest Formation containing its own HQ unit.

The Army HQ is special in that it is the only HQ which doesn't indicate any specific Command. A reference to a Command (say "Second Corps") refers to all the Leaders and units under it.

The Order system's purpose is to control the movement of HQs. Orders move and fight Commands using them as the Army's building blocks.

3.2 Headquarters (HQs)

HQs are the control hub of their Formations and keep units from drifting rudderless. HQs are Non-Combat Units which mark the center of their Formation's Command Radius (CR) (3.3).

The Army HQ. The Army HQ automatically accepts (without a Command Roll) new Move Orders on their arrival. The Army HQ otherwise functions normally but is the only HQ not to mark a specific Command.

Movement. HQs only move according to their Orders (a simple notation of the HQ's destination hex number is sufficient). This could be the destination hex of an Attack Order — in which case, the HQ moves along (usually behind) the attacking units as the attack proceeds.

Once an HQ's Order ends, the HQ is "bolted to the ground" in its location and cannot voluntarily move further. A "bolted HQ" means that its CR's center is fixed — however, all its subordinate Formations may freely move and/or fight around it.

Combat. HQs have no combat ability and cannot be destroyed. They are not affected by enemy Fires. HQs have no Morale State and only Retreat when other units in their Stack do so.

When an HQ needs to Retreat (because of a Morale Result against Combat Units in its hex), or an enemy Combat Unit enters an HQ hex, the entire Formation must Skedaddle (13.6e).

3.3 Command Radius (CR)

A Command Radius (CR) is the maximum distance from HQs (or Leaders) which allows units to function normally. The Command Radius Chart lists each level's available CR. CRs extend from the Command HQ out through the various Formation Leaders and finally to the Formation units — much like the branches of a tree. This CR Tree typically begins with the Corps HQ (or a specific Leader, if no HQ is available) which is not required to be inside the Army HQ's CR. The starting point of this CR Tree is the starting HQ or Leader (as the case may be) and reaches out to each level's Leader in turn. Usually, this runs from Corps to Division to Brigade to the actual units. Each of these levels allow the level below them to function freely anywhere within its level's CR, given their Orders.

Special Cases:

The Army HQ's CR applies to units directly assigned to the Army HQ. It does not apply to Commands or any other lower-level Formations.
The Army Commander must be in his HQ's CR to make any Command Roll.
Leaders with no separate HQ counters (typically Division and Brigade Leaders) project their own CR from their present hex instead. Except in the case of 3.3f, Leaders must be located properly to make any Command Roll.
Ignore CR for Artillery Replenishing Ammunition or "Posting" (4.2e).
CRs have no effect on other CRs (except as needed as part of the CR Tree).
CRs never affect Wagons.

3.3a A Stack is "in CR" only if all the CR Tree levels above it are also at or within appropriate CRs. Lower CRs cannot "skip" a higher-level CR by reaching the CR above it.

3.3b If part of a Command is outside CR due to the set-up, the scenario's orders, or happenstance, handle the CR Tree's available levels normally.

In that case, the senior cut-off Leader will stand in for the HQ meaning:

He defines his level's CR center hex.
He can only move following Orders like an HQ (3.2).

RSS Note — Detaching Formations: The RSS games (THG, TTS, AFS and SM) made liberal use of an ability to detach and attach Formations. When playing those games allow the original rules. While 'detachment' still existed in NbH under v1.0, the game's limited map area kept the matter under control. Future games will be able to use the "Designer's Exception" when such a thing is actually needed. The older detachment rules were heavily abused ... use them infrequently and only in those games.

3.3c Count CRs using hexes (never MPs) ignoring all terrain of any type or effect. Enemy units and EZOCs block CR counts. (Exception: Friendly Combat Units negate EZOCs in their hexes for CR. This is the only time EZOCs are negated for any reason.)

3.3d Check CRs only at the two instances below. Units found at these times within CR function completely normally, no matter where they are at other times. A Stack that begins moving in CR is free to move out of it. However, next turn they might regret it. Units found at those times outside of CR apply 3.3e.

Stacks ONLY check CRs when they:

Begin to move.
Conduct a Withdrawal (13.7a).

3.3e Out of CR Effects. A Stack beginning its move Out of CR:

A Stack not in an EZOC may choose to move, but it must move to re-establish CR. Otherwise, it must remain in its current hex.
Can Charge but not Fire.

Design Note — No Fires, but they can Charge?!? What? If this sounds backwards, consider the desperation involved. They do not want to get involved in a drawn-out firefight. If they must fight their way home, they will go as hard as possible. Think 'cornered animal.'

A Stack required to Withdraw while Out of CR is a "Trapped Unit" (13.7a).

3.3f CRs and Orders. You cannot Order Formations Out of CR. A Leader Out of CR can only make a Command Roll for Initiative and (even then) only to move his Formation back into CR.

3.4 Order Types (Simplified)

A scenario's Orders determine what your units will attempt to do. Interpret them as given below. When you are ready, add 13.0 so you can start issuing your own Orders to command your army beyond the scenario's instructions.

Attack Orders direct friendly troops to move forward and fight to seize enemy-held ground.
Move Orders command a simple movement from Point A to Point B where enemy contact is not expected.
Defensive Orders define a specific Defensive Position for the Formation to deploy and resist enemy incursions.
Reserve Orders relegate a Formation to specifically stand-by and be ready for rapid action.
No Orders are for Formations awaiting new Orders and have a Limited Defense Status.

Some historical Orders, of course, defy these simple categories. The "Designer Exemption" allows the designer to write Scenario Orders in ways that follow history and might require constructions the player cannot generate.

4.0 Special Units

4.1 Leaders

Leaders are Non-Combat Units representing historical commanding officers or their replacements. Leaders move normally using their own MA, but do not count for (or apply) Stacking, Formation, Facing, Fire Combat, or Morale. Leaders are not required to stack with any Combat Unit, but may Stack to affect the units in various ways. Brigade Leaders must Stack with at least one Combat Unit of their Brigade, if they Stack at all.

Leader Ratings have two values: Command Value (left) and Morale Value (right) i.e., a 3-1 Leader has a Command Value of 3 and a Morale Value of 1. Both Ratings are on a scale of 0 (worst) to 4 (best).

Command Value is the ability to deal with Orders, to decide what to do himself (Initiative), or to reform his Command after an attack. It is more an administrative skill.
Morale Value is the ability to inspire troops to achieve more, to risk more, and to stand firm when all might seem lost. It is more an emotion-based charismatic skill.

Only One Leader per Stack (owning player's choice, below) can use his Morale Value for that Stack's Morale Check. The player can use any Leader in that hex, provided the Stack contains at least one of his own Combat Units. Leaders designated as "Artillery Leaders" can squeeze additional performance and coordination out of their Artillery Batteries (4.2e).

4.1a Leader Loss. When a Stack containing Leader suffers a Combat Table, Opening Volley, or Charge Loss Result, roll two dice for each Leader in the targeted Stack on the Leader Loss Table, rolling only once for each Leader. The situation dictates which column to use. If the result is anything other than "No Effect," remove the Leader from play. The results of Captured, Wounded, or Killed are only for color and have no effect beyond removing the Leader from play. Leader Loss takes place before any Morale Check from the same Loss result which created it. If Leader Loss occurs, follow both the promotion system (4.1b) and any applicable Ending Order processes (13.6).

Leaders are valuable, especially the good ones. The first time you field large numbers of Zeroes, you'll understand completely and will never again take undue risks.

Special Situations for Leaders:

Capture. If enemy Infantry (in Line) or Cavalry enters a Leader's hex containing no friendly Combat Units (including during a Charge), roll on the Leader Loss Table's Capture Column. If 'No Effect' occurs, the owning player places the Leader(s) in any hex(es) containing at least one of his own units.
Leader suddenly alone (but still has other units). If all the Combat Units in the Leader's Stack are destroyed, check the Leader(s) for Leader Loss and then displace them to any Stack containing some of their units. However, if this occurs during a Charge, make additional Leader Loss check(s) for their Capture before displacing the Leader(s).
Leaders who have NO remaining units. Remove any Leader whose Combat Units have all been destroyed. Return him to play if:
- Any of his units return to play.
- He is needed for promotion.
- More of his units arrive as Reinforcements.

In each case, the Leader re-enters with the arriving units or at the assigned new position.

4.1b Promotion. When a Leader is eliminated or promoted, promote his ranking subordinate Leader to fill his position at that time. Continue down the same chain of command until each position is once again filled. If a senior ranking Leader is not yet available, temporarily promote the ranking available Leader until the senior one arrives (when he does, shift these temporary Leaders back to their original positions).

Play Note: If a Corps Leader is killed, his ranking Division Leader will become Corps Leader, that Division's senior Brigade Leader will be promoted to Division Leader, and a Repl will be placed in charge of his Brigade. Promotions fill the top first, making openings lower down. Continue promoting until you replace a Brigade Leader.

4.1c Repl Leaders. At the Brigade level, all replacement Leaders are represented by generic Leaders labeled "Repl." Repl Leaders are subject to loss just like regular Leaders.

On a Brigade Leader loss, flip the counter to its Repl side and place it in the player's choice of a different Stack of that Brigade. Once there, he functions normally.
If that Brigade has no other Stack available, leave the Repl Leader in the same Stack, but he is unable to affect any Morale Checks for the rest of that Player Turn.
If the Brigade is already commanded by a Repl, follow the same process above using the same Repl counter (technically representing a different replacement Leader).
When promoting a Brigade Leader, however, leave him in his current Stack and place a generic Repl Leader (marked "Any") in that hex as the former Brigade Leader's replacement.

Play Note — Mechanics of Repls: Most Leaders have a Repl Leader on their back. Most Repls list a Brigade designation on them to clarify who they command. A few others only have the word "Any" and may be used wherever needed. Some Leaders may have a specific alternative leader on their counter's back, instead of a generic Repl. See the Game Specific rules regarding the status of these alternative Leaders.

4.1d Zeroes. Brigade Leaders with a 0-Command rating are unable to coordinate their formation on the field. A Leader is a Zero only due to his Command Rating. The Morale Value does not affect the Zero status. Leaders rated 0-0 all the way up to a 0-4 are still Zeros. Have no doubt, a 0-4 is still just a Zero.

Example — Zero-led Brigade MAs: A DG Line Infantry unit (MA 3) would apply the Zero Roll's Half Result giving an MA 1 (3 divided by 2 then rounded down), which is too few to Fire, even standing still. Getting that same result, Line Infantry (this time not DG) with 3 MPs remaining could fire with a -1 DRM, but only if it doesn't expend any MPs for other tasks.

Other than a potentially limited MA and its ramifications via the Zero Roll Table, Zero-led units perform normally.

Never apply this Zero rule to:

Leaders ABOVE the Brigade level.
Artillery only Formations.
A Brigade which "gains" a Zero in the current Activity Phase (i.e., a Leader became a casualty or was promoted in this Phase).

A Zero-led Brigade:

Only makes Zero Rolls when following Attack or Defensive Orders. Never make a Zero Roll for a Brigade following a Move Order.
Roll for a Zero Roll Table result before any unit of a Zero-led Brigade begins any Activity. Make only one roll separately per Zero-led Brigade per Activity Phase.
Conduct all Activities by Brigade as limited by their own Zero Roll result.
Do not move units from other Brigades or roll for any other Zero-led Brigades until finishing the first Brigade. Keep them organized and they won't confuse you.
Applies Retreats normally and they are unaffected by any Zero Roll results.

See the Zero Roll Table in the Charts & Tables.

Design Note — Zeros are terrible, it's not fair! This rule caused several testers to think it was too draconian. The point is that a Zero is worse than 'just' a 1-rated Leader. It has a nice secondary effect of forcing you to think twice before allowing your Leaders to get killed. Divisions filled with Repl Leaders just aren't the same anymore.

Drill Field Note — What really makes a 'Zero'? Having multiple Zero Leaders is a major burden to your army. They are inconsistent. When you need lots of action out of them, they might do nothing. Other times when there is little to do, they are fully alert and active. While they might be dependably slow overall, their activity level at any given moment is sporadic. There are several characteristics that make up a Zero: indecision, uncertainty, second guessing, the inability to triage useful from useless advice, a fear of making mistakes, slowness and distraction from mundane processes, sluggishness in issuing orders, and a lack of "battlefield intuition" or what the German tacticians called "Fingerspitzengefühl."

4.2 Artillery

Artillery requires special handling due to its cumbersome nature, special needs, and limitations. As such, pay close attention to these rules. Learn how Infantry moves and fights in depth before trying Artillery (which can be done in an isolated "Artillery only" test game first to see its differences before integrating the two systems).

4.2a Formation Changes. Artillery can only Unlimber if its hex is:

At least 5 hexes from any enemy Combat Unit regardless of LOS, Visibility, or "protective" friendly units.
Within any friendly Infantry Formation's CR. In addition, Horse Artillery may use a Cavalry Formation's CR.
Is not Prohibited for Artillery on the TEC.

Artillery can Limber, however, unaffected by enemy units and EZOCs.

Play Note — Why do you need to be in CR of Infantry/Cavalry?!? The requirement for an Infantry/Cavalry CR is important and must be remembered for Posting (4.2e) or when moving Artillery Battalions (4.2f) as the guns can move beyond CRs without a problem, but they cannot Unlimber until an Infantry/Cavalry Formation shows up to provide the required CR. This distinction is important. There is a lot of freedom in the Artillery rules, but this leash keeps it from being exploited. In a realistic sense, there is a difference between allowing the guns to go to some useful hillock versus sending A.P. Hill's Artillery Battalions to Cemetery Hill at 9:00 a.m. on July 1st! Reasonable players can tell the difference.

4.2b Facing Changes. Unlimbered Artillery can reface as desired for free. It could, however, trigger an Opening Volley (9.2), even without expending MPs.

4.2c Artillery Stacking. Limbered Artillery Stacks normally. Unlimbered Artillery, however, can only Stack with other Unlimbered Artillery and Non-Combat Units.

Special Cases:

Limbered guns which wish to end their move Stacked with Unlimbered guns, must Unlimber. If their remaining MPs will not allow this, they cannot end their movement in that Stack. This requirement cannot be met during a Retreat.
All other Combat Unit types cannot end a move stacked with Unlimbered guns. Retreating Stacks must extend their Retreats to avoid doing so (10.3d).

4.2d Movement. Unlimbered Artillery cannot exit their hex. They can only change Facing. To do more, they must Limber first (paying the MPs — 2 to 6 — depending on the hex's terrain) and then move with their remaining Limbered MA. EZOCs do not lock Artillery units (6.4).

4.2e Artillery Leader. Artillery Leaders are Leaders with extensive Artillery training. The "Crossed Cannon" symbol denotes a Leader as an Artillery Leader. Artillery Leaders are normal Leaders with the following extra capabilities: Extra Shots per Target Hex and Posting.

Drill Field Note — What are Artillery Leaders all about? In general, Artillery fires were usually not well coordinated. Battery commanders independently picked their own targets based on local importance. Fires to suppress specific enemy batteries or defensive lines were made more by coincidence than on purpose. Written Fire Plans with map outlays were decades in the future. The exceptions to this norm were the few available Artillery Leaders. Artillery Leaders were officers with specific training, authority, and ability needed to coordinate multiple batteries against single worthwhile targets. They have enough 'rank horsepower' to focus the local battery commanders (usually Captains) on the joint effort, instead of their personal fiefdoms and gentlemanly 'duties.' Senior officers (such as Corps Leaders) have all the 'rank horsepower' anyone could need, but were sometimes lacking in the skills and training needed to work as true Artillery Leaders.

Extra Shots per Target Hex. Artillery Leaders allow second and third exclusively Artillery Fires against the SAME Target hex, given all the following:

The Artillery Leader is in (or adjacent to) each Firing Stack and he must remain in this hex after these shots.
Each Firing Stack contains at least one participating Battery from the Artillery Leader's own Formation.
The Target hex has already been Fired on in that Phase by Artillery (regardless of the result).

Posting. Artillery Leaders can "Post" one Battery of their Formation outside CR per turn.

Posting requires the following to be true or done:

The Artillery Leader must be Stacked with the Battery at the start of the Command Phase.
Jot down the Battery's destination hex. The chosen hex must allow Unlimbering (4.2a) at that moment.
In the next Activity Phase, the Battery must rapidly move to that hex and Unlimber, if possible, on arrival.
If the destination hex does not allow Unlimbering when the Battery gets within 10 hexes of it, the Battery returns to the Posting Leader's hex for new instructions.

Unlimbered Batteries (currently within CR) are assumed to be "Posted" so the battery can always choose in any friendly Activity Phase to either stay as Posted (even if it is now out of CR there) or Limber and move to return to CR.

Drill Field Note — What is Posting? Posting is the act of ordering a Battery to move to a specific location on the battlefield, Unlimber, and engage targets as they become available. The order is usually given in a location where the leaders can observe the intended destination directly and discuss the purpose and goals of the mission. Posting allows the siting of guns in locations which are beyond normal Command Radii (but are not important enough to require an entire Artillery Battalion). Once Posted, a battery simply fires at what it can, but otherwise sits in position awaiting good targets and/or new orders. It can Replenish Ammunition and return to that spot afterwards but, when the player feels its usefulness has ended, it can return to normal CR of its own volition (without any need for Orders or an Artillery Leader). In effect, Posting allows the Artillery Leader to attend to the needs of many guns while trusting the Battery Commander to take care of local matters.

If a Posted Battery Limbers, it must return to normal CR unless it is Replenishing Ammunition — the unit may return to the same Posting hex. Note that this return to normal CR may occur due to Limbering because of a Morale Result.

In an exception to the requirement to be an Artillery Leader to Post Artillery, the Army commander and every Corps Leader may Post any friendly Artillery.

4.2f Artillery Battalions. Artillery was sometimes organized into small 'Artillery Commands' equipped with their own HQs. For simplicity, the game calls them all "Battalions" (although the Union referred to them as "Brigades" instead).

Artillery Battalions usually consist of a Leader, an HQ, and between one and ten Batteries, but None but Heroes demonstrates the various possibilities with the Confederate Artillery showing multiple arrangements. Also, not all Artillery units belong to any Battalion, even if standard Battalions are present. Some Batteries belong directly to Infantry or Cavalry Formations (of assorted sizes) instead.

An Artillery Battalion HQ counter may list its 'normal' Division assignment as a Linked Command (1.3f). This is for historical information only and has no effect on play.

Drill Field Note — How do I use Artillery Battalions? It is likely the Battalion is commanded by its own Artillery Leader, so the ability to concentrate fires comes naturally. Moving an Artillery Battalion around using Initiative is easy. Higher leaders need never expend time and effort dealing with them. Once you get the feel of these units, they are easy to use and adjust. A Battalion makes it easy to control small groups of Artillery to support the Infantry's attack or defense (or just remain ready as a rapid reaction force).

4.2g Fire Combat. Only one Artillery shot may be made per Target per Phase in addition to any number of Small Arms shots. Artillery applies the "MPs remaining" DRM on the Combat Table using the remainder of its Limbered MA (even if no longer Limbered). Note that no matter the number of MPs remaining, Artillery cannot get the +1 DRM a Small Arms unit might (9.1e). (Exception: Artillery Leaders allow a second or third Artillery shot against a given Target hex (4.2e).)

4.2h Round Types and Restrictions. Artillery can usually fire either Canister or Shell — though some cannons can only fire Shell. Select the Battery's Ammunition type independently for each shot. The Ammunition may be restricted by: Weapon Characteristics, desired range, and available Ammunition. No unit can fire both types at once — nor at all if it does not have the correct type.

There are two types of Canister: Dense and Normal. A given Artillery type can only fire one of these versions (if it can fire Canister at all). The difference between them is in the number of projectiles they fire each time. The Canister available to each kind of cannon is listed on the Weapons Characteristics Chart.

Dense Canister gives a +2 DRM, while Normal Canister gives only +1. Before the Combat Table roll, announce any Canister type used.

Round types are only available at certain ranges:

Canister (Dense or Normal) can only fire at ranges of 3 hexes or less.
Shell can fire at any range from 1 hex up to the Weapons Characteristics Chart's maximum range for the gun's type.

For the Combat Table Canister DRMs, use the single best available according to the below.

Example — SPs & Canister: 2 SPs of Dense Canister and 4 SPs of Normal Canister fire together. 6 SPs firing have a Threshold of 3 SPs. To obtain the 3 SPs needed, the player would have to ignore the Dense Canister as there is not enough SPs of it, alone, to qualify, so when the 6 SPs fire, they get only the +1 "Normal Canister" DRM.

If the Threshold Value (9.3) is met counting:

Exclusively Dense Canister — use the Dense Canister DRM.
Using Normal Canister OR any mix of both types — use the Normal Canister DRM.

If the Threshold Value isn't met counting both types, neither DRM applies.

4.2i Long Range Fires. Some Combat and Morale Table DRMs apply only at shorter ranges. At range 10 or more, only DRMs in Red type apply and ignore the ones in Black type. At ranges below 10, all modifiers might apply.

4.2j Danger Close. Batteries took great care to avoid hitting friendly troops. Doing so meant avoiding firing at longer range targets if friendly troops were nearby. This rule applies only when you decide to "go for it" anyway.

The Combat Table Loss Result from Artillery Fires at ranges greater than 5 hexes apply to EVERY friendly Stack adjacent to the Target hex. LOS is irrelevant as the guns had no idea where the rounds went or who might be there. Ask Hood and Sickles about that one!

Apply this Loss to your choice of unit in each Stack and roll Leader Loss for all Leaders in it. Do not make any Morale Checks as a result. The original Target Stack applies the Combat Table result normally.

Example — Danger Close Loss Application: If you get a 1 SP loss result on the Target hex, you'll take one SP off each friendly Stack adjacent to the Target (not each unit) as well as the original enemy Target hex.

Design Note — Danger Close is a "Doctor, it hurts when I do this…" rule. I don't know if this is ever worth the risk, but you have your reasons. No, there is no identical "spray" effect on the enemy units near the Target hex.

4.2k Artillery Battery Morale. Note the special rules regarding Retreating Artillery in 10.3d.

Design Note — Artillery Morale: Yes, most Artillery Batteries have only fair to middling Morale Ratings. They are much more interested in abandoning ground than dying in place against a concentrated infantry assault. If the enemy infantry keeps on advancing even after they fired some canister, the Artillery will pull out while they still can. The few batteries which will stand their ground show up with their well-earned A ratings. With so few men (70 to 100) armed with rammers and sponges, they have little interest in trying to hold off 400 or more well-armed infantrymen should their last canister rounds (and the kitchen sink) not do the job.

4.2l Counter-Battery Fires (CBF). Applying CBFs using your Artillery reduces enemy Artillery effectiveness. If the Firer obtains at least an 'M' result on a hex containing enemy Artillery, place a CBF marker on its hex; the first such result is CBF level 1 while the second result upgrades it to CBF level 2. Additional results beyond Level 2 have no effect.

CBF Effects. All Artillery units under a CBF marker:

CBF Levels act as DRMs on the Combat Table when Artillery in the hex Fires.
Cannot do Caisson Replenishment (4.3c).

CBF never affects the movement or Fires of non-Artillery units.

CBF Removal. Remove all CBF markers (either level) from your Artillery in your Rally Phase. If all a hex's Artillery is destroyed and/or leaves the hex (for any reason and does not return that Phase), remove its CBF marker.

Design Note — CBF Purpose: CBF reduces a Stack's firepower while retaining the same chance of Depletion. Therefore, you get less for the same potential cost. You can avoid this effect by silencing your own guns. That's fine, they are still operating at reduced effectiveness — or in this case — no effectiveness. Your choice. As they cannot use Caisson Replenishment, CBF marked guns must choose to either wait out the marker or use Battery Replenishment instead.

Drill Field Note — What is CBF about? Traditionally, the most satisfying fires for an artillery battery officer was against enemy artillery: Counter-Battery Fires (CBF). The goal of both side's artillery leaders is the same — to the detriment of the infantry they were tasked to support — force the other side to reduce (or cease) returning fires to show that the enemy could neither withstand the power of the friendly guns or do anything about them. Inflicting actual damage was a secondary concern; overwhelming enemy fires was the goal. Emotional arguments aside, what did expending ammunition on the (distant) enemy batteries accomplish? Very little actually. Moments after reducing the Counter-Battery Fires because "you won," the enemy artillery will be back into normal operations with — at best — a slightly reduced firepower or the enemy will play possum — such as when Hunt ordered the Union batteries to first reduce and then cease firing during the

4.3 Wagons & Artillery Ammunition

The only 'supply' in LoB is that on the Wagons for replenishing Ammunition for Artillery Batteries. Wagons contain a specific and generally limited supply of both kinds (Shell and Canister) of Artillery Ammunition. The game does not deal with other supply types (small arms ammunition, food, engineering assets, etc.).

4.3a Wagons. A Wagon's Ammunition can only be used by Batteries of its owning Formation. The Game-Specific Rules state the starting Ammunition carried by each Wagon.

Wagons ignore:

Stacking.
CR.
Orders. They move freely whenever desired.
Any kind of "Capture."

Destroy any Wagon (and eliminate its contents) if:

Any enemy Infantry or Cavalry unit moves adjacent to them and there are no friendly Combat Units in the hex. Ignore Open Order units that do so.
They suffer a Combat Table Loss result.

4.3b Ammunition Depletion. Artillery might Deplete their Ammunition on the Combat Table. Wagons can Replenish Batteries given their stocks remaining. Mark Canister and Shell Depletion separately using Depletion marker(s). A Battery Depleted of both types will need both markers. Place the marker(s) under the affected unit.

Batteries Depleted of:

Shell cannot Fire at ranges greater than 3 hexes.
Canister cannot obtain the Canister Modifiers.
Both cannot Fire at all.

When Depletion Occurs. Depletion occurs to an Artillery Firing Stack if the Combat Table roll falls into one of its colored bands. Depletion takes effect after inflicting the Combat Table result.

Blue Band results deplete one Battery only if Canister was fired.
Reddish Band results deplete one Battery regardless of Ammunition type used.

How to Deplete. The Combat Table result only Depletes ONE Battery in the Firing Stack. If more than one Battery is involved, the owning Player selects one to Deplete — the others are unaffected.

Historical Note — Confederate ammunition at Gettysburg: Seeing the Union guns reduce or cease their own firing to conserve limited ammunition during the pre-assault bombardment before Pickett's Charge, the Confederate artillery reduced or ceased its own firing to conserve its limited ammunition, further reducing the effects on the Union defenders who conserved strength to deal with the charge itself.

If the Depletion can be automatically refilled using Caisson Replenishment (4.3c), expend the needed Ammunition but do not place a Depleted marker. Otherwise, place the appropriate Depletion marker and Replenishment can be conducted by either Caisson or Battery methods when desired.

Historical Note — Ammunition? Ammunition "types" are split between their best ranges of use. Shell — solid shot, shell itself, spherical case shot — can be used at all ranges. Canister — actual canister, "rotten shot" (shell with no fuse time), random metal debris rammed in on top of the powder charge, was only effective at short ranges. Gunnery experts, such as John Gibbon, calculated that the optimal distribution of canister fragments occurred at 300 yards (within 3 hexes). It is possible to exhaust one type while the other remains plentiful. Artillery ammunition was a critical concern and dictated each Army's strategic options. For example, Lee's Army ended Gettysburg with its long-range ammunition almost exhausted, yet with ample Canister. Continuing the offensive in Pennsylvania was simply impossible. On the other side, Henry Hunt observed that after the three-day battle at Gettysburg, there was enough ammunition remaining: "...to fill the ammunition chests and enable the army to fight another battle" [of the same size].

4.3c Replenishment. You can Replenish Artillery Ammunition in one of two ways, each of which consumes Ammunition from the appropriate Wagons to remove the Depletion.

Caisson Replenishment. The Battery remains in position and functional, while its caissons travel back and forth (below the game's resolution) to the Wagons to obtain refills.
Battery Replenishment. The entire Battery leaves the firing position to go to the Wagons, refills, and then returns to the HQ refilled.

Replenishing a Battery requires one point of the right type of Ammunition per SP in the Battery ("partial Replenishment" is not allowed). No Battery can Replenish if the Wagon does not contain enough of the needed Ammunition. Batteries are never required to be Replenished. You can freely choose to Replenish both, one, or neither Ammunition type at once. Morale States do not affect Replenishment.

Play Note — Managing your Ammunition: Your decision to fire is how you manage your Artillery Ammunition. The more shots you take, the greater the likelihood of a Depletion. You only have meager ammunition stocks; so, make wise firing decisions. Long range Artillery sniping wastes both playtime and ammunition to produce minimal results. It's possible that one Battery could become depleted very rapidly while another seems impervious to ammunition concerns. This lack of standardization is merely friction in action.

Example — Replenishment Costs: A 4 SP Battery Depleted of Shell requires 4 Shell points to Replenish. If the Wagon has 16 points of Canister but only 3 of Shell, this Battery could not Replenish at all.

In nutshells: If Caisson Replenishment is allowed and the conditions below met, Replenishment occurs at the moment the result occurs on the Combat Table: Do not place the Depletion marker at all, instead expend the needed Ammunition points directly from the Wagon. If Caisson Replenishment is not done at this moment, it can be done later using the same requirements to remove the Depletion marker at that time.

For Battery Replenishment: Move the Battery itself to its HQ and follow the below to remove it from play. The Ammunition points needed are expended to remove the desired Depletion marker(s). One hour later the reloaded Battery returns to the HQ.

Caisson Replenishment (quoting Gibbon's Artillerist Manual): "Upon going into action, but one caisson at a time for two pieces should be opened, reserving to the last the ammunition in the limber-boxes of the pieces in case they should be separated momentarily from their caissons. The pieces should never be without a supply."

Caisson Replenishment is automatic at the time of a Depletion result but can be used at any time. Caisson Replenishment must be done if all the requirements are met.

Caisson Replenishment occurs automatically when:

The Wagons are available and not more than 25 Limbered MPs from the Battery.
The path to them is not blocked by enemy Combat Units or EZOCs. (EZOCs cannot be negated.)
The Wagon has sufficient Ammunition points of the correct type.
The Battery is not under a Counter Battery Fire (CBF) marker (4.2l).
The Battery is not in an EZOC.

Battery Replenishment. In this method, the Battery reloads by going physically to the Wagons. This is the only way to Replenish artillery Ammunition if the Battery is under a CBF marker. Battery Replenishment is possible only in the Player's own Player Turn.

Execute the following:

Limber and move the Battery to w/i 1 of its HQ.
Remove the Battery. A path must exist from the HQ to the appropriate Wagon (or its arrival point) free of EZOCs and enemy units. If the needed path is unavailable, the Battery must wait at the HQ until it is clear.
Replenish the Battery. Expend the needed Ammunition to remove the Depletion marker(s) when desired.
Return in One Hour. Place the Battery on the Turn Record Track one hour later. At the beginning of that Turn's friendly Activity Phase, place the Battery (Limbered) w/i 1 of its HQ. In case enemy units or EZOCs block the pathway back to the HQ, the Battery remains on the Turn Record Track until the path clears.

Design Note — Abstract Battery Replenishment: The main abstraction compared with the old Battery Replenishment system was to avoid the ant-like drill of marching Batteries across the map to refill them. While I personally enjoyed the effect, others pointed out it was a waste of playtime. They were correct.

4.4 Open Order & Sharpshooters

Open Order units are proficient in dispersed tactics. "Sharpshooters" are similar, but also contain carefully selected marksmen. Do not confuse the many self-titled "sharpshooter" units with actual Sharpshooters — the name they chose as the "Yazoo County Yankee Killers" or some such, has no tactical effect at all. Even if they slipped "sharpshooter" into the name as well!

(Important: "Open Order" refers to both Open Order and Sharpshooter units. However, the word "Sharpshooter" is only used for actual Sharpshooter units.)

4.4a Identification and Basic Handling. Rather than the usual "battleline" on the top of their counter, Open Order units are marked with a "bugle" and Sharpshooters with a "rifle."

Open Order units (Capable or not):

Cannot Charge.
Cannot "jump" HQs.
Cannot become Blood Lusted.
Are not restricted by Advanced Road Columns [7.2 Opt] in any way.
Cannot be Rebuilt (12.2).
Always use the Terrain Effects Chart's Open Order Column.
Apply the Open Order column on the MPs Remaining on the Combat Results Table.
Have all-around Frontal Facing (6.3).
Do not have Locking EZOCs (6.4).

Sharpshooter units use their own Combat Table Range and a +1 DRM on the Leader Loss Table (4.1a). In fact, these are the only differences between regular Open Order units and Sharpshooters.

Design Note — Open Order: Growing Skills. Open Order units are capable of fancy footwork because of their tactical flexibility that gives relative immunity to Fire Combat and Charges. While some may see this as excessive, it accurately reflects these units. Have fun with them. I'm sure you'll note the subtle change in the tactical abilities of Open Order units after 1863 regarding Retirement. By 1864, trained Open Order units developed with a better sense of their effectiveness. Line Infantry (designed to concentrate fires on massed targets) couldn't effectively engage skirmish units and suffered prolonged delays. Retiring is required before 1864, but is a choice for the non-Phasing Player in 1864 and after — each time it occurs, he can choose to either Retire or stand fast. However, if a unit decides to stand fast, it can no longer choose to Retire later in that phase. If a unit stands fast, continue play normally.

4.4b Open Order Capability. Only Open Order units currently "Open Order Capable" can use the special Open Order abilities in 4.4c below.

Open Order units are NOT "Capable" when they are:

Stacked with any other unit(s), even other Open Order units, at the beginning of a Phase.
DG.
Routed.
In Breastworks.

If they avoid all four situations, they are "Capable."

4.4c Tactical Flexibility. An Open Order CAPABLE unit (or any Mounted Cavalry unit) can, any number of times per Phase:

Automatically pass Closing Rolls.
Freely EXIT EZOCs provided the first hex entered is not adjacent to an enemy Combat Unit (EZOC or not).
Retire 2 hexes if any Fire OR Non-Mounted Charge is declared against it which would trigger an Opening Volley.

Drill Field Note — What do I do with these Open Order guys? Aside from a modifier on the Leader Loss Table and an occasional easier range DRM, Open Order and Sharpshooter units are generally identical. Learning the fine points of using them can wait until you have a general grasp of what they can do. Their flexibility allows them to maneuver in ways which are impossible for Line infantry to counter. The key purpose of Line Infantry (to concentrate firepower on massed targets) is completely negated by dispersed targets. Open Order units can slow enemy infantry to a crawl with minimal losses. The net effect is the ability to protect terrain and buy time by fighting as a screen. This flexibility can cause havoc on the enemy flanks. Only in emergencies and in desperation should Open Order units stack to try to slug it out with infantry battlelines. However, Open Order units must always be wary of prowling mounted Cavalry.

4.4d Retirement. Retirement is required before 1864. Starting in 1864, the unit may choose to "stand" or Retire. However, if the unit stands, it cannot later choose to Retire that same turn.

Process:

Move the non-Phasing unit to a new hex 2 hexes to the rear of its current location.
Retiring is not a 'Retreat' for purposes of EZOC Losses (6.4a and 10.3b), Collisions (10.3c), or Cowardly Legs placement (10.4).
The Opening Volley, attempted Fires, and Non-Mounted Charge do not occur.
The moving Stack stops Movement (forfeiting any remaining MPs) where the Fire or Charge declaration occurred.
The moving Stack is Finished for the Phase and cannot switch to another Target hex or complete the proposed Charge.

4.5 Green Units

Green Units are worse than just inexperienced; they are extremely raw and untrained. They have been under arms in their current form (such as artillerymen deployed as infantry) or in the army itself for a very short time (weeks — maybe even days — not months). Their status will not change during the game (no matter how much combat they see during it) — the time period is too short. In every sense of the word, they are completely raw.

Green Units have a green border on their counters to identify them.

Green Units:

Expend their whole MA to change Formation (6.2), except during a Withdrawal, when they pay normal MPs to change Formation (13.7a).
Line Movement Allowance is 4, not 6. They have a normal MA in Column.
Conduct Opening Volleys with -2 DRM (9.2).
Cannot Rebuild (12.2)
Must be the top unit in their Stack. (Even if in violation of 6.1b).

5.0 Breastworks

Breastworks are rough earthen defenses. Once their green feelings of field works as 'cowardly' were crushed by reality, the troops eagerly created works which in time begin to rival those in early WW1.

(Early LoB Game Note — Early War Breastworks Use: Breastwork markers are not available in NbH.)

5.0a Breastwork Availability. The scenario allocates each player's available Breastworks markers. The player cannot exceed that number.

5.0b Building Breastworks. If a Breastworks marker is available, it can be placed only if all these are true:

The unit's Formation has been under the same Defensive Orders for at least 3 hours.
The hex contains a friendly unit in Line, continuously, for that time.
No enemy Formation has attacked the position during that time (ignore the occasional Fire Combat, the enemy must be under actual Attack Orders).
The hex contains at least some Woods (the hex symbol, not Woods hexsides).

(Important: No hex can ever contain more than one Breastwork marker.)

If so, place one Breastwork marker on the hex or change the facing of the existing Breastworks marker in it. Once placed, you must "rebuild" the Breastworks to change its Facing.

5.0c Removing Breastworks. Breastworks remain until the Formation occupying them accepts Move or Attack Orders — i.e., they leave. When units exit a Breastworks hex, the Breastwork marker can remain as is or it can be removed for use elsewhere. Also, the owning player can simply remove the Breastworks in any of his Player Turns — whether there is one of his units in the hex or not.

Breastworks are unaffected if the Formation enters Reserve, or changes its Defensive Orders, provided it continues to occupy them. If you capture enemy Breastworks and occupy them, you can use them "as is" (including their current Facing) but you cannot change them. If you remove enemy Breastworks markers, they are destroyed and cannot be rebuilt elsewhere by either player.

Once the enemy Breastworks are removed, those hexes can have new friendly Breastworks built in them, but this requires using Breastwork markers from your own side's pool.

5.0d Closing from Breastworks. Stacks starting in a Breastworks hex apply a -3 Closing Roll DRM. It shows the troops' lack of enthusiasm of leaving the works.

5.0e Breastwork Markers and Combat Units. Once created, Breastworks exist as "hexside terrain" for any Combat Unit (either side) occupying them.

Units in Breastworks need not conform to the Breastwork marker's Facing — however, the Combat and Morale benefits (9.1g) only apply to enemy Fires which enter through the Breastwork's Frontal hexsides (inclusive of its corners).

The Breastworks modifier applies in addition to other applicable modifiers — which can lead to interesting results when enemy fires come into the Stack simultaneously through the Stack's Rear but the Breastwork's Front!

6.0 Basic Concepts

6.1 Stacking

A Stack is a hex containing one or more units. Unlike some games, a single unit is also considered a 'Stack.'

The Stacking Limit (6.1a) dictates the maximum numbers of SPs that can be within a single hex. Each hex is, however, a small area and cannot be maximized without forcing unit Formations to lose effectiveness (e.g., you could "pack" a hex like a modern sports stadium — uselessly) and its firepower would be degraded. Even when properly formed within the Stacking Limit, the firepower (in SPs) is limited by the hex's available frontage.

The Stacking Order (6.1b) is the arrangement of a Stack's units from top to bottom. The Stack's Top Combat Unit is used for Combat and Morale purposes.

Stacks and Movement.

Stacks can Move together or split up into separate Stacks to Move, as desired.
Units can freely Move through other friendly units regardless of Facing or Stacking unless they stop and must conform with that Stack's Facing and Stacking requirements.
Morale & Stacking (repeat of 10.0): Momentary Stacking — Units are unaffected by Moving momentarily through Stacks with other Morale States. Ending a Move Stacked — If a Stack ends a Move in a Stack with more than one Morale State, the resulting Stack adopts the worst Morale State represented.

6.1a Stacking Limit. A maximum of 16 SPs of Combat Units can be in one hex, regardless of Terrain. Non-Combat Units do not affect or count for Stacking (a Stack can contain any number of them). (Exception: Wagons might take up space along roads [7.2 Opt].)

Stacking is enforced ONLY:

At the end of each Stack's Movement or Retreat (10.3).
When announcing a Charge (11.2).

Ignore Over-Stacking at all other times.

An Over-Stacked hex:

Is automatically DG or — if already DG — Routed.
Fails its Charge Closing Roll.

6.1b Stacking Order. The Stack's arrangement (from top to bottom) is its "Stacking Order."

Organize Stacking Order according to the following:

Leaders should be on top to be easy to find.
Combat Units in Line must be on top of other Combat Unit types and other Formation types. The Stack's largest single Combat Unit (in SPs) should be on Top (player's choice in ties). (Exception: Green Units (4.5) must always be on Top, regardless of their SP strength.)
Markers go on top of the units that 'own' them except Ammunition Depletion and SP markers which go under the affected unit counter.
HQs & Supply Wagons go at the bottom.

You can change Stacking order to be correct only when a Stack:

Finishes its Activity Phase or
Ends its part in a Retreat.

Do not change Stacking Order at any other times (even after taking losses which change the Stack's relative Strengths).

6.1c Leader and Formation Requirements.

Leaders are not required to Stack with any Combat Unit.
If Brigade Leaders Stack at all, they must Stack with at least one Combat Unit of their Brigade.
Friendly Formations and their Units can freely intermingle without penalty except for Unlimbered Artillery (4.2c).

6.2 Formations

'Formations' are arrangements of Combat Units for tasks using the available 19th Century drill movements. The term 'Formation' is in the sense of "a unit's Formation on the ground" as opposed to the other use of the term in these rules which means "combat units working under a single Leader." Context should allow the player to instantly tell the version in use.

Each side of a Combat Unit's counter identifies its current Formation. See examples on Counter Key and the samples at right.

Most units have two Formations, one on each side: one that benefits movement (Column, Mounted, or Limbered) and the other benefits combat (Line, Open Order, or Unlimbered).

Units with only one printed side have only one usable Formation while Non-Combat Units have no Formation at all.

Units change Formation by flipping their counter from one side to the other and paying any MP cost listed on the Terrain Effects Chart; the TEC lists the MA, Change MP cost, and the terrain costs for each Formation — which may vary based on the Unit Formation.

Pay any required MP cost before the Formation Change occurs. The required MPs must be available to do so or the Formation change cannot occur.

Units can usually freely change Formation when able to move, with the following restrictions:

Retreating Artillery must Limber.
Artillery cannot Unlimber when within 5 hexes of the enemy (4.2a).
Reserve units must remain in Column, Limbered, or Mounted until released (13.2d).

Different Formations of the same unit type may have different MAs. Convert between them whenever a unit changes Formation by determining the remaining (new) MA proportionally; truncate any fractions.

Example — Remaining Proportional MA: A Line unit has 6 MA. It changes Formation to Column expending 1 MP. The proportional remaining MA is 6. (8 Column MA/6 Line MA = 1.33 x 5 remaining line MA = 6.67, truncated to 6 MA).

Design Note — Formations? Why? Leaders controlled masses of men in battle via these much-practiced drills so units could change from one Formation to another efficiently and quickly with minimal confusion and predictable results. During the Civil War, the available Drill Manuals were called "tactics." It took decades for Parade Ground tactics to become fully obsolete, but the seeds of that insight were planted before 1865. The tactics of Open Order units were met with intense skepticism.

Design Note — Mixing Units? While "legal" to mix your units willy-nilly, you'll want to keep your Army organized so that you do not confuse yourself or find it nearly impossible to pull them apart so they can follow their Orders. Yes, that requires judgment. Cavalry Formations: "Dismounted" is not a Formation type. Most Cavalry units have Mounted on one side and Line or Open Order on the other, indicating their preferred method of fighting while dismounted. A Cavalry might not have a second side at all if unskilled in tactics off their horses.

(Exception — Unlimbered Artillery: No MA? Unlimbered Artillery (0 MA) changes Formation by borrowing MPs from its Limbered side (4.2d).)

Drill Field Note — What do these Formations look like and do? The Formations you need to understand are infantry Lines and Columns. Yes, there is artillery's Limbering/Unlimbering and cavalry's Mounting/Dismounting, but these are straightforward decisions based on the current need of fires or movement. But the key Formations which dictate how your army fights are the two infantry Formations.

Infantry Formations use intermediary drill movements which use various kinds of "columns" that flit back and forth on the border between the game's two Formation types. At one end of this spectrum is the standard two rank 'battleline' (which includes a third, partial rank of NCOs and Officers called "File Closers"). At the other end after various levels of "column" occur you arrive at the "Column of Fours" which is the one used for long marches, one directly behind another. The result doesn't have anything like the firepower of a regimental battleline but is much better at maneuver. The Column of Companies is compact and easily moved but is dense and easily targeted by the enemy. The Column of Companies is frequently the actual arrangement of a 'Column' counter, while extended Road Columns in Advanced Road Columns [7.2 opt] are literally "Columns of Fours" instead.

Much of the drilling of new recruits involved learning the maneuvers necessary to switch Formations as needed, seamlessly, and without confusion. You can imagine what happens when involved drill instructions are issued on the battlefield to semi-trained troops for the first time. The Green Unit rule deals only with the length of time such maneuvers take but the more descriptive "Rout in Place" is not so, by definition, a Column of Fours works great to march down 25 miles of road, but forming a battleline in an emergency can take time. The trade-off there is based on the mission of the troops involved — no Formation can do everything well. Likewise, no regiment in battleline would efficiently move from point A to point B as well as a Column of Fours. A battleline, however, could get hopelessly mired in terrain. It is draining for the men to move this way for long distances. Changing direction is a matter of the man at one end of the line stepping in place and rotating while those at the far end must almost break into a run to keep up. So, there is a spectrum from full battleline through all these other columns until you get to the extremely narrow — yet very long — Column of Fours — which cannot fight but makes full use of narrow features such as roads.

The "other" levels of columns involve Columns of Regiments, or Companies which create different depths and frontages in-between the Line (full frontage, small depth) and Column (small frontage, deep depth) game Formations. At any rate, each "column" has a small battleline of whatever size listed. A 'Column of Companies' would have each of the regiment's companies (usually 10) in its own little battleline of one company with each company shown literally. Invariably, the regiment in battleline was clumsier, slower, and harder to control than any of the columns, but (of course) it is ready to fight and maximizes its frontal firepower. Narrowing the frontages of columns rapidly increases the regiment's length (even more so when it comes to divisions and corps marching columns) but reduces — almost to zero — its firepower. The greater the length, the more time it takes to form the full battleline — time needed for the rearward men to catch up.

As the regiment approaches the enemy, it might start out in Column of Fours until a mile or two then switch to Column of Companies to close with the enemy to, say, 500 yards, and then the lead company would halt (and probably be re-aligned) while the rest of the regiment marches to make up the full battleline using that company as the keystone for location and orientation. Once the regiment forms battleline, it would march as needed to change its location and direction retaining contact with that keystone company or "Guide."

6.3 Facing

"Facing" defines a Stack's orientation on the hex grid using its counter's Center Front edge. All a Stack's Front/Rear Facing units must face the same direction as one another, but are unaffected by any other Stacks.

Counter Center Front. To make each counter's orientation easier to determine, one counter edge (the printed "top" of the counter) defines the counter's 'Center Front.'

Units with Front/Rear Facing: Line; Unlimbered.

Units with All-Around Front Facing: Open Order; All Non-Combat.

Units (and a Morale State) with All-Around Rear Facing: Column; Limbered; Mounted; Routed (ignore the unit's Formation).

(This section includes a Facing Diagram showing a sample unit's Center Front, the 120-degree Fire Fan of a unit with Normal Facing, and a unit with All-Around Rear Facing.)

6.3a Facing Change.

Stacks can freely change Facing during their Movement.
No Stack, however, can change Facing after Firing or beginning a Charge.
Terrain & EZOCs do not restrict Facing change.
Only Line Formation has a Facing Change MP cost (1 MP). No other Formation has one at all. If a Facing Change Cost applies, no Facing Change is allowed if the requisite MP is not available. The 1 MP allows unlimited Facing Changes (any number of sides at one time) within that hex; Facing Changes in subsequent hexes incur the MP cost again each time it is done.
Facing Change and Opening Volleys. Facing change triggers an Opening Volley (9.2) only if the Firing Stack is adjacent to the enemy, even if no MPs were expended.
Any unit can Change Facing (for free) after a Retreat or when switching from a Formation without a Front/Rear Facing to one that does.

6.3b Facing and Movement.

A unit in Line Formation can move through any of its three Frontal hexsides without additional costs or penalties. (Exception: See 6.3d. See also Backpedaling [7.0h Opt].)
Unit Formations with All-Around Facing and all Retreating units are unaffected by this requirement. Maintain the counter's Facing Center Front hexside orientation during Movement through other Frontal hexsides — if the unit is "crab-walking" through its left-front hexside, its map orientation (Facing) itself doesn't change.

6.3c Facing and Fire Combat. Use the printed hex grid (not the LOS End Points) to determine where a Stack can Target the enemy via Front or Rear hexsides. Units cannot Fire through their Rear hexsides, if they have any.

Firers with:

Front and Rear Facing Fire through their three Frontal hexsides. Such units cannot fire through their Rear Hexsides (or the corners joining Front to Rear). The Fire Fan is 120 degrees (not 180!).
All-Around Frontal Facing can Fire in any direction.
All-Around Rear Facing cannot Fire.

Targets can:

TAKE Fire from any direction.
Apply the Combat and Morale Table modifiers for "Rear" if the Fires come through their Rear Facing OR the hex corners joining Front to Rear. Do not apply them if the Fires come through Frontal hexsides.

6.3d Charge Facing Restrictions. After announcing a Stack's first Charge and passing the Charge's Closing Roll, a Stack must:

Move only through its Center Front hexside for the remainder of its Move (including any additional Charges).
Not change Facing again in that Phase.

Design Note: 6.3d prevents fancy wheeling once a Charge begins — the Stack can go straight ahead OR stop. That's it. It's the only choice it has.

6.4 Zones of Control

'Zones of Control' abstractly show the close-range effects of one side's units on the other's freedom of movement.

Units capable of Firing have ZOCs in each hex adjacent to one of their Frontal hexsides.
Units incapable of Firing (due to unit type, Facing, Formation, Morale State, or Ammunition Depletion) never have ZOCs.
Friendly ZOCs have no effect on friendly units.
Terrain never affects ZOCs.

The ZOCs of enemy units are called 'Enemy Zones of Control' (EZOCs). The key EZOC effect is the Locking of friendly Combat Units.

Locking Effects. Locked units cannot exit their hex but changing Formation and/or Facing of a Locked unit may trigger an Opening Volley (even if no MPs expended) (6.4b). A Locked unit becomes Unlocked when it:

Retreats (10.3).
Executes a Deployment and/or Withdrawal (13.7b, 13.7a).
Passes a Closing Roll to conduct a Charge (11.0).
Enters a hex because of a successful Charge.
Backpedals [7.0h Opt].

(Exception: Open Order units do not create Locking EZOCs.)

A unit is never Locked (or is automatically Unlocked) when it is:

Artillery.
Open Order.
Non-Combat.
The first full Night Turn.

(Exception: While Open Order units cannot Lock any unit, they inflict the SP Loss when other units Retreat into their EZOCs (6.4a).)

Design Note: EZOCs Lock units into local slug fests. Your battleline will start to fray with losses, units will drop back due to Morale results, and you will need reserves to buck up weak points before your line really breaks. His will, too. Your options rapidly become limited once entangled with the enemy — have fresh units available to continue the fight, leave gaps between rearward troops to allow retreats, and be aware of the abilities and limitations of the Leaders regarding Initiative. The entire world of the fight devolves down on this very small bit of land as all that matters.

6.4a EZOCs and Retreats.

The length of a Retreat is not affected by EZOCs.
Inflict one SP loss for each EZOC hex the Retreating Stack enters. Apply one SP per Stack per instance, never one SP per unit. Use Loss Distribution, counting any that began on the CRT for these (9.4a).
Open Order units never take losses from Retreating into EZOCs (10.3b).

6.4b EZOCs and Facing/Formation Change. Changing Facing or Formation adjacent to the enemy (whether there is an EZOC or not) is an Opening Volley trigger (9.2). Otherwise, EZOCs have no effect on Facing or Formation Change.

6.4c EZOCs and Command Radius. EZOCs block Command Radius and can be negated by a friendly Combat Unit (of any strength, type, or Formation). Otherwise, friendly units never negate EZOCs.

6.4d EZOCs and Closing Rolls. EZOCs do not affect Closing Rolls or their requirements (7.1).

7.0 Movement

Movement is the act of using each unit's MPs to physically Move them on the map. You can Move all, some, or none of your units during your Activity Phase, as desired. Units Move individually or as Stacks.

Each Formation/unit type has a Movement Allowance (MA) listed on the Terrain Effects Chart (TEC) in Movement Points (MPs). The TEC lists every hex and hexside feature costing MPs based on unit type and Formation.
Each hex entered will require its own MP cost plus the MP cost of any hexside crossed to enter it (if any).
A unit might have its MA modified by other effects (such as Morale).
Units cannot share MPs with other units, save unused MPs for future turns, or exceed its current MA.
Track each unit's MP expenditures separately.
Units can use all, some, or none of their MA for each Activity as desired.
A unit's remaining MA determines the unit's "available firing time" — the more MPs still available, the more time the unit can use to Fire (9.1e).

(Exceptions to "must pay MP cost fully": Units in a Road Column (7.0e) ignore all hex and hexside feature costs and pay only the cost of their road and nothing else. One Hex Move, 7.0a.)

Example — MP Costs: Say a unit is in Road Column moving along a Primary Road and it enters a Briar Marsh hex via a Stream hexside. The unit pays only ½ MP for the Primary Road, ignoring the +1 for the Stream (a hexside), and the 3 MPs for the Briar Marsh hex.

Moving units:

Must follow a path of contiguous hexes. No hex can be "jumped" or skipped.
Cannot exit or Move off-map.
Cannot enter Prohibited hexes or cross Prohibited hexsides.
Are NOT executing Retreat, Withdrawal, Deployment, NTB's Leg Bail, or the Open Order freedom to Retire.

7.0a One Hex Move. Units capable of Movement with an MA greater than 0 can always Move one hex despite the hex's MP cost. The Move cannot involve a Fire, Charge, Prohibited Terrain, and cannot violate Stacking or Command Radius. The unit is Finished upon doing so. (Units that Backpedal [7.0h Opt] must automatically use One Hex Move [7.0a].)

7.0b Partial Move. You can modestly intermix Stack Activities (2.3).

7.0c Effects of Enemy Units. No unit can enter a hex containing enemy Combat Units (even during a Charge resolution). Combat Units can enter enemy Non-Combat Unit hexes and there is no added MP cost for doing so. The effect on the enemy unit depends on its type: Leaders (4.1a), Wagons (4.3a), and HQs (3.2). Except for Leaders, Non-Combat Units cannot enter a hex adjacent to an enemy Combat Unit.

7.0d Entering a Friendly Occupied Hex. If a Phasing Stack enters a hex containing friendly Combat Units, the following apply depending on the situation:

No Closing Roll is required to enter that hex. This never frees a Stack from a needed Charge Closing Roll (7.1).
The newcomers ignore any Opening Volley trigger for not Firing after moving into a hex adjacent to the enemy. Apply the Opening Volley triggers for Firing, OR changing Formation/Facing normally (9.2).
If the units already in the hex have Fired or Finished earlier, the newcomers to the hex cannot Fire or Charge from it.
If all units already in the hex have not Fired or Finished earlier, they can Fire OR Charge together with the newcomers.
When needed, use the MPs from the unit having the fewest remaining and the Charge Closing Roll DRM for any units of the Stack starting adjacent to the enemy.

7.0e Road Columns. Units can use Pikes, Roads, Trails, and/or Railroads (hereafter the lower-case "road" refers to any type) by using "Road Columns" for their more rapid Movement rates. Rule [7.2 Opt] gives a more detailed approach if desired. Mark the first and last unit of each Road Column with a Road Column marker.

A unit can Move in Road Column if:

It is a Combat Unit and in Column, Open Order, Mounted, or Limbered Formations OR a Non-Combat Unit.
It does NOT Move or enter a hex with other Combat Units as a Stack.
It follows a continuous path of road hexes. The exact "road" type involved can vary along it.
It applies the Town effects (1.6b).
It does not execute a Mounted Charge (11.4e) at any time in its Move.

Upon entering each hex, each unit can freely use (or not use) Road Column as desired provided it meets these requirements.

When Moving as a Road Column using contiguous road terrain, a unit can:

Use road hex MP costs.
Ignore all hexside Terrain Features.
Ignore hex Terrain Features other than the road itself.

7.0f Disorganized Units (DG).

DG units Move normally at ½ MA (drop any fractions).
DG units Fire using their MPs remaining from their ½ MA, not their normal MA.

7.0g Routed Units.

Routed Combat Units cannot Move normally and have no MA.
They "move" in response to approaching enemy units if they fail to Rally (12.1, step 4).

Design Note: To the civilian observer, the idea of moving backwards is very simple: "Have the troops turn around and march that way, instead! Nothing to it!" However, doing so creates a confusing situation with many other drill movements as the Formation's guides (almost always to the right-front-corner of the battleline when in Guide Right) are now in the tail of each rank, in the wrong firing rank, and at the wrong side of the regiment as well as of each smaller formation. Doing so for a very short distance can be done when really needed, but any more than that will require intricate movements to correct the positions of guides, officers, file closers, and all companies in the regiment.

[7.0h Opt] Backpedaling. Units restricted normally to moving through Frontal Hexsides (such as Line Infantry) can do a limited backwards movement without any Formation or Facing changes. However, a Stack that Backpedals must move into its center-Rear hexside using the One-Hex Move rule and its restrictions (regardless of the MA available or the cost of the move) (7.0a).

Backpedaling does not cause an Opening Volley trigger for Facing or Formation change adjacent to the enemy (9.2). Backpedaling Unlocks a unit (6.4).

7.1 Closing Rolls

Closing with the enemy (either at small distances or to Charge them) dramatically tests your unit's courage. Even the best units do not always pass this test. The 'Closing Roll' mechanic is a quick application of this test via a roll and a few modifiers. The Moving Stack will either decline the honor or take on the greater danger and potential expense in blood.

When Needed? Unless exempt (7.1b), a Closing Roll is needed when your Combat Unit(s) attempts to:

Move adjacent to enemy Combat Unit(s).
Conduct a Charge.

Procedure:

Use the Closing Roll Table based on the Morale Rating of the Moving Stack's top unit.
Assuming the roll is neither unneeded (7.1b) nor automatically failing (7.1a), roll one die and add any applicable modifiers.
If the modified roll is greater than or equal to the Table's Passing Roll, the roll succeeds.
The Phasing Stack either enters the hex or executes a Charge as intended.
Otherwise, it fails (7.1c).

Modifiers requiring additional information:

Rear. This applies if the desired hex is in one or more enemy Stack's Rear.
Leaders. Use the Leader's Morale Value as the DRM. A Leader can move to the Stack from elsewhere but must be in the Stack before the Closing Roll and then Finish with it.
Starting in Breastworks OR Charge adjacent to the enemy. It's difficult to get troops rolling on a Charge if they are already adjacent to the enemy or to get troops to go anywhere (let alone Charge) if they are in Breastworks. These two situations apply if all or some of the Phasing Stack BEGAN its move in the hex BOTH applying the DRM and requiring the Closing Roll.

Two Closing Rolls to Charge? Normally a Charge involves two Closing Rolls: one roll to Move adjacent to the Target and — once there — another roll to launch the Charge (11.0).

Do not apply the "Starting a Charge Adjacent" DRM if the moving Stack did not start the Phase in the hex requiring the Charge Closing Roll.
Both Closing Rolls must succeed to conduct the Charge.
A Stack starting the Phase adjacent to its Charge Target would require only one Closing Roll (the one for the Charge). It would, however, apply the "Starting a Charge Adjacent" DRM.

7.1a Units which cannot Close. Do not bother rolling for these units. They cannot be successful.

Disorganized (DG) Units (10.2d).
Wrecked Units (1.3b). If a Stack makes a successful Closing Roll with Wrecked units in it, leave behind all Wrecked units (regardless of their position in the Stacking Order) in the hex where the roll was made. This effect does not apply during a Charge, even to units which become Wrecked during it.
Over-Stacked Units. Charge Closing Rolls only (6.1a).

7.1b Automatic Success? Success is automatic for any Closing Roll (including Charge) when any of these are true:

The intended hex contains a friendly Combat Unit. (This never applies to Charge Closing Rolls.)
The intended hex contains (or is adjacent to) only enemy Open Order Capable or enemy Non-Combat Units.
The Phasing Stack cannot 'see' any enemy Combat Units adjacent to the intended hex. (See = Clear LOS.)
The Phasing Stack is Blood Lusted (10.2a).
The Phasing Stack contains exclusively Open Order units (4.4).

(Exception: Units unable to Close (7.1a) trump every listed case, except the first one (friendly unit in the hex). A friendly Combat unit already in the hex allows any unit to Close.)

7.1c What Happens on Failure? After failing a Closing Roll, the Phasing Stack:

Cannot enter the intended hex OR Charge.
Stops its Movement but can still Fire.
See 9.2 regarding the Opening Volley.

(Exception: Units failing a Charge Closing Roll suffer their Opening Volley and do so at the 1 (not Charge) Range (11.1 step c).)

7.1d 'Must Succeed' Closing Rolls. 'Must Succeed' Closing Rolls are those a Stack must pass to avoid violating some other rule — such as the Stacking Limit (6.1a), uniform Facing within a Stack (6.3), or stacking with Unlimbered Artillery (4.2c).

If 'Must Succeed' Closing Roll's result is:

Success: Resolve everything normally (with no other effects).
Failure: The Moving Stack must exit the violated hex and return to a hex which will not apply any violations.

[7.2 Opt] Advanced Road Columns

Long Road Columns were an everyday feature of Civil War units. While dealing with their own ungainly features, these Columns were the most efficient way to move thousands of men, animals, horse-drawn guns, and wagons where needed. While this rule is a bit involved and cumbersome, it correctly models masses of marching troops.

Use Advanced Road Columns in addition to (not in place of) Road Columns (7.0e). Units obeying Move Orders along a road MUST apply 7.0e as well as the below. Units in other situations apply 7.0e as desired, but do not need to use the below. Leaders and HQs do not apply the below.

7.2a Road Column Markers. These are merely placeholders that occupy hexes without any unit counters.

Fires must be directed at an actual unit, never at a Road Column marker.
If a Retreat result occurs, execute it normally but remove the unit's Road Column markers.
If unit SP sizes change the number of Road Column markers (7.2c), remove the excess at that moment.
If an enemy unit (somehow) manages to enter the hex containing a Road Column marker, remove all that unit's Road Column markers.

7.2b Creation and Breakup.

Move the units one at a time leaving room for their needed Road Column markers, pulling the Road Column out behind it like taffy (7.2a).
The Column breaks up in the opposite manner: Remove Road Column markers as they march back into their units.
Not until all a unit's Road Column markers have been removed, can the unit Move or change Formation.

Design Note: The exact number of hexes needed for a unit in a march column varies based on the type of unit and the terrain involved (depending on how constricted it might be). Rather than repeatedly changing the number of SPs allowed in each hex, it is easier to change how the unit's tail hex is rounded. This divides terrain into two types for this purpose (alone): Normal and Constricted. Normal terrain allows the space needed to march along the side of the main column as well. Constricted terrain barely allows room for the single basic column of fours. It's important to note that while a column can "extend out" when it meets constricted terrain along the way, for a number of reasons, it cannot "close up" after the constriction has passed unless the column itself stops, allowing the following units to close-up manually. Typically, this is not needed until the column reaches its destination.

7.2c Road Columns and Movement.

Conga-Lines. Each Road Column must form a single 'conga line' with as few breaks as possible. Put the Formation's Leaders and HQs at the column's head. Brigade Leaders will be at the head of their own troops while higher Leaders will be with the first Brigade Leader of their part of the Formation.
Stacking. Other than during its creation and breakup, Road Column units cannot Stack with one another. They can Stack with non-Road Column units. More than one unit can only be in the same hex of a Road Column only if the total SPs needed is no greater than the maximum shown below (no unit within that hex requires more than one hex of the column). No unit can share a Road Column hex based on any remainder of the last hex of that unit's Road Column (see Column Length Rounding below, instead).
Column Length. Show correct Road Column length by placing the actual unit in the Column's first hex and leave a few empty hexes (depending on the length needs below) between it and the next unit. Fill the empty hexes with Road Column markers as place holders to maintain the needed distance. Wagons are affected normally by stacking along the road space required below.

Column Length Rounding: Choose the version that fits correctly with the Terrain of the hex the march column is entering. This may require a column to take up more hexes when it must deal with a constriction, but such an extended column does not 'close up' afterwards. Round 0.5 in the direction required.

Normal Terrain: Round DOWN…
Constricted Terrain: Round UP…

…any time the last hex needed by the unit is less than completely full.

Constricted Terrain is the following:

Roads, Trails, and RRs in a Town hex.
Roads, Trails, and RRs which cross a Creek or River hexside without a Ford.
Trails and RRs (not Roads) in a Wilderness hex.

Normal Terrain is any other situation.

The number of SPs allowed per hex (or hexes needed per Wagon unit) is (# = SPs which can fit into one hex):

Infantry or Open Order: 3
Artillery: 4
Mounted Cavalry: 1 (Optional, for greater precision, 1.5)
Wagons: 6 hexes each. (25 wagons)
Army Reserve Ordnance Train Wagon: 16 hexes each. (70 wagons)

Design Note: The Mounted Cavalry value at left (1 SP per hex) makes for excessively long road columns. That SP is still 64 men (the horse holders are in the ranks with everyone else) and they are riding in ranks of four across like the infantry. That gives 16 rows per SP which consumes 20 or so feet of road length for each horse and rider — which is too generous. A walking horse is about 8 feet long and requires some space at both ends to work (2-3 feet each) or a total of 13 feet. Using 1.5 SPs per hex is a bit clumsy but the resulting 24 rows per hex gives 13.75 feet per horse and is more reasonable.

Example — Road Column Lengths: Infantry Unit, 8 SPs: Using the normal 3 SPs per hex, this unit would have two full hexes and a fraction (2 of 3) in the third hex. In Normal Terrain, the remainder is rounded down, so the unit will take up two hexes (one with the unit counter and the next with a Road Column marker). The next unit in the column will begin in the hex which used to contain the remainder. If it is in Constricted Terrain, it will round up and require three hexes total (one for the unit counter followed by two Road Column markers). The next unit would begin in the 4th hex from the head of that unit.

Artillery Battery, 6 SPs: Artillery uses 4 SPs per hex, so the battery occupies one hex fully and half of another. With rounding, if Normal the battery takes up only one hex and if Constricted, it will require two hexes.

Artillery Battery, 2 SPs: This battery can share its hex with up to another 2 SPs. The additional unit can be Infantry, Artillery, or Cavalry but not Trains or Wagons because of their size requirements — provided the additional unit is no more than 2 SPs.

Cavalry Unit, 10 SPs: Using the standard Column Length requirement, this unit would entirely fill each of 10 hexes whether the Terrain is Normal or Constricted. If the optional 1.5 is used, the 10 SPs completely fill 6 hexes and will round off the #7 hex up or down based on the Terrain. In Normal Terrain, a 10 SP Cavalry unit would have a Column Length of 6 hexes, whereas it will require 7 in Constricted Terrain.

Column Speed. The most numerous units within the Column (normally Infantry, Cavalry, or Artillery) set the Column Speed. Units faster than this 'speed' must slow to it, units slower than it will fall behind. Road Columns go at the speed of the most common ship, not the slowest ship as in naval convoys.
No Passing or Cutting Line! Road Columns can only follow, never pass, or cut in front of, one another. Even the previous Column's sluggish Wagons!
Intersections. If two Road Columns arrive at an intersection, the "closest one" (in MPs) goes first and the other must wait until the first has finished clearing the intersection (including all its lagging units). If it is a literal tie, the column with the highest-ranking officer in front goes first.

Room for Columns of Fours, etc.? (Seriously Optional!) For simplicity, the game does not try to get into Infantry and Cavalry columns where the Terrain requires two abreast rather than the normal four or Artillery in single line of guns & carriages, rather than the normal two abreast — but if you want to get into more detail, in each of these cases, the Column Length will be double what is normal in Constricted Terrain on top of the rounding rule. To do so, simply use the limits as shown for Normal Terrain, but use the following for Constricted Terrain (assuming the Game Specific rules do not further restrict units by type in the bad Terrain depicted!):

Infantry or Open Order: 1.5
Artillery: 2
Mounted Cavalry: .5 (Optional, for greater precision, 0.75)
Wagons: 12 hexes each. (25 wagons)
Army Reserve Ordnance Train Wagon: 32 hexes each. (70 wagons)

Design Note: Advanced Road Columns are designed to deal with Brigade (or larger) marching forces following Move Orders. Units that want to change Formation to jump on a road for a short movement can do so freely (although they may not share or cross a road occupied by another Road Column). That's true, marching columns never work out "sharing agreements" regarding intersections ('taking turns' or what not). To attempt it invites chaos that keeps drill instructors awake at night (from the Romans till today). Note that the set ups will skew toward slightly longer Road Columns than the above "Rounding" rule allows you in regular play. This is to make the scenario's initial columns slightly less efficient as the troops will "tighten up" later.

[7.3 Opt] Sound of the Guns ('Attack Drift')

This rule is best for easy-going players who enjoy historical movements. It works best (or is the least frustrating) when playing solitaire so that your lower Leaders doing something 'different' adds to the storyline.

Each turn before any of a Brigade's units move, if its Division's Axis of Advance (13.2a) does not send the Brigade directly toward the nearest enemy Combat Units, roll one die. Roll independently each turn for each attacking Brigade.

If the result is less than or equal to total of the Brigade Leader's Command Value plus the Divisional Leader's Command Value (i.e., a Brigade Leader rated a 2 and a Divisional Leader rated a 1 would need to roll 3 or less), the Brigade follows its Axis of Advance.

If the result is greater than that total, the Brigade must attack directly toward the nearest enemy.

If both the Division and Brigade Leaders are 'zeros,' you might as well only order them directly forward! You will be going that way, anyway.

The results might cause Brigades to zigzag — alternating between the original Axes of Advance and Movement directly toward the nearest enemy. That's OK. The results might require Movement out of Command Radius as well; let the Brigade do so.

8.0 Line of Sight (LOS)

LOS is a matter of deciding: "Is 'this' keeping my units from seeing your units right now?" 'This' includes various possibilities, such as a hill, a forest, small folds in the earth, units of either side and so on. Because the weapons are usually Small Arms at fairly short ranges, the following two rules supersede the more elaborate LOS sections — only resort to them if you are dealing with longer range Artillery Fires.

1-hex. If the End Points are adjacent to each other, the LOS between them is always Clear.
Easy LOS. Given 2 or 3 hex Range, features (only those which give an LOS Modifier) between the End Point hexes will Block. If no such feature exists, it is Clear. Ignore the elevations involved. There is usually no need to graph this. However, either Player can challenge an Easy LOS, as long as that player does the work involved.

Play Note — Is LOS Difficult? Only a few LOS problems need to be solved using anything other than the "two cases." If you find that you are using the "whole" system often, I suggest re-checking to see how the two cases can resolve the work load. LoB divides the LOS into two distance groups based on range: 13 hexes or less (executed graphically) or 14 or more hexes (executed with a small equation). If players prefer, the equation can be used at any range instead of the graphic method. However, the two cases can preclude spending the time on unneeded precision. This causes the line between them to be slightly higher than ground level (the observer isn't lying prone!) making some limited obstacles be under the LOS rather than through it.

8.0a Specific Terms.

Clear LOS. The End Points can see each other (in either direction). No Obstacle is higher than the LOS Line at any location between the End Points.
Blocked LOS. The End Points cannot see each other. If any Obstacle exceeds ('pokes through') the LOS Line, it is Blocked.
End Points. Each LOS is a straight line with two 'End Points,' each containing an opposing Stack (usually Firer and Target). The End Point can be anywhere inside the hex (usually at its highest point). Most times, the Phasing Player selects BOTH End Points, but if a Closing Roll is needed, the Non-Phasing Player selects both. The player with the greatest interest in having a Clear LOS selects both End Points.
Obstacles. These are points along the LOS Line which might exceed the Line's height at that distance.
Elevation. The actual elevation of the ground at each End Point and Obstacle, free of modification. (Exception: Crests modify Elevation (1.6a).)
Lower Point. The End Point assigned height of 0. Ground lower than it does not matter. Its elevation (plus any Crest) is subtracted to equal 0 and used as the LOS Check's base line.
Higher Point. The End Point with a height equal to the Elevation differential between the two End Points (including any Crest modifications).
Height. A shorthand for a Modified Elevation after subtracting the Lower Point's elevation.
Advanced Heights (optional). (Shown on the LOS Chart) Can be used to help show that the terrain is a smooth curve, and contours are lines of equal elevation, not the edge of some imaginary layer cake. To use the Option: Shift both end points upward ½ level (to the graph's dashed lines). Note the change needed when the formula is used at Long Range below.
Obstacle Height. The height of the ground at that point plus applicable Modifiers.
Modifiers. Modifiers apply to the Obstacle's Elevation if they are directly under the LOS Line. See the list at the bottom of the Graph Sheet. Use only the greatest applicable Modifier.
LOS Line. The line between the End Points connecting their heights. The LOS Line is not the same as the hex-grid line used in 9.1g.

Example — Height Differentials: Given two End Points, one at Level 6 and another at Level 9. The Lower Point height is Zero (by definition) and the Higher Point's 'height' is 3. If, however, the Lower Point contains a Crest Line (which modifies it to an elevation of 7), then the height differential for the Higher Point is 2, rather than 3.

8.0b Determination. At ranges of 13 hexes or less, use the Graph Sheet while at 14 hexes and beyond, use the formula. The Graph is intentionally not to scale (vertical vs horizontal) to exaggerate the slope of the LOS, so it is easier to use.

Short Range: 13 Hexes or less. Draw a straight line from the (0,0) point (or (0, ½) if using Advanced Heights) in the lower left-hand corner to the Higher Point (correct range on the X-Axis and the Higher Point height (+½ if using Advanced Heights) on the Y-Axis). This line represents the direct line from the Lower to Higher Point on the map — the LOS Line. Along this LOS line, check any questionable Obstacle heights against the graph's LOS line.

(Fractions in 8.0b are almost always truncated e.g., 4.95 truncates to 4. There is no rounding.)

Long Range: 14 Hexes or more. The formula will give the right answer at any range, so if you are comfortable using your calculator, you can use this method and skip the graph entirely. Truncate all fractions before the final comparison. If using Advanced Heights with the formula, do not change the End Point Height levels but instead subtract ½ level from the Obstacle's height.

Multiply the Obstacle's height (H1) by the range to the Higher Point (R2) and compare it to that found by multiplying the Higher Point's height (H2) by the Obstacle's range (R1): H1 × R2 ≤ H2 × R1. If true, the LOS is Clear of that Obstacle (others might still need a look). Otherwise, the LOS is Blocked.

8.0c Special LOS Cases.

'Troop' Modifiers. The LOS Modifier listed on the Graph Sheet applies to all Combat Units (of either side) except Open Order units.
Along Hexsides. If either the LOS Line OR the line used in 9.1g runs along a hexside, the hexside ONLY counts for Troop Modifiers if it's between two hexes containing Combat Units of the same side.
Sudden Dips. No unit can see a unit adjacent to the inside of a Sudden Dip hexside unless that unit is also adjacent to that hexside. Likewise, no unit inside a Sudden Dip can see anything at a range greater than 1 hex. Sudden Dips only affect LOS if the LOS crosses the Hexside (to include its corners), and the target stack is on the downhill side of the hexside.
Orchards. Entirely ignore an Orchard if any part of it is within either End Point hex. Determine the Orchard's extent using its outside edges. The Orchard blocks LOS if neither End Point is contained within it.
Same Hill. Ignore all unmodified Heights on the descending slope of the hill containing the higher End Point. Ignore any "ripples" of raw elevation that might exist on that slope. Terminate this "same hill" when the ground begins to rise for another, different, hill or there is a modified Height. Use common sense here.

(This section is accompanied by the LOS Charts — a Close Range graph plotting Height from the Lower Point (0-7) against Range from the Lower Point (0-13 hexes), a Long Range formula panel, and a Modifiers table: +1 Crests (added to Elevation at End Points and/or Obstacles); and, as the single largest applicable Modifier to an Obstacle only: +1 Friendly or Enemy Infantry/Cavalry/Artillery, +1 Orchards, +2 Town, +3 Woods. Four worked LOS Examples illustrate Firers #1-#4 sighting along a Crest Line — #1 has a clear shot from the Crest's high point; #2, one hex to the rear at the same level, is Blocked by the Crest Line #1 uses; #3, also behind the Crest but without its own elevation, is looking "up" through the Crest Line; #4, atop a Crest Line itself, has a Clear LOS since the lower ground between the two End Points is lower than both of them. A fifth example shows two Firers against an Orchard: Firer #1, with neither End Point inside the Orchard, is Blocked by it; Firer #2, with an End Point inside the Orchard, ignores it entirely.)

Design Note — Remaining MA as a Fire DRM: The last item in the list of Firepower producers is new in v3.0. It represents the Stack's time dedicated to engaging the target. A unit's remaining MPs abstractly measure its available Firing time (which applies a DRM on the Combat Table) — time available and not spent on other tasks. The greater the MA remaining, the more time available to Fire, and the more intense the shot. Conversely, the smaller the MA remaining, the shorter the time available, and the weaker the shot. The daytime turn is 15 minutes and the MPs remaining translate directly so an Infantry unit with an MA of 6, literally uses 2.5 minutes per MP.

9.0 Fire Combat

Fire Combat is the interaction of both sides' weapons Fires resulting in losses to the Combat Units. Over time, those losses reduce each side's combat effectiveness. Each side conducts their desired Fire Combats and Charges in their own Activity Phase. During that Phase, enemy units may have the chance to respond with Opening Volleys against your units (which can inflict losses on your units before they get to Fire) or they may suffer Morale results in addition to losses. In the enemy's Activity Phase, the roles are reversed and while he does the Fire Combats he desires, you get to do Opening Volleys against him.

Units can Fire individually OR as Stacks — but any units Firing from a Stack must Fire at the same Target hex at the same time.

A unit's firepower is a product of available:

Weapon Type (1.3c).
SPs (1.3a).
Unspent MPs (9.1e).

Design Note — Remaining MA as a Fire DRM (continued): So, that unit Firing for the minimum amount of time (2 MPs remaining) will Fire for 5 minutes, while a unit which Moves using 1 MP and has 5 MPs remaining can dedicate 12.5 minutes to Firing or 2.5 times as long. The player need only know the number of MPs Remaining and never needs to convert it into minutes nor determine the relative proportions of time used by different unit MAs. A Line Infantry Stack which expends half its MA, leaves only 3 MPs for firing (the old Fire Activity). Only half the available time was spent Firing, resulting in a -1 DRM. A Stack that doesn't Move at all (all 6 MPs are unspent), uses its whole time Firing and is enhanced by a +1 DRM. Artillery units do the same (but with no ability to get a +1 DRM for not Moving) using their Limbered 10 MA. Teamed with the ability to Move and Fire, as well as the slightly easier Unlimbering MP cost, the time frames work out exactly right. In easy terrain, a battery can Unlimber using 2 MPs, so an Artillery unit starting Limbered has 8 MPs to move before Unlimbering (or 5 MPs to use and still be able to get off a (poor) shot). It could, however, Move one hex (two on a good road!) and Fire without a -1 DRM. If the Artillery is already Unlimbered, it will need to change Formation twice, allowing 6 MPs to Move (and not shoot) or 3 MPs to Unlimber again and get off a poor -2 DRM shot. Note that there are different Artillery Formation Change MP costs based on the Terrain of their hex. The 2 MP (nice ground) cost is based on allowing the battery 3 minutes to get into its Unlimbered firing formation — the drill standard was only 1 minute, but this was not under combat conditions. At any rate, this is more accurate and gives better resolution than earlier editions.

Procedure

Identify the Firer, its remaining MPs, and the Target.
Confirm a clear LOS and Range.
Execute any Opening Volley (9.2).
Determine the number of Firing SPs and determine the total DRM to the Combat Table.
Roll two dice and add the DRM to determine the result. For most Fires, this will just use the top of the Table, but if the raw roll is 9 or more, ignore the top part of the Table and use the result given in the grid below it, cross-indexing the raw roll with the DRM.

Example of Combat Table DRMs: a) The Firer has 4 MPs remaining. b) The Firer is using Breechloader (alone in its hex, so there is no Threshold Value to compute). c) The Firing unit is 4 SPs. d) The firing Range is 1 hex. So, the resulting DRMs are: Firer MPs Remaining 4: +0 DRM; Firer Breechloader (Min SP 2): +1 DRM; Number of Firing SPs 4: –1 DRM; Range of 1: +0 DRM. For a total of +0+1–1+0 = +0 DRM.

Example of Combat Table Resolution: 1) If the raw dice roll is 8 or less, use the top grid alone for the result. In the example, the DRM is +0, but if your DRM is a +3 and the Combat Table roll is an 8, only a 1 SP loss and Morale Check would be the result. Apply negative DRM, however. If your DRM is a -2 and the Combat Table roll is an 8, the result is a Morale Check. 2) If the dice roll is 9 or more, do the following: a) On a roll of 9, the DRM of +0 will give one SP loss, a Morale Check, and a Depletion of Canister (if applicable). b) On a 10 through 12, the DRM of +0 will always give two SP losses, a Morale Check, and Depletion of the Artillery Ammunition type used (if applicable).

9.1 Fire Combat Requirements & Restrictions

Each Firing Combat Unit:

Must have a Clear LOS to the Target hex out of one of its Frontal hexsides (8.0 using 9.1g).
Must be Capable of Firing.

To be Capable of Firing a unit:

Cannot be in Column, Mounted, or Limbered Formations.
Cannot be a Non-Combat Unit.
Cannot be Routed.
Has at least 2 MPs (Infantry/Open Order) or 3 MPs (previously Limbered Artillery) remaining.
Cannot have Fired earlier this Phase. A Stack can only Fire once per Activity Phase.*
Cannot be Finished (2.3) or Charging (11.0).

( If some of a Stack's units have already Fired, remaining (or newly entering) units cannot fire later from that Stack (even if it has not yet Fired itself) (7.0d).)*

Target hexes:

Must contain at least one enemy Combat Unit.
Must be at or within the Firer's maximum range of the weapons used. (Use the shortest Range of the Firing unit weapon types).
Must be at or within Visibility.
Can sustain Small Arms Fire(s) (and/or be Charged) any number of times per Phase.
Can only be Fired upon once by Artillery during a Phase (4.2g) unless an Artillery Leader is employed (4.2e).

Play Note — But They'll Always Fire on the 'A' Column!! Some seeing the +1 DRM for non-moving Firing Stacks faint at the horror of exchanging blows with the enemy on the heretofore 'deadly' A Column. Now this ignores two things: the A Column isn't quite as deadly as it used to be (the Expected Value has changed from 1.139 to 0.917 while the 6-8 column is still 0.75... losses of 22% rather than the previous 52%), and the player controls closing with the enemy. The takeaway with the Expected Value is, while it is bloodier than the 6-8 column, it is nothing like it was before. But I need the player to recognize the differences in how he handles his troops (keeping in mind, he controls how they close). Typically — and out of habit — players assumed that the way to conduct a fire fight was to close adjacent with the enemy and slug it out. You can still do that, but the losses will pile up rapidly. With mild abstractions, think of this adjacent firefight as within 100 yards, while firefight leaving a hex between them is at or around 100 yards. There is no need to get into literalism ("well, the units are in the centers of each hex" ... and so on). Close-in combats must be seen (for game purposes) as fires between adjacent hexes at less than 100 yards — an obvious abstraction given that the hex grid shows hexes rigidly 110 yards from side to side and units in them 'never' crowd their edges. Remember, firefights of 100 yards are very typical, while those closer than 100 yards are of far greater intensity and emotional impact. We won't go to 50 yards or less, as that's the realm of Charges! This is a long way of saying: Firefights at 2 hexes (with an empty hex of no man's land in-between the combatants) are normal (assumed to represent approximately 100 yards) while those at 1 hex range (adjacent) are highly intense (representing those less than 100 yards). The hex grid abstractly allows both levels of firefight — without getting into Charge tactics. The upshot is that if the moving player wants to execute sustained firefights, he must do so at range 2 where the MP Remaining DRM (+1) is directly balanced out by the range (-1), leaving the player on the 6-8 column he is used to. However, thoughtlessly zooming straight adjacent to the enemy (inside the 100-yard zone) incurs the heavier loss rate (+22%) and the resulting battle happens faster than might be expected. System firefights in v2.0 generated the historical losses but took 2-3 times as long to do it! In v3.0, the loss rate has been straightened out with respect to time. If you go into that adjacent zone, you'll need to accept the resulting loss rate. Thoughtlessly parking adjacent to the enemy is not a tactic.

9.1a Firing Finishes each involved unit.

9.1b SP Limit. A maximum of 8 SPs can Fire out of one hex in one Phase. The owning player chooses which of a Stack's units Fire.

Use the number of SPs available AFTER taking any Opening Volley losses.
DG halving (10.2d) occurs after applying the 8 SP limit.

9.1c Cherry Picking Points. All the units chosen to Fire from a Stack must do so together. If the total is more than 8 SPs, the player must reduce the number of SPs used by his choice of the Stack's units. The player can reduce the number of SPs used by any given unit(s) so that he can meet the Threshold Value requirements (9.3) to allow some special Weapons unit(s) to Fire.

Should Ammunition Depletion apply to such a "partial" Artillery unit, that whole Battery is Depleted, not just the SPs which Fired.

9.1d No Combining or Splitting Fire. All Stacks Fire independently; they cannot combine into single larger shots. Stacks cannot split their Fire; if they Fire at all, a Stack's units must Fire at the same Target at the same time.

9.1e Pre-Fire Movement & MPs Remaining. A Stack can move into a hex with units which have not yet begun their Activities and Fire together. Alternatively, two (or more) Stacks could move separately to a common hex to Fire together.

Additional points regarding MPs Remaining:

All involved units expend all remaining MPs upon Firing and are Finished.
Drop any fractional MPs.
If the Stack's Firing units have differing remaining MPs, use the one with the fewest MPs remaining.
MP Remaining DRMs never apply in Charge resolution.
Artillery units use their Limbered MA to determine any MPs they have remaining.
If no MP entry exists for the +1 DRM, the unit type cannot obtain a +1 regardless of how few MPs it expends (even 0).

9.1f Terrain Effects. Some Terrain applies as a Combat Table DRM as "Protection." Only items listed in the Table's Protection note can do so. There is no additional effect if more than one applies. Apply only the Target hex's Terrain and hexside (9.1g).

9.1g Hexside Features and Fires. Some hexside features affect the Combat and/or Morale Tables. Use the following geometry to determine applicability, not the chosen LOS line in 8.0. Draw straight lines outlining a fan starting from the Target hex's center through the ends of Terrain hexsides of concern. If the Firing Stack is located on or inside this fan's boundaries, the Terrain applies.

Drill Field Note — Anatomy of a Fire Fight: A Civil War firefight was significantly different from the far looser tactics of today. It was the end of wars where marching men shoulder-to-shoulder was the only way commanders could both control their forces and maximize their firepower. The ever-increasing deadliness of the firefight beginning to show during the Civil War was in full bloom by World War I, with fighting troops widely dispersed and frequent use of field works. Contrary to popular belief, Civil War commanders and troops were fully aware of (and proficient in) the use of field works. West Point was an engineering school, after all.

What changed over the course of the war were the times when field works were to be used and the eagerness with which the common soldier was constructing them. There was an enormous difference between the time when Halleck "dug his way" to Corinth, Mississippi and the Union and Confederate lines in Virginia, 1864-65.

Civil War open field fighting came in three stages: identifying the enemy's infantry, trading blows with them, and reacting to the 'moment of crisis.' Guiding this was the framework of planning from generals on both sides (for better or worse) and at multiple command levels. They directed (as best they could) how the men were positioned and what they were expected to do. Once in position to "feel out" the enemy infantry (taking occasional hits from enemy artillery), the line will move toward the enemy, they will move toward you, or both will close. These movements will be under control to avoid surprises as the distance decreases.

At one point, a wise Vietnam Vet NCO took me aside (a wet-behind-the-ears infantry lieutenant and wargamer) and explained: "In combat, everything is frontal." He suggested forgetting all the fancy maneuvers — the enemy is there and you can't ignore him!

The two side's firing lines will approach somewhere around 100 yards (more or less) from the enemy. This distance is not defined by a tape measure, but rather by the loss rate. Too rapid, and they are too close. Too slow, and they are still a bit too far. The distance that is "just right" varies depending on terrain, weapons, foliage, and a whole manner of other conditions — including the unit's morale and experience. Once this distance is found, the sides will continue exchanging fire, neither closing nor withdrawing — until the crisis comes. In the case of the fledgling Iron Brigade at Brawner's Farm, the pre-crisis stage lasted around 90 minutes.

This crisis comes in a number of forms: losses are getting to be too much, a beloved leader is killed or (alternatively) puts his hat on his sword and demands to know who is with him, other units (friendly or enemy) perform something that radically disrupts the local flow of events, new orders arrive (unlikely to be written at this level, but rather the arrival of an aide or a leader a few hundred yards away yelling and motioning with his hands and arms or his sword. These orders can be to move in either direction in order to press the issue by charging or withdrawing to break off the firefight. Together with orders arriving for the enemy troops, the result can involve both sides at once with many possible combinations.

What the sides won't do is just stay there continue trading blows. Whether breaking for the rear, or to the front, something will end the stasis at 100 yards. Your units will do so, too. Furthermore, if the leaders were intent on closing before the battle even started, they may attempt to skip the firefight entirely — but rather to push right through it into the realm of the Charge. However, even in the "Charge to end all Charges," July 3rd at Gettysburg, the Confederate troops still paused at this 'exchanging fires distance' for a brief time, before launching several independent breaching attempts (the actual Charges) at the defending line. There was no doubt among the attacking troops that a full charge was expected from the time they stepped off.

9.2 Opening Volleys

'Opening Volleys' are a stand in for non-Phasing fires triggered by specific enemy actions — such as the enemy moving very close to the Stack to commence Firing. Opening Volleys are done by a rapid process, rather than the former "Defensive Fire Phase." See also the Opening Volley Triggers and Exceptions Chart on pg 4 of the Charts and Tables.

Such Phases were excessively coordinated and precise, potentially disrupting the entire Phasing Player's plan before he can even Fire. Opening Volleys allow non-Phasing Player units to Fire only when specific local Triggers occur, forcing them to be disjointed. This is more realistic than having Defensive Fires precisely planned and conducted.

Process: Given an Opening Volley Trigger (see requirements below), conduct the Opening Volley:

Find the applicable column on the Opening Volley Table using the Range from the Opening Volley Stack to the Opening Volley Trigger's hex.
Make a roll on one die and add any applicable DRMs.
Check the modified roll against the minimum Successful Roll on the Opening Volley Table.

If the modified roll generates 1 or 2 Losses, inflict them and make Leader Loss Checks against each Leader in the Triggering Stack. Do not make a Morale Check. If the modified roll does not generate a Loss, there is no result at all and no Leader Loss Checks.

This completes this Opening Volley; in either case, continue with the original Activity which Triggered it.

Opening Volley Triggers:

Formation/Facing Change while Adjacent. A Stack's unit(s) change Formation and/or Facing (Especially Artillery Facing change (4.2b)) while adjacent to any enemy unit, even if no MP expense occurred. (Exception: Backpedaling [7.0h Opt] never generates a Trigger.)
Firing After Moving. An announcement of a Stack's Fires when one or more units in it have expended MPs in the current Phase.
Not Able (or Refuses) to Fire AFTER Moving Adjacent. A Stack that Moves adjacent to an enemy unit and cannot, or chooses not to, Fire Triggers the "Not Firing" DRM on the Opening Volley Table. Ignore this Trigger (no Opening Volley occurs) if another friendly Combat Unit already occupies the hex (7.0d).
Announcing a Charge. Even if it fails its Closing Roll and/or there was no MP expense.

(Important: No matter how many Triggers might occur from a single Trigger hex at one time: Only ONE Opening Volley occurs at that moment.)

No matter how many available Stacks exist, only one can make use of a Trigger.
The Inactive Player freely selects the Stack to be the Opening Volley Firer.
The chosen Stack need not be the Target of the Fires (or Charge) which created the Trigger.
A Trigger is a Trigger. Triggers do not have 'strengths' or differences from one source to another.

To use a Trigger: The Opening Volley 'Firer' must contain at least one Inactive Combat Unit legally able to Fire at the Trigger hex. This requires a Range of 3 hexes or less, a Clear LOS via a Frontal hexside, and the normal ability to Fire. The Opening Volley can only be executed on the Stack which created the Trigger.

Special Situations:

The Phasing Stack's top unit takes the entire Opening Volley loss result. If the top unit cannot absorb all the required loss, apply the remainder to the Stack's next unit. There is no exemption from this rule if the Trigger was not the top unit's 'fault' or some such.
After a failed Charge Closing Roll, the Opening Volley Range is 1, not at Charge 'Range.'
Opening Volleys never Deplete Artillery Ammunition. However, existing Depletions might affect (or preclude) an Opening Volley. To use the Opening Volley Table's Canister DRM, the Opening Volley Firer must have Canister available and Fire through its Frontal hexsides.

Example of Opening Volley: 1) Assume the unit providing the Opening Volley (the Firing stack) is at Range 2 (+1) and has Frontal Canister (+1). 2) The Triggering unit is 8 SPs (+1) and is not the unit which will do the Firing (+1). 3) So the total DRM is +4. A die roll of 5 plus the DRM gives a result of 9 or a 2 SP loss against the Triggering unit.

Play Note — Trigger Suppression: Beware; separate Triggers can allow an enemy Stack to fire any number of Opening Volleys. You can't suppress the enemy by stacking dead bodies in front of them!

Example — Opening Volley Triggers: If a Stack moves adjacent to the enemy without announcing a Fire, changes Facing, announces a Charge and fails its Closing Roll and switches to Fire instead... only one Opening Volley occurs.

9.3 The Fire Combat Process

Units Fire at enemy units using Fire Combat to degrade their strength or to otherwise affect them. The Fire units can deliver is determined by several factors such as their:

Firing strength (SPs).
Type and Formation.
Time expended firing (as measured by the firing Stack's remaining MPs).
Distance to the enemy (Range).
Morale State, Facing, and/or Breastworks.
Weapons (Weapon Characteristics).

Charges use their own procedure and are not resolved using Fire Combat (11.1).

After the Opening Volley (9.2), if any, roll two dice on the Combat Table with a DRM as determined by all the effects mentioned earlier. The result may be one or more of the following: a Morale Table roll (a Morale Check), a Numeric Loss to the enemy (in SPs), and Leader Loss Checks to see if enemy Leaders are wounded or killed. Execute all these results before moving on to the next Activity. If there is no result, move on immediately.

The Phasing Player executes all Fire Combat rolls. The Inactive Player only executes Opening Volleys. The Phasing Player identifies both the Firing and Targeted Stacks.

Example — SP Maxes & DGs: A 12 SP DG unit would use up the 8 SP limit (wasting 4 SPs which cannot shoot) but would still only Fire 4 SPs out of that hex (the maximum).

Example — SP Maxes & Threshold Values: If an R12 stacks with an SR3, the entire SR3 and 5 SPs of the R12 will Fire (for the total of 8 SPs). The Threshold Value of 8 Firing SPs is 3, so the Breechloaders give the Stack a +1 DRM. The remaining 7 SPs of the R12 will not Fire at all.

Basic Combat Table Process.

Total the Firing Stack's SPs.
If the Firer is DG, halve its SPs (drop any fractions).
Based on the top Target Combat Unit, the Terrain, the Range, one Firer Weapon type, and the Firer's MPs remaining, determine the DRM using all modifiers that apply.
Roll two dice and add the DRM to determine the result. For most Fires, this will just use the top of the Table, but if the raw roll is 9 or more, ignore the top part of the Table and use the result given in the grid below it, cross-indexing the raw roll with the DRM.

(Important — Fire Target Selection and Distance: Enemy Stacks adjacent to the Firer must be chosen before any potential Targets at greater distances. Closer enemy Stacks are bigger threats.)

Weapon Characteristics.

Range. Each weapon lists its maximum Range. Weapons have no effect beyond their maximum Range.
DRMs. Some weapons and Ammunition types (Buck 'n Ball, Breechloader, Repeater, and Canister) might apply positive DRMs to the Combat Table roll. These are listed on Weapons Characteristics Chart. To determine if enough SPs of a weapon Fires to allow its specific DRM, use the Threshold Values Chart (see below). Choose only one weapons DRM, if more than one could apply. See 4.2h regarding Canister.
Threshold Values. Find the row on the Threshold Values Chart with the total Firer SPs (9.1c). To the right of that row is the Threshold Number. The shot must contain this Threshold Number (or more) of that weapon type to obtain its DRM. Otherwise, it has no effect.

9.4 Combat Table Results

A Combat Table result requires each of these actions against the Target Stack in this order:

Apply Loss. Remove SPs equal to the Numeric Loss result, if there is one. Use Loss Distribution (9.4a) as needed.
Leader Loss Checks. If the result is a Numeric Loss and there are any Leaders in the Target hex (4.1a).
Morale Check. If the result is "M" or more, make a Morale Check (10.1).
CBF Marking. If the result is "M" or more and the Target contains Unlimbered Artillery, increase the hex's CBF marker by one level (apply one if it's currently zero) (4.2l). The Maximum CBF Level is 2.

9.4a Loss Distribution. Apply the following in order:

The Top Unit must take any Opening Volley losses.
The Top Unit must take the first loss from the Combat Table or Charge.
The owning player distributes remaining losses to any Combat Unit in the Stack as desired. Each Combat Unit must take one loss BEFORE any takes two losses. Do not count Opening Volley losses in this determination.

Design Note: Distribution stops players from using a 'flab' unit to absorb losses for a good unit under it.

9.4b If the Combat Table result DESTROYS the Stack's LAST Combat Unit:

Dead Pile. Place that unit in the Dead Pile.
Cowardly Legs. Place a Cowardly Legs marker in the hex (10.4).
Leaders. Make any Leader Loss Checks (4.1a) needed, but do not make a Morale Check.
HQs. If the hex contains an HQ, leave it in the hex. The HQ is not affected until an enemy Combat Unit enters that hex.
Wagons. Destroy any Wagon in the hex if there are one or more enemy Combat Units adjacent to it (4.3a). Otherwise, it remains unaffected until an enemy Combat Unit does move adjacent to its hex.

10.0 Morale

Morale reflects a unit's ability to continue to function normally under combat's stress, strain, and unpredictability.

Morale and Stacking. A Stack can only have one Morale State (10.2) at a time and applies to all of its Combat Units.

Momentary Stacking. Units are unaffected by Moving momentarily through Stacks with other Morale States.
Retreats. Entering another Stack's hex while Retreating applies Collisions (10.3c).
Ending a Move Stacked. If a Stack ends a Move in a hex resulting in a Stack with more than one Morale State, the Stack adopts the worst Morale State represented. Do not apply the Additive Morale Chart (use that Chart only when a Stack obtains a new Morale Table result).

10.1 Morale Checks

Morale Checks determine if the Stack's Morale State changes because of events — such as taking losses. It may inflict a change to Morale State, Retreat, or even cause additional losses as men drift away from the colors. Morale Checks are made as required by the Combat Table or Charge Procedure using a modified roll on the Morale Table.

The Stack's current top Combat Unit's Morale Rating determines the applicable modifiers (even if — at the moment — it is not the Stack's largest unit).
Only one Leader can affect a Morale Check. If more than one Leader is available in the Stack, the owner chooses the one to use without regard to rank or rating.

(Important: The one caveat regarding Leaders is that the chosen Leader must have at least one Combat Unit of his own Formation in the Stack.)

Procedure

Total the applicable dice modifiers, including those at the top regarding the hex's top Combat Unit's Morale Rating (B = +1, for instance).
Roll two dice and add the total DRM. Find the Morale Table's Row containing the modified roll.
Read the right column along the roll's row to determine the result. The Morale Table result may have up to four items: No Effect, Morale State changes, Retreats, Losses, and a Cowardly Legs reminder. Execute them in the order presented.

10.2 Morale States

Morale States are temporary conditions of confusion, fear, disorder, or even anger. They are shown by a marker atop the Stack's affected units. From best to worst: Morale States are Blood Lust (BL), Normal, Shaken (Sh), Disorganized (DG), and Routed (R). Morale States come from Morale Table results, Collisions (10.3c), Over-Stacking (6.1a), and Town hexes (1.6b).

Morale State effects are listed in 10.2a through 10.2e and also on the Morale State Effects Chart.

To keep things straight: Morale States 'Decrease' when they become 'worse,' while they 'Increase' when they become 'better.'

During your Rally Phase, Morale States recover toward Normal (12.1). "Normal" is the Morale State of all unmarked Combat Units. So, during Rally, a BL stack might 'Decrease' and a Shaken stack might 'Increase' while both are moving toward Normal.

If a Stack suffers another Morale State result when it already has one, use the Additive Morale Chart to combine the two. Use only the resulting Morale State marker for the Stack.

10.2a Blood Lust (BL) Units.

Always pass Closing Rolls.
Ignore any Morale Table Retreat or Loss results. However, this does not protect them if another Stack Retreats into their hex, apply 10.3c normally.
Apply a Blood Lust result only if the checking Stack is adjacent to the Firing Stack.
Open Order units cannot become Blood Lusted.
Ignore Friendly Leader DRMs for Blood Lust determination. In other words, Leaders never help units to become Blood Lusted.

Example — Blood Lust Morale Checks: A Wrecked Morale A unit with a 4-rated Leader makes a Morale Check. For most purposes, the DRM (Wrecked (+3) plus the Leader (-4) and the A-rated unit's (+0)) gives a total DRM of -1. However, if the roll is low and a potential Blood Lust might result, ignore the Leader. Therefore, with only the Wrecked DRM of +3 and the unit's +0, BL would become impossible for this Stack to obtain.

10.2b Normal Units. No special effects.

10.2c Shaken (Sh) Units. No special effects beyond the occasional DRM.

10.2d Disorganized (DG) Units.

Their MA is halved (round down).
Their Fire Strength is halved (round down).
Cannot Charge.
Cannot pass a Closing Roll.

10.2e Routed (R) Units.

Cannot Move, but they may be required to Retreat if they fail to Rally (12.1 part 4).
Cannot Fire.
Have no ZOC.
Have no Frontal Facing.

10.3 Retreat

Morale results may involve the target Stack Retreating toward greater safety. Retreats are not Movement and given in hexes, not MPs. The affected units must Retreat that number of hexes — in some rare cases, they may be allowed to Retreat further to avoid Stacking with Unlimbered Artillery or Over-Stacking. In those cases, extend the Retreat the minimum number of hexes needed to avoid the problem.

Retreats are typically unaffected by Terrain (all hexes count as 'one') unless rendered impossible due to Prohibited Terrain or enemy Combat Units — in that case, destroy the Retreating Stack. (Exception: Units can always Retreat along roads through Prohibited Terrain.)

The owning player Retreats his units. Do so in a relatively straight line which is locally "to the rear" away from all enemy units (especially the ones shooting at them!). Doubling back and other "game tricks" are not allowed.

10.3a The Retreating Stack cannot split up and must stay and end up together. Retreating units can freely change Formation, Facing and/or Stacking Order as the player desires. Retreating units cannot end Over-Stacked (6.1a).

10.3b EZOC & Retreats. Inflict one SP loss (per Stack, not per unit) for each EZOC hex the Retreating Stack enters. Make a Leader Loss roll if the Retreating Stack contains any Leaders. If EZOC losses eliminate a Retreating Stack, no Collisions occur (10.3c). Retreating Open Order units are exempt from EZOC losses (6.4a).

10.3c Collisions. A Collision is when a Retreating Stack enters a hex with a stationary Stack. The stationary Stack must choose one of the following actions:

Displace themselves 1 hex allowing the Retreating Stack to use their hex.
Join the Retreating Stack for the rest of the Retreat.
Allow the Retreating Stack to Pass Through them without Displacing out of the way.

(Exception: Open Order Retiring (4.4d) does not create Collisions.)

Displacement: A Displacement is a sidestep to avoid the Retreating Stack. The owning player can send the Displacing Stack one hex to its left, right, or center rear hexes. Decrease the Morale State of each Displacing Stack by one level (e.g., Sh becomes DG). Displacement is, itself, a Retreat and could force a Collision with another Stack — or even a whole chain of them — if the Displacing Stack side steps on top of some other Stack. Units can Displace more than once — even in the same Retreat — and each time their Morale State gets one level worse. Leaders and HQs must Displace with their Stack. Wagons cannot Displace at all. (Remember: HQ Displacement initiates a Skedaddle (13.6e).)

Joining: Apply the worst existing Morale State in the new combined Stack and it continues (together) with any remaining Retreat. Do not apply the Additive Effects Table, just use the worst Morale State of the two. Joining cannot be in violation of the Stacking limit. If there is no remaining Retreat, a Joining HQ does not invoke a Skedaddle. If the HQ must Retreat at least one hex, it does invoke a Skedaddle.

Design Note — Large Formation Joining: This harkens back to rules I tested during the CWBS's development in the mid-1980's. Those rules involved cascading Morale Checks, a workload nightmare that led to excessively dramatic large-scale panics. Cowardly Legs is simpler and involves no extra workload — and does not tend toward the test rule's excesses.

Pass Through: This allows the Retreating Stack to run through another Stack and continue with their Retreat while the stationary Stack remains in place. Note that there is no such thing as a "Pass Through" if the Retreat ends in the stationary Stack's hex; if that's the case, it must be evaluated as a Displacement or Joining.

If one or both Stacks have 4 SPs or more, take the two Stacks' worst Morale State, decrease it by one level, and apply it to both.
If neither Stack contains at least 4 SPs, the Pass Through has no effect on the stationary Stack. It simply remains undisturbed in place and the Retreating Stack continues.
Pass Throughs permit HQs to avoid a Skedaddle.
Unlimbered Artillery is unaffected by other friendly units Retreating through its hex and do not stop.

10.3d Retreating Artillery. There are several special requirements when Artillery Retreats.

Retreating Artillery:

Must be Limbered for the entire Retreat.
Must extend its Retreat as needed to not end Stacked with any unit with a different Morale State.
Does NOT place any Cowardly Legs marker.
Removes any CBF marker from its hex.
Does not affect other units at all (even from Collisions, 10.3c) by Retreating into or through other friendly units.
If the retreating artillery were to stop in an Unlimbered Artillery's hex, they must extend their Retreat to not do so.
If the Retreat results are from a Charge and there is Unlimbered Artillery in the hex, roll one die. Kill that many SPs from the Artillery and the remainder Limbers and conducts the Retreat. Situation and solution courtesy of Tom Beach.

10.3e Wagons and Retreats. Wagons ignore Retreat results but must Join other unit's Retreats into their hex (10.3c).

10.4 Cowardly Legs (a.k.a. Jimmy Legs)

"If Almighty God gives a man a cowardly pair of legs, how can he help their running away with him?" — A. Lincoln

"Cowardly Legs" is the effect on adjacent units when a Stack leaves a gap in the line. Units have a tougher time retaining good order if their flank supports give way. This is shown as a Cowardly Legs marker is placed in the hex vacated by Retreat — so friendly units adjacent to the marker apply the modifier when they make Morale Checks.

Multiple Cowardly Legs markers have no additional effect.
Important: A Cowardly Legs marker never affects the Stack that created it.

Drill Field Note — What on earth are Cowardly Legs? It's a running joke among those who have spent a lot of time reading after-battle reports in the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion (128 volumes, unless you count the Addenda!) that so very many of the reports from various officers in command (or their replacements) contained a line to the effect of "My regiment was holding its own, under extreme fire, when the regiment to our left (or right) gave way — so we were forced to follow suit." Finding these statements in countless reports was akin to Finding Waldo, one of Dan Cicero's pastimes. All joking aside, there was decidedly something to these statements beyond being an excuse. Specifically, there is an effect on other units when a nearby unit bugs out. Watching (as much as you can with the smoke and confusion) your neighboring regiment head for the hills makes the troops doubt the wisdom of staying put — is something happening that we should know about? Did their Colonel make a decision that our Colonel would do well to emulate? Are we being sacrificed for no good purpose? And your Colonel is pondering the same thing. No one wants to be the last to get the word and be abandoned. At that moment, the holding regiment (and/or its leadership) is more susceptible to bolting. Hence, the Die Roll Modifier. The marker itself limits this effect to the units adjacent to the hex whose defenders took a leave of absence at the very time it happened. It gives these stacks a slightly greater chance of failing their Morale Checks, if they must do one.

10.4a Placement. Mark a Retreating or destroyed Stack's vacant original hex with a Cowardly Legs marker. This "original hex" is where the Retreat began due to its Morale Table Result or where units are destroyed due to the Combat or Opening Volley Tables. Do not place Cowardly Legs markers because a vacant hex is created due to Collisions (10.3c), EZOC losses, Withdrawals (13.7a), Retiring (4.4d), or Artillery Retreats (10.3d).

10.4b Removal. Remove all Cowardly Legs markers every Rally Phase for both sides. No Activity Phase starts with Cowardly Legs markers already on the map. It is acceptable to remove the markers "as you go" where they can no longer have any effect.

11.0 Charge!

A "Charge" is a rapid very close-range fire fight combining maximum firepower with an intense test of will. They are resolved using a Closing Roll (to see if the attacker presses the attack home), an Opening Volley (with a higher-than-normal loss rate), and the Morale Table (to determine if the Target gives way). The Combat Table is not used to resolve Charges.

11.1 Charge Process

Only the Phasing Player can Charge and must follow the sequence below for each one until it is completed:

a) Declaration. Identify the Charging Stack, its Leaders, and the Target hex. b) Closing Roll. If successful the Charge continues, otherwise apply 7.1c. c) Opening Volley. The Inactive Player uses the Opening Volley Table against the Charge. Announcing any Charge (even one that fails its Closing Roll) triggers an Opening Volley (regardless of any MPs expended). d) Leader Loss Checks. If there is a loss result from the Opening Volley, make a Leader Loss check for the Attacking Stack's Leader(s). e) Target Losses. If the Target Stack takes an SP loss (as per 11.3a), check all its Leaders for Leader Loss on the Charge Defender column. f) Target Morale Check. The Target hex makes a Morale Check (whether there was a loss or not). g) Charge Results. If any of the Charge Results list in 11.3 apply, execute them.

That ends this specific Charge.

Design Note — Attacking Fires in a Charge: At first glance, the Charge's attacking fires might seem too abstract. I understand that sentiment as the system's ancestors had roots dating back for many years where one ran fully through the Fire Combat process each time. The simplification and streamlining are obvious. Note that while the Target suffers somewhat from fires (and the almost unheard-of crossing of bayonets) the far greater effect is from morale collapse and abandoning their position if the attacker 'wins.'

11.2 Charge Requirements & Restrictions

Charges are not conducted inside the Target's hex. The Charging and Target Stacks remain adjacent to each other.
A Stack can Charge any number of hexes provided it is successful in each attempt and it has the needed MPs to do another.
A Target Stack can be Charged any number of times in one Phase provided it Retreats into a new hex or is Charged by another Phasing Stack.
Regardless of remaining MPs, the Charging Stack is Finished if the Target does not budge.
Units can Charge only if all four sections below are true.

Charging units must be or have:

Line Infantry or Mounted Cavalry. A Leader can tag along to assist.
Stacked together at the start of the Phase. (Exception: Leaders can join (and must then stay with) a Stack any time before it Charges.)
Adequate MPs to enter the defender's hex, should the Charge get that far. (There is no specific 'Charge MP Cost.')
In Command Radius for their initial Charge announcement but are exempt afterwards.
Facing with their Center Front aimed directly at the Target (6.3d).

Charging units must NOT be:

Finished (2.3).
Unmounted Cavalry.
Over-Stacked (6.1a).
Stacked with non-participating Combat Units.
Applying the "Can always move one hex" rule (7.0a).

The Target hex is:

Adjacent to the Charging Stack at the time of Charge Closing Roll.
Not in (or across) Prohibited Terrain for Movement.

These points have been done or are true for the given Charge:

The Charge Closing Roll is successful and each Charge needs its own Closing Roll.
Only Pay the Target hex's MPs after making a successful Charge and the attacker successfully enters the Defender's hex. Do not pay these MPs if the Charge fails or never begins (due to a failed Closing Roll).
Do not use any Fire Combat DRM for MPs Remaining (9.1e). They do not apply in Charges.
The Stack must be successful in any earlier Charges this Phase. If not, it is Finished.
Once its Charge is announced, the Stack cannot change Facing again in that Phase.

11.3 Charge Results

11.3a Defender Loss. If a Charging Stack still has at least 4 SPs (after the Opening Volley) and is not attacking through frontal Breastworks, its Target automatically loses 1 SP and checks its Leaders for Leader Loss.

Otherwise, neither a Target loss nor any Leader Loss checks occur.

11.3b Defender Morale Check. Apply all of these:

The normal Morale Table Modifiers.
The Charge Modifiers (on the Morale Charts page). These use the differential between the sides' SPs; counting all SPs capable of Firing (after both Opening Volley and automatic losses) unrestricted by Firing limits (9.1b).
Both sides' Leader Morale Value — subtract those in the Target Stack and add those in the Charging Stack.

Design Note: Yes, the Attacking Leader's Morale Value applies to the Target's Morale Check. At a great risk to themselves, Leaders can imbue a Charge an enormous amount of energy.

11.3c Advance after Combat and Additional Charges. If no Combat Units remain in the Target hex, the Charging Stack must advance into it using normal MP costs, and a Cowardly Legs marker is placed on top of it. The Charging Stack can then continue to Move (even Charge again) with any remaining MA, if desired.

All normal Movement rules apply, except (until Finished):

The Stack ignores all Command Radius and EZOC concerns.
The Stack cannot change Facing.

Example of a Charge Sequence: The 1st Texas (7 SPs, A Morale Rating) Charges the 7th Indiana (full strength, 4 SPs, B Morale Rating). Two hexes from the Target, the 1 Tex must first pass a Closing Roll to move adjacent to the 7 Ind; its only DRM is +3 for its A Morale Rating, and a roll of 2 succeeds, just barely. A second Closing Roll is then required for the Charge itself — had it failed, the 1 Tex could instead have converted to a regular Fire engagement, but the 7 Ind would still get to conduct an Opening Volley. The 1 Tex wins this second +3 roll handily with a modified roll of 9. The 7 Ind's Opening Volley is at Charge Range (+3) with no other DRMs; a roll of 4 modifies to 7, for a 1 SP loss against the Texans, dropping them to 6 SPs. Neither side has Leaders to check for Leader Loss. The Texans have adequate SPs (at least 4), so the 7 Ind automatically takes 1 SP loss and checks Morale at a reduced strength of 3 SPs. With 6 SPs to the 7 Ind's 3, the Charge Modifier gives the Texans a "Bigger" status DRM of +2; adding the 7 Ind's own B Morale Rating (+1) gives a total DRM of +3. A roll of 7, modified to 10, Shakens the 7 Ind, which retreats one hex and leaves a Cowardly Legs marker behind. The Texans advance into the Cowardly Legs marker (unaffected by it themselves) and, with any MA remaining from before the first Closing Roll, could continue to Charge straight ahead into the 7 Ind again. This ends this specific Charge execution.

11.4 Special Charge Situations

11.4a Attacker is Destroyed.

There is no Target loss.
The Target does not make a Morale Check.
The Attacker makes all Leader Loss Checks.
The Charge ends.

11.4b Attacker Fails Closing Roll.

The Charging Stack can switch to just Firing.
An Opening Volley is Triggered, even if no MPs have been expended.
The Opening Volley uses a 1 hex range, not Charge.
The Firing Target must be the original Charge Target.

11.4c Attacker Becomes Wrecked. Complete the Charge, even if units become Wrecked during it.

11.4d Defender Stands Firm. The Charging Stack is Finished for the Phase.

11.4e Mounted Charges.

Only Mounted Cavalry (as indicated by the Yellow Stripe, 1.3f) can Charge. Other units cannot, even if Mounted.
Mounted units cannot Charge if their previous MP was expended in Road Column (7.0e).
The Target's Terrain must cost 2 MPs or less to enter.
Open Order units cannot escape a Mounted Charge via Retiring (4.4d).
The Target cannot contain Line Infantry, unless it is DG or Routed.
Mounted Charges suffer double any Opening Volley losses.
Automatically destroy Target if it is exclusively Artillery or Open Order, provided 11.4a doesn't occur.

Drill Field Note — So, exactly what is a Charge and how do I use them? What are they good for? See also the Drill Field Note after 9.0, especially the Crisis Phase. First, yes, over the many years of this system and its earlier versions, I have known numerous players who would never Charge unless all the planets aligned, the target was Routed (and hit in the flank, anyway), led by a Wrecked regiment with no Leader, and unhindered by Breastworks. Needing all of that is not "using Charges" to make your play better — it is a present: gift-wrapped with a bow on top and dropped into your lap. No doubt, Charging is risky — and more so if you send your 4-4 rated leader to command it with his hat on his sword. Once, a player thought it would be exciting to lead a charge with R.E. Lee at Gettysburg. It certainly was, but not in the way he had hoped; Lee disappeared in a cloud of pink mist.

What you really want is an enemy stack that has already been weakened by fires (at the 2-hex range, I talked about earlier). It might still be holding — becoming sketchier every turn. Here is where I'd part ways with the 'No Way' players above. Given enough time, you might cause the enemy to break off before you do. But you don't know what else might happen before that. You might not have time to spare. This is the crisis you want to 'win' this firefight. Like Colonel Chamberlain running out of ammunition on Little Round Top — it's time to fix bayonets and Charge!

You'll take losses (from the Opening Volley), but if you have a force that can absorb them and generate some good DRMs for the Morale Check, it all might be over with one dice roll — before they get reinforcements or your sister units flake out and head to the rear. If the defender bolts instead, he leaves a Cowardly Legs marker behind. While your Charging stack might be able to keep going — a rare, but possible, event — the now unhinged enemy line gives other friendly stacks the chance to take advantage of now unprotected juicy targets. Everything will change (locally, anyway) ... and it's up to you to take full advantage of the suddenly unsettled situation before it resolidifies. Of course, your gut instinct might be dead wrong, and you'll be stopped cold. Chalk it up as a learning experience and learning the feeling for when the time is right.

12.0 Rally & Rebuilding

12.1 Rally

The Active Player's Rally Phase allows units to recover from their Morale States toward Normal using the strict order below. The Active Player must do so; the Non-Active Player must wait until his own Player Turn to Rally.

Remove Active Player's Sh, BL, and all Cowardly Legs markers.
Flip all DG markers to Sh. (Exceptions: 1.6b (Towns) and 6.1a (Over-Stacking).)
Roll for Routed Stacks. Roll for each Routed Stack (one die plus the Morale Value of one Leader, if any, in that hex). If the total is 5 or more, the Stack Morale State becomes DG. Set the DG Stack's Facing and Formation as desired. On any result of 4 or less, the Stack remains Routed.
Failure to Rally. Routed units that fail to Rally and are w/i 5 hexes of any enemy Combat Unit: Retreat until at least 6 hexes from all enemy units. LOS and Visibility do not reduce this distance requirement. The units in the Routed Stack must Retreat remaining Stacked together.
CBF Recovery. Remove all CBF markers from your units, both Level 1 and Level 2 (4.2l).
Rebuilding. Return SPs to qualified units (living and dead) (12.2). (Midnight turns only.)

12.2 Rebuilding Units

'Losses' include men who are, of course, killed or severely wounded — but the number includes men separated from their units, those helping the wounded, those unable to keep up, and those lightly wounded…as well as active shirkers. Most of those who are not killed, severely wounded, or actively shirking, will find their way back to the colors as soon as they can. In previous editions of these games, they were referred to as Stragglers, but in the LoB they have just been counted as "Losses" as the battles do not last long enough to allow more than what would be called 'Stragglers' to return to the battle.

Just so there is no confusion, Artillery Losses include men, horses, and gun carriages — only rarely are the cannons themselves destroyed.

Units are 'Rebuilt' once per Day and ONLY as the last action of the owning Player's Rally Phase of the 12:00 p.m. Midnight turn. There are no Rebuilds done at any other time.

Rebuilding:

Allows Infantry and Artillery units a chance to regain some of their strength and even return from elimination. Each qualified Regiment and Battery does so separately.
Returns 1 SP to each eligible Combat Unit (living or dead) regardless of the number of Losses sustained, as long as it has lost at least 1 SP and is not Full-Strength.
Cannot be done by Cavalry, Open Order, and Non-Combat Units.
Is unaffected by Orders, the need for Recovery (13.7c), Formation, Facing, EZOCs, Stacking, and Morale States.
Must take units as they are, regardless of any Consolidation (1.3e) conducted earlier. The player cannot "undo" Consolidations first.
Must be done in Command Radius or the Dead Pile. Units returning to play are placed in any hex within CR at least 5 hexes from any enemy unit. Return all removed Leaders (not those Wounded or Killed) stacked with the first unit of their formation Rebuilt from the Dead Pile.

Design Note: This simplifies v2.0 Loss Recovery which allowed returns of 25% OR 1 SP whichever is more. So, everyone had to figure out 25% and then decide if it was more than 1 SP. The dirty secret was that units needed to have 8 SPs of loss before getting 2 SPs back. This was very rare and not worth the work needed to deal with that precision.

Play Note: Admittedly, Rebuilding takes some time, but only occurs once per game day… and everyone likes to get stuff back!

13.0 Advanced Command Rules

The "Advanced" Command rules are just adding the rules needed to run the Command system allowing you to write your own Orders as the game progresses — to really be "in Command." Add them after learning the basics of unit mechanics while following the printed scenario Orders.

Play Note — How does it work? The Army Commander (you) issues 'Orders' to instruct your units (grouped into "Commands") to do the things you want — which could be very different from the Orders which began in place for the scenario or those orders may have ended and the battle rages on.

Basically, each Order instructs your troops to advance to capture ground, defend ground you hold, OR to move elsewhere — the difference comes from the clash between your and your enemy's conflicting choices and plans.

To issue an Order, first make a Command Roll in your Command Phase's Orders Segment. If you pass it, you can create and send one Order. If not, the Order cannot be issued that turn.

The Order itself is your written note (on notebook paper) as to who is ordered and what they are to do. Each Order only applies to one Command and its subordinate Formations. The actual Order can be as detailed or simple as you like and need. Other than the instructions to move to a specific place and/or attack a certain area, Orders exist to bring the battle to life — and to make sure your army doesn't wander off to do something else. Use them as a reminder of what you intended when they were written — it's 'cheating' if that intent magically adjusts to meet changing circumstances.

Orders take time to be delivered based on the distances involved and for the recipient Leader to 'accept' them. Combined, this delay means you might be required to act on your Order in a very different situation than originally expected. Regardless, follow the Order and its original intention in good faith — even in a different situation. You could paint yourself into a corner by trying to micromanage or do things too often. The resulting paralysis is part of the fun!

When a Leader receives a new Order, he must make a Command Roll to 'accept' it. If successful, he begins to follow the Order or any requirements to reissue the Order to his subordinates. If this Acceptance Command Roll fails, he must try again next turn.

Orders need not be sent to every sub-formation of a Command. Only in the case of Attack Orders must the Order be forwarded to the echelon just below the Command Leader, and then only to echelons lower than it as needed. All other types of Orders need only be accepted by the Formation's senior Leader.

But the sub-Formations and their component Leaders and their units cannot begin acting on these Orders until the lowest required level has accepted the Order via a Command Roll.

(This section is illustrated with a diagram showing a Corps HQ accepting an Attack Order via Command Roll while in CR, then Re-issuing it to its two designated Divisions; the 1st and 2nd Divisions, having Attack Orders, then Re-issue copies to each Brigade Leader for whom the Order contains specific instructions.)

13.1 Issuing Orders & Running your Army

Orders are written instructions telling the recipient what to do. If you want a job done, you will need to issue Orders to do so. Make sure the job is important and realize that it will take time to execute — and this might result in the Formation not being available for other duties for a while.

All Orders should be straightforward and relatively infrequent. Their wording should convey the actual instructions as well as the original intent (to reduce mutations caused by changing circumstances).

Don't change your mind frequently — each Order should last a Formation a significant amount of time while you attend to other matters.

Remember, the Civil-War-era society was steeped in notions of duty, honor, and glory. Following slightly inappropriate Orders (after writing them when trying to divine the future) is part of the fun. Don't worry, these same honorable officers will gladly bring their commanders up on charges after the battle and will want to be able to claim they were following Orders to the letter in court.

The Army Commander generates most of your Orders himself. A successful Command Roll (13.3c) allows the creation of one Order per turn of any type and will be required again (separately after delivery) by the receiving Leader to Accept them.

Leaders below the Army Commander can generate Orders in only two ways:

Initiative (13.4a) for limited purposes.
Re-Issuing Attack Orders to affected Formations of their Commands (13.2a).

Each Order must contain:

When it will arrive at its destination as per the Order Delivery Chart.
Sending and receiving Leaders' names.
Type (Attack, Move, Defensive, or Reserve).
Instructions required by the Order Type for both the entire Formation as well as its sub-Formations.
Movement routing needed for Preliminary Movement Instructions (13.1d), if allowed.
Objective. This is the Formation's destination (including the HQ's destination hex), as well as the terrain feature to move to, attack, occupy, or defend. Objectives mark where a successful Order ends.
Defensive Orders require a "Defensive Position." (13.2c).
Any applicable Conditions (13.4b) (Rare).

Orders are usually sent from the Army HQ to the subordinate Leader or HQ (as appropriate, 13.3a) to be executed. The receiving Leader must then attempt to Accept the Order via his own Command Roll. He cannot act on the Order until this roll succeeds.

13.1a Write each Order as clearly as possible with the content as detailed — or brief — as needed to convey its intent and purpose. Remember, if you write something too cryptic or complex, you might not remember your meaning when you play next time! While excessively broad instructions such as "attack west!" are not allowed, only enough verbiage is needed to get the Order's intent across. The rest is to create color to enjoy the game. Remember, this is a military Order, not a candidate for the NY Times Best Seller list. Write orders the way you'd expect the actual officers did. Avoid all urges to parse them legally. There will be plenty of time to write a brutal exposé after the war.

Both "Move to B14.24 and defend" and "Move to B14.24, establish a defensive position along the creek and be sure to secure the bridge" say about the same thing, but the second wording fully describes the intent more colorfully.

13.1b Orders tightly control HQ movement and establish the Order's overall goals and type. Lower units move and fight as needed to meet its Objectives. (Exception: No Orders. (13.2e))

13.1c Orders can contain instructions for only one main Formation (say, a Corps); it should contain the full Orders for each involved subordinate Formation where needed (its Divisions, Artillery Battalions, and (rarely) Brigades). You can save work by writing a single Order that specifies each lower Formation's instructions. When this Order is relayed as needed, just use the same bit of paper (since it isn't really going anywhere). Just add the recipient, sender, and time data as needed to account for each recipient.

Example — Sending Orders down the Chain: An order to a corps has instructions for a specific brigade in it. That order must be first reissued from the corps to the appropriate division and then, again after the Division Leader accepts it, from the division to the brigade as they are the ones expected to fulfill the order. Be careful … it's easy to lose control!

13.1d Preliminary Movement Instructions. While an Order can give only one major type, Attack, Defensive, and Reserve Orders allow "Preliminary Movement Instructions." These allow Formations to travel to their Attack jump off points, Defensive area of operations, or the location to wait in Reserve.

It is not a separate Move Order and need not be accepted in addition to the main Order. Actual Move Orders cannot specify some sort of inverse of the form "in addition to moving, do this Attack… etc."

But to be clear, when moving as part of an Attack Order, the possibility of Fluke Stoppage (13.6h) does not "wait" until the Formation is in position — you have an Attack Order and start checking normally from the start of movement.

13.2 Order Types (Complete)

Each Order's type gives clear instructions about execution & mission constraints and defines the mission's goals & objectives.

Play Note: Orders control the large-scale movements and missions. With few requirements, units function as desired within the intent of their Orders and do not need separate Orders to do so. Telling the Corps to "attack and capture the hill near A23.12" is plenty — what the 14th Wisconsin will do during this need not be written out. Once the Corps is in position to start, units function as needed (given normal rules, especially Command

The available Order types are:

Attack. Attack Orders (13.2a) instruct friendly troops to attempt to seize enemy-held ground (actual or just suspected) and damage his Combat Units.
Move. Move Orders (13.2b) involve moving the Formation's HQ from Point A to Point B where no enemy contact is expected. The Formation's lower units tag along to remain in CR and do not need individual Orders to do so.
Defensive. Defensive Orders (13.2c) establish a Defensive Position (DP) where the Formation resists the enemy.
Reserve. Reserve Formations/Units (13.2d) are on standby, ready for rapid action, as needed (given normal rules, especially Command Radius) to execute that Order. Stand-alone Reserve Orders set aside Formations for use when needed. Reserves within an Attack Order to obtain the Fluke Stoppage Table's "Reserve Modifier" (13.6h) helps attacking Formations remain in action longer.
No Orders. No Orders (13.2e) is a default when a Formation has no accepted Orders at all. It is not an order per se, but rather that lack of any one of the above orders plus a limited defensive ability. (Important: Formations in No Orders have their CRs Halved (13.2e).)

Some historical Orders, however, defy these simple categories. The "Designer Exemption" allows the designer to write scenario Orders in ways that follow history, but which use constructions that you cannot.

13.2a Attack Orders. Attack Orders allow the Command to both Move to and seize contested terrain (whether enemy occupied or not at that moment). Offensive operations always require Attack Orders. Attack Orders normally require "Reissues" down to the Division level. Attack Orders can be used to avoid the Move Order "Column" requirements (at a higher Fluke Stoppage risk — which might generate a sluggish caterpillar "start, stop, then start again" effect). Units with Attack Orders may be given Preliminary Movement Instructions (13.1d).

(Important: A Corps Leader must separately "Reissue" his Attack Order to each of his affected Divisions. The turn the Corps Leader Accepts the Attack Order, he must 'Reissue' it. This is automatic: Reissues need no sending Command Roll and the Corps Leader can Reissue any number of Orders to the involved Divisions the turn he Accepts it. Generally, these are delivered the next turn. Compute Reissue Order delivery times normally if the distance is unusual. Each Divisional Leader must Accept his Orders independently by a separate Command Roll before beginning to follow them. However, unless Conditions (13.4b) exist, each Division starts functioning immediately once its Leader Accepts it — regardless of other Divisions being ready or not — he cannot wait. This may occur before other Divisions have even gotten (let alone Accepted) their Orders.)

Attack Orders must contain a:

Starting Location. An 'LD' — Line of Departure — in modern terms.
Route to get to this LD.
Reserve (if desired) (13.2d).
Axis of Advance. The direction from the LD to the Objective.
Objective. The terrain to capture.

Axis of Advance. Each Attack Order must list an 'Axis of Advance' from the Line of Departure to the Objective. The direction can be based on map features (such as a road, hill, or (ahem) Clump of Trees) or simply a hex grid direction. The Axis of Advance must be straight unless following a printed map feature. Changes to the Axis of Advance requires new Orders or Initiative.

Ending Attack Orders occurs in two ways:

The command wins control of the Objective. The Command has achieved what the orders directed the force to do. (13.6a)
The player decides that the attack is no longer viable and aborts the Attack Orders (see Aborting Attack Orders, 13.6f).

13.2b Move Orders. Move Orders send a Formation to a new location. They do so by Moving the HQ to some new hex location while the Formation's lower units must Move to maintain CR as well as obey the requirements below.

Commands under Move Orders have no ability to assault the enemy or to defend themselves effectively.
Move Orders require all affected units to enter Column, Mounted, or Limbered Formations, if capable of doing so.
If the Order's route involves a road, its units must follow the requirements in 7.0e (and [7.2 Opt], if used).
Standard Stacking and Terrain effects apply, but the units must be in the appropriate Formation for Movement and remain so until the Order ends (13.6).
Put the Formation's Leaders and HQs at the column's head. Brigade Leaders will be at the head of their own troops while higher Leaders will be with the first Brigade Leader of their part of the Formation.

(Important: Move Orders are never Reissued unless lower Formations require their own specific routes.)

Special Notes for Artillery: All Orders to Artillery Commands are Move Orders. An Artillery Battalion can move to an unoccupied hill and Fire in support of another Command's Attack using a Move Order. If the hill above turns out to be enemy occupied, the Artillery cannot perform its mission, and a Non-Artillery Formation with Attack Orders will need to secure the hill first. If the destination hex no longer allows Unlimbering because of the enemy, see 4.2e (Posting).

Move Orders must contain:

Objective. Usually, the hex or named location intended for the Formation's HQ is enough.
Route to get to that Objective, using roads as much as possible.

Ending Move Orders. The "Ending Order" process (13.6) begins when the Formation Leader reaches the Move Objective. The Leader then decides if the Formation will Deploy or not Deploy.

Deploys. The Order Ends for the Formation once all the subordinate units move to deployment location in accordance with requirements in the Deployment rule (13.7b).
Does not Deploy. The Order Ends when the Formation leader enters the Move Objective hex. If moving along a road, the Formation stacks up on the road to await new Orders.

13.2c Defensive Orders. Defensive Orders lay out the Defensive Position (DP) for a formation. Defensive Orders can be created by the Orders process (13.3), or Initiative (13.4a) rolls. Changing a DP requires new Defensive Orders. DPs may be written for sub-formations (Divisions and Brigades) to allow for better positioning and defending.

Each Defensive Position requires 1) an orientation, 2) a front-line and 3) a left and right boundary. This creates a three-sided position for the defense. The rear of the position is open, restricted by Command Radius only. The Command's units can function freely within this DP given the following: No more than one Brigade of the Command can change from the general orientation of the defense (to refuse a flank, etc.) without the Command's leader getting Initiative to do so. Defensive Orders may have specific DPs included for subordinate formations if that helps clarify the positioning and orientation of the overall formation.

HQs or Leaders without an HQ must move to a location within the three-sided position to establish the CR for the DP. Once they have moved to the DP, they are bolted to the ground and unable to move until they receive new orders or are forced to Skedaddle (13.6e). The CRs of the Formations are used to define the DP limits but be careful to not overextend the Formations.

Units with Defensive Orders can:

Only be inside the Position's hexes but the Formation's Open Order units can move up to 3 hexes outside the Position's boundaries.
Freely Move toward, Fire at, or Charge enemy units which enter their Position.
Build Breastworks within their Position.
Fire at Targets outside their Position but cannot move or Charge outside of it.
Retreat outside their Position. Units forced outside their Position must Move as rapidly as possible back into it.
Follow Preliminary Movement Instructions (13.1d).

When a Defensive Order is written (not Accepted), no hex inside its assigned Position can be w/i 3 of any enemy Combat Unit (ignoring Open Order units).

Defensive Positions are unaffected by other Formation's Positions (friendly or enemy) — they can overlap freely, provided this distance requirement was met when the Order was written.

Defensive Failure occurs in two ways:

The enemy wins control of the Position. This occurs the instant there is no friendly Combat Unit within the Position while enemy Combat Units occupy more than one of its hexes.
The enemy violates the Position BEFORE any friendly units occupy it. The enemy is violating the Position if enemy Combat Units are w/i 3 of any Position hex (they do not need to occupy any hex inside the Position).

When failure occurs, the Defensive Order cease to exist. The Formation must execute the appropriate Ending Orders (13.6g). The Leader can attempt to set up a new defense "further back" away from the enemy via initiative (13.4) or stay in place while in Limited Defensive Status while waiting for new Orders. In addition, the defender can decide that the position is no longer tenable and aborts the Defensive Orders (see Aborting Defensive Orders, 13.6f).

Drill Field Note — How to write orders? As stated in the rules, your orders can be as simple or as complex as you like, given that the required information is there and you can actually follow them within the rules. But one point must be emphasized — the orders only set up a framework for the units to follow, the real game is on the game map between the two sides. You shouldn't be spending a lot of time trying to impress the enemy (who can't even read it) with your literary skills or dazzling flim-flam of order tasks and writing. On top of that, good orders last for hours of game time — important movements and attacks you can play for an extended period. You decidedly do not want to be changing your mind every couple of turns as to what your formations are doing or trying to do. A real situational change requires new orders so you can deal with it and replace obsolete orders. But in general your orders should be robust enough to withstand many uncooperative enemy actions without concern. So, the result is your writing style combined with a robust plan which leads to fairly infrequent order issues with most of your time on the game map executing them. If you are writing every turn like your life depends on it, you'll want to reconsider the above paragraph. Your orders might be too limited and narrow. While we can't all have real subordinates in the game to execute our orders as written, you'll have to make do with the guy you see in the mirror every morning. It's important that you write orders which you can follow days later and which do not leave the flexibility to mutate based on the current situation. Yes, the real subordinates made mistakes in interpretation, but unlike them, your "mistakes" will somehow consistently manage to take advantage of a change in the situation which only occurred 15 minutes ago. Don't do this, it will wreck your enjoyment as well as your opponent's.

Play Note: It is important to avoid overextending formations while maintaining defensive positions. Maximizing the command radius of each formation may restrict their ability to address gaps that arise within the line. More compact formations tend to offer greater resilience and durability compared to those that prioritize increased frontage. Ideally, each formation should maintain a strength of approximately 400 men (6-8 SPs) per hundred yards (hex) and be supported by dependable brigades on both flanks, with an additional reserve available to reinforce compromised units as needed.

13.2d Reserves. Reserves are Formations set aside for more rapid future use and frequently as an attack's backup. "Rapid future use" is the result of the Reserve Release Command Roll DRM (which does not apply for 'having' or 'making' a Reserve, only for Releasing it). A Reserve is in readiness for any action needed. Any size Formation can be put into Reserve. Reserve Orders can define and execute Preliminary Movement Instructions (13.1d).

Creation: Reserves are established by Orders. You can issue Orders that do nothing but create a Reserve. However, normally Reserves are established within another Order (such as an Attack Order). The next higher Leader for the Reserve (the Division Leader usually) can also establish a Reserve via Initiative.

When a Leader Accepts (or creates) a Reserve Order, the Reserve exists instantly — no lower Leader need Accept it.

Requirements: All of a Reserve Formation's units must:

Stay in Column, Mounted or Limbered formation (if they have these options).
Stay in hexes where enemy Small Arms cannot Fire upon them, moving as needed to maintain this.
NOT be Disorganized, Routed, or Wrecked.

Release: A Reserve exists until it is "Released." Release only occurs when:

A new Order is accepted which does not list that Reserve.
The next higher Leader (Division Leader, usually) uses Initiative (including the special "Release Reserves" DRM) to Release them and instructs them what to do. There is no need to roll to Accept the Release Order; it is Accepted automatically.

Reserve Leaders cannot self-Release. Reserves Released as part of a Defensive Order can counterattack, but only within the confines of that Position.

Fluke Stoppage DRM: Reserves help a Division's attack by providing a DRM on the Fluke Stoppage Table (13.6h). It does not need to "do anything" to obtain this DRM; it must be in Reserve (following the requirements above) and be of the size below. (The Reserve Fluke Stoppage DRM does NOT apply on Night Turns.)

Size: The minimum Reserve required to obtain the Fluke Stoppage Table DRM for a Division of:

3 or more Brigades is one Brigade.
1 or 2 Brigades is one full-strength Regiment. (Note: If a Regiment is composed of multiple units (i.e. -a and -b units) then all units of the Regiment must be in Reserve to qualify as a one full-strength Regiment.)

13.2e No Orders. A Formation in No Orders is considered in Limited Defense Status. Its HQ (or Leader if no separate HQ) is "bolted to the ground" and cannot move, locking down their CR. The Command's units, however, move and/or fight normally within the area they currently occupy, but cannot advance (or expand this area) without new orders. Units are not able to build breastworks while under Limited Defense Status but otherwise defend normally. Units are not eligible for the Firer MPs Remaining (9.1e) +1 MP DRM for any small arms combat. There is a +1 DRM on the Morale Table if a unit is required to make a Morale Check while under Limited Defense Status.

Formations in Limited Defense Status have their CRs halved (a Brigade CR would be three hexes and so on).

Play Note: Limited Defense Status is not a punishment for completing your previous Orders, leaving you helpless until new Orders are obtained. No, it represents the normal flow of Command with the Formation expecting new instructions and does not want to or cannot expend the time needed to fully deploy into a strong defense. So, if the situation really needs the Formation to deploy in battleline where it is, the senior Leader can obtain Defensive Orders using Initiative rather than wait for Orders from his higher Command.

13.3 The Order Process & Command Rolls

Orders must be created, arrive at their recipient after the calculated delivery time, and then 'Accepted' (using a Command Roll) by the recipient before being acted upon. Command Rolls use two dice and any applicable modifiers to give a Yes or No result on the Command Roll Table. Unless the Order is an Attack Order, the recipient's Formation acts on the Order starting the turn when it was accepted. Roll for every Order awaiting acceptance once each turn until it is Accepted or the Order is eliminated by some reason.

If the Order was an Attack Order, there is one additional step. When the recipient accepts the Order, the Order must be then reissued to each of his involved Divisional Leaders (these 'Reissues' generally arrive the next turn).

Once a Divisional Leader receives his reissued Orders and Accepts them, his Division begins to follow them. He does not need to wait for other Divisions to accept their Orders.

13.3a Delivery Times. Delivery times are calculated to determine the turn in which the Order will arrive at the recipient. Simply add the following to the current game turn. So, if it is 1:00 p.m. and the Order needs three turns to travel, it can attempt to be Accepted at 1:45 p.m.

All Orders "move" 12 Leader MPs per turn (rounded up). Measure distance from the sender to the recipient. Each end point is either an HQ or the Leader himself (if available, use HQs).

The minimum time for 'distance' (even if the Leaders are in the same hex) is 1 turn.

Only the Army Commander adds 'Awareness' to the time needed. Awareness is given in Game Turns on the Order Delivery Chart and the Game-Specific Rules list each Army Commander's Awareness.

Example — Determining Order Arrival: Say an Order must travel 26 MPs, which is two turns (24 MPs) and a remainder of 2 MPs which is rounded up to give a total time of three turns.

(Exception: Initiative Orders are sent and arrive in the same turn (unless they apply to a different Leader, then use the 1 turn minimum).)

Awareness in Older Games: NbH and the RSS games (THG, TTS, AFS and SM) will list the Awareness for all Army Commanders in the LOB Game Specific Updates document found in The Gamers Archive on the MMP website.

13.3b Existing Orders. Use the Ending Orders (13.6) processes to handle Orders already on-hand (if any) when a new Order arrives.

RSS Note: There is no Distortion anymore. For NbH 2.2d, execute it the moment McClellan's initial Order to Sumner obtains a "No" Command Roll result.

13.3c Command Rolls. Command Rolls are made to create and accept Orders (regular or via Initiative) using the Command Roll Table. The table is simple: Roll two dice, add the Leader's Command Value plus any other applicable modifiers, and read a result of either Yes (successful) or No (failure).

Restrictions and requirements:

Leaders must make successful Command Rolls to issue or accept a new Order. Even the Army Commander must make one to issue an Order, but it is unlikely he will ever need to accept one!
A Leader can only make ONE Command Roll per Command Phase and that Command Roll can be for ONLY ONE purpose. If you have multiple items to address, you'll only be able to do one each turn, and you must do any required ones first. (Yes, using that one Command Roll for a normal Orders purpose means that Leader will not be able to use it for Initiative in that same game turn.)
Each Leader (even the Army Commander) MUST be in his own HQ's CR (if any) to make a Command Roll. (Exception: Leaders can roll for Initiative anywhere.)
A Command Roll is needed to create any Initiative Order (13.4), but no Command Roll is needed to accept a self-issued Order. A Command Roll for acceptance is required if the Initiative Order is sent to another Leader for execution.

A Yes result allows the Leader to do one of the following:

Issue one Order.
Accept one Order and begin acting upon it.
Accept one Order and Reissue it to all his affected sub-Formations.

A No result's effect depends on that roll's purpose:

If to Issue an Order, the Leader may choose to try again next turn.
If to Accept an Order, the Leader MUST try again each turn until that Order is accepted or is replaced by another.

Example — A Narrative of an Elaborate Order Issuing Cycle: 1) The Army Commander issues an Attack Order to a Corps. He is in his HQ's CR and has not used this turn's Command Roll ability. If he were not in CR or had already used his one roll, he cannot make the needed roll to issue the desired Orders. If the Command Roll was unsuccessful, he can try again (once a turn) until he is successful, if desired (trying again for the Army Commander is not mandatory). If he is successful, he jots down what the Corps and its sub-Formations are to do and notes its delivery turn. The Army Commander has a 'Normal' Awareness (2 turns) and the two HQs are 23 MPs apart. 23/12 rounded up gives 2 turns for distance. So, the Order arrives at its destination in 4 turns (2 for Awareness and 2 for distance). It was issued at 7:30 a.m. and needs 4 turns to arrive, so it arrives at 8:30 a.m.

2) The Corps Leader gets the Army Order at 8:30 a.m. Assuming he is in his HQ's CR, he makes a Command Roll to Accept it. If he is successful, move on to step 3, otherwise he must repeat this step each turn until successful. When the Corps Leader Accepts his Order, he Reissues it to each of his affected Division Leaders in that same Command Phase (because it's an Attack Order). Creating these Reissues does not require a Command Roll. Jot down any additional instructions needed for each Division and forward the Orders to each, noting the delivery turn like the Army Commander did in step 1, but without any turns needed for 'Awareness.' Determine the distance from the Corps HQ to the Division Leader (at that moment) for each Reissue. So, following one of the reissued Orders, if the Corps HQ is 10 MPs from a receiving Divisional Leader, a Reissue at 8:30 a.m. would arrive the next turn, 8:45 a.m.

3) At 8:45 a.m., the Reissue arrives at the Divisional Leader who must make a Command Roll to Accept it before beginning to implement his part of the Corps Order. Like all the others, the Divisional Leader must be in CR to do so and must successfully Accept the Order before he can start to follow it. Each Division will begin to execute the Corps Order independently when Accepted. No Division needs to Reissue the Orders from Corps to any lower units (experts can identify the few and very unusual circumstances which might require them, but those merely confuse players just starting out). The Corps HQ, itself, would start following any instructions it has when the first Division Accepts the Corps Order.

(This section includes a diagram of an Order involving a Corps attack with Re-issues to subordinate Divisions and Artillery Battalions — using Longstreet's Corps attack of July 2nd, 1863 as the illustrative example, with dummy hex numbers that do not correspond to the actual game map.)

13.4 Initiative and Conditional Orders

13.4a Initiative. Initiative allows Leaders to create their own Orders for the limited purposes listed below. Leaders make Command Rolls to create Orders either for himself OR to send to one of his subordinates. You can roll for Initiative any time in your Player Turn you find the need (not just in the Command Phase). Leaders can only roll for Initiative once per Player Turn AND only if they don't violate the 'Layering for Success' rule. (Important: The Army Commander, however, can never use Initiative.)

Self-Issued Initiative Orders arrive immediately and do not require any Command Roll for Acceptance — the Leader can act on his own Order that same turn. If he fails, however, he can try again next turn.

Initiative Orders sent to a lower Leader use the Order Delivery Chart (there is no Awareness modifier), to determine the turns needed to deliver, and then handle Acceptance normally (the subordinate does need a successful Command Roll to begin to execute the Initiative Order).

Initiative Orders are restricted specifically to:

Generate a Move Order for an Artillery Battalion.
Modify an existing Attack Order's starting point(s) or Axes of Advance OR a Move Order's Routing, but NOT the Objective of any Order.
Generate a Defensive Order.
Establish or Release a Reserve.
Generate a Move Order specifically to move back into CR (3.3f)

(Important: Initiative cannot use "Layering for Success" (i.e., rolling for Initiative at multiple levels to affect the same units — even if that wasn't your intention). To avoid this, only ONE Leader may roll to generate Initiative Orders affecting a given Formation. So, if a Brigade Leader rolls (and fails), that action precludes his Division Leader from rolling to obtain Initiative that would affect that Brigade and vice versa.)

Play Note: While it is not necessary to write an Order before each Initiative attempt, a player should decide what he wants to do before rolling.

Play Note: These rules greatly restrict what you can do with Initiative. They are for very routine affairs or to deal with emergencies. This avoids the "freedom" of lower Leaders to ignore the Army Commander and do whatever they want. It is much more realistic to command an Army following your planned orders and respect the Chain of Command.

13.4b Conditional Orders. While you cannot run operations using a clock (20th century staff procedures), you can designate a few starting Conditions for your Orders.

Allowed Conditions:

Before First Light (two Night Turns before the day's first Twilight Turn).
First Light (the day's first Twilight Turn).
The same time as another friendly Formation begins executing its attack.
A 'period' (hour or half-hours, only) after another Formation begins executing its attack.

(A Condition is the EARLIEST an Order can begin to roll for Acceptance.)

Design Note: This rule's purpose is simple: It keeps players from writing and rewriting Orders all night. Just issue the Orders you want for the new day — better to not waste playtime on

13.5 Special Orders Situations

13.5a Orders and Reinforcements. You can send Orders to Formations which have not yet arrived on the game map. Calculate any normal delay to the hex where the Leader will enter the map. Ignore any speculation as to how far off the game map the Leader might be at that time. If the Order arrives there before he does, it waits in that hex for him. Beginning on the first Command Phase he is on the map, attempt to Accept the Order. Off-map Leaders cannot issue, Accept, or Reissue Orders nor use Initiative.

Design Note (continued): night turns. Obviously, to make the Conditional Order of "Before First Light" happen, the needed Orders will need to be issued before Midnight. But hilarity might ensue in the Acceptance of those orders (with no ability to intervene) in the pre-dawn hours. Ask Braxton Bragg about that one. As Jerry Axel says: Many things can happen at night, all of them bad.

Play Note: In multiday scenarios, the 2-hour no-Fluke Stoppage grace period starts anew with the two Night Turns before the new day's first Twilight Turn.

13.5b Midnight Orders and Twilight. The Army Commander can write any number of Orders on the Midnight Turn but cannot issue any additional Orders after Midnight until the first morning Twilight Turn. This Midnight 'order burst' ignores the 'one Order per turn per Leader' rule and requires no Command Rolls. There is no need to compute delivery times and other delays (enough time exists for the Order to go anywhere). Deliver all Midnight Orders and begin rolling for Acceptance just before morning's First Light (two Night Turns before the day's first Twilight Turn).

All other Leaders cannot issue, Accept, or Reissue any Orders which were issued at Midnight. Initiative and any Orders sent before Midnight (even if they arrive after Midnight) are not restricted in this period.

13.6 Ending Orders

All Orders end. The cases below identify the types of End of Orders events, along with the Ending Orders Steps (13.7) that are required to be accomplished and in which order. (Note that some events occur in the enemy Player Turn and are the steps resolved immediately.) As the steps may differ from one event to another, it's important to apply only those called for and in the prescribed order. Execute as many steps as you can (it could be all of them) before returning to the interrupted Activities. If you miss a required dice roll or the process cannot be done until a specific Phase (e.g. Recovery, 13.7c), return to regular Activities. Continue the next process steps in the next turn or when the correct Turn Phase allows.

Some situations dictate when new Orders can be Accepted. New Orders can be issued and arrive at any time following the normal Phasing requirements. They just can't be Accepted until the correct step occurs.

13.6a Attack Order (OBJ taken). The enemy is no longer contesting OR player has determined that the Objective has been taken. In the next friendly Command phase, the Command's Attack Orders are canceled, the Command automatically accepts Limited Defensive Status and the HQ (or Leader if no HQ) must bolt to the ground.

Eliminate current Order and change to No Orders (13.2e).
Deployment (13.7b).
New Order Acceptance.

13.6b Move Order (OBJ reached). The head of the Column enters the OBJ hex. If the player decides to not Deploy, then the formation will halt in place. However, the Formation may Deploy instead of halting in place (13.7b). Afterwards, the formation will:

Eliminate current Order and change to No Orders (13.2e).
New Order Acceptance.

13.6c New Orders. There are two cases of new Orders arriving:

While NOT under Attack Orders. The formation will immediately upon order arrival: Eliminate any other Orders waiting for Acceptance and change to No Orders (13.2e); Deployment (if desired) (13.7b); New Order Acceptance.
While under Attack Orders. The formation will immediately upon order arrival: Eliminate any other Orders waiting for Acceptance; the new Orders wait (and do not undergo Acceptance) until the attack ends by its own success or failure.

Play Note: For 13.6c and 13.6d, units fulfilling new Orders can exit EZOCs, but if they enter EZOCs later in that move, those EZOCs apply normally.

13.6d New Initiative Orders. If a formation leader creates new Initiative Orders, then the formation will immediately:

Eliminate any other Orders waiting for Acceptance.
If the Initiative Orders changes the current attack's planning or operations, implement it right now.
If the Initiative Order requires something different from the above, the Initiative Orders wait until the attack ends and the Formation can accept new Orders.

13.6e Skedaddle. A "Skedaddle" (soldier's slang for "running away") represents units moving out of harm's way without orders to do so. Whatever its cause, a Skedaddle is a controlled event — not a Rout — though it might be unplanned by higher commanders.

Eliminate all Orders (current and awaiting Acceptance).
Withdrawal (13.7a).
Deployment (13.7b).
No Orders (13.2e).
Recovery (13.7c).
New Order Acceptance.

Skedaddles only occur when an HQ:

Has enemy Line or Mounted units enter its hex.
Retreats along with other friendly Combat Units from enemy Small Arms Fires.
Retreats because of a Collision (10.3c) due to the Retreat of other friendly units.

Special Cases:

Only actual HQs can be forced to Skedaddle, never a Leader filling in for one.
If the Army HQ triggers a Skedaddle, only those troops directly attached to the Army HQ must Withdraw (13.7a).

Drill Field Note — What is a Skedaddle? In many ways a Skedaddle is like Rout, except it is under the control of its leaders and an organized withdrawal of the Formation's units to form a new line, take stock of the situation, and get things fully back under control. In a way, a Rout is from the bottom up, while a Skedaddle is from the top down. The net result is the same — the Formation pulls back and is non-functional for a time as it gets its act back together.

Play Note: When a Skedaddle begins, the HQ must immediately move to its new location. The Formation units will not be able to follow until their next Activity Phase.

13.6f Aborting an Order. You can 'Abort' Orders you already have underway. The procedures required depend on the Order type being "Called Off."

Only the Active Player can Abort an Order and it must be done before any of the affected units begin to execute their Activities. Only the Leaders which Accepted the Orders can Abort — and they do so independently.

Listed below are the procedures to use when Aborting an Order as well as common reasons for doing so. Only use an Abort if a valid reason exists. If a reason isn't listed as either valid or not, apply your best judgment.

Aborting an Attack Order:

Eliminate all Orders (current and any awaiting Acceptance).
No Orders (13.2e)
Recovery (13.7c).
New Order Acceptance.

Valid Reasons: You consider the Attack futile and unable to take its Objective; Other Formations which were expected join in the attack did not participate; The enemy has abandoned the Objective and attacking it is no longer necessary.

Invalid reasons: You consider the Objective no longer worthwhile or "the smart game thing to do."

Play Note: The difference between the valid "futile" reason and the invalid "not worthwhile" reason is the difference between an attack the player cannot win vs. one he no longer wants to win.

Aborting a Move Order:

Stop in Place.
Remain in Column.
Await New Orders.

Valid Reason: The enemy occupies or is close to the Objective or blocks the route to it.

Invalid Reason: You changed your mind and want to go to the original location by a different route or just go to a different location.

Play Note: A reminder that Initiative should be used to change the route of march in a Move Order while still maintaining the Order to move to the new location. Aborting a Move Order is to cancel the movement entirely and waiting for New Orders.

Aborting a Defensive Order:

Eliminate all Orders (current and any awaiting Acceptance).
Withdrawal (13.7a).
Deployment (13.7b).
No Orders (13.2e)
Recovery (13.7c).
New Order Acceptance.

Valid Reason: The Formation's defense cannot hold back the enemy attack and must Withdraw and reorganize.

Invalid Reason: To move to another location.

13.6g Defensive Failure and loss of Senior leader (4.1a). Both follow the same procedures.

Eliminate all Orders (current and any awaiting Acceptance).
Withdrawal (13.7a).
Deployment (13.7b).
No Orders (13.2e)
Recovery (13.7c).
New Order Acceptance.

13.6h Fluke Stoppage. Fluke Stoppage represents exactly what the name suggests: Something happened to derail the attack. Regardless of the cause, the Division falters.

Drill Field Note — What is Fluke Stoppage? Fluke Stoppage is anything that causes an attacking Formation to be caught short. A key leader getting a near miss that takes time to shake off, lower units misunderstanding confusing commands, a sudden decision in the minds of the men that what they are doing has failed — or cannot be done — regardless of what their leaders think is the case, and so on. Obviously, the longer the Division is attacking the more opportunities and likelihood of some "fluke" event occurring. None of us can predict what might fail (hence "Fluke") but the overall effect is almost always the same: a delay or end to the current offensive action. An unwelcome "Bolt out of the Blue" is a fine way to think of it.

Procedure:

In the last Segment of each Command Phase, each Division with Accepted Attack Orders (which have met any starting Conditions) must check the Fluke Stoppage Table. Each check is completely independent of any previous results.

First, make a Base Check by rolling two dice plus any applicable modifiers. Compare to the Table's value to determine the result. On a Pass, no Fluke Stoppage occurs and do not make a Failure Roll. On a Fail, make a Failure Roll with two dice and add any applicable DRMs.

The Failure Roll's result will be either Fluke Stoppage (Initiate the Ending Order Steps right then) or not (which ends the check).

(Grace Period: Make no Fluke Stoppage Rolls (13.6h) in the first 8 turns (2 hours) of play unless the scenario specifically states otherwise.)

Design Note — Grace Period: This Grace Period exists as short scenarios might implode if the attacking units Fluke too soon. Once the ball is well underway, however, an odd Fluke Stoppage is just part of war's unpredictability.

Special Cases:

Units unassociated with any Division or Brigade, and Non-Combat Units, never roll for (or are affected by) Fluke Stoppage.
A Brigade executing its own Attack Order checks for its own Fluke Stoppage. Apply the procedure above using the Brigade Leader instead of Division Leader. Brigades are always "Divisions of one Brigade" for Reserve purposes.
Divisional Fluke Stoppages have two main cases with different handling: one for a Division actively attacking and another for one still conducting an approach march.
The Failure Roll uses the Divisional Leader's Morale Value as a modifier, but the Corps Leader uses his Command Value.
Fluke Stoppage Reserves (13.2d) (needed for the DRM on the Fluke Stoppage Table) have the following requirements: A Division of 3 or more Brigades must have one complete Brigade in Reserve. A Division of less than 3 Brigades must have one full-strength Regiment in Reserve. A Formation requires a Reserve of the same type. An Infantry Division requires an Infantry Brigade in Reserve, etc. Artillery Formations cannot use (or serve as) Reserves for this purpose. The Reserve cannot contain any Disorganized, Routed, or Wrecked Regiments.

Design Note: The required Leader Ratings for the Fluke Stoppage Table might seem odd at first, but it reflects the different jobs of leaders at different levels. The direct commander (normally the Division Leader) is motivating the troops by example (his courage) while his superior (the Corps Leader) is supporting the attack by marshalling resources. The Corps Command Value was added to show the good effects of an excellent commander vs. the failings of a lackluster one. However, the Divisional Morale Value merely replicates the old table's probabilities.

Fluke Stoppage can happen to either SOME (but not all) of a Command's Divisions or to all the Command's Divisions.

Play Note: Units in column at any distance or in line beyond 10 hexes from enemy units should be considered "on the approach March" for purposes of determining which Case to use.

SOME but not all of a Command's Divisions are dealt with in one of two cases.

Case A: In Combat. Division is currently attacking and engaging in Small Arms Fires. See note below regarding current Orders; Withdrawal (13.7a); Deployment (13.7b); Recovery (13.7c).

Case B: On the approach March. Division has not yet begun its attack and is not suffering Small Arms Fires. See note below regarding current Orders; Stay in position; Recovery (13.7c).

(Note: The Command's 'Current Order' remains in effect (but cannot be acted upon) until completing all steps. At that point, the 'Current Order' must be acted upon again, instantly.)

ALL of a Command's Divisions: Eliminate all Orders (current and those awaiting Acceptance); Withdrawal (13.7a); Deployment (13.7b); Recovery (13.7c); New Order Acceptance.

If at any point, the "ALL of a Command's Divisions" applies, follow all its steps instead, starting from the beginning. Redo any procedures even if the Division has already executed some of them.

13.7 Ending Order Processes

Depending on the Ending Orders (13.6) triggering event, you will need to execute one or more process steps. Each step gives a specific procedure. Start them the moment the 'Event' occurs, in the order listed. Apply the process below as required and start going through each of the listed steps until you either complete the list or must wait until the next turn or a specific later Phase.

When you fail a step requiring a dice roll, try that roll again in the next Activity Phase. If Recovery is needed, you must wait for your next Recovery Segment. Both cases will occur in the next Game Turn. When an Ending Order Process goes on 'hold' like this, go back to the Phase that was already in progress and continue with the normal Turn Sequence.

13.7a Withdrawals. Withdrawals rapidly move Formations to safe places where they can prepare to rejoin the battle. This may seem like the same thing as a Retreat on a far larger scale, but it isn't.

The owning player selects a 'destination' hex which MUST be:

As many or as few hexes to the rear away from the current location of the Formation Leader.
In the direction of the Formation's higher HQ, but through, if it is too close.
Playable, not Prohibited Terrain.
Remain on the map if possible. If not, then the formation is removed from the game. Specific games may allow for return of formations during multi-day scenarios.

The route to this destination hex need not be evaluated. After selecting the destination hex, 'teleport' the Formation's senior Leader to it. Teleporting is exactly what you think: merely pick the counter up and place it in the destination hex. If the senior Leader has his own HQ, bring the HQ with him. All the withdrawing Formation's sub-Formations leaders and units must move each turn towards the destination hex, ending within one half Command Range. Withdrawing units must enter Column, Limbered, or Mounted Formation (as appropriate). (Important: Units outside CR once the Leader teleports are Trapped.)

In an exception to 4.5, a Green unit is allowed to change formation and move in the same activity phase while conducting a Withdrawal.

If playing with the optional Backpedaling rule (7.0h), the unit may move one hex backwards before changing into Column or Mounted thus not triggering an Opening Volley for Facing or Formation change adjacent to the enemy (9.2).

Trapped Units. Units which must Withdraw while not in normal CR must: Allow the units to continue to withdraw OR Have them surrender (place them in the dead pile).

13.7b Deployment. Deployment is a preparation step for a full defense in its current location (after the Formation takes its Objective or after a Withdrawal). Deployment might be at your option. In that case, you freely choose to either Deploy OR remain as is (such as staying in Road Column). If you Deploy, you can arrange the Formation as desired staying at or within half CR for each level. Location, Facing, and proper Stacking Order can be set freely with no MP costs needed or expended.

(Important: Deployment only occurs when required by (or given as an option on) the Order Ending process. Deployment is not a required prerequisite step for a regular defense. A Deployed Formation is NOT following Defensive Orders. It is in Limited Defense Status. Standing around rather than setting up a Defensive Position. Units might wait in Column, rather than form a more defensible Line.)

Once deployed, the units must remain as determined until Recovery ends (if Recovery isn't required, then when a New Order is Accepted) OR there is a Retreat result to execute.

13.7c Recovery. Formations use Recovery to make themselves useful again after being disarrayed by combat. Each Division executes Recovery independently. Until they Recover, the Division is incapable of Accepting new Orders. If the Formation needing to Recover is smaller than a Division, insert its size for 'Division' above and follow the same process. If this smaller Formation is still attempting to Recover when its Division needs to do so, roll for the Division only — the smaller Formation no longer needs to do so separately.

Recovery only occurs in your Command Phase's Recovery Segment each turn. (Exception: All Divisions automatically Recover in the first Twilight Turn each morning.)

Failed Recovery attempts have no effect on future attempts.

Design Note: While they are very similar, the Fluke Stoppage and Recovery Tables are organized differently. Fluke Stoppage occurs only with a failure with both check rolls. Recovery occurs only on a success with both check rolls. In one you are trying to avoid something happening while in the other you actively want something to happen.

Procedure: In your Command Phase's Recovery Segment: do the following for each Recovering Division.

On the Recovery Table: First, make the Base Check by rolling two dice, adding any modifiers that apply. When determining 'Wrecked or Dead units,' ignore all Artillery and Open Order units. On a Fail, there is no Recovery and do not make a Recovery Roll. On a Pass, make a Recovery Roll with two dice modified by the Divisional Leader's Command Value (if listed).

The Recovery Roll result will be either Recovery or not. On a successful Recovery, move on to the next Step required by 13.6 (Phasing permitting). On an unsuccessful Recovery, that Division must try again each subsequent turn until it succeeds.

Full Weapons Characteristics Listing

Small Arms

Weapon Code	Name	Range	Special Capabilities	Examples
B	Breechloading Rifle	4	Breechloader	Ballard, Hall, Joslyn, Wesson
C	Carbine	3	Breechloader	Burnside, Sharps, Smith, Gallager, Merrill, Starr
CR	Colt Rifle	4	Repeater
HR	Henry Rifle	3	Repeater	Henry, Volcanic
M	Smoothbore Musket	2	Buck 'n Ball	Springfield M1842, Potzdam
P	Pistol	1	-	Remington, Colt, Smith & Wesson
R	Rifled Musket	4	-	Springfield M1861, Enfield, Austrian Lorenz, Mississippi
S	Spencer Rifle	4	Repeater
SC	Spencer Carbine	3	Repeater
SH	Shotgun	1	Buck 'n Ball
SR	Sharps Rifle	5	Breechloader	Sharps, Merrill
T	Target Rifle	5	-	Whitworth, scoped muzzle-loading hunting rifles

Artillery

Weapon Code	Name	Range	Canister Used	Designation/Examples
H	12 lb Howitzer	10	Dense	M1841 12 lb Howitzer
hH/hvH	24 lb Howitzer	12	Dense	M1841 24 lb Howitzer
hR/hvR	Heavy Rifled Cannon	30	Normal	20 lb Parrott Rifle
L	Light Gun	14	Normal	M1841 6 lb Field Gun
MH	Mountain Howitzer	10	Normal	M1841 Mountain Howitzer
N	Napoleon Cannon	16	Dense	M1857 12 lb Napoleon Gun-Howitzer
NG	Naval Gun	22	-	32 lb & 8-in Dahlgren Guns
R	Rifled Cannon	30	Normal	3-in Ordnance (Rodman), 10 lb Parrott, 12/14 lb James, 12 lb Blakely
SG	Siege Rifle	30	Normal	4.5-in Siege Rifle, 24/32/42 lb James, 30/100/200/300 lb Parrotts
W	Whitworth	38	-	12 lb Whitworth Rifle

Terms and Abbreviations

Acceptance — The Command Roll to implement a new Order. (13.3c)
Activity — The use of your units to do the Tasks you desire in your Activity Phase. (2.3)
Attack Order — Orders allowing offensive combat operations. (13.2a)
Blood Lust (BL) — A positive Morale State of temporary excitement making a unit less susceptible to adverse Morale effects. Note: BL never lasts beyond the owning side's next Rally Phase. Use it or lose it. (10.2a)
Center Front — The right reading top counter edge of every counter. Used to determine Facing. (6.3)
Counter Battery Fires (CBF) — A marker which reduces enemy Artillery effectiveness. (4.2l)
Charge — Combat occurring closer than 110 yards. Melee combat might ensue, but for the most part, a Charge is just a Firefight at very close range. (11.0)
Closing Roll — An abstract measure of units "cowboying up" to get near the enemy. (7.1)
Combat Units — All Infantry, Open Order, Sharpshooter, Cavalry, and Artillery units. (1.3)
Command — A Formation containing a Leader, HQ, and all the subordinate Leaders and Formations & units under their control. These typically consist of Infantry Corps, Artillery Battalions, and Infantry Divisions. (3.1)
Command Radius (CR) — The distance from an HQ or Leader to the units under his Command. (3.3)
CR Tree — The pattern produced by a Command's units including all lower Formations, showing the correct use of CRs. (3.3)
Control — The player controls a hex if his units occupy the hex or were the last to move through it.
Consolidation — Assembling small or damaged units to flesh out the depleted strength of larger units within a Brigade. In effect, the Brigade's crippled Regiments are 'Brigaded' to fight as one larger Regiment. (1.3e)
Decreasing — This means that a Morale State becomes 'worse' than it is currently. (10.2)
Defensive Orders — Orders to defend a specific area. Defensive Orders can be issued normally or can be self-issued by Initiative. (13.2c)
Disorganized (DG) — A Morale State where much control has been lost due to confusion. (7.0f) (10.2d)
Die Roll Modifier (DRM) — Die (Dice) Roll Modifier. A value added to (or subtracted from) the dice.
Enemy Zone of Control (EZOC) — An enemy unit's Zone of Control. (6.4)
— A Stack's hexside map orientation using each counter's Center Front edge. (6.3)

v2.0 Designer's Notes (abridged)

The first question I want to answer is exactly how and why Line of Battle came about. In late 2006, Bob Cloyd (then CWB and RSS Honcho) decided to move on to other work. As a result, the current draft of a rules consolidation landed on my desk for finishing. While I was busy with other series, I was also deep into the preliminary design work for None but Heroes, the RSS Antietam game, I knew I needed to get the Series Rules ready.

At first, I merely wanted to give the existing draft Rules a full hard edit — but it soon became obvious that numerous design decisions that I had made 20 years earlier in the CWB needed re-examination and could be done in simpler & faster ways. I set a goal of making the system play faster while still being an improved model of Civil War combat. Before long these changes became too extensive to merely be an update and the new system was awarded a separate name: Line of Battle.

For example, the consolidated "Activity Phase" was the result of attempts to integrate Fire and movement and better replicate the historical "rat fight" feel. Under RSS, the attacker would march up to the Defenders, and watch his line get devastated by defensive Fires while his troops patiently waited to fire with whatever troops remained. While there is no denying the historical "Defender's advantage," the net results were too extreme and explicit. Players reacted accordingly such that all battles took on the appearance of Petersburg. Some responded in terror at the prospect of closing with even a mildly superior defensive line. They would, instead, generate an extremely thin line they could use to edge around the enemy position. Players vied to win this 'line extension' contest in order to "flank" the enemy and had no interest in closing with the enemy line until they had to (at which point, the enemy would run away). This was only "safe" because the enemy couldn't attack either. The model simply failed to show the swirling fights that occurred in the mobile battles I wanted to simulate.

The change to integrated Fire and Movement allows the attacker to mix it up with the defender (who can return the favor in his own turn). This required two new rules: Closing Rolls and Opening Volleys.

Closing Rolls added friction and uncertainty to the Phasing Player's movements — good units were more likely to go where you needed them, while poor units might not do so. This both breaks up the "perfect" formations your troops were expected to use and throws a monkey wrench into the perfect results that were expected. Units get embroiled in Firefights, losing their ability to continue to close, and poor morale units give unpredictable behavior. This gives covered approaches a value.

Opening Volleys replaced the crusty Defensive Fire Phase by executing "defensive Fires" in an abstract manner only when needed and in a brutally simple way. The defender's advantage is still there, but it is localized, uncoordinated, and only the product of the Phasing Player's triggering actions.

The original defensive Fire sequencing allowed a "fade back" defense forcing the attacking player to forever try to close with the defenders. The current integration of Fire and Movement, along with Closing Rolls and Opening Volleys, allows attacking troops to develop the situation and take advantage of its results in the same Phase. Proper play now involves massing troops at critical points and the use of reserves.

The defender, meanwhile, must vigorously slug it out with the attacker in an "active defense." This puts a premium on maintaining a strong solid line (which requires reserves as losses accumulate) and the possibility of pulling back to reform a tighter, shorter line somewhat to the rear. Counterattacks to blunt attacker incursions are a must — sitting passively can be suicidal. "Just staying" might ruin a Formation for any future use — the cost of holding too long is always in the back of the defender's mind. No rules needed.

Meanwhile, the attacker needed a system which stops his attack in spite of "the good" circumstances and positive events. This became Fluke Stoppage, an outgrowth from the earlier "Corps Attack Stoppage." Attack Stoppage did the same job using two parts: simple chance and grinding the Formation into the ground. Obviously, simple chance is just a roll of the dice, but "grinding the Formation into the ground" was, in effect, a literal requirement before anything happened. On top of that, required extensive bookkeeping was needed to know when this rare event actually happened. Eliminating all those records and the player's work to do them (relying on a few key modifiers) and relying on the 'simple chance' did almost everything, but without the fuss and effort.

Similarly, excess work and systems were removed from the Command system to streamline play. I eliminated the Order Point system as well as the minor matters of Written vs. Oral Orders and such. The Order Points existed for those very rare times when you had numerous orders to send, but not enough time to do them. The Acceptance Table became another function of "Command Rolls." Orders are Orders now, except for the mechanical distinctions (needed for each purpose) of Attack, Move, Reserve and (in v3.0) Defensive. The Move Order Column requirements still exist to ensure players take the risks inherent when such movements stray too close to the enemy. I did reduce the speed of Order issue based on the Army Commander's 'Awareness.' The rates are still very liberal; you really should not be issuing Orders so fast. It is important that in an unforeseen crisis, the Leader might lose control of events.

Several other changes — large and small — were designed to bring out more Leader variations (the new dual Leader Ratings, for instance), get rid of rarely used rules verbiage (such as Conferences), deleting oddly implemented and frequently confusing rules (Loose Cannon), making the Army Commanders more important (other Leaders having less Initiative to fall back on). I wanted to bring out more strongly how you are the commander; activating the Army Commander was part of that effort.

I slowed the speed of Recovery. It was simply too easy to issue breathtaking, fancy-footwork Orders to put Corps-sized Formations back into the attack mere hours after attacking elsewhere. This makes for much more realistic game play. Recovery allows a chance of getting a Corps to attack again in the same day (depending on the time of day, Leader quality, and a little luck).

With the improved offensive balance and integrated turn structure, a rule was needed to keep units from simply zipping through enemy Fire fans during movement. This required using the long-derided locking EZOC. Units get locked in local death matches and reserves mean something — yet the rule is incredibly simple. It's hard to believe! Sometimes old ideas aren't bad, they are just waiting for the right application.

The streamlining effort attempted to unload all the paperwork overhead. I've already talked about the Stoppage rules record keeping, the rest existed to track the two types of losses units suffered (casualties and Stragglers) as well as the Wrecked status of Regiments. Dave Powell invented an easy way to track Wrecked status: "50% loss? You are Wrecked." I tweaked this during development to "more than 50%" to push the staying power up just a little, but the idea was (and is) a good one that works great.

Tracking Stragglers and casualties was a thornier matter. The only difference between the two was that you could get (some) Stragglers back. I looked at strength Recovery during battle and concluded, for the most part, that men would only return to the ranks at night, after the fighting had died down. The math showed that we could make do with a strength Recovery mechanic involving a single value (1 SP) as few units were large enough for the old additional percentage system to even matter. This breaks down in battles lasting more than a few days (else all the dead will arise!), but such battles (campaigns?) are well beyond the series design parameters anyway.

The new Combat Table tracks exceptionally well with the old one but requires far less arithmetic. Where it does differ, the change is intentional. Firing by stack individually came about as players spent too much time agonizing over how to manage the combinations presented. This change eliminated the decision (beyond deciding to hit the same Target again). While at first blush one might think this doubles the number of Combats, this is not the case. I recorded 100 Combats from actual play; only 14 of them involved multiple Stacks and (of those) 10 were Artillery Fires. The Artillery Leader's 'second and third shot' effect reflects the better Artillery coordination and, behind the scenes, gives them a reward for "combining Fires." The Infantry best "bang for buck" was when Fires weren't combined anyway.

I also made decisions that deal with the thorny issue of Artillery representation that had long plagued RSS.

The new limitations on unlimbering distance from the enemy and freedom (generally) to limber without loss replaces the tricky system RSS added to keep Artillery from acting as "proto-panzers." The unlimbering restriction does not apply Night (or otherwise limited) Visibility and you might wonder why. This was done to keep enemy Artillery from pushing forward after dark expecting to light up the enemy at close range at dawn. As a rationale, remember the Infantry has picket lines forward of its main body to provide security. Artillery just couldn't wander into that area — in the dark — to set up.

A key v2.0 provision precludes Unlimbered Artillery to stack with other unit types. This brings a whole new look at the concepts of Battery location, handling, and supports. Heretofore, "support" meant you stacked your guns with hapless Infantry who would be there to take the losses the guns avoided. Now, you support the way they did it — Infantry keeps the Artillery's flanks secure while the Artillery provides its own frontal protection. The guns are not automatically free from losses, nor will players pat themselves on the back for brilliance because they were clever enough to stack Infantry with the guns. Now, you must allocate the ground footprint the guns need to operate and use Infantry around them for protection.

I deleted the old Small Arms ammunition rules. While not particularly complex, they still managed to take too much attention away from more important matters and forced you to deal in micromanagement. It just wasn't right and the impact on play was too small and rare to be worth keeping around.

While this might seem at odds with the attention expended on Artillery ammunition, it really isn't. Artillery ammunition was an important operational concern — its availability or shortage drove Army level decisions. This starkly contrasts with small arms ammunition. While Regiments can and did run low on ammunition at times, an Army's small arms ammunition supply was essentially unlimited.

For a time, I promoted the Detailed Artillery Ammunition system to be standard rules, but it was eventually replaced with the simpler and faster Depletion mechanic. This came about because of earlier effort and overhead involved. I have John Kisner to thank for bringing it up.

Lastly, I added the Open Order capabilities that developed during the war as well as a distinction between 'small' and 'large' Open Order units. These give life to these tactically interesting little units and for the first time bring out their roles and impact. This allows the development of Cavalry and the Confederate late war "Corps of Sharpshooters."

In summary, I hope you find Line of Battle an advance in the portrayal of American Civil War fighting and adds greatly to both your enjoyment of your games and knowledge of this fascinating era.

A Word of Thanks… There were many who repeatedly playtested these rules, their names in the playtest credits do little justice to the many hours spent going through these rules, playing the RSS games looking for back fit problems. I'd like to single out three. First is Hans Korting. He slaved over every rule edition looking for minor editing problems I needed to fix. The rules would not be as tight and clean were it not for his eagle eyes. The second is Chip Pharr. Longtime supporter and CWB/RSS advocate, Chip came to the project as a skeptic but promised to be an honest broker. While we have had our disagreements and I'm sure some of my decisions rubbed him the wrong way, he stayed true to his word and worked very long and hard to make LoB a great system. Lastly is my youngest son, John Essig. After cutting his teeth on SCS games, he played LoB in all the various developmental stages in small scenarios and large — even playing three This Hallowed Ground campaign games in addition to dozens of first day starts. While only 14 and later 15 years old, he showed a memory for rules wording and the effects and interactions in the system that made his old man proud — and sometimes embarrassed — finding out the kid was right. It was great playing with you, John!

v3.0 Designer's Notes

This is the culmination of the design effort to provide a better American Civil War game system beginning in 1986 using the University of Illinois ROTC detachment as 'playtesters' (guinea pigs really, since they were too green to be effective playtesters), leading to the Civil War, Brigade Series of 14 games. This was followed by the Regimental Sub-System (RSS, 1998) of three games and finally the Line of Battle (LoB, 2011). The whys and so on for this last transition were the subject of the v2.0 Designer's Notes earlier. These v3.0 Designer's Notes discuss the high points of changes made in v3.0 — changes of substance, that is, not the countless wording rewrites or minor grammar/punctuation clean ups. The more complete listing of changes (including more minor ones) is in the v3.0 Crib Notes that follow.

The answer to the first question that I'm sure will come up ("Why do this? Is it needed?") is decidedly Yes. As you go through the major items below, I'm sure you'll notice that each one either adds to the fidelity of the system, corrects something that just wasn't correct before, or both. And that doesn't begin to bring up rules wording that was difficult to decipher, rules that pandered to the rules lawyers among us (by forcing the rest of us to suffer trying to figure out what the rule meant when stripped of all its caveats, rarely applicable exceptions, or just plain unnecessary wordiness), and a rules organization and formatting that paid homage to the past while avoiding becoming cleaner and easier to play.

If I were to make a list of the most significant changes from v2.0 LoB to v3.0 LoB, they would be (in order by my opinion): Movement & Fire Combats; Fluke Stoppage Rates; Ending Orders; Defensive Orders; Preliminary Movement Instructions; Order Delivery using MPs not CRs; Consolidation.

Movement & Fire Combats. (9.1e) While the actual mechanics of Movement and Fire Combat have not changed, there is one matter of relatively great importance (Engagement Times) and some smaller issues (mainly on the Terrain Effects Chart) that need some comment so players can understand the purposes of each.

Engagement Times. First, don't worry about the title here, it isn't a name of something important you missed in the rulebook, it's just a convenient phrase that captures all the ideas involved in fewer words. The ideas being the whole business of "MPs remaining" as well as the ability for Artillery to Unlimber and (sometimes) fire in the same Activity's Move. As was described in the Designer's Notes in the section introducing the rule (9.0 and specifically 9.1e), the whole point here has to do with time.

Mechanically, the rule measures Engagement Times using the MPs the unit has remaining from its MA before it fires. The less it has, the more degraded its fires. This "degradation" is implemented by a DRM on the Combat Table. If the MPs Remaining becomes too low (less than 2 for Line infantry), the unit cannot fire effectively (or, in game terms, not at all).

If one converts the various MAs into time, you see that Line Infantry (MA 6) uses 2.5 minutes per MP, Open Order (MA 8) uses just shy of 2 minutes per MP, and Artillery (MA 10) uses 1.5 minutes per MP. With Infantry, using 100 or 94% of their turn doing nothing but firing actually makes them a bit better than what they could manage in the past (1 column right). 70-75% depending on the unit type would give the normal straight-up fires we had in the past, while using only around 50% to about 40% allows fires, but they are reduced from "normal."

The result is in the end a much more accurate reflection of what the unit can do depending on how much time it dedicated to firing at the target. One flaw in the older version was that if the unit (Line infantry for example) only moved 3 MPs, it could fire at 100% efficiency (the same as if the unit didn't move at all and blazed away for the full 15 minutes). Now, such a unit would fire with a -1 DRM which is much more accurate than assuming its fires were "just as good" as if it hadn't moved at all.

Allowing Artillery to do this "trick" seems to violate the rules ensuring that Artillery doesn't behave like proto-panzers, but the key limitation on Artillery has always been the inability to Unlimber closer than 5 hexes from the enemy which still must be followed. As with the infantry, the key is time. Under perfect conditions, a trained battery was expected to unlimber and be ready to fire in 1 minute. This is only a fraction of the time required in non-pristine conditions to be sure, but the old game required the expenditure of a full 15 minutes before the guns could fire. That's way too much. Here, at an absolute minimum, slightly over 3 minutes must be available to fire at all. That won't be a great shot, but it will be much more in line with the expected time needed to get the battery deployed and put rounds down range.

Hex-type Artillery Formation MP costs. Unlike the more involved idea above, this one is very simple: a difference for the change of Formation of Artillery based on the hex terrain. Obviously, it can range from easy to very difficult (ignoring the P terrain which has no purpose) for artillery to go into (or out of) battery depending on the terrain. For simplicity, we only look at Woods hexes, Wilderness hexes, and "everything else." There can be a case made that Inclined Ground (the second version on the Chart, if not both) should also be included, but the cost to enter the hex plus the "Other" Formation change cost seems to cover it well and such hexes are frequently Wooded as well! Anyway, detaching the guns from the caissons, pulling the teams and caissons out of harm's way, and changing the gun locations for fine tuning are one thing in an open field and another in Woods (let alone the Wilderness). So, as the latter takes more time, it should use more MPs.

Fluke Stoppage Rates. (13.6h) This "change" was merely a revision to the die rolls and the expected values of the Fluke Stoppage Table. It was also a case where the old version gave the "right" results, so why change it?

This was a matter of rates. If you look at the losses sustained in the end of a v2.0 LoB firefight, the values by the end turned out pretty close to the historical expectations, so stopping right there everything seems like it is right. But, if you look at it regarding how long this fight took, you'd get numbers 3 or more times as long. In other words, you got the right number of losses, but it took three times as long to get them (and per hour was one-third the historical rate).

Small increases to the losses on the Combat Table (the occasional fire that gets a +1 DRM for not moving, for example) and the modifiers on Opening Volleys, brought the rate up — but could not stand alone if the fights went on as long as we were used to doing (or the end total would be much higher than it should be). So, to end the fight earlier, a tweak to the Fluke Stoppage Table was needed. So, in the end, the loss totals which were right before (but took too long to get) are the same but happen faster. To the player, this doesn't mean a great deal, except that when the clock is running in an attack, you can't fight in a hesitating and overly cautious manner. Go in with full power! Longstreet's quote was "the best 3-hours of fighting anywhere" not "the best 9-hours of fighting anywhere!"

Ending Orders. (13.6) When I approached v2.0's ending of orders, I was struck by a couple of features. There were multiple processes doing the same jobs (but under different names with their own rules and so on). At the same time there were systems doing double-duty (sloppily) at the end of different types of Orders (or did so after being hijacked from completely unrelated purposes). And lastly some Orders had no instructions about being ready for new Orders. The topic was blank; the Order was over and there was nothing special to be done at all — you just needed new Orders. The latter might be true, but you had no guidance beyond habit.

So, to clean up this mess, I installed "Order appropriate" endings (the end of an Attack is decidedly different from the ending of a movement behind the lines), created several specific process steps which may or may not apply based on the situation, and established several specific orders of these steps, depending on the situation at hand. Functionally, the key to the situation is the Ending Order Process rule. (13.6) Following it allows you, without memorizing a bunch of procedures, to correctly run through the processes the Formation must execute to be ready to take on new Orders. Depending on what was just completed, that complete process might be done in one turn or take more than a few. Nicely, this makes for historical situations that might never exist before which might make the Formation vulnerable and unable to begin anew for a time. The multiple possible statuses make for situations that offer both challenges and opportunities for both sides, providing more interesting game play.

Defensive Orders. (13.2c) Earlier versions in these games (RSS and some CWB games) had Orders to "Defend" which made sense historically and also made it so that a defense was a proactive Order — while before then, a defense was merely the absence of any other Order. This seemed like an unnecessary distinction with the advent of LoB, which assumed that any Formation which was without other Orders, would be — in fact — in a defense.

That thinking changed here in v3.0 as the various procedures and Formation "Statuses" not only allowed for a concrete Order calling for a deployed defense, but the simple lack of orders (awaiting orders, needing instructions after other orders end, and so on) precluded using "No Orders" as a place holder that included defenses as well.

The resulting Defensive Order then allowed for more detail than the system previously used. It had the chance to avoid being the vague "addition of a little color" effects of the abortive RSS and CWB versions. Giving the "defense is just a kind of No Orders" freedoms, one sees movements and realignments which allowed defenders to rebuild their defensive lines while the attacker (who spent all day getting everything going) moved into position with perfect intelligence and timing. Giving the Defensive Order the directional "Position" to hold on the ground, allowed some reaction, but not major ones (short of getting new orders). Sure, the defender can fight freely inside his Position, but if he needs that Position to be on the west side of the ridge, not the east — he'll need new instructions.

Preliminary Movement Instructions. (13.1d) This addition allows many normal "two-part" orders to be used as they historically were. The real leaders didn't always get instructions to move to "this road junction" and then wait for orders as what to do next (most Union orders on 1 July 1863 being good examples of that type). Instead, the order would be given as one item that included both the march to some location and the specific tasks to be done when the force gets there (be it an attack or a defense, usually).

Not only does this make the process more natural, but Fluke Stoppages (of minor effect) will occur. When following the Ending Order rule, all that will happen is that Division will stop its march, non-deployed, and then get going again — a brief cost in time. The bigger time loss occurs with two separate Orders (provided the player doesn't forget to send the second one) when the first one finishes and the wait to accept the second one. The net effect is that of the senior commander acting as if the second order is literally something he never heard of before and must start his preparations from zero — when in fact the order was issued by the Army Commander before the corps left on the march and all that initial acceptance work was done back then — not as the corps made it to the line of departure.

The result of the change is to let the player give orders the way he's thinking anyway, the way the real commanders would handle such matters (Braxton Bragg excepted) and isn't in the way at all unless it is needed. That's all good. If there is a downside to it, I frankly can't identify what it is.

Order Delivery using MPs not CRs. (13.3a) Originally CRs were used to determine the LoB Order delivery times to make the process simpler and faster. However, this resulted in some strange Leader locations to take advantage in what amounted to "table breaks" in the CR distance counts. Rather than rewarding that type of play, the actual MPs used did two things: gave overall distances a more precise measurement of time.

Consolidation. (1.3e) Consolidation is a relatively minor addition to allow the player to keep his house in order. Rather than having four shot up regiments, the available SPs are consolidated (if the conditions are met) into a single regiment of 4 SPs (with two counters instead of eight!). In terms of firepower, the unit is the same as the stack was before. There will be some differences in how the "stack" reacts now (versus how it would have reacted before) when it comes to Morale Checks and Closing Rolls — but a good argument can be made that once a given regiment is so decimated as to be one of its sister regiment's "C Company" it is the consolidated regiment that will be making such checks, not the individual companies in it, so actually the non-Consolidation "old" way was actually too fine a cut to be realistic. Consolidation is more accurate.

v3.0 Changes Crib Sheet

Overall.

Cleaned up small items all over the place. Checked the rules using each, assuming nothing.
Extensive rewrites and reorganization to kill wordiness and vague statements.
Reorganized to make the presentation easier to follow by the Sequence of Play.
All internal conflicts discovered were adjudicated.
Where possible, Essig-ese has been replaced with actual English.
Placed a mention early on that a given rule might be affected by other rules, orders, or what not rather than repeating caveat boiler plate all through the rule book.
Combined rules 'mentions' into the largest sub-group they affected, rather than having them spread out throughout the rulebook.
Tables were re-designed to conform to a dice roll plus DRM format, rather than a mixture of column lookups, column shifts, and DRMs…yet have the same probabilities for results (except for a few specific cells, which were tweaked for excessive results (on the CRT) and excessive minor changes (on the Morale Table). The others converted directly.

LOS.

Added the graphic LOS and formulaic systems.

Leaders.

Zero Leaders must roll to see how much of an MA they have if they have any Orders (except Move Orders).

Orders.

Made Order issue and delivery less dependent on CR and more flexible. Made the measures using Leader MPs with 12 MPs or any portion thereof per turn.
The Leader must be in his CR to make a Command Roll.
Added Limited Defense Status to No Orders to show a Formation has some ability to defend while waiting for Higher HQ orders.
New Orders wait (and do not undergo Acceptance) until the attack ends by its own success or failure.
Wagons do not need Orders, or pay attention to Command Radius, they merely move as desired. Given the nearly instantaneous nature of orders to wagons before, let's not fool ourselves that it was anything more than busy work! This means some players will send their Wagons to the front to replenish batteries rather than sending the batteries to the Wagons (remember, the game isn't called "Supply Leader").
Skedaddles end via Recovery, rather than have a separate method.
All Ending Order processes explicitly state if they are to apply Withdrawal, and/or Recovery. Each function is standardized and applied to more than one specific situation.

Charts and Tables.

Reworked the formatting and use of color on the tables to make them easier to use and generally cleaner.
Adjusted the Opening Volley, Fluke Stoppage, and Recovery Tables to give better Expected Values.
Consolidated the two formats for DRMs used on the Combat and Morale Tables for fires over 10 hexes (they were opposites).
Reworked Closing, Opening Volley, CRT, and Morale Tables so they uniformly act (with similar results) using straight die rolls and DRMs, rather than a mix of DRMs, column shifts, and column entries.

General Cleaning.

I eliminated Artillery "association," some Unlimbered Artillery penny-ante stuff, the merging of Split Units… (has anyone ever done this? I didn't remember the rule existed!), Smallness (Inadequate Frontage). Now when needed it is used in the tables without having to call it something or remember what it needs. The effect of EZOCs on Entry Areas (you must occupy the hex to "block" it), the un-needed Loss Chart rules, the clumsy "by Battery" and "by Caisson" terms and replaced them with "Battery" and "Caisson."
The Stack's top Combat Unit must be its largest single unit.
Cherry-picking SPs is only allowed to allow needed Threshold Value units to Fire.
All units use proportionality for converting MAs from one to another...the exemption regarding Line to Columns is gone.
Added Consolidation.

Better Combat and Movement Integration.

Replaced the concept of Fire-Activities vs Movement-Activities. Made the combination more fluid. Added rules needed for the few times when the original difference mattered.
Replaced the rarely used (and never remembered) Intersection rule with a far simpler one. The "who got there first" rule in [7.2 Opt] remains as is.
Units that begin their move Out of CR can Charge but not Fire. They are not going to get into a long slugging match but rather act on desperation to Charge to save themselves.

Combat.

Firers (including Artillery) have new DRM based on unused MPs — the more MPs available out of the unit's MA, the more time spent firing and the more powerful the firepower DRM used.

Morale.

Deleted the DG and Routed unit "move 10 hexes rather than their MA" rule.
Not a change, but expressly stated that Routed units who fail to Rally must either be at least 6 hexes away from enemy units or they must Retreat to at least that.

Open Order.

Open Order units lose their Open Order Capability when in a Breastworks hex… talk about having your cake and eating it too!
Eliminated the trivia of whether a Stack forcing an Open Order unit to Retire (new term to avoid confusion) stops in its own hex or in the Open Order unit's. It just stops in the hex it was in when the Fire/Charge was announced, and it is not micromanaged "to get just one more hex" like it matters.

Artillery.

Made the Artillery Formation Change cost vary depending on the difficulty of the terrain involved.

Rebuilding.

Changed Attack Recovery to just Recovery (as it has other purposes), Loss Recovery to Rebuilding (to avoid confusion).
Rebuilding automatically gives 1 SP per eligible unit and does not bother with the 25% rate of return at all.

Credits

LoB Design: Dean Essig. RSS/CWR Series Design: Dave Powell. CWR v3.0 Series Development: Bob Cloyd.

LoB Playtesting: Kevin Ankoviak, Chris Anthony, Jerry Axel, Curtis Baer, Norm Bedwell, John Best, Rob Bottos, Daniel Broh-Kahn, Jim Broshot, Chris Bryer, Ryan Caldwell, Dan Cicero, Dan Cochrane, Richard Crowe, Jim Daniels, Jim Dauphinais, Ric Van Dyke, John Essig, Don Evans, Mike Galandiuk, Mike Gebert, Stephen Graham, Brent Griffin, Tim Gritten, Nolan Hudgens, John Kisner, Jim Lauffenburger, Joe Linder, John Maag, Ned Mellon, Curtis Milbourn, Rod Miller, Dave Misner, Jonas Multing, Elias Nordling, Robert Outlaw, Gerry Palmer, Chip Pharr, Gary Phillips, Dave Powell, Mike Riley, Henk Roelant, Nick Roser, Ed Sasko, Mark Shyrock, Bill Speer, Matt Severns, John Stadick, Steve Takacs, Dan Taylor, Keith Todd, Bryan Vannortwick, Dick Vohlers, Zach Waltz, Paul Wegner, Jay White, Brook White, Blake Williamson, Max Workman, Steve Worrell, Rusty Witek.

v1.0 LoB Editing: Hans Korting, Dave Demko, Tim Gritten.

v3.0 LoB Editing & Refinement: Dean Essig, Chris Anthony, Carl Fung, Lionel Martinez, Randy Strader, Rusty Witek, Herman Wu.

Last Chance for Victory Exclusive Rules

The following section transcribes the game-specific rules booklet exclusive to Last Chance for Victory (©2013, Multi-Man Publishing, Inc.), which supplements the Series Rules above with special rules and historical exceptions for the Battle of Gettysburg. Game and Series Designer: Dean Essig. Research Assistance: Eric Wittenberg, Earl Hess, John Heiser, Dave Powell, Jerry Axel. Compilation Map Research and Original Sketch Map: Rick Barber. Proofing: Hans Korting. Playtesting: Christopher Anthony, Jerry Axel, Curtis Baer, Daniel Broh-Kahn, Jeff Coyle, Francis Czawlytko, John Essig, Don Evans, Mark Guttag, Hans Kishel, John Kisner, Joe Linder, John Long, Ben Magnus, Rod Miller, Chip Pharr, Dave Powell, Marty Schaubel, Ken Spuda, Jim Stravers, Dan Taylor.

1.0 Common Special Rules

1.0a Breastworks. The Federal player has 15 Breastwork markers available. The Confederates have none. (Yes, the Confederates did build some limited Breastworks on Seminary Ridge). Federal Breastwork markers can only be built in hexes containing at least a bit of the Woods symbol.

1.0b Map Notes.

a) Farmer names in parentheses are tenants, not landowners. Those without parentheses actually own their land.

b) Vertical Slope hexsides are used to indicate the location of the Railroad Cuts northwest of town. The point there is that units cannot cross them (except in spots where other features allow crossing). Technically, this means that a regiment cannot get stuck inside a RR Cut (but can be destroyed by being forced to retreat through one, which is effectively the same thing), but it also means that the cuts are not represented by some sort of 100 yard across expanse, either. I think the former is a mild price to pay to avoid the latter.

c) The McPherson Quarry (vic N27.25) has no effect on play itself, but the associated Vertical Slope hexside is impassable. Likewise, the seemingly minor McPherson's Pond (N27.27) also provides a blocking hexside.

d) The White Triangular Mileage Markers indicate every 8 MPs along the major routes to ease counting during play.

e) The symbols for the Lutheran Theological Seminary and Pennsylvania College buildings accurately depict the actual period roof of these buildings. (To include not showing the dormers added after the battle.)

f) The various cemetery plots and boundaries on the map have no effect on play.

g) The game comes with the four maps covering the entirety of the main battle area (Maps A, B, C, and D) plus two maps that isolate the primary battle areas of the 1st Day and the 2nd/3rd Days. Combining these two maps allows playing of the entire battle on a two map footprint. The map arrangement chosen impacts both the set up and the Orders of Arrival that are used. Crimping the battle into just the two maps does cause a large portion of the Confederate rear areas (needed for movement between the two maps) to fall off map. When playing the two-map version of the campaign, the Confederates can move between N29.14/N31.14 and S9.23 at the cost of 5 turns. (Optional: To add some uncertainty to this timing — and recreate the historical march of the 2nd Day — at the end of the 5 turns roll one die. On a 5 or 6, allow the force to enter. On any other roll, try again the next turn. Regardless of any roll, the force enters 3 hours after it exited if it has not already done so.)

1.0c Hex Numbers. The grid is divided into two major sections (because of the multiple map configurations that are possible), "North" and "South". The various map possibilities lie atop this grid in a way that reduces confusion as best as possible. Note that the grid was not extended all the way (1.xx through 124.xx) because of the limitations of the type space available.

1.0d The Turn Record Chart. To make an accurate rendition of sunrise and sunset times, the Turn Record Chart guides the player from using the 15-Minute track (most day turns) to the hour track itself before going to the 30-Minute track (most night turns). For example: At 6:00 p.m. in the evening, the player continues to use the 15 Min Track and marker. Once you are about to start the 7:00 p.m. turn, set aside the 15 Min Track marker and use the Hour marker (only) for 7:00, 7:15, 7:30, 7:45, 8:00, 8:15, and 8:30. The next turn after 8:30 p.m. is 9:00 p.m. at which point, the Hour marker will be in the 9:00 p.m. box and the marker used for the 15 Min Track earlier will go in the ":00" part of the 30 Min Track. Use that track normally until the process reverses itself at 3:30 a.m.

2.0 July 1st 1863

For an assortment of reasons, the Battle of Gettysburg began in a very specific way. Since neither Army Commander (represented by the player) is present, much of the opening is out of the player's control. Once the commanders do arrive, they must feel out the situation and proceed with caution. As a result, a number of rules that either hamstring the player or give the player additional "powers" are needed to fit the historical parameters. Yes, this takes some of the early battle's control away from the player, but at that point many circumstances were already in motion that the commander (player) could not foresee or modify.

For players wishing to remove all or some of these conditions (generating what has been termed "Panzergruppe Hill"), they can be lifted at will. The player should be forewarned that this freedom will allow events to happen at a far, far greater rate… probably leading to a complete Federal defeat by the morning of July 2nd at the latest. (Unfortunately a feature of pretty much every Gettysburg title heretofore.)

2.1 Confederate First Day Rules

Sent with orders to avoid a general engagement and expecting to meet only militia, Heth's advance was methodical and cautious. Planning on scattering the "militia" with a little artillery fire, Heth had Pegram's artillery lead the column out of Cashtown. Meeting the Federal cavalry, the infantry deployed a screen of skirmishers who, slowly, pushed them back on their main defense line. Certainly, Heth was not in a rush, he did not know that a major engagement was about to begin, and he also had no idea how critical time had become.

The rules below restrain the player from making use of his hindsight to have the fight play out in a way Heth could not have imagined necessary at the time. Once Lee (the player) arrives and gets a grasp of what is going on, the leash will be loosened.

2.1a Confederate Skirmishers. Heth's Division deployed a line of skirmishers that (slowly) pushed the cavalry videttes in front of them. These are not shown literally, but the units supplying them (three infantry regiments) representing their main body reserves are used to indicate the rough location of the skirmish line. Do not confuse these 'ghost' skirmishers with any sort of actual Open Order unit. These three units ignore Command Radius until Archer starts a turn on Map A (8:45 a.m.) (even if not all of Map A is in play); afterwards Command Radius applies to them normally.

2.1b Deployment. No Confederate unit can move east of the Herr Ridge Road until all units of Arch/Heth and Dav/Heth (minus 11 Miss) begin a turn in Line formation in that road's hexes. From the beginning of the game until the Recon in Force period ends (see 2.1c), no Confederate unit can switch to Column formation once in Line and no unit can move east of the Herr Ridge Road in Column. Artillery, HQs, and Leaders are unaffected by this rule.

2.1c Recon in Force. The turn Heth's units move east of the Herr Ridge Road Recon in Force automatically begins. It constitutes an "attack order" with the following exceptions: a) There are no Fluke Stoppage Rolls, b) Only Archer's and Davis' brigades can attack and c) There is no need to conduct Attack Recovery because of these combats afterwards. No other orders are allowed during this period.

During Recon in Force, Heth (marking the center of his Command Radius) must remain directly on the Chambersburg Pike.

Recon in Force ends at 12:15 p.m., if any Union unit moves west of xx.22 (inclusive), or if the Confederate player "calls off" the attack (per LoB 10.7a). When it ends, all Recon in Force restrictions terminate and so does Heth's "attack order."

2.1d Lee. Lee has "Not so Sure" Awareness. It is possible for his Awareness to jump to "On Fire," see 2.2h.

Lee cannot issue any orders until the turn after Ewell successfully makes his Command Roll (see 2.1e).

Urged to Action. Once able to issue orders and Ewell's order requires Rodes' Division (ignoring Doles' Brigade and the Sharpshooters) to attack southward along and/or west of Oak/Seminary Ridge, Lee can make one order that is implemented immediately. Merely make a Command Roll for Lee. If successful, generate one order to Hill's Corps with instructions for the 3rd Corps divisions and Artillery Battalions on hand at that moment and they can begin to act on that order in the next game turn. This order need not be accepted by other Leaders nor relayed down to any formation.

Lee can only do this once and cannot do it on any turn after he issues any order using the normal system (in other words, if this rule is to be used, it must be used for the first order Lee gives).

Long Nights for Walter Taylor. Lee cannot issue orders at night on July 1st and until 8:00 a.m. on the 2nd, and cannot issue orders (at midnight) on the night of July 2nd (see 2.2h).

Historical Note: Lee was in no position to issue orders on the night of July 1st as the situation and ground was too nebulous to make any major decisions. He attempted to do so on the night of July 2nd, but was unable to get a clear order out to his corps commanders to ensure that the desired operation occurred. This was the result of two problems, both of his own making: the corps commanders were not ordered to HQ to obtain coordinated instructions and his staff was incapable of filling in the gap this mistake created with clear orders. In a game sense, the easiest way to show these failings is to not allow Lee to issue orders during either night.

2.1e Ewell. Ewell can create one order on the 1st for any purpose. Ewell must be stacked with the recipient and make a successful Command Roll. Once he does this, write up the desired order and that order takes effect that same turn. If he fails the roll, he can try again each turn until he succeeds. Note that the order's content affects Lee in 2.1d. If this order applies to Rodes' Division, it can contain separate instructions for Rode's detachment (3.2d).

2.1f Hill's Restrictions. The lack of available recon and Hill's seemingly out of commission status makes it so that Hill's HQ is required to stay directly on the Chambersburg Pike until his HQ enters N26.27 (the top of West McPherson's Ridge). Once it enters that hex, it is no longer constrained by this rule.

Remember, by default, this restricts the ability of Heth and Pender to 'swing wide' in their attack before this location is clear enough to allow the HQ to enter.

This is in addition to the requirement for Heth (himself) to stay on the Chambersburg Pike until the Recon in Force ends (2.1c).

2.2 Federal First Day Rules

Until Reynolds was able to assess the situation to Buford's front, the march of 1st Corps forward was relaxed. The infantry was not expecting a major confrontation. That attitude changed soon enough. Reynolds moved rapidly once he intercepted a messenger from Buford telling him of the urgent situation. He rode through Gettysburg, stopping at the George George (yes, really…) house to obtain directions. Between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. (accounts vary greatly), he met with Buford (possibly at the Seminary, as popularly thought) and then rode forward to observe the field. He began issuing orders at 10:00 a.m., sending dispatches to Generals

2.2a Who Ever Saw a Dead Cavalryman? Keep track of the losses inflicted on the cavalry units (not Calef's artillery) by counting only losses from Opening Volley and the Combat Table (Morale and Retreat through ZOC losses do not count).

If there are one or more losses, roll one die at the very start of the Union player's turn. If the roll is equal to or less than the number of losses, remove all the units of 1/Cav from play. Calef's Battery is unaffected by this roll.

2.2b The Infantry Deploys. The first Union player turn that any unit of 1 Corps will switch to Line formation, if the cavalry has not been removed because of 2.2a, remove them from play as if they had failed the roll. Do this when the Union player expects a unit to switch to Line formation and do it before any cavalry units move or fire. If the player does not remove the cavalry, the infantry cannot deploy into Line that turn.

2.2c Reynolds. His first order, however, is "automatic" to Wadsworth's Division. At 9:30 a.m. the player merely jots down the desired instructions for 1/1 and it is implemented that turn. Reynolds' automatic order cannot contain instructions to attack further west than Willoughby Run.

Reynolds' movement to the front is abstractly handled by the Order of Arrival. This is merely for its informational value, if desired the player can leave him with the troops.

2.2d Double Quick. The following units can take advantage of Double Quick: Reynolds; Doubleday; 1 Corps HQ; 1/1 Division (but not the 7 Ind 2/1/1); 2/1 Division; Hall's Battery; 2/3/1 (only, not 1/3/1 or Rowley).

Just so there is no confusion, Double Quick does not apply to Buford's cavalry, Mr. Burns, or other reinforcements. They all move normally.

To use Double Quick, Reynolds must have issued the automatic order (2.2c) and the Road Column head must be at or north of the Peach Orchard (S9.28) at the beginning of its move. If a particular Road Column has not yet made it to S9.28, those units only move normally.

When Double Quick can be used, the following apply:

The special movement rates are in hexes, not MPs, and road terrain costs do not increase or decrease speed in any way.
If going through town, the Intersection Rule (LoB 1.7g) applies normally and the column must go north on Washington Street and turn west onto Chambersburg Street.
The column cannot divert off the Emmitsburg Road south of N61.35.
While using Double Quick, units move double (2x) their MA in hexes (not MPs.)

No unit can use Double Quick to move into a hex adjacent to any enemy unit. No units can change out of Column or Limbered formation before having ended Double Quick. Units can use their hexes of movement to collapse their Road Column when doing Double Quick (merely move the head of the column a little slower so that the following Road Column markers can catch up).

When it Ends. Double Quick ends for a unit the turn it switches to Line or Unlimbered formation. It ends for leaders and HQs when they finish any move north of N45.xx. On that turn, move the unit (for its player turn) without any Double Quick and move using normal MAs, movement rules & costs allowing firing and Charges. Once a unit stops using Double Quick, it cannot use it again. Do this on a unit-by-unit basis.

2.2e The Iron Brigade Breaks Camp. Iron/1/1 left camp after a short delay that allowed a gap to form between them and Cutler's Brigade. The Order of Arrival provides a die roll to release them. Roll each turn at the beginning of the Union Player Turn until they are released. Until released, the Iron/1/1 units cannot move or change formation.

2.2f Our Man Burns. John Burns can only help morale, he has no Command or Initiative value. He moves as a Leader, but has an MA of only 6. Burns can never lead a Charge or assist a Closing Roll attempt.

2.2g Reynolds' Death. Obviously, the battle would have unfolded much differently without Reynolds' death. Also, no player will ever risk getting this superb leader killed. So Reynolds must die 'on schedule'. Expect the Confederate player to exact a high price for the option that allows Reynolds to live (5.1a).

Buford's cavalry executed a masterful delaying action while falling back on their main defensive line. At that point, they briefly defended the ridge before allowing the 1st Corps infantry to take over the fight. Reynolds arrived and agreed with Buford's decision to hold west of town and began hustling his infantry into line.

Reynolds is unable to issue any orders until 9:30 a.m. When he does so, he will be an acting army commander with On Fire Awareness.

Just so it is clear, Reynolds' death has no effect on any orders that exist at that time.

2.2h Reynolds Picked the Ground: You Get to Defend it. John Reynolds forced the hand of the Army of the Potomac by deciding to fight for time west of Seminary Ridge for the army to concentrate. You must do so as well. (The easy gamer decision, based on hindsight, is to bolt for Cemetery Hill while 1st Corps is intact. I'm not going to let you do that.)

If the Confederates occupy any hex along the road from N30.33 to N36.33 (inclusive) at the end of any Union Player Turn on or before 4:00 p.m. 1 July, the following occurs:

Lee enters "On Fire" awareness for the remainder of the game.
Early and Rodes do not flip to their 0-rated sides.
Lee can issue orders at midnight each day and is not restricted on the morning of the 2nd.

There is no penalty for this happening at 4:15 p.m. or later on July 1st.

Historical Note: After the war, an effort was made to blame the mistakes made on specific leaders (anyone other than Lee) which made for extensive (and rather pointless) blame and counter-accusation arguments for the next forty or more years between the participants and even longer with following historians.

Thereafter (seemingly to make up for this 'Lost Cause' mentality), the pendulum swung hard the other way and gave an image of Lee surrounded by some who knew better, but that he was incapable of making rational decisions and when he did they went against wise counsel and were mistakes. This was done to 'correct' (by tearing down, a popular modern way to handle revered persons of the past) the image of Lee as, what has been called, "the Marble Man."

As is almost always the case, the truth is somewhere in the middle of these extremes.

Several Confederate generals showed two faces during this battle. My notes extensively analyze the conclusions I came to on the sensitive subject of James Longstreet and the not so contentious issue of Richard Ewell. The others can be handled in brief here.

Lee was more cautious than usual as he did not know the ground or the enemy situation as well as he normally did. Also, he (like most everyone else in the Army of Northern Virginia) knew that this battle was the one to potentially win the war. Those two situations combined to slow the decision making process on July 2nd to await the results of the various reconnaissance teams he sent out in the pre-dawn hours. Others have suggested that he was lethargic and "operating in a fog" due to either a heart condition or the effects of Pennsylvanian food. I have to disagree with those assessments. There are options here to test those theories. I think you'll find them in error as the Lee they portray cannot issue the orders he did in the time he used.

Rodes was visibly ill by the night of the 1st and bedridden enough by the evening of the 2nd that he left his division in the hands of its brigadiers who took a vote and decided they could not advance onto Cemetery Hill while Early's men were being driven off of it.

Early (of all people) seems to have become unnerved by the evening of the 1st and was a consistent voice of caution in Ewell's ear for the rest of the battle (and Lee's as well, if his self-centered account is accurate).

A.P. Hill was simply non-functioning for the duration of the battle. Except for brief "Oh, and Hill was there, too" comments, it's almost possible to make an argument that the man wasn't even at the Battle of Gettysburg.

3.0 Confederate Special Rules

3.1 All My Generals

One of the key features of the battle (long a point of contention for historians) was the suddenly balky nature of the Confederate high command — Lee, his corps commanders, and a number of divisional leaders seemed suddenly gripped with indecision that certainly did not characterize them either before or after this particular battle.

3.1a Longstreet. Longstreet's counter has two sides, one 2-rated and the other 0-rated. Use the 2-rated side when he is accepting any Move Order and the 0-rated side when accepting any Attack Order.

Should Longstreet become Army Commander, he uses his 2-rated side with a "Not so Sure" Awareness for the remainder of the battle.

3.1b Rodes and Early. These men are given counters with two sides, one good and one not so good. The OOA specifies which to use and when to change them.

3.2 Lower Confederate Command

3.2a Trimble. Trimble is a spare Division commander. When available, he can be used to replace any Confederate Division commander who is killed, wounded, or captured. When Trimble is in charge of a given division, do not apply the modifier for original Divisional Leader wounded or killed on the Fluke Stoppage Table. The player need merely announce that Trimble is in command of the given division. Once assigned, Trimble cannot be re-assigned to another division later.

3.2b Corps Artillery Leaders. Alexander, J.T. Brown, and R. Walker can post any battery, act as an Artillery Leader and give Initiative orders to any Artillery Battalion within their corps.

3.2c Sharpshooters in Rodes' Division. SS/Rodes units can trace Command Radius to Rodes, Blackford, or any brigade leader in Rodes' Division. If used for Command Radius, Blackford must be in the Command Radius of any of Rodes' other leaders. SS/Rodes does not roll for Fluke Stoppage — they are tied to the orders of the Leader to which they are tracing Command Radius.

3.2d Rodes' Divisional Detachment. Doles' Brigade was detached to cover the area from the left flank of Rodes' Division and to Early's right on the afternoon of the 1st. Doles joined into the attack on 11th Corps with Early's Division.

Doles can trace Command Radius back to either Early or Rodes. Once Early or Rodes' attacks end, Doles must permanently return to using only Rodes as his source of Command Radius.

3.2e Early's Detachment. Smith's Brigade of Early's Division spends most of the battle off the east map edge guarding the Confederate left flank. That brigade can be used as Early's Reserve Brigade for Fluke Stoppage even while off map. Early's situation becomes "normal" once Smith enters play.

3.3 Other Confederate Special Rules

3.3a Supply. All Confederate supply trains are only available off map. Measure "by Caisson" ranges to the given entry hexes. "By Battery" is accomplished by exiting those hexes. Expend the needed ammunition and then roll one die. The result is the number of turns in the future the battery returns. Returning batteries must do so at the Entry Area from which they exited.

4.0 Federal Special Rules

4.1 Command

4.1a Meade. Meade has "Normal" Awareness but cannot issue any orders until the first twilight turn on the morning of July 2nd. Meade can issue orders normally at midnight on the night of July 2nd.

4.1b Acting Army Commanders. The senior Leader on the field is the Acting Army Commander until Meade arrives. Acting Army Commanders function exactly like a regular Army Commander in every way, except that they have no Army HQ (and ignore any restrictions based on one).

Seniority runs from Reynolds to Slocum to Howard. Hancock does not rank Slocum or Howard. Meade, of course, ranks everyone.

No Acting Army Commander can issue orders at night.

The Acting Army Commander cannot command his own corps at the same time — promote the current ranking divisional commander to command the corps for the interim.

When Hancock arrives, he shares army command with Howard (so the Union has two Army Commanders for a time). Howard can only issue orders to his own corps. When Slocum arrives, he becomes Acting Army Commander, Hancock returns to his corps (simply remove his counter from play), and Howard reverts to just being a corps commander.

4.1c Slocum. Slocum commands the "Right Wing" (5th, 6th and 12th Corps). He acts as a second army commander with the ability to issue orders to those corps. Meade can ignore Slocum when making orders directly to these corps; Slocum is merely an additional commander the Union player can use to get orders for this wing.

4.1d Acting Army Commanders Awareness. Acting Army Commanders have the following awareness:

On Fire: Reynolds and Hancock
Normal: Howard
Not so Sure: Slocum

4.2 Looking for Glory

The Confederate player can "order" the Federal player's troops to do something especially stupid representing various Federal leaders doing what seems best for their own needs rather than for the army's. The player can do this once on July 2nd.

At 8:00 a.m. on the 2nd, the Confederate player selects the time the order will be issued. It can be any turn from that turn until dark on that day. He need not decide what that order will be at that point.

On that turn, do the following until you have a "winner":

The Confederate player selects a Union corps.
The Union player rolls one die. If the roll is equal to or less than the corps commander's Command Value, the corps is not selected. If the roll is greater than the Command Value, the rule affects that corps.
Repeat until a corps is selected or the Union player runs out of corps. In the case of the latter, no corps follows this rule.

Try each corps only once and ignore any corps whose HQ is not yet on the map.

The Leader in question is ordered to move his HQ location to a location 12 hexes (or less) forward from his current location as indicated by the Confederate player (if possible, use a terrain feature to make the order easier to follow).

The Federal player, for his part, must follow the instructed movement as if it was an order he issued. He cannot be ordered to do any actual attack (i.e. told to move into an area currently-or soon to be-occupied by the enemy). The order is merely to 'move' the corps to the new location. It is not an actual Move Order and there is no formation requirement for any unit during it.

The order must be issued at the start of the Federal player's Activity Phase and must be followed as of that phase. The Federal player cannot issue the affected Command new orders (or Skedaddle) for 2 hours (8 turns) counting that turn.

4.3 Other Federal Special Rules

4.3a Henry Hunt. Hunt can act as an Artillery Leader for any Federal battery and post any battery, or Artillery battalion in the Federal army. Hunt does not need to give orders to do this; he need merely stack with the battalion's Leader and its HQ and posts the entire battalion as you would a single battery.

4.3b Supply. Several Corps never have a Wagon arrive for them (1st, 3rd, 6th Corps). These must use the Army Arty Res ammunition supply. The exception is 1st Corps which can also use the 11th Corps Wagon.

4.3c Lockwood's Brigade. Technically, Lockwood's Brigade in 12th Corps is assigned directly to the corps HQ (a matter of rank in the convoluted organization of the corps). Rather than force the player to jump through hoops for this, they are assigned to 1/12 here, which is where they will be after the battle and how they acted during it.

4.3d Calef's Battery. Calef's Battery has an HQ to allow more freedom of movement early in the battle. This "Battery" HQ has an Artillery Battalion HQ's Command Radius and acts as one for all purposes.

4.3e The Army Reserve. v.Steinwehr's Division (2/11) is placed into "army reserve" when it first enters play. This means the division is restricted to the area at or within 6 hexes of N49.45 until 4:00 p.m.

4.3f Tyler. Tyler is the commander of the Army of the Potomac's Artillery Reserve. He functions the same as Henry Hunt (4.3a), except his authority is limited to the Artillery Reserve Battalions and their batteries (not the batteries belonging to the corps) as well as the Arty Res Supply Train. As an historical aside, at some point on July 3rd, Tyler succumbed to heat stroke and was no longer commanding the Artillery Reserve — as best I could determine, this occurred after Pickett's Charge began, hence he is still on the map in those scenarios.

5.0 Optional Rules

These options are all designed to tweak the historical parameters of the game either to explore "what ifs" or if you feel my choices are all wet. Just remember, a "major" variant will shift the game greatly toward the side getting it. Mixing in numerous variations at once will generate unpredictable results, but you can tell the overall slant by the groupings chosen. Have fun!

They are designed primarily for campaign starts, but can be implemented with any scenario.

5.1 Major Union Variants

5.1a Reynolds' Death. Ignore 2.2g. Reynolds does not die according to the Order of Arrival (if the player gets him killed anyway, that's his problem).

If this option is chosen, make the following changes to the Union Order of Arrival:

July 1st, 1863

Turn	Entry Area	Units
3:00 p.m.	-	Hancock (do not have him enter play at this point)
3:30 p.m.	G	12 Corps (all)
4:00 p.m.	J	3 Corps (all)

Each corps is to report to the Acting Army Commander for orders. Restrictions, such as those normally applying to 2nd Corps and the Artillery Reserve, are not in effect. Howard arrives as a corps commander only.

Obviously, this is a massive adjustment to the historical timeline. The historical rationale for the times are as follows: Sickles got first word that Reynolds thought he should come up via his aide Henry Tramain between 11:30 a.m. and noon (Tramain left a very much alive Reynolds with those instructions, so the change in the timeline in this option has not had the ability to propagate to Sickles as yet). Sickles then became indecisive about whether he should obey the order from Reynolds or the one he had just gotten from Meade so he did nothing (except try to clarify things) until he got a new order (from Howard) a little after 3 p.m. Assuming that Reynolds was still alive, and aware that Sickles needed a greater prodding, the only possibility is that an additional order would have cleared up the problem at some point between noon and 3 p.m. (a 3 hour window). For argument's sake, I gave Reynolds credit for two of the three hours and assumed that the direct order to "come on" would have hastened 3rd Corps to come as an entirety.

Slocum has a similar timeline. 12th Corps pulled into Two Taverns (4-5 miles away) a little before noon. He got his "please come" order from Howard between 1:30 and 2 p.m., but did not begin to move until 3:00 p.m. The assumption then is that not only would Reynolds have thought to urge Slocum on sooner than Howard did, but that Reynolds had enough rank horsepower to actually get results. It took Slocum almost an hour and a half to get on the road after getting word from Howard (and even then sent Geary ahead by himself so that he, Slocum, would not be tagged with the catastrophe he expected to land in Howard's lap). So, I'll assume that Reynolds would get word to Slocum about an hour earlier than Howard did, and Slocum would take only an hour to get going (as well as bringing his whole command). That brings him into the game 1.5 hours earlier than Geary alone shows up historically. I did not change 2nd Corps other than to keep Hancock with his corps.

5.1b Ignore All the Ducks in a Line. Ignore 4.2 and no Union corps goes off solo.

5.1c After Slocum the Incredible. Finally deciding to heed Howard's request to come to the field, Slocum wanted to take his corps and fall into the Union defensive line north-east of Gettysburg (11th Corps' right flank). As it turns out, only one division (Ruger's) made the cross march from the Baltimore Pike to the Hanover Road to execute this plan (Geary was intercepted and kept on the main road). Finding Confederate cavalry blocking the route, Ruger was in the process of deploying to attack Benner's Hill when new orders arrived for him to pull back and return to the army via the Baltimore Pike.

This variant allows players to explore the rather unlikely event that Slocum was willing to press the attack with his entire corps that evening (keep in mind that this is the same general who was less than thrilled at the idea of showing up at Gettysburg and taking any of the blame for the fiasco away from Howard in the first place).

Allow 12th Corps (all, minus 12 Corps Supply which enters the game normally) to enter play at Entry Area F at 6:30 p.m. on July 1st (ignore all other entries and times for 12th Corps). The corps has orders to Attack onto Benner's Hill.

At 6:00 p.m., have Smth/Early enter at Entry Area E to move to N37.60 to defend.

Additionally, should the Union line be holding north of town at 6:00 p.m., allow the entries above, but with 12th Corps operating under orders to Move to fill in the right of the Union defensive line, Smith's Brigade is to move to rejoin Early's Division (and not to Benner's Hill).

5.2 Major Confederate Variants

5.2a Releasing Hill. Ignore 2.1b (Deployment), 2.1c (Recon in Force), and 2.1f (Hill's Restrictions). Also, ignore the Order of Arrival restrictions on Pettigrew and Brockenborough's brigades. This allows Hill to slam into the enemy as normally occurs in Gettysburg games.

5.2b Lee's Not Puzzled. Ignore all of 2.1d. Lee enters with "Not So Sure" Awareness (2.2h applies normally) and is otherwise not restricted. This dramatically frees Lee to act in the first 18 hours of the battle.

5.2c Longstreet: The way he remembers himself. Ignore 3.1a and play Longstreet as a 4-4 rated corps commander.

5.2d Lee has a real Staff. Ignore the Long Nights for Walter Taylor portion of 2.1d. Lee has a staff up to the task of sending out coordinated orders at night (both the 1st and the 2nd). Other portions of 2.1d remain in effect.

5.2e The Five Brigades. In the middle of May, 1863, torn between the competing needs of the proposed Pennsylvania invasion and possible action in the Western Theater, Jefferson Davis denied Lee's request to return these five brigades to the Army of Northern Virginia. They were five experienced brigades of great value not only in and of themselves, but in the effect they would have had on the ANVa's reorganization after Chancellorsville.

If these brigades are used in the game, Heth's Division will not exist (Heth himself will not be used). Instead, Robert Ransom commands a division of R/Ran, Ev/Ran, Ck/Ran, Dav/Heth and Pett/Heth. At the opening of the battle, replace Heth's own arrival with R. Ransom and Ck/Ran enters in the place of Arch/Heth. Ev/Ran enters when Brock/Heth would have. Brock/Heth and Arch/Heth belong to (and enter with) Pender's Division. In later scenarios, do the same replacements, but apply 50% losses to Ck/Ran.

The additional brigades of Pickett (Corse and Jenkins) enter the turn after Armistead's Brigade. If already set up, arrange the two brigades with the rest of the division in any way that makes sense. Adding the two brigades to Pickett's Charge is an interesting experiment. Give it a try!

5.3 Minor Variants

5.3a Let the Cav Fight! Ignore 2.2a and 2.2b. Buford's Cavalry stays in the battle until 12:00 noon on 2 July. Remove them on that turn. They'll do a lot of fighting — which is well beyond their capabilities.

5.3b Free up Reynolds. Ignore 2.2c and allow Reynolds to act as an "On Fire" Army Commander from the very beginning of the game. There is a give and take to this one, you can start earlier, but lose the automatic order to Wadsworth.

5.3c Iron Brigade Skips Coffee. Ignore 2.2e and allow the Iron Brigade to freely join the rest of their division on the march north. This will get ugly for Heth.

5.3d The Killer Angels. Replace the B-rated 20 Maine (3/1/5) with the optional A-rated 20 Maine (3/1/5). Won't matter in the bigger picture, but might be something some players just will not accept.

6.0 Campaign Victory

Last Chance for Victory is a game about the battle itself. The fun comes from trying to better your opponent and see what happens as a result on the field. For most players, telling them that they will recognize it when they win is plenty — but a minority will take that as a license to do something pointless like building a fortress around a few hexes, ignoring all other concerns, and ruin the fun for both sides.

To avoid this type of play, what follows is a guide to determining "victory" by basically giving both sides reasons to do more than just build a fortress.

Note that it is a matter beyond the scope of the game to state that your win in play will cause the war itself to go one-way or another. That's a good subject for your post-game discussions with your opponent — what do the results of our game mean in the greater context of the war? What will happen next and why?

So, to get you aimed in the right (opposite of your opponent's) direction:

The Confederates win if they have any Unlimbered Artillery at or within 4 hexes of N48.46 (The Cemetery Gate House) at the end of play. The strength, Morale State, or Ammunition status of the artillery is not a concern.

The Union wins if they avoid the Confederate condition and there are no Confederate infantry units in any hex of the Taneytown Road and the Baltimore Pike (south and east of Cemetery Hill).

Any other result is a draw.

Design Note — Why these? The battle happened in the first place because all the roads led to this location. Cemetery Hill dominated the town and its road nexus. Should the hill fall to the Confederates, there is little reason for the Union army to remain on this ground to fight — a good case could be made that given the loss (and lack of recapture) of the hill controlling the roads, the Army of the Potomac would reform elsewhere to continue the campaign. The "roads being cut" portion exists simply because the presence of an isolated Union fortress on Cemetery Hill is not a realistic way to 'win' the battle — the Union player must have a reason to control the lines of communication as well. These two conditions work hand in hand for the Confederate player as well. Sure he can allocate everything to take Cemetery Hill, but failing to cut the roads too, because no effort was made, in combination with a failure to 'take that hill' spells a Union win.

Historical Notes

As always the case, game designers find themselves with limited space to write down some thoughts about their subject. They have neither the room — nor the qualifications — to give a worthy history of the battle in question; books on the subjects abound, and never more than on this topic.

I have no interest in filling space with a 7th Grade Cliff Notes™ version of the battle, but I do have some commentary to give on some of the highly controversial points to explain my decisions on them. I hope you find them interesting and useful.

Those that feel "I already know everything worth knowing about Gettysburg" have a comforting simple view of life; I shall not bother disturbing them. They must understand far more than I do. I most certainly do not know all the answers… and barely remember the time when I was young enough to believe I did.

For those seeking additional understanding and know they 'don't have all the answers' either, I present the following for contemplation and consideration.

I remain, Sir, your Ob't Svt, Dean

Lee and Longstreet

Longstreet at Gettysburg: The Third-Rail of the Civil War

After over 130 years of mud-slinging and name-calling, an analysis of the behavior of the senior Confederate command structure is not only difficult, but is subject to instant rejection.

To paraphrase Robert Krick, James Longstreet was assailed so violently that eventually any criticism of him was off limits. To blame "Old Pete" is subject to an accusation of Lost Cause'ism (this is the catch-all phrase for the effort to blame someone — anyone — other than Robert E. Lee for losing the war). Since this is such a contentious subject (as well as being so important), I decided to put my thoughts to paper so you can make an informed judgment of the assessments that underlie the ratings in the game.

Now keep in mind I write as a game designer, not a historian. A historian confronted with situation A at one time, and situation B at a later time, has the luxury of ignoring how to connect the two if no sourcing exists. As a game designer, I can't afford those gaps. I must give the best conjecture I can muster based on the available research, even if doing this twists the gizzard of an academic historian. Here, I'll tell you why I did what I did and what conclusions I reached.

Invariably, Lee-Longstreet discussions devolve into a recounting of who-slandered-who in a magazine article in 1879 and who made up some "facts" in a speech in 1881, etc. Tracking the back and forth after the war is not germane to my purpose. I merely need to determine what happened so I can design a game as accurately as possible. Laying blame is someone else's job and concern.

That said, one post-war myth still must be dispelled: there was no "sunrise attack order" issued on the night of July 1st, 1863. Enough said on that; it didn't happen. Focusing on an imaginary "sunrise attack order" merely distracts from the foot dragging that did occur.

For my purposes, I must endeavor to cut through the noise and determine the most accurate assessment of Longstreet's leadership performance at Gettysburg.

In short, the question of Longstreet's rapidity of action when given orders directly indicates the game's leader values his counter should wear, so his "unit" behaves as it did on those fields.

Timeline: When did all this happen?

The key to understanding what happened between Lee and Longstreet can be found in the simple timing of events. This isn't as easy as one might think, given conflicting sources and the period's non-standard time measurements. Still, the relative time of events can be determined to a great extent.

Let's follow the story…

On the evening of July 1st, Longstreet joined Lee first on Herr Ridge and later moved forward with him to Seminary Ridge. The two discussed options for the coming day. Longstreet advocated maneuver, but not the tactical maneuver around the Round Tops that many suggest.

Instead, he preferred a much larger maneuver south and east, presumably to the Pipe Creek area along the Maryland-Pennsylvania border. This would, in theory, place the Confederate army between Meade's Army of the Potomac (the main Federal field force in the Eastern Theater) and Washington.

Lee would have seen this option as impractical — mainly because of the Army of Northern Virginia's lines of communication back over South Mountain and the enormous trains built up from the foraging effort in Pennsylvania. Shifting this logistical tail, possibly exposing it to Federal operations, would be a very risky and difficult undertaking. On top of this, he would have understood that the Army of the Potomac was most assuredly going to win any footrace to Pipe Creek.

Failing to convince Lee to follow his plan, Longstreet left at dark to meet the van of his corps and bring it up for the potential battle the next day.

Longstreet linked up with his corps late that night at Cashtown after moving down the congested Chambersburg Pike. The head of the 1st Corps column (Lafayette McLaws' Division) reached Marsh Creek (3 to 4 miles from Gettysburg) around midnight, followed by Hood's Division around 2:00 a.m. Both bedded down briefly. McLaws arrayed his troops off the road while Hood stayed right along it. McLaws was informed he would move out to finish the march at 4:00 a.m. and made arrangements to get the division ready to do so. Before McLaws set out, he received word that Hood (still on the road) would lead the line of march and that McLaws was to wait until Hood had passed. Presumably these orders were from Longstreet.

Hood's Division reached Seminary Ridge and filed south of the pike into the area just west of the orchard containing the army headquarters. McLaws followed Hood in and led his column almost directly up to the army HQ.

In the meantime, Lee awoke at 3:00 a.m. and dispatched three reconnaissance parties made up from his staff. Major Charles Venable was sent to examine the positions of Ewell's Corps to determine the possibilities there. Colonel Armistead Long (possibly with Brigadier General Pendleton, Chief of Artillery, tagging along) was sent to look over the entire line's artillery positions. Most famously, Captain Samuel Johnston, engineer, was sent to explore the Federal left.

All three teams headed out by about 4:00 a.m.

How and why Johnston managed to miss the Federal troops in and around Little Round Top is not a concern here, but has been examined in Bill Hyde's article in Gettysburg Magazine #29 and also an earlier article by Dave Powell. Interestingly, Mr. Hyde deals with the idea that Johnston reported the Federal position as arrayed along the Emmitsburg Road. Hyde maintains that Johnston did not state it was so. What is of importance to us is the time of his return. As near as can be determined, this was around 8:30 a.m.

Around that time, Lee, Longstreet, Hood, McLaws and Johnston were all together on Seminary Ridge. Leaning over a map, Lee indicated to McLaws where his division should go. Longstreet, meanwhile, paced back and forth nearby and then tried to point out a different orientation for McLaws, only to be overruled by Lee. Longstreet tersely denied McLaws permission, twice, to go recon his route (a wise move on Longstreet's part — the last thing he needed was to lose an experienced Major General to a Union cavalry patrol!). Lee asked McLaws if he thought he could move to the jump off point unseen by the enemy to which he answered he could. McLaws, it seemed, was under the mistaken assumption that Johnston had yet to conduct his recon and asked to accompany him.

Obviously, Lee violated the chain of command and some might suggest that this snub gives Longstreet license to react the way he did for the rest of the battle. Justified or not, what is important for my purposes is that for the next two days Longstreet did not function as even an average commander of his significance.

Suggestion or Order?

Some maintain that Lee's statement to McLaws was a mere "suggestion" and not really an order. While, it is true that Lee's command style was one of delegation and trusting the execution details to his subordinates and staff, anyone with a military background understands that the commander's "wish," "desire," or "suggestion" is an order and must be treated as such. If the CO says "It would be nice if the barracks were painted blue," you had better believe that blue paint will be slung quite soon. The dramatic "I order you to" do such and such statement is more a creature of Hollywood than anything else.

Furthermore, it is claimed that Lee had new corps commanders who were unfamiliar with such a delegated ordering style. Be that as it may, neither Longstreet nor his divisional commanders can plausibly be lumped in with the new guys.

I believe that Lee's "suggestion" was indeed an order and the subsequent movements of units after this was given show that all concerned knew so at the time — even Longstreet.

Colonel E.P. Alexander (temporary head of Longstreet's artillery) was given definitive orders to move the corps' artillery to support the attack at this time. Longstreet gave Alexander orders in Lee's presence to scout the area around the Peach Orchard and move his artillery over to the right. If Lee was still there when the orders were given, they must have been issued before Lee left to see Ewell around 9:00 a.m. Alexander isn't sure of the time, but he believes he moved his battalion of artillery to Pitzer's Schoolhouse and was waiting there for the corps before 11:00 a.m. — Alexander, pg 235-236

Meanwhile, A.P. Hill sent orders to one of his divisions (R.H. Anderson arrayed along Herr Ridge) to move forward and relieve the battered division currently serving as the right flank of that corps on Seminary Ridge. Anderson was also given his attack orders for later in the day. Sources vary as to the time of these orders, but it seems the division might have started forward from the ridge as early as 7:00 a.m., but was still moving into position around 11:00 a.m. when its right brigade (Wilcox) ran into Berdan's Sharpshooters around Seminary Ridge. It is more likely that Anderson received orders later than 7:00 a.m., which places his orders in around the same 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. timeframe as the others.

McLaws' Division had to countermarch back down the Chambersburg Pike and then south along Herr Ridge Road to be in a position ready for the attack movement. This movement was followed by what was called a "long delay" stopping the column near the intersection with the Fairfield Road. This movement was completed on or before 10 a.m., meaning orders from Longstreet for McLaws to do this movement must have originated by 9 a.m. at the latest.

J. B. Polley, in his recollections in Hood's Texas Brigade, states that Hood's Division stopped behind Seminary Ridge for about an hour and a half. At which time, he reports the division moving about a mile or more to the "south-east" into a valley where there was "water and fuel" so they could make breakfast. — Polley, pg 154

Obviously, the direction given is in error (else, they moved onto Cemetery Ridge which is rather doubtful). More likely they moved back over McPherson's Ridge into the valley of Willoughby Run (water available from the run, fuel from Herbst Woods). As is the case for McLaws, orders were given to Hood to shift his division to this staging area at around the same time as all the rest of this is happening. Orders, we can assume, originated from Longstreet.

Hood's movement here seems to have been 'cross-country' which makes sense if McLaws was also moving back and blocking the Chambersburg Pike at that same time.

Readers should take note that where the 1st Corps divisions ended up they could either begin a circuitous march to Warfield Ridge or launch a movement around the Federal left to interpose between Meade and Washington. Conjecture, to be sure, but the fact that they were sent there and then halted while Longstreet remained on Seminary Ridge to await Lee's return suggests Longstreet was still hoping to convince Lee to change his mind.

Foot Dragging?

All that established, we must examine the time after the initial order's issue. Obviously, Longstreet set preliminary movements into motion (something some have accused him of not doing), but what happened then?

It seems that Longstreet, fresh from his first — and unspectacular — attempt at independent command (Suffolk) fancied himself a better general and strategist than Lee. Having argued the night before against any sort of attack, Longstreet was still questioning Lee's plan, and now his orders. He was placing himself not as a subordinate, but as a second army commander who was in a position to veto plans he did not approve.

Around 9:00 a.m. after issuing instructions to Longstreet and McLaws, Lee went to see Richard Ewell (commander of the 2nd Corps) and issue him the orders of how he was supposed to support the attack (actually, pretty much the same orders he gave Ewell the night before: he would demonstrate against the Union right when he heard Longstreet's attack against their left, and to translate that into a real attack if the opportunity presented itself). These orders dictated what Ewell was to do for the rest of the day. Ewell executed those orders as given.

When Lee returned to his HQ a little after 10:00 a.m., he found Longstreet still there. Alexander and the infantry divisions were — or had finished — still hoping to convince Lee to change his mind.

In my view, all these supporting movements and orders confirm that Longstreet knew and understood that he had orders to move his corps to execute an attack in the Peach Orchard area that were received between 8:30 and 9:30 a.m. A good estimate being 9:00 a.m., about the time Lee left his headquarters. "At 11:00 a.m., Lee finding his suggestions not being followed issued a direct order to get Longstreet to undertake the operation." — Coddington, pg 378

Longstreet requested that he wait for Law's brigade (then an hour out) before moving and Lee agreed. Sometime between noon and 1 p.m. the corps finally began moving toward the assault positions along the Emmitsburg Road.

The elapsed time between the original order and the final beginning of execution is 3 to 4 hours. Lee authorized one hour of that to wait for Law. McLaws and Hood needed at least an hour to move to the line of departure for the flank march. If Longstreet is culpable for "foot dragging," it would seem that his contribution was between one and two hours.

On face value, this delay is not excessive and can be explained as the possible result of the sluggish movement of Anderson's Division forward to Seminary Ridge. However, Longstreet chose to move the divisions well in back of the line (and then stop them) before beginning the flank march (which was its own comedy of errors). Moving directly down the valley west of Seminary Ridge would have concealed the column (one of Lee's specifications) and allowed the troops to get to their jump off points for the assault. The time saved by the shorter march is important. Doing this, Longstreet's divisions would have been ready to assault between noon and 1:00 p.m. (even with the "foot dragging"), not at some point in the rear ready to start a flank march that would use up another 3 hours (counting the time then still needed to deploy from march column into the assault formations).

Again, Anderson's movement is a major limitation here. While Longstreet could have shot his divisions southward along the back of the ridge, he would have done so in front of Anderson's advance (risking more confusion), marching back allowed Anderson to clear Herr Ridge and be "in front" of Longstreet's divisions as they proceeded south. However, the fact that Longstreet (trying to protect his reputation for the next 40 years) never made the case that he was waiting for Anderson to pass is telling.

So, while we have a relatively minor time delay (1-2 hours), we also have command choices (where to go, how to do it) that added another 3 hours. The combined delay of 4-5 hours (not counting the authorized hour to wait for Law's Brigade) is significant and must be laid at Longstreet's feet.

Sloppy Execution — Two Days Running

Longstreet's performance, recounted above, was indeed slow (regardless of the exact reason). But relative speed is just one indicator of a leader's quality. Once a leader starts to follow orders, the choices he makes in how to accomplish the tasks assigned must also be integrated into any assessment. There are a number of choices from both the 2nd and 3rd of July that show Longstreet ineffectively executing (or possibly even actively shirking) his duties.

Longstreet's handling of Law's Brigade is flawed in a number of ways. Requesting permission to await Law's arrival is one thing, holding up the entire corps' movement is another. Law could have just as easily linked up with his division on the move to the attack position. Next is the decision to have Law on the furthest right of Hood's Division. Simply putting him on the right of the division instead of the left made their march all the further by forcing them to continue their march for the extra length of the entire division's column. Law's exhausted men were then eventually placed in the lead wave of the division, instead of in a supporting role (as the plan was modified when it was discovered that the Peach Orchard was occupied by Union troops). None of these decisions show the mark of an experienced corps commander giving his chief's plan the maximum chance of success. Longstreet would have been well aware of the jaded condition of Law's men. He did not handle them in a way that showed that understanding. If Hood made these decisions (and he was experienced enough to consider these matters himself), Longstreet would have both known and was in a position to over-rule them to improve the corps' efficiency.

Apparently upset by Lee jumping the normal chain-of-command, to give instructions to McLaws, and still sulking about receiving a direct order to accomplish a task he did not feel was right, Longstreet made the unpardonable decision to place authority for the march of his corps in the hands of Captain Johnston (who was blissfully unaware of his new role as demi-corps commander). Longstreet chose to ride in the middle of the column at the head of Hood's Division. Longstreet's post-war excuse was that since McLaws was under Lee's orders, he (Longstreet) was no longer responsible for the division's movements (but that a mere captain was) defies belief. Johnston was sent as a guide, not as a commander. That somehow the experienced Longstreet was confused about the command relationship within his corps (something he should have been experienced enough to clarify with Lee before setting out) or (and seemingly more likely) the man was pouting after having his viewpoint turned down and his feelings bruised indicate neither a particularly excellent, nor energetic, leader.

The now leaderless corps marched to a small ridge just south of Black Horse Tavern and stopped, unable to determine how to proceed unobserved. Longstreet eventually rode up to the head of the column and ordered Hood to take the lead. When McLaws objected that he was in front and wanted to maintain that honor, Longstreet allowed this, and the countermarch began — wasting more time.

Finally, approaching the Federal line at the Peach Orchard (sometime around 3:00 p.m.), Longstreet brusquely rode up to McLaws and again declined the division commander's request to make a reconnaissance. McLaws stated he didn't know what was to his front. Longstreet brushed this aside, saying there was nothing to his front and demanded to know how McLaws was going to deploy. McLaws laid out what he thought he would do (still feeling he was advancing blind). Longstreet responded, "That suits me," and rode off.

Longstreet's handling of the march, his ordering (multiple times) McLaws to blindly attack to his front, and his refusal to attempt to find out the real situation once they arrived, were all egregious errors. Then, after forcing McLaws to gear up for a frontal assault on the fly, he stopped him and told McLaws to wait for Hood.

Longstreet hurried Hood's men to the right of McLaws' position.

Once he extended his division to the right, Hood sent out scouts further beyond his flank. Finding nothing there, he requested permission four times to extend his flank further right. Longstreet denied all these requests citing Lee's orders. Hood finally gave up the argument and proceeded to attack "under protest." I'll leave interpretation of this suddenly narrow-minded viewpoint regarding precisely following the commanding general's orders to Robert Krick who concluded Longstreet was going to do Lee's plan exactly the way Lee wanted it so as to "teach the old man a lesson."

Around 4:00 p.m., Hood launched his assault and was promptly wounded. Evander Law, now division commander, was not aware of his increased responsibilities and allowed the division to disperse into multiple directions.

Longstreet, by this time, was over with McLaws holding him back from attacking until the situation was right. It is unknown if he was aware that Hood's Division was careening without a rudder. If he was, he made no effort to re-coordinate the attack. Eventually, around 5 o'clock, Longstreet unleashed McLaws' men.

Personally brave, Longstreet advanced partway with Kershaw's Brigade, to observe and be seen by the men. A corps commander's effect on a battle in progress is limited. He could do little besides direct reinforcements and provide a calm example. This he did.

Meanwhile, the troops and subordinate commanders under Hood and McLaws ripped the Federal lines to shreds and effectively destroyed one Federal corps and savaged divisions of two others.

Supporting this attack was Anderson's Division, 3rd Corps, next in line to the north. What — if any — coordination Longstreet did with Anderson (or A.P. Hill, Anderson's corps commander) is unknown. Possibly influencing this lack of coordination was Longstreet's cold relationship with Hill — they were barely on speaking terms (due to a spat regarding newspaper coverage during the Seven Days' Battles the year before). Longstreet did, however, order Wilcox's Brigade (under Anderson) to "incline to the right" so as to avoid observation by the enemy. — Black to Bachelder, Bachelder Papers, pg 1241

On the night of July 2nd to 3rd, 1863, Longstreet failed to report to Lee to discuss the day's fighting and get orders for the next day. As he customarily did report back, this was especially odd behavior. Nonetheless Lee's orders to resume the attack (at dawn) were issued and somehow made it to Longstreet's HQ. Alexander reported to HQ late that night and was told the attack would resume at dawn and to arrange his guns accordingly. He did the best he could in the dark. Ewell also received his instructions and heavily reinforced one of his divisions with brigades from another. Ewell was ready to attack at dawn, but was pre-empted by a Federal counterattack.

Aware of his orders (yet later claiming he had none), Longstreet issued no instructions to bring Pickett's Division forward, but instead ordered McLaws' Division to disengage (which Longstreet later denied doing) and sent out scouts to determine a way around the Round Tops to strike at the Federal left.

There is speculation that Longstreet did bring Pickett forward in preparation to execute a flank march, but then had to march Pickett back to the launch point for the later attack — causing Pickett to complain about being "jerked around" (not his words…) that morning — but without Pickett's official report, and no mention of such a move by Longstreet, there is no way to ever determine if such a movement was ever made at all.

Lee rode up at dawn to determine why the attack had not begun and ordered Longstreet to cease preparations for a flanking maneuver and to prepare for the attack that would become known as Pickett's Charge.

Lee's plan for a coordinated pair of attacks on both flanks at dawn was willfully ignored. Longstreet enthusiasts would point at this, given what happened later in the day, as an example of Longstreet providing Lee with a better alternative. These same fans miss the point that Longstreet's loose cannon behavior eliminated the planned coordinated attacks on the Federal flanks and set the stage for the single-direction action that happened later. It probably would not have had any effect on the eventual outcome of the attack. But it does offer more insight into the performance he rendered at the battle.

Coordination between the two corps was almost non-existent. The instructions to the two sets of artillery were different. No objection was made to the selection of the 3rd Corps units being used — those chosen were picked because they happened to be in that location and ignored other fresher units. Marching instructions were minimal and the right guides of the 3rd Corps only discovered that the infantry assault had begun when they noticed Pickett's left racing out ahead of them.

As far is known, no clear objective was passed down to lower commanders. The "clump of trees" being something Bachelder suggested to Alexander in the 1880's with an eye toward publicity and advertising. Alexander's confusion came about because Ziegler's Grove (probably the real target trees) had been felled and the copse — small trees at the time of the battle — had grown to full size. Regardless, both the "copse" and Ziegler's Grove aligned directly with Pickett's starting point and Cemetery Hill (key to the entire Union line). Some have speculated that the actual target of the attack was that hill.

But Longstreet's most egregious error was shifting the responsibility to Alexander for determining the effectiveness of the artillery barrage and the decision to send the infantry in. As with the day before, Longstreet shirked his responsibility as a corps commander and was willing to let someone else — both times of much lower rank — do the heavy lifting. This was unpardonable.

Finally, when the time came to order the attack, Longstreet perched on his fence rail merely nodded his head to Pickett and watched the attack go in. He, again, made no effort to coordinate movements or provide support from either infantry or artillery. Would it have changed the result? No. But it was his duty to do everything in his power to give it the best shot possible.

All these examples show a commander failing to effectively lead and control the magnificent troops under his command.

An Assessment: Longstreet at Gettysburg

As Longstreet said himself in a letter to his uncle dated 24 July 1863: "I consider it a part of my duty to express my views to the commanding general. If he approves and adopts them, it is well; if he does not, it is my duty to adopt his views and to execute his orders as faithfully as if they were my own." — http://www.gdg.org/Research/People/Longstreet/shlong1.html

He certainly wasn't hesitant to express his views, but he did not execute orders as faithfully as if they were his own. This occurred on both of the days of Gettysburg where he and his troops were directly involved.

As his aide Colonel Moxley Sorrel stated in At the Right Hand of Longstreet, speaking of the boss he loved at Gettysburg: "[He] failed to conceal some anger. There was apparent apathy in his movements. They lacked the fire and point of his usual bearing on the battlefield." — Sorrel, pg 167

Or the description by another staff member, Captain T.J. Goree in Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Major Thomas J. Goree (writing to his mother at a time before the Battle of Gettysburg): "…he is some days very sociable and agreeable, then again for a few days he will confine himself mostly to his room or tent, without having much to say to anyone, and is as grim as you please, though, when this is the case, he is either not very well or something has not gone to suit him. When anything has gone wrong, he does not say much, but merely looks grim." — Goree, pg 60, emphasis added

Only four days after the battle, 7 July 1863, McLaws wrote to his wife: "General Longstreet is to blame for not reconnoitering the ground and for persisting in ordering the [2nd day's] assault when errors were discovered. During the engagement he was very excited, giving contrary orders to every one, and was exceedingly overbearing. I consider him a humbug, a man of small capacity, very obstinate, not at all chivalrous, exceedingly conceited, and totally selfish." — Oeffinger, A Soldier's General: The Civil War Letters of Major General Lafayette McLaws, pg 195-197

Some try to claim that McLaws wrote this to respond to potential public criticism of his own performance at the battle. They do, however, avoid telling us how a private letter to his wife only revealed after the war would accomplish this feat, or how it is McLaws thought to dwell on newspaper coverage three days after this historic blood-letting. In my humble opinion, he was venting his true feelings to the one person on earth he could trust to keep them private. The wounds were too open — too raw — for nuanced public relations.

Regardless of the stones cast upon him unfairly in later years (or for that matter, the half-truths he generated to defend himself), James Longstreet's command performance at Gettysburg was sluggish and lacking the "fire" of energetic execution (as Sorrel put it). Whether McLaws' assessment was correct about the man over-all is for others to debate, but in this designer's opinion he accurately described the officer at the helm of 1st Corps, Army of Northern Virginia on the three days that matter here.

I can only conclude that Longstreet was a "below average commander" at Gettysburg and I have rated him as such. I believe this is a fair assessment given the available evidence of his performance.

Robert E. Lee

A common reaction to my analysis of Longstreet's performance above is to think I'm making an apology for Lee's as army commander. The creation (or assailing) of The Marble Man is not germane to getting a proper perspective of the leadership of either man at this battle. Each had specific duties and performed them as the historical record indicates. As army commander, Lee is ultimately responsible for his subordinate's actions. He obviously understood this and did all he could to ensure that the battle's outcome was seen as "all my fault" in his statements at the time, his official report, and his offer to resign his command soon afterwards.

All that is true, but simply because Lee is responsible for the actions of his army does not mean that his subordinates did not screw-up or fail in their own responsibilities. Subordinates in military organizations fail all the time; commanders simply cannot make them mistake free. A good commander supervises within reason, corrects when and where he can, and provides an operational vision, allocation of assets, and order framework that allows the subordinate the best chance of success — even where actual success isn't physically possible, such as during Pickett's Charge.

My demonstration of Longstreet's shortcomings has nothing to do with excusing Lee from his command responsibilities. It determines Longstreet's abilities as shown in the battle so that the game can match them. No more, no less.

One feature that clouds assessing Lee at the battle is his command style. He was typically a hands-off commander who would give general instructions and leave the execution and details to his subordinates. A forerunner of mission-type order systems as promoted by the German General Staff in the late 1800's, but without the highly trained professional staff officers and procedures needed to implement it successfully. In many cases, this ad hoc decentralized command structure accomplished what would not have been possible otherwise as competent leaders on the ground can react faster to changing circumstances, but the cost of such a command system is always an accepted level of imperfect coordination and a greater risk of the subordinates making mistaken choices.

Any commander's leadership style must strike a balance between centralized planning (generally sluggish and rigid, but with overall coordination maximized) and unbridled decentralization (rapid reaction to local circumstances but with inherent confusion and only that coordination allowed by happenstance). Lee was far closer to the latter than the former.

Furthermore, such decentralized execution requires both subordinate leaders of training and quality levels high enough to handle independent responsibilities and adequately trained staff support so that confusion in order formatting and wording is minimized. For the Germans, their highly trained staff officers ensured a kind of 'group think' that allowed them to coordinate without communications because one staff officer knew what his counterpart in the adjacent army would be advising his commander.

Nearly all of Lee's subordinates had training at both West Point (or other military academies, such as VMI) and junior to mid-level officer experiences in the pre-war army. They all had relatively extensive combat experience at multiple levels of command. While some might be in new — higher — positions, even they had experience in the field. While that was the general rule for these men, Henry Heth was a notable exception.

True staff training had not yet been developed, so none of them had such a background. There was nothing Lee could have done to implement a true general staff of the sort the Germans developed — such a thing did not exist — nor could he draw on the aristocratic staff tradition available in Europe as a substitute.

Lee's staff was extremely limited and simply incapable of the job they were tasked to do. Lee can be personally faulted for not supplementing his tiny staff with additional experienced officers. Such an expansion was proposed, but was not done because he wanted to keep good officers in their combat commands.

So, what is my assessment of Lee at Gettysburg?

First, I believe it severely short-circuits analysis when one automatically assigns good and bad to a commander's style simply based on a battle's results. Lee's hands-off style is criticized because he lost, while Meade's 'running about like a wet hen' (to quote the Duke of Wellington) is lauded because he won. What would have been the opinion of historians had the Confederates won? That's right, Lee's approach would be written of as genius and Meade a goat. Obviously, this type of analysis simply cannot objectively examine the merits of either style.

Both styles have their place and the best commanders mix them as the situation requires. But such flexibility is limited by both the commander's personality and the army's character.

In this battle's case, Lee's hands-off style came back to bite him because one corps commander was incapable of functioning (Hill) and another was seemingly unwilling to function (Longstreet). Lee was unable or unwilling to drastically change his style when the crisis demanded it. This became critical by the late afternoon of July 2nd. Taking a more direct charge of unfolding events such that Anderson deployed his whole strength or that Pender was able to launch was absolutely critical. Such actions on Lee's part would have brought Ewell into the battle earlier and perhaps allowed his army to carry Cemetery Hill.

Some might say he should have done this on the afternoon of the 1st day. I'd suggest he did what he could, but that the shortcomings that evening — critical as they look to us — were his first warnings that a change was needed. It's unfair to expect him to peer into the future and "just realize" that the command system he had used so successfully so far was failing before something did fail. But all the indications were there by the time he was embroiled in extended arguments with his sullen senior corps commander in the early hours of the 2nd day. By the time the assault in the afternoon began to fall apart, it may have been too late to recognize and implement the needed changes. That still gave him a window of some hours to determine that something was very wrong and to take steps to correct it.

He was doubly at fault in that he did not make this adaption in time for the planned early morning attack on the 3rd day. It was probably too late at that point for the change to have worked in terms of winning the battle, but a better performance that morning would have resulted from the then embarrassingly needed additional command and control.

Lee finally determined that a tighter hand on the reins was needed upon finding Longstreet preparing for an unauthorized flank march rather than the attack that was ordered early on July 3rd. At that point, Ewell's Corps was already embroiled in fighting. Even then — despite being active with Longstreet through the morning in establishing the assault plans — much was left unprepared and, obviously, the additional direct control was nowhere near the level required to execute the replacement plan that eventually became the fiasco of Pickett's Charge.

So, you have an outstanding military commander (no argument there, he caused a larger army to withdraw from the gates of his capital, and went on to beat back all comers with an army on a shoestring) faced with an almost unthinkable problem: in the midst of what he knew was the battle that might decide the war, he needed to recognize that the situation required him to greatly change his heretofore successful style of command to one ill suited and unaccustomed to himself, his staff, and his subordinates. He needed to recognize this need, determine the best way to adjust, and implement that change in an effective manner in a matter of hours. And, he needed to do this knowing that his subordinates' freedom to act — a key reason for his success so far — would have to be sacrificed.

Personally, I do not know that such a pivot is possible at the head of an organization as large and complex as a 19th century army in the midst of a major battle.

Was Robert E. Lee responsible for the Army of Northern Virginia's failure at the Battle of Gettysburg? Yes, as commander, he was. Was it his fault? That's a very different question. Myriad failures generated the Confederate loss on that field. Robert E. Lee's fault is that he was unable to stop enough of them to allow his army to prevail overall.

The greatest failure crippling the Army of Northern Virginia was the effective collapse of the linkage between Lee's will and the actions of his divisions at the highest levels.

Hill's incapacitation should not have come as a great surprise; he was "ill" regularly. Lee would have known early on the morning of July 1st that Little Powell was unable to function properly. Egos aside, the solution there is "easy" enough — put Hill on some sort of sick leave and place the corps temporarily under the ranking Major General. This would have been R.H. Anderson, unless even more disruption is accepted by reaching into other corps for officers. Anderson's performance was lackluster anyway, so it may not be possible to salvage Hill's Corps. Dorsey Pender was just promoted on May 27th, so he is not getting the job.

Longstreet's churlish behavior is puzzling and probably caught Lee by surprise. Replacing him on the field is not an option. Lee's only real choice would be to ride herd on the man throughout the battle to ensure that 1st Corps acted as desired. In this, Lee made a mistake. He chose to ride herd on Hill, instead, and was not willing to take the reins from him when Hill simply could not do the job. Longstreet was left to his own devices with disastrous results.

That was Lee's fault.

R.H. Anderson, McLaws, and Hood's Divisional Arrivals

I used information in my Longstreet assessment that was unsnarled from a confused narrative regarding the arrival of the above divisions. The un-inquisitive might leap at the most common version available and not even notice the inconsistencies. The seemingly unimportant details of these movements helps to flesh out a better narrative of what happened on the morning of July 2nd and point to certain critical matters involving Longstreet and the orders he was given.

Conventional wisdom — statements repeated often enough that they become accepted as fact — goes as follows: 1) Anderson arrived on the 1st and deployed on Knoxlyn Ridge to await morning. 2) On arrival, McLaws turned right on Herr Ridge and stopped his lead elements near the Fairfield Road. 3) Hood, arriving next, also turned right on the Herr Ridge road stopping north of McLaws.

All three are wrong.

First, Anderson's bivouac site. "Upon approaching Gettysburg, I was directed to occupy the position in line of battle which had just been vacated by Pender's Division, and to place one brigade and a battery of artillery a mile or more on the right of the line, in a direction at right angles with it and facing to the right." — R.H. Anderson's OR Report vol 27 part 2 [emphasis added]

Anderson arrived in the late afternoon of the 1st. The only location that had just been vacated by Pender at that time was Herr Ridge. Pender's Division did originally deploy on Knoxlyn Ridge, but moved forward to Herr Ridge much earlier in the day before being stopped by a direct order from A.P. Hill. Pender stayed on Herr Ridge until the afternoon assault began. To Anderson's eyes, the only place of note regarding Pender was Herr Ridge.

Harry Pfanz came to this same conclusion in his monumental study of the 2nd day: "When Anderson's Division reached the approaches to Gettysburg, Hill ordered Anderson to deploy four of his brigades on Herr Ridge. Pender's Division had vacated this high ground a short time before when Hill sent it forward into the attack." — Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, pg 21

So what is the origin of the idea that Anderson spent the night on Knoxlyn Ridge? First, we have two reports of his distance to the rear: "[Anderson's Division was] some 2 miles to the rear of the battleground." — A.P. Hill's OR Report. "…about 2 or 3 miles from Gettysburg, where they remained until next morning…" — A.R. Wright's OR Report

Read the right way and from the right starting point both of these reports could be interpreted to mean Knoxlyn Ridge. Herr Ridge is a little less than 2 miles from Gettysburg's town square. Knoxlyn Ridge is around 3 miles from the same place. Measuring from something like McPherson's Ridge or the "edge" of Gettysburg changes the meaning completely. Both of these reports are ambiguous because of the unexplained starting point.

Furthermore, Bachelder placed the division on Knoxlyn Ridge on his troop movement maps. I believe this was the result of applying Anderson's "just vacated" notation but not ascribing the full meaning to the "just" part of that statement.

Placing Anderson on Herr Ridge has serious ramifications regarding the arrival of the two divisions of 1st Corps.

As for McLaws' approach march, we have this sort of confusion coming from historians: "…The division commander [McLaws] had ridden in advance of his troops, who were halted in a lengthy column along the Chambersburg Pike. …With the instructions given, McLaws returned to his command, which he had posted along Herr Ridge, roughly a mile and a half west of Seminary Ridge. …The time was approximately nine o'clock when McLaws headed back to start his division for Herr Ridge." — All of these on pg 264 of General James Longstreet by Jeffery Wert, in the order given above [emphasis added]

But a very clear statement coming from the division commander himself: "The march was continued at a very early hour, and my command reached the hill overlooking Gettysburg early in the morning. Just after I arrived General Lee sent for me — as the head of my column was halted within a hundred yards of where he was — and I went at once and reported." — Lafayette McLaws, "Gettysburg," SHSP vol 7 pg 68 [emphasis added]

Since before McLaws' Division arrived, Lee was on or near the Seminary grounds on Seminary Ridge. McLaws is therefore stating that the van of his division stopped on the Chambersburg Pike just shy of the army HQ on the west side of Seminary Ridge. Likewise, there is only one "hill overlooking Gettysburg" in the direction these troops are arriving from, and that is Seminary Ridge.

Contradicting this is: "At the head of McLaws' Division I arrived in front of Gettysburg, about one half hour after sunrise on the morning of 2d of July 1863. We debouched from the main road by a by-road that traversed an open common for a few hundred yards, and there halted, the head of the column having reached the mouth of a lane which the road entered at Hoss' [sic, Haas] house." — Joseph Kershaw, letter to Bachelder, 20 March 1876 Bachelder pg 453

But note that Kershaw (commander of McLaws' lead brigade) adds no information between arriving in front of Gettysburg and debouching from the main road. He does not state where "in front of Gettysburg" he arrived, nor does he include the direction of the debouchment. This was also written 13 years after the battle without the assistance of his own official report. He did say in his official report: "We reached the hill overlooking Gettysburg, with only a slight detention from the trains in the way, and moved to the right of Third Corps, and were halted until about noon." — Joseph Kershaw, OR Report

So, here he arrives specifically at "the hill overlooking Gettysburg" (again, that is Seminary Ridge). The rather cribbed sentence construction of the linking "ands" leads me to believe he was actually saying he 1) arrived at the hill overlooking Gettysburg, then 2) moved to the right of Third Corps and then 3) halted until about noon. In other words, he was describing three sequential activities.

A bit of indirect evidence that McLaws was accurate comes from the above discussion of Anderson's location. Having McLaws move in column down Herr Ridge right after dawn would commingle the two divisions in a way that would cause great confusion. Anderson would not have left the ridge until several hours after McLaws arrived. No experienced divisional commander would have set his division on top of another in so small an area. The risk would be too great. Additionally, no one in either division reported the two divisions having to work through each other that morning. Furthermore, McLaws was following orders to report directly to Longstreet. No one suggested — or ordered him — to put his division in battle-line a couple of miles to the rear.

So, we must have McLaws moving to Seminary Ridge first and later moving to Herr Ridge to start the flank march.

Lastly, the matter of Hood coming on to Herr Ridge closer to the Chambersburg Pike than McLaws.

The conventional wisdom here is that McLaws arrived and marched down Herr Ridge and Hood followed him so that he filled in the area between the rear of McLaws and the pike. This is demonstrably wrong. It is quite clear from a number of reports that Hood actually marched toward Gettysburg first that morning. It is true that McLaws led the march from Chambersburg, but the divisional march order was changed in the pre-dawn hours such that Hood was in front. If the conventional wisdom were correct, Hood would have been the division furthest south on that ridge.

Worse than the problem with McLaws and Anderson mixing on Herr Ridge, to follow the convoluted logic of the conventional wisdom, you have Hood arriving and stopping at the northern end of Herr Ridge (on top of part of Anderson) and then McLaws marching through the middle of both of these divisions to occupy the southern part of the ridge. Now you have three divisions piled on top of each other in a small space.

Polley's description above placing Hood in the field just south of the Chambersburg Pike on the west side of Seminary Ridge and subsequent movement (about an hour and a half later) cross-country about a mile or so to a valley with fuel and water works well. McLaws would have had to countermarch back up the pike to turn down Herr Ridge while Hood moved cross-country just south of the pike to occupy the area just west of Willoughby Run near Herbst Woods. All of this happens while Anderson moves off Herr Ridge to the southeast to relieve Heth's Division. This keeps all three divisions from mixing.

"… Hood's Division followed its commander toward Gettysburg by way of the Chambersburg Pike and filed into the fields west of Seminary Ridge, where its men stacked arms and fell out to rest. McLaws' Division followed Hood's, and its van got as close as a hundred yards to General Lee's observation point before it halted." — Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, pg 110

I believe Pfanz has the situation here described accurately. Both Hood and McLaws were under orders to report to Longstreet as quickly as feasible. Neither received any orders that morning to park on a ridge several miles away. The divisions would have behaved as Pfanz notes.

That said, it requires some conjecture to fill in the blanks regarding the movement from these initial locations to the Herr Ridge jump off points at mid-day. Other than Polley, no one recorded any "preparatory" marching. However, given the known locations, there is only one way to reconcile the matter. That is what I have outlined earlier. These movements, and their sequencing, is critical to understanding when Longstreet received his orders and what he did with his corps afterwards.

Richard Ewell

Second only to Longstreet in the post-war carnival of blame is Richard S. Ewell, the one-legged commander of 2nd Corps.

Here again, conventional wisdom wreaks havoc and prevents many readers from seeing through its murk. As conventional wisdom would have it, a newly married, recently crippled, Richard Ewell took an unsteady command of Jackson's old corps and was indecisive at best. The assumption being he lost "something" of his character and leadership with that leg and marriage, becoming much more tentative in his decisions.

Upon taking the town of Gettysburg, he was supposedly gripped both by this indecision and an order from Lee to "avoid a general engagement." Lastly, Lee's use of the phrase "if possible" and "if practicable" in his orders to take Cemetery Hill the first night was "unfamiliar" to this new corps commander who was so used to Jackson's authoritarian methods and orders.

The result, so goes conventional wisdom, is that he could not decide what to do and ended up failing to decide what is obvious in hindsight — and the only chance to take Cemetery Hill faded away.

When I first began this project, I had no issues with that particular conventional storyline (as opposed to Longstreet and Lee, where the activities of each officer seemed at odds with conventional assessments). Ewell and his corps seemed passive and of limited import compared to the more interesting tales of the battle involving the fighting on, and south of, Cemetery Ridge into the Round Tops. To be honest, few give the actions around Culp's Hill more than a passing look. I know I did not.

That changed rapidly. As a friend stated: "Ewell becomes the one-eyed man in a room full of blind men."

Let's look at what actually happened.

First, the brand new "indecisive" Ewell used his bold decisions and daring to win the Second Battle of Winchester in his first days as a corps commander. The battle has been called "one of the most perfect pieces of work the Army of Northern Virginia ever did" (Maj. Robert Stites). If even partially true, this is high praise indeed.

With an order in his pocket from Lee telling him to "avoid a general engagement" and word from A.P. Hill regarding a concentration at Gettysburg, Ewell decided on the morning of 1 July 1863 to turn his corps toward Gettysburg — instead of the safe bet, Cashtown, arguably Lee's preferred choice.

Once on the ground, he observed the positions of the Union defense lines and A.P. Hill's troops, correctly identified the opportunity, ignored the "no general engagement" restriction and immediately sent orders to both Rodes and Early on his own initiative to attack. His corps proceeded to be the key element of the immensely successful Confederate attack that day, where four divisions of the Rebel army virtually destroyed two Union corps (one of which being arguably the Army of the Potomac's finest, while the other is typically written off as its worst).

Taking the town, both his divisional commanders expressed the viewpoint (which many believe was in error) that their troops were in no condition to continue the assault onto Cemetery Hill without additional support. These were both very aggressive officers; if they had reason to believe going on without support was impossible, it carried great weight. Ewell decided on their best counsel to stop long enough to re-organize.

Meanwhile, A.P. Hill convinced Lee that his corps was incapable of additional combat that day. Lee summoned a staff officer, Major Walter Taylor, to go to General Ewell and tell him "it was only necessary to press 'those people' in order to secure the possession of the heights south of town" with an admonition to do so "if practicable". Taylor rode off to find Ewell in the town square (probably right around 5:00 p.m.), delivered the order and believed it to be understood and that it would be executed.

Taylor delivered Lee's order just before Early and Rodes arrived to discuss the situation with Ewell (and convince him they needed support to accomplish anything). Early suggested Ewell request help from Lee; Ewell liked the idea. With the corps leader endorsing the idea to stop, reform, and then attack when support was provided, Rodes rode back to his division and found them in the process of stepping off on their own hook to attack the hill. He stopped them in their tracks. Two of his brigade commanders, O'Neal (who wanted to redeem himself for his earlier mistakes) and Doles (who had helped rip apart 11th Corps with little loss) were aghast and vehemently argued the case to continue. The increasingly ill Rodes would not allow them.

Ewell sent an aide (James P. Smith) to Lee requesting the desired support. Lee told Smith he would give what support he could and issued orders for Hill's artillery to deploy on Seminary Ridge in order to fire upon Cemetery Hill. These orders were not implemented by Lee's chief of artillery William Pendleton (who, not surprisingly, joined Early after the war in the witch-hunt to find someone else to blame for the loss). Pendleton placed the artillery, in park, behind Seminary Ridge and they were not deployed pursuant to Lee's orders that day.

Lee then told Smith essentially the same order he sent to Ewell with Major Taylor: "to take Cemetery Hill if it were possible". Smith returned to Ewell with these orders.

In both cases, described in great detail later by both Taylor and Smith, the words "if practicable" or "if possible" are used but not the conventionally attributed admonition to "avoid a general engagement".

The wording choices here are important. The first one (practicable or possible) is also one of the pillars upon which the "indecisive" and "not used to Lee's style" arguments rest. The phrase is used to suggest that the order was optional, dependent upon the result of some sort of reflection on its possibility. That interpretation rests on removing the phrase from its historical context. It was then a common condition applied to discussions among gentlemen recognizing respect for the other's status. It was not unusual in Lee's orders any more than the common — subordinating — valedictions used in letters of the time.

Confusing the issue even more is the insertion of "avoiding a general engagement" into the argument. Neither man delivering these orders stated that this phrase was part of the message relayed to Ewell.

It's origin? One phrase contained in R.E. Lee's official after action report. The conventional wisdom goes that Ewell was throttled and confused by that requirement. The argument is used (along with 'if practicable') to also illustrate the conventional image of a confused, indecisive, and 'in a mental fog' Lee.

The problem is that these orders did not contain this warning. It was in the orders Ewell had earlier that morning. Orders that Ewell — correctly — ignored when he saw the incredible opportunity presenting itself from Oak Hill. That somehow he managed to ignore that restriction (demonstrably in his hands) and opened a general engagement at 2:00 p.m. or so, but was completely stymied by the same idea (which evidence indicates was not reiterated) at 5:00 p.m. is illogical.

Hanging their opinion strictly on one phrase in Lee's report, historians ignore the personal accounts of the two men who actually carried the orders.

"Why is it, then, in Lee's report?" they'll say. Lee, and his military secretary Charles Marshall, carefully crafted the report to protect his subordinates from public blame for the defeat. Lee struck out entire sections Marshall felt were vital to the understanding of the battle (Pickett's entire official report was ordered destroyed). Every word was chosen with great deliberation. Lee attempted to ensure that he alone was deemed at fault.

The assignment of the phrase into those later orders is not supported by the evidence and ridiculous in light of the day's events. To state that he first committed to a general engagement, but was then suddenly frozen by that earlier admonition after a major victory is laughable. His other actions that day are at odds with the conventional wisdom, but I'm not expecting any 'serious historian' to agree — yet oddly, they are not troubled by the contradictory bigger picture.

Still, regardless of his earlier boldness and in spite of two orders to do so, it is also true that Ewell did not actually attack.

One can only speculate that the advice of his generals, his own appreciation of the need for support, and his direct observation of the enemy was enough to convince a veteran combat leader that his command could not precede at that time. In the game, I believe we can discover whether or not his decision was the right one, but we also have to assume he made the best decision he could given the available information and his own experience.

That night's tale of 2nd Corps command breakdowns continued after the decision to not storm Cemetery Hill. Lee met with Ewell and his division commanders around 6:30 p.m. to discuss the corps' options. Lee did not repeat his order regarding the capture of Cemetery Hill (they must have convinced him, too, that it was not possible), but he did instruct them to capture Culp's Hill with Johnson's newly arriving division. Ewell issued orders to Johnson to do so.

Three events conspired to make that operation misfire, too.

First, upon returning to his headquarters, Lee changed his mind and sent Ewell orders to prepare to pull his corps back to the west to be in line with the rest of the army on Seminary Ridge. Ewell went to army headquarters to argue the idea and Lee reversed himself countermanding the second set of orders.

Second, Ewell's orders to Johnson specified to attack the hill only if the hill was "unoccupied." Johnson, who was apparently unaware that Ewell's staff had already done a recon and found it deserted, sent out his own recon. It found a few troops there (the 7th Indiana Regiment and the crippled remains of the Iron Brigade), so it was decidedly "occupied."

This led to the third problem. On their way back, Johnson's recon team managed to capture a dispatch rider with an order from Slocum to Sykes detailing the movements for the Union 5th Corps. This corps was stopped for the night a few miles from Ewell's left flank. With a Union force presumably marching right into his flank in a few hours (as well as another unaccounted corps, the 12th, known to be somewhere on the field), Ewell could be risking the entire army's flank if he pressed on to the south without strongly guarding that approach route. There was only one brigade of Early's Division facing that way. Early reinforced it with another brigade and Ewell must have also felt that holding Johnson in his current position (just south of the Hanover Road) would be necessary.

That being the state of affairs, he made two decisions students of the battle will forever question. First, he called off the attack on Cemetery Hill (to which Lee belatedly concurred). Second, he held Johnson's Division in place to guard against the possibility of a Union attack in the morning. Without hindsight, both are arguably reasonable and prudent.

Whether the hyper-aggressive Jackson would have done so in Ewell's place is irrelevant (except that in a similar condition at Chancellorsville, Jackson did halt an advance to reform his troops). What we do know is that since the morning of July 1st, Ewell made four key decisions: he turned toward Gettysburg rather than continue on to Cashtown, he attacked with Rodes and Early, he decided not to attack Cemetery Hill, and held Johnson back from moving up onto Culp's Hill.

No one with the benefit of hindsight can excuse the latter two decisions. However, regarding mistakes at the time, Lee reportedly once said "Young man, why did you not tell me at the time? After the battle, even a man as dull as I can see what I should have done."

The two earlier decisions were not only the correct ones, but each was the aggressive choice and was made rapidly. They created the impressive Confederate victory on the battle's first day.

So, what became of Ewell in the remaining two days of the battle?

The next morning he again convinced Lee that it was not in the army's best interest to maneuver his corps out of its position on the left flank. He then obtained orders (around 9:00 a.m.) that he followed the rest of the day with his corps. After executing the required "demonstration" (by artillery fires), he ordered his corps to attack when the opportunity seemed available. His troops briefly captured East Cemetery Hill and also lodged a threat to the Baltimore Pike. The latter forced the Federals to plan a counterattack to press it back the next morning.

On that day, he is at fault for not making Early attack with more of his division. Also, Rodes (laid up sick in Gettysburg) did not prepare his division properly. It took so long to deploy out of the town that it could not attack. Arguably, both were the purview of the division, not corps commander, but like Longstreet, Ewell is ultimately responsible for what his corps does (or does not) do. He also did not find useful employment for two of his artillery battalions (Carter and Nelson), but as players will discover in the game, there just isn't a great deal of good ground for artillery in the 2nd Corps sector. He did, however, follow his orders that day as issued and each of his division commanders attempted to execute those orders. This was not the case in either of the other two corps of the Army of Northern Virginia.

On the night of the July 2nd, Ewell was issued orders to attack the next dawn. He prepared that night by heavily reinforcing Johnson's Division. He also shifted both of the 'forgotten' artillery battalions to more useful locations. The corps was preparing to attack when the Union attack preempted it. The battle raged there for a few hours, during which Longstreet was reigned back in for not following his orders. This set the stage for the fiasco that was Pickett's Charge.

In the end, except for the pair of decisions on July 1st (which may have been the best choices at the time) and a failure to ensure Rodes and Early executed their attacks on July 2nd in concert with the forces available, Richard Ewell did his job within reason and even with a bit of independent flair on the first day.

A Tale of Two Ammo Dumps

In beginning work on this game, I started digging into the known information on the artillery ammunition reserves of both armies. This was primarily done to fulfill the series' needs for accurate artillery ammunition data. I figured that this would be a relatively easy job, especially when compared to the detective work needed for None but Heroes. Heck, it's Gettysburg, one of the most documented battles in history. Surely in the reams of information collected on every aspect of this critical battle, someone must have taken an in-depth look at the supply of ammunition to the big guns.

Not so, in fact the topic required the peeling back of many layers of the historical onion… and not a little educated guess work.

Most games have always assumed that the Union army was swimming in ammunition while the Confederates had a modest but reasonable stock pile. The result was that while the Confederates might have to pay passing attention to ammunition, the Union was pretty much able to ignore the issue entirely. This, of course, colored the behavior of players in all those games.

At odds with this "standard wargame" feel is the heated arguments between Henry Hunt and Winfield Hancock regarding the conservation of ammunition and the general impression that batteries were running very low by the third day.

This would never be the case in a game, as few of them ever got as far as the third day (the Confederates generally shoot their bolt on the second and the players pack it in afterwards).

However, the Army Artillery Reserve Ammunition train (Hunt's private stash) was depleted and sent back to the rear to refill on July 3rd. "…a fear that the ammunition would give out. This fear was caused by the large and unreasonable demands made by corps commanders who had left their own trains or a portion of them behind, contrary to the orders of the commanding general." [Emphasis added]

The Army Artillery Reserve train of 70 wagons led to the field by Lt. Cornelius Gillett who was diligent enough to make a full report of his activities relates that 7,325 rounds of the 19,189 he issued at the battle went to 2nd, 3rd and 11th Corps (the remainder were issued to the guns of the Artillery Reserve).

These two bits of evidence waved the red flag in front of me as to what might be going on. Who left their wagons behind, and what else was going on here?

First, we have Gillett going to refill the reserve wagons on the 3rd. That means there was a major accumulation of ammunition some distance behind the battle. This turns out to be Westminster, MD some 15 miles SE of Gettysburg. Westminster was turned into the army's main supply hub and the terminus of the railroad leading to it. The army's Supply Train parked there and with it much of the ammunition reserve (everything beyond what the corps wagons carried and Gillett's wagons took to the battle).

Second, we have the three corps who needed to replenish their own reserves. The first two were easy. Hancock (2nd Corps) reports that to move faster to the field he only brought half of his trains. Sickles (3rd Corps) specifically decided to send his trains to Westminster and did not bring any to the field.

But what of 11th Corps? Here the plot thickens. Major Osborn (11th Corps Artillery Commander) did bring his trains, but relates that his stock was depleted, not by his own guns, but by issuing ammunition to 1st Corps "who were without their trains."

While I have not been able to find a "smoking gun" relating to the movements of the 1st Corps Artillery Reserve train, I believe it is reasonable to assume that in the movement to get to the field on the morning of the 1st, Reynolds either left his train behind at Emmitsburg (in the loving hands of Dan Sickles, who then presumably sent it to Westminster with his own ammunition), or sent it to Westminster himself following the instructions from Army HQ to send all the baggage trains to that location. Either way, 1st Corps arrived at the scene without additional ammunition for its batteries in the critical first hours of the battle.

Splitting the 270 rounds per gun into the 120 typically with the gun and its caissons (12 ldr) and what Cole (Civil War Artillery at Gettysburg) relates as the "bulk of the army's ammunition" at Westminster. If we assume "bulk" is at least 51%, then that equates to 137 rounds per gun. This leaves only 13 rounds per gun for the corps trains (given that the "lost" corps trains count toward the 51%, this is 13 rounds for all the guns on the field, not just the corps with their wagons).

The result is slim and spotty ammunition reserves that may have proven fatal had not Hunt's reserve been available. As it was, the army was forced to ration fires on July 3rd, leading to the extended lull before the opening fires of the afternoon Confederate assault.

And what of the Confederates? Everyone recognizes that the Army of Northern Virginia was nowhere near as well supplied as the Union, so games showed them with some smaller number than the extreme over-abundance given the Union.

As usual, Confederate information is sketchier. Alexander estimates that each gun had 100 rounds in its chests and another 100 in the trains. Given the poor quality of Confederate ammunition, this equates to a smaller number of actual fire-able rounds. Furthermore, an actual inventory of the Army's Ammunition Reserve has recently been discovered from 29 June 1863 that shows the ANVa trains only had enough ammunition to resupply one artillery battalion (typically 4 batteries). This is an extremely small amount for an army of this size. The remainder was kept in the corps reserve trains.

Looking deeper, I found that not only were the amounts extremely small, but the army and corps trains were slow in getting to the battle and established in the 3rd Corps hospital complex west of Marsh Creek (in other words, off map). Some trains moved to the area near Black Horse Tavern to support the action on the 2nd day, but even they were some distance away from the actual battle zone (Union trains, on the other hand, were consolidated into an enormous "Grand Park" near the Granite Schoolhouse directly in the rear of the fish-hook line).

The result is that Confederate batteries were essentially forced to use what they had on-hand. This led to another feature of the battle that looks very odd until the paucity of ammunition is considered. On all days of the battle, you can see entire Confederate artillery battalions left in the rear taking no part, at all, in the fight. Examples include both Heth and Pender's divisional artillery (which pretty much spent July 1st twiddling their thumbs around Marsh Creek) and the Washington Artillery Battalion which spent most of July 2nd around Willoughby Run.

These units were being used as ammunition reserves. Should a battalion at the front become depleted, these battalions were available to fill in the gap while the empties went to the rear. Effectively, the army saw the battalions as "expended" when they were used up. Some could be replenished from corps stocks (such as what Alexander accomplished between July 2nd and 3rd), but when that ammo was gone, it was over. Literally, Longstreet's assault on July 3rd was the last gasp the army had at Gettysburg. There wasn't enough left to "try again" and still support the retreat back to Virginia.

Designer's Notes

I'll refrain from the obligatory "why a new Gettysburg game?" section and merely jot up my thoughts about the design issues I worked on. For the grognard, those sections should answer the "why" question. I figure it's 'all new' to the uninitiated, so I'm covered at both ends. For the great middle, enjoy!

The Morning of July 1st

Of repeated concern in testing was the exact manner in which the morning's initial battle was to take place. Being a meeting engagement, timing was — and is — critical. Even a modest force arriving at the scene of the action mere turns out of sequence could lead to repercussions from which a side might never recover. Furthermore, the wildly changing balance of forces led players to very clear decisions on what they would do. (We did this in testing, so you wouldn't have to!)

Timing

Just getting units to the field (for the Union, especially) required the coordination of a NASA launch. I deliberately chose to avoid "design for effect" here (which would simply place units along the road at a point where X turns later they would, by normal movement, end up in the fight at the right time).

Instead, I wanted to show things like the details of the 1st Corps approach march that are typically glossed over. I knew that Cutler had left camp (south of Marsh Creek) and was moving north of the Iron Brigade's camps at 8:30 a.m., that they would march to the Peach Orchard road junction to await orders while Reynolds went forward to investigate the situation. Furthermore, a gap developed between Cutler and the Iron Brigade as the latter took until around 9:00 a.m. to break camp and get on the road (letting them catch up was one reason put forward for the division's Peach Orchard halt). Following those events worked well enough, except that the units literally double-timed from the halt locations to the battle. The time from when Reynolds' release until they got to the location for the first infantry fire exchange was just too short. Also, Reynolds' entire ride forward, visit with Buford, and return happened very rapidly (too rapidly to do it literally in the game). Lastly, this is one of three instances I found where the normal workings of the Command System would take too long to get the job done.

I addressed the "march speed" issue with the Double Quick rule, Reynolds with the OOA's 'transporter' functions, and the command issue with the instant order to Wadsworth. There is a price to be paid in rules weight, but I feel the pay-off in seeing what actually happened is worth it this time.

Timing was critical for the arrival of the two Union infantry brigades and some variability between them makes things interesting. Cutler had to be in position in time for the 1st shot (roughly 10:15 a.m.) or the cavalry would not be able to withstand the Rebel attack long enough to cover Seminary Ridge. Being late was not an option here (as will become more apparent when we look at the Carrots section). The Iron Brigade's breaking camp has a bit more variability and this adds significant tension to the defense and gives the Confederates some useful goals as we shall soon see.

One thing that took time to get my arms around was the fact the cavalry didn't fight a tooth and nail action with the Confederate advance (I'd like to, again, thank The Killer Angels clouding the image for me).

Games typically show the cavalry getting shredded by massed infantry attacks and leveling entire regiments of Rebs using their 'carbine buzz-saws'. Neither of these is accurate (the real action accounted for 2 SPs of loss on each side). Instead, the cavalry fight was limited to the important functions of slowing the Rebel march (from Marsh Creek) and (critically) forcing Heth to deploy. Restricting Confederate use of Column formation forward of Herr Ridge and forcing them to deploy on line with both brigades before advancing show the important effects of the cavalry fight.

Without them, the Confederates a-historically 'ignore' the cavalry screen and bludgeon right into the cavalry's main defensive line. That's a situation Heth was in no position to offer — and Buford could not afford to try to resist. Makes for nice novels and movies, though.

Once Heth begins his advance, the two Zeroes (Davis and Archer) made the remaining advance happen at the right speed (averaging 4 MPs per turn) so they would get to where they needed to be on time to meet the Union infantry (with a bit of variability in both directions to make things interesting).

Carrots

Once the basic timing was under control, it rapidly became apparent in testing that the situation rode on a knife-edge. When all of Wadsworth's Division was up, Archer and Davis really must pull back to Herr Ridge and await the rest of the army (as they eventually did historically). Players quickly began to decide to avoid a fight until then, anyway, to the point of not seeing a reason to attack at all. Meanwhile, the Union had absolutely no interest in holding the ridges forward of town — the player knew he'd eventually be back on Cemetery Hill and figured he'd do better with an intact 1st Corps than not. Both players were seemingly coming to the joint conclusion that they'd skip any morning fight and agree to start the battle "some time this afternoon" back on Cemetery Hill.

The Confederates needed a reason to attack and the Federals needed a reason to defend.

Typically, this is handled (at least from the Confederate side… I'm not sure designers have really given the Union player much of any reason to defend forward) by letting all of Heth and the rest of Hill's Corps slip the reigns and go berserk. Jerry Axel dubbed this effect "Panzergruppe Hill." Obviously, this "fixes" one game design problem by ditching historical reality and taking a quick run into fantasy. Players deserve better than that.

Instead, I chose to have Cutler show up pretty much right on time, but allowed some possible delay to affect the arrival of the Iron Brigade. What this — combined with the variations in the speed of Heth's Zeroes — does is Cutler may have a few turns to deal with Heth alone before being fully supported. That gives Davis and Archer a brief window of opportunity to beat Cutler up a little before being scared off by 'them Black Hatted Fellers'.

Damaging half of Wadsworth's Division has great value to the Confederates, so they have a good reason to attack early on. Giving the Federals a reason to defend needed its own carrot.

Reynolds and Buford chose the ground northwest of town to defend specifically so they could fall back before needing to defend the key high ground of Cemetery Hill. Unlike the game player, they did not have a printed order of arrival in front of them and dozens of histories to look at to know when reinforcements would arrive. They needed to hold for as long as possible — and hopefully that would be long enough. You need to sweat that time, just like they did.

I gave the Federals two reasons to "hold forward". First, keeping the Hill's Corps HQ off the top of West McPherson's Ridge severely constrains Hill's freedom of action (limiting any wide maneuvers the player might want to pull off). Second, allowing the Rebels to make lodgments on the top of Seminary Ridge too early affects Lee's "attitude" about the fight and generates a "momentum of victory". Good reasons to hold on for dear life.

Order Short-Circuits

I mentioned above that the order from Reynolds to Wadsworth could not follow the normal order process due to the time involved. This situation also occurs with Lee in his orders to Hill's Corps in the afternoon, and then Ewell's order to Rodes. All of these could not follow the normal order process as that would take too long… and all of them were the result of very special circumstances. These circumstances are also very similar to one another.

Reynolds left Wadsworth to see what the situation was, but everyone involved knew that orders were coming to move forward into the fight (the question being where to go, not if they would). By the time Reynolds came back and sent his staff to drop fence rails, the division was already ready to go and only needed to hear the word. They had gotten ready for the order long before it came.

While Lee was observing the field and getting a feel for the situation, Heth asked, at least twice, if he could attack. Upon seeing Rodes' attack along Oak Ridge, Lee sent Heth back to his division to await orders. Those orders came in under 30 minutes. Since the end of the morning's attacks, Heth had been getting his division ready to go again. As with Wadsworth, Heth had gotten ready for the order before it came. Similarly, Pender's Division was on hold after actually starting an attack earlier in the morning (and being stopped in its tracks by Hill's staff). They were ready as well. Both divisions moved out without delay.

Rodes appeared on the northern end of the field to behold a spectacle he (and his men) had never seen before… the wide open flank of a Union battle-line spread out for all to see. He began deploying his division. Ewell arrived briefly thereafter and also recognized the opportunity. He issued the orders for Rodes to attack and sent an order to Early coming down from the northeast to do so as well. Both divisions launched on the fly (successfully on Early's part, not as much for Rodes). I coded Early's orders into the Order of Arrival (so to avoid giving the player excessive flexibility). The player is given some freedom with Rodes, with the downside of some choices in how it affects Lee.

11th Corps

As the favorite whipping boys of the Army of the Potomac, I feel 11th Corps has been unfairly shown in earlier games. 11th Corps was poorly handled and used as a scapegoat to deflect blame for the disaster of the first day's fight. To show this, games usually show them with morale levels that make players wonder why they just didn't all desert the army before they ever got to Gettysburg.

I rated them up a notch in morale… a level I thought they had earned.

In earlier test versions, there was an additional 'Looking for Glory' application on the afternoon of the 1st day as well (simulating Barlow's unhinging Schurz's line by advancing to a knoll that now has his name on it). This was found to be unnecessary as von Steinwehr's Division had to be assigned to Cemetery Hill as army reserve. This was a two-headed problem. If von Steinwehr was allowed to move forward early, 'looking for glory' or not, 11th Corps was just too much for Doles and Early to take on.

Even with von Steinwehr in reserve, the "Looking For Glory" proved to be less than useful in unhinging 11th Corps to the point where Early and Doles could take them on with anything like the historical losses. Also, "Looking for Glory" in this case generated its own set of potential abuses — aside from the fact that pushing Barlow to his knoll really didn't mess up the corps' line as much as you might think.

In the end, I had to pull the corps' morale ratings back just a touch (but still better than they are usually shown), leaving von Steinwehr back in reserve, and eliminating the extra "Looking for Glory" to get the right balance of power in the historical fight.

What does all this do? The 'Script' Accusation

Some take one look at the timing mechanics I've presented above and think I'm trying to force the game to follow the history… that there is no room left to deviate and so on.

They seem to think the game will follow a script.

I have to point out that since the game is not actually restricted the way they think it is, I can only assume that they are reacting to what they think these rules do. An image untainted by actual play.

What does happen is that the deviations to the historical "script" start small and grow as time passes (as one would expect). The rules exist so that the deviations from the historical timeline do not start out too large (swamping all further inputs).

I feel players neither want the game to 'show' Gettysburg (like a movie) to them, nor do they want something that bares no resemblance to what really went on. Naturally, they (and I) want to be put into the driver's seat so we can run Gettysburg and see how we do within realistic limits. At either of the extremes (script vs. letting them have laser cannons or some such), I can't tell how well I'd do at Gettysburg as I'd either see Gettysburg just as it was, or Gettysburg as done without the boundaries of reality.

So, putting the player in charge of the actual battle (as best we can do with cardboard and dice, anyway) means that the player will be operating a) in the historical environment (no AK-47s), b) under some decisions made before he arrived at this point, c) in an environment where some things are simply out of his control, and d) there are "actors" under him who are still wanting to operate as well (or poorly) as their historical counterparts did.

As a result of those four conditions, deviations from the script Gettysburg to the player's Gettysburg start out small (where case b is strongest), but retain inertia throughout (a, c, and d are always involved).

So, as the old saw goes: "You are in command!" But, you are "in command" where some events are already underway, some people are not dependable, and you are running mid-19th century armies with the capabilities and limitations of mid-19th century armies. If you, like I, want to see how your own Gettysburg turns out — this is your chance.

How on Earth did they pull this off?

One thing that struck me (and some others) in the research for this game was the sheer effectiveness of the Confederate attack on the afternoon of July 2nd. You can see what I mean by setting up the situation at 3:45 p.m. and playing to the 7:00 p.m. turn. Then compare what you've accomplished versus the historical set up for 7:00 p.m. My guess is you'll be struck, as I was, with just how much those two and a half divisions accomplished. I really think that they managed to do something just outside the envelope of what is possible given the game system (a good place for the system to be, since it is not designed to model outliers as "normal"). The comparison is well worth your time and consideration as it will shed a new understanding on how hard the fighting in that zone was and just how precarious the Union line was becoming when night fell.

Playing forward, into the dark, from the 7:00 p.m. set up is also informative, as those exceptional circumstances are already in play.

There is a reason Hancock had to send Willard's Brigade and the 1st Minnesota on their death-ride attacks. The Union left was in trouble. Sure, parts of 12th and 6th Corps were arriving on the scene, but the crisis they were sent to deal with had moved further north — out of their immediate reach.

Repeated testing showed that the historical results are very difficult to achieve. This confirmed to me that the relatively excellent morale ratings you find in the Confederates (especially in Longstreet's Corps) and the more mundane ones in the Army of the Potomac are in fact accurate for the model and must exist in order to perform close to historical levels — and even then, doing what they did is no easy task.

The 20th Maine

Fabled in story starting with the writings of both their commander Joshua Chamberlain and Oliver Norton's The Attack and Defense of Little Round Top, the 20th Maine's defense of the flank of Little Round Top achieved an almost religious fervor among fans of Michael Shaara's The Killer Angels (and the resulting movie, Gettysburg).

The combination of its place on the line (the end — at one point in time, anyway), the post-war build up of Little Round Top as the point where the battle was decided, and Shaara's book, highlighted this one — good, but not spectacular — regiment to a lime light no other formation in the Civil War obtained. I have taken the possibly unpopular course of evaluating the unit based on what it actually did, and not on some popularized appeal.

The 20th Maine ended up at the end of the line because of the order of march taken by Vincent's Brigade to get there. They were not "selected" for this position because of any superior abilities. Once there, they spent around an hour fending off the attacks of one unsupported Confederate regiment — the exhausted 15th Alabama. After marching 28 miles from Chambersburg, rushing into the far right of the Rebel battle-line, leading the attack for Hood's Division, and climbing up and over Big Round Top, the 15th Alabama put in an attack that caused it to have only about 19% losses and inflicted a little over 30% on the defender.

At that point Chamberlain charged with his regiment (which was about out of ammunition) as a desperate measure. This action inflicted another 83 losses on the 15th Alabama (mainly captured POWs).

In the end, the 20th Maine inflicted fewer losses by firepower (95) on a larger (by about 100 men) attacker (and ran out of ammunition in the process) than were inflicted upon it (120) while defending. And they did this, while relatively fresh compared to their enemy. These are not the marks I expect of a unit achieving the even temporary status of 'elite' in the game system.

Now, contrast this performance with an undisputable A, the 16th Maine. Here, you have a regiment that marched off to its own destruction fully realizing it was being sacrificed to make good the escape of the rest of its brigade. They attacked into swarming Confederate brigades so they could hold some ground to the last man.

In a game sense, the entire action of the 20th Maine is in a location where the terrain makes them "behave" as an A (due to the modifier). Psychologically, players see an A-rated regiment and start thinking offensively. This is as they should and correctly models the approach players should take with other A-rated units (such as the 16th Maine above, the 1st Minnesota, and 111th New York). But that is not how anyone viewed the use of the 20th Maine.

In this last point, one might wonder about the A-rated regiments in Greene's Brigade; they were strictly defensive in nature. They are indeed violating that provision, but one must remember that Greene's Brigade held off the better part of Johnson's Division and did so with an open (and infiltrated) right flank. What they did was most assuredly "A-rated quality".

So, why is the 20th Maine's location one of the most visited and asked about places at Gettysburg today? This in spite of the heroic sacrifice of many other Union regiments (who have gone forgotten) and the fact that "Buster" never existed. Why? Because of the myth-building that surrounded both Little Round Top and "the end of the line" beginning as soon as the smoke dispersed and reaching a head with a popular historical novel and movie.

All this said, and the results of my analysis in the game as the standard rating of this unit, I know that some will have opinions so at odds with that thinking that they might be unable to move past this one unit and look at the many other lessons I tried to convey. I can understand this point of view. For them, the optional version of the 20th Maine is provided. In my view, the game has bigger fish to fry and I don't want this one decision to get in the way of players experiencing the whole.

Some Odds and Ends

Students of the battle will note that Zimmerman's Battery (Pegram's Artillery Battalion, A.P. Hill's Corps) arrives with only three 3-inch Rifles in the game while most sources agree that the battery had four 3-inch Rifles. This is because one gun snapped its axle wheeling into position on Lohr's Ridge (just west of the game map) and was rendered inoperable.

Given the new rules regarding artillery Morale Losses and Loss Recovery, I was able to insert the temporary losses to artillery units (guns abandoned and later recovered) as actual losses. Before, their loss would be ignored as the guns were later retrieved and the only losses recorded were those that were permanent. The "soft" losses allowed me to better reflect the damage to the battery in terms of caissons lost and horses killed. This works well, as quite a few batteries were out of action because of such losses, but actual destroyed guns were fairly rare. Refitting during the night was a major operation for the batteries at the battle, it will be for you as well.

Similarly, I had a number of batteries on the Union side (Heckman and Walton come to mind) that were literally "sent to the rear" after sustaining such damage that they were no longer considered usable. Above and beyond the damage modeled in the system's losses and loss recovery, they were simply removed from the order of battle to fight in some future action. Leaving them in as "dead" units would allow the player to rebuild them as well as have them wandering around on the map (a-historically) with a SP (or two) when they were actually on their way back to Washington to refit. I merely removed them from play in scenarios occurring after they were relieved.

Jenkins' cavalry has been ignored. Jenkins, himself, received a serious head wound by shrapnel near Blocher's Knoll on July 2nd. Nobody informed the next in line (Colonel Milton Ferguson who was commanding the 16th Va Cavalry acting as provost at Lee's HQ) and the activity of this, rather useless, brigade is a complete mystery until they show up with Stuart on July 3rd at the East Cavalry Field. As such, the brigade has been ignored in the game (exactly modeling its historical usefulness). To avoid confusion, the 17th Va Regiment (riding as a screen for the advance of Early's Division to the field and a unit of this brigade) has been nominally assigned to 2nd Corps and is later removed from play. It spent the 1st in reserve for Early's Division and then was broken up to round up and guard prisoners.

Meanwhile, the 35th Virginia Cavalry Battalion was also detached to Ewell's Corps and screened the approach of Rode's Division to the field. They were immediately assigned to screening the army's left flank and did some service in scouting Meade's right during the remainder of the battle. They were never used en-masse once they had arrived.

Sitting to the rear of Cemetery Ridge (N58.41) is undoubtedly the only "Chicken Bake" hex that will be in this series. In the early afternoon of July 3rd, a rather "old and stringy" bird was roasted up for the brass of 2nd Corps and (it seems) much of the high-ranking officers in the area at the time. Joshua Chamberlain, who had not had a meal in days, reported to Hancock at this time and wrote of the torture of smelling the roasting bird, but was not offered a bite to eat. Thanks to the efforts (as probably the only people in history who bothered to try) of Jerry Axel and Rick Barber, I've identified the location of this chicken bake with reasonable certainty. This was based on where Gibbon walked and crested the ridge to observe the cannonade (he was at the bake when it started) and the needs of the officers to locate their meal in a position not filled by some unit or another.

Many Thanks are due…

This game was a labor of love for many years now. I had enormous help along the way from the usual suspects, but I do want to identify two in particular.

First, there is the indubitable Rod "Iceman" Miller, who time and again waded into campaign games of LCV testing until his fingers bled. He was instrumental in bringing forth the polish and sheen of the game specific systems as well as the new version 2.0 LoB series rules. He took time he really didn't have to repeatedly test, to analyze, and to suggest streamlining and improvements on matters large and small. More than a few times, he reached into his pocket to spring for plane tickets and travel expenses to come play the game. Thank you, Rod, I couldn't have done this without you.

Second, is (of course) my favorite partner in crime, Jerry Axel. Jerry was, yet again, 100% indispensible in arranging for trips to the field, dropping everything on a moment's notice to come play, set up, or do whatever bizarre task the designer came up with in his usual state of delirium. Jerry was my loyal go-to guy… always willing to say "Sure, I'll drive three hours to come and look at those counters. Just let me finish this coffee. Want me to pick up anything on the way?" You are one of a kind, Jerry, it even makes up for Shakes the Clown. Well, almost.

On the Shoulders of Giants…

Obviously, many of you will compare LCV to its RSS forerunner, This Hallowed Ground.

THG (1998) was, and is, Dave Powell's definitive opus on the Battle of Gettysburg. It was the culmination of a lifetime of study and the hard work of a designer who brought the battle to life in the earlier CWB games on the topic. It is the ultimate statement of Dave's well-considered viewpoint on the battle.

LCV is designed to be complementary to that great work. I had not previously had the opportunity to express my viewpoint on the topic. The need for a LoB specific treatment of the battle gave me that opportunity. Like Dave, Gettysburg was one of my first two ACW loves (the other being, as most already know, Antietam).

If you happen to own both games (and are the envy of many, mind you!), I hope you will find the places where Dave and I have differing visions as a jump-off point for your own contemplation and study of this fantastic subject. Our viewpoints are neither mutually exclusive nor competitive — rather they show the differing ways one can approach a given subject. I hope you find that examination fruitful, entertaining, and enlightening.

Seniority List

Seniority governs which Leader is promoted or takes command when a superior becomes a casualty (4.1b), and which Acting Army Commander outranks another (4.1b, LCV 4.1b).

Army of the Potomac

Unit	Commander	Rank	Date of Rank
Army	Meade	MG	29 Nov 62
Left Wing	Reynolds	MG	29 Nov 62
Right Wing	Slocum	MG	4 July 62
1st Corps	Doubleday	MG	29 Nov 62
1/1 Division	Wadsworth / Meredith / Cutler	BG	9 Aug 61 / 6 Oct 62 / 29 Nov 62
2/1 Division	Robinson / Paul / Baxter	BG	28 Apr 62 / 5 Sept 62 / 12 Mar 63
3/1 Division	Rowley / Stannard / Biddle / Stone	BG / BG / Col / Col	29 Nov 62 / 11 Mar 63 / — / —
2nd Corps	Hancock	MG	29 Nov 62
1/2 Division	Caldwell / Zook / Cross / Kelly / Brooke	BG / BG / Col / Col / Col	28 Apr 62 / 29 Nov 62 / — / — / —
2/2 Division	Gibbon / Harrow / Webb / Hall	BG / BG / BG / Col	2 May 62 / 29 Nov 62 / 23 Jun 63 / —
3/2 Division	Hays / Carroll / Smyth / Willard	BG / Col / Col / Col	29 Sept 62 / — / — / —
3rd Corps	Sickels	MG	29 Nov 62
1/3 Division	Birney / Ward / Graham / de Trobriand	MG / BG / BG / Col	20 May 63 / 4 Oct 62 / 29 Nov 62 / —
2/3 Division	Humphreys / Carr / Burling / Brewster	BG / BG / Col / Col	28 Apr 62 / 30 Mar 63 / — / —
5th Corps	Sykes	MG	29 Nov 62
1/5 Division	Barnes / Tilton / Sweitzer / Vincent	BG / Col / Col / Col	29 Nov 62 / — / — / —
2/5 Division	Ayres / Weed / Day / Burbank	BG / BG / Col / Col	29 Nov 62 / 6 Jun 63 / — / —
3/5 Division	Crawford / McCandless / Fisher	BG / Col / Col	25 Apr 62 / — / —
6th Corps	Sedgwick	MG	4 July 62

Army of Northern Virginia

Unit	Commander	Rank	Date of Rank
Army	R.E. Lee / Trimble / Stuart	Gen / MG / MG	14 Jun 61 / 17 Jan 63 / 25 July 62
1st Corps	Longstreet	LTG	9 Oct 62
Pickett Div	Pickett / Garnett / Armistead / Kemper	MG / BG / BG / BG	10 Oct 62 / 14 Nov 61 / 1 Apr 62 / 3 Jun 62
Hood Div	Hood / Law / G.T. Anderson / Robertson / Benning	MG / BG / BG / BG / BG	10 Oct 62 / 3 Oct 62 / 1 Nov 62 / 1 Nov 62 / 17 Jan 63
McLaws Div	McLaws / Kershaw / Semmes / Barksdale / Wofford	MG / BG / BG / BG / BG	23 May 62 / 13 Feb 62 / 11 Mar 62 / 12 Aug 62 / 17 Jan 63
2nd Corps	Ewell	LTG	23 May 63
Rodes Div	Rodes / Daniel / Doles / Iverson / Ramseur / O'Neal / Blackford	MG / BG / BG / BG / BG / Col / Maj	2 May 63 / 1 Sept 62 / 1 Nov 62 / 1 Nov 62 / 1 Nov 62 / — / —
Johnson Div	Johnson / Steuart / J.M. Jones / Walker / Williams	MG / BG / BG / BG / LTC	28 Feb 63 / 6 Mar 62 / 15 May 63 / 15 May 63 / —
Early Div	Early / Hays / Smith / Gordon / Avery	MG / BG / BG / BG / Col	17 Jan 63 / 25 July 62 / 31 Jan 63 / 7 May 63 / —
3rd Corps	A.P. Hill	LTG	24 May 63
Anderson Div	R.H. Anderson / Wilcox / Mahone / Wright / Posey / Lang	MG / BG / BG / BG / BG / Col	14 July 62 / 21 Oct 61 / 16 Nov 61 / 3 Jun 62 / 1 Nov 62 / —
Heth Div	Heth / Pettigrew / Archer / Davis / Brcknbrgh	MG / BG / BG / BG / Col	24 May 63 / 26 Feb 62 / 3 Jun 62 / 15 Sept 62 / —
Pender Div	Pender / Lane / Thomas / Scales / Perrin	MG / BG / BG / BG / Col	27 May 63 / 1 Nov 62 / 1 Nov 62 / 13 Jun 63 / —

Scenarios

The following transcribes the framework and historical/narrative content of the Scenario booklet (©2013, Multi-Man Publishing, Inc.), which pairs with the Exclusive Rules above. Each of the 22 scenarios also specifies an exact unit-by-unit Order of Battle set-up (hex-by-hex counter placement) and, where applicable, its own victory conditions — that component-level deployment data is reference material for physically setting up the counters and is not reproduced here; what follows is each scenario's own historical framing, general parameters, and any rules unique to it.

7.0 Scenarios

All the large scenarios can be played with an ending at midnight on the day they begin. Apply the same victory conditions as the full campaign game and enjoy the battle — you'll just end play sooner than the bitter end of the battle. Remember, it's the hours you spend outwitting your opponent that matters.

You can play the large scenarios on the appropriate 1st Day or 2nd/3rd Day Maps (or as a mini-campaign linking those two) as desired. Set up the map area you want and use the Orders of Arrival that apply to those maps. The First Day scenarios can be played using Maps A and B as well, following the same technique as above.

7.1 The Battle of Gettysburg: Traditional Start

This is the whole thing; the largest battle in North America, 1 to 3 July 1863. Note that not much beyond a movement drill occurs in this period (before the 9:30 am start). It is only provided as a 'legacy' scenario as players have come to expect to see Heth march onto the map based what they've seen in other Gettysburg games.

General Information: Maps Needed: Maps A, B, C and D. Map Area: All. First Turn: 8:30 a.m. July 1st. Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. July 3rd. First Player: Confederate.

7.2 The Battle of Gettysburg: Regular Start

This is the primary full-battle campaign scenario. It skips the first four turns of drill that one gets with the 'legacy' 8:30 am start.

General Information: Maps Needed: Maps A, B, C and D. Map Area: All. First Turn: 9:30 a.m. July 1st. Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. July 3rd. First Player: Confederate.

7.3 The Second Battle of McPherson's Ridge

After the morning rebuff, Heth regrouped on Herr Ridge and awaited orders. After seeing Rodes' attack from Oak Hill, Lee unleashed Heth to take McPherson's Ridge with the uncoordinated help of a portion of Daniels' Brigade.

General Information: Maps Needed: 1st Day Map. Map Area: N15.29 to N15.15 to N32.15. First Turn: 2:30 p.m. July 1st. Last Turn: 3:30 p.m. July 1st. First Player: Confederate.

7.4 Try, Try Again!

This scenario starts just after the failed attack by O'Neal and Iverson of Rodes south of Oak Hill. Heth's Division is rolling forward with Pender on his heels while Early is attacking with Doles in an unplanned coordinated attack on the Federal 1st and 11th Corps which resulted in a major Confederate victory on the first day of the battle of Gettysburg.

General Information: Maps Needed: Maps A, B, C and D. Map Area: All. First Turn: 2:30 p.m. July 1st. Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. July 3rd. First Player: Confederate.

7.5 Flying Dutchmen

This short scenario allows the player a chance to try to damage 11th Corps on the Gettysburg plain north of the town proper. It is more difficult than you might think given popular lore and the limited losses Doles and Early took doing it. Because of the need to do this so rapidly and with low losses makes for an interesting puzzle.

General Information: Maps Needed: Map B. Map Area: N1.66 to N33.50 to N33.35 to N1.35, inclusive. First Turn: 2:30 p.m. July 1st. Last Turn: 4:00 p.m. July 1st. Total Game Length: 7 Turns. First Player: Confederate.

7.6 Fading Light, Fading Hope

Having blasted 1st and 11th Corps into a Skedaddle to Cemetery Hill south of Gettysburg, the Confederate army stands on the brink of finishing the Battle of Gettysburg as a massive Southern victory. Some consider this to be the golden opportunity for the Confederacy. Will this win the war? That's not to be decided here. This is just a step in that direction and a chance for the South to implement Lee's strategy of "driving one corps back upon another" to win the campaign.

Its victory conditions require the Confederates to exit SPs of Hays/Early and Gordon/Early (not Hoke/Early) off the map via the Harrisburg Road, with no Union units within 3 hexes of N17.49.

7.7 The Deciding Day: July 2nd 1863

This scenario begins right as Lee becomes capable of issuing orders on the morning of July 2nd. For many looking at the battle, this is the start of the decisive day of the entire thing. The preparation work of the first day sets up the situation for the crisis to come.

7.8 The Proposed Attack

This scenario is strictly "what if." The hypothetical requires Longstreet to have acted right away on the orders he was given before Lee left to talk to Ewell at 9:00 a.m. on July 2nd. It requires that Longstreet march his divisions down the far side of Seminary Ridge and directly into the assault positions Lee drew on the map for McLaws. It begins at about the absolutely earliest time such an attack could have begun.

General Information: Maps Needed: Maps A, B, C and D. Map Area: All. First Turn: 11:30 a.m. July 2nd. Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. July 3rd. First Player: Confederate.

7.9 The Best Three Hours of Fighting Anywhere

This isolates the assault of Longstreet's Corps and the right of Anderson's Division on Cemetery Ridge through the Peach Orchard. Accomplishing what the Confederates actually did in the time allotted is a feat in and of itself.

General Information: Maps Needed: 2nd/3rd Days Map. Map Area: South of N55.xx and west of (the play boundary as printed). First Turn: 3:45 p.m. July 2nd. Last Turn: 8:00 p.m. July 2nd. First Player: Confederate.

7.10 Dan Sickles: Savior of the Union

Once all the arguing and confusion was done, the Second Day's assault finally began just before 4 p.m. From that point until the fighting died in the darkness, the last chance for Confederate victory was expended and found wanting. Here, you can see how the dice roll in your battle.

(The scenario also lists "Options to Explore" variations for further play.)

7.11 Dogs of War

This is a training scenario allowing players to come up to speed on the unit handling skills needed to play LoB well. This isolates the action right at the Peach Orchard at the time of Barksdale's and Wofford's assault that made up the last of the initial attacks of Longstreet's corps. A number of Union units preoccupied by other Confederate attacks north and south (or in the line facing south in the case of some artillery) of this area have been ignored. For simplicity, the Open Order units in Wofford's Brigade have been ignored.

General Information: Maps Needed: 2nd/3rd Day Map. Map Area: South of S3.xx, north of S12.xx, west of xx.35 inclusive of the boundaries. First Turn: 6:00 p.m. July 2nd. Last Turn: 6:45 p.m. July 2nd. Total Game Length: 4 Turns. First Player: Confederate.

Victory Conditions: Play the scenario twice, switching sides. The player who exits the most SPs from Barksdale's Brigade via the map edge indicated above wins. If both plays yield the same number of SPs, the game is a tie.

7.12 The Attack Spreads North

As Law's Brigade expends itself unsuccessfully on Little Round Top and Anderson, Kershaw, and Semmes are locked in a stalemate struggle in the Wheat Field, Caldwell's Division of Hancock's Corps executes a counterattack pushing into Rose's Woods. Longstreet is holding Barksdale and Wofford awaiting the right moment to send them as a wedge into the Peach Orchard and allow the battle to spread north. That moment has arrived.

7.13 Col. Colvill, Advance and Take Those Colors!

This small scenario deals with the near collapse of the Union left flank at the culmination of the Confederate attack on July 2nd. The last energy of the Confederate assault is expended to get on top of Cemetery Ridge and Hancock is reduced to sending Willard's Brigade and the 1st Minnesota to their deaths as last ditch efforts to stop them.

7.14 The Battle Between the Farm Lanes

Around the time the fight for Little Round Top and Peach Orchard was over and the fight for the Wheat Field was coming to its conclusion, the Union left was in disorder. All of 3rd Corps, most of 5th Corps, and a division of 2nd Corps were no longer combat effective. 6th Corps was approaching but was being deployed where the battle was ending. Fighting transferred north into the ground between the farm lanes.

7.15 It's Not Easy Being Greene…

This small scenario explores the defense of Culp's Hill on the night of July 2nd. Through an almost catastrophic series of decisions, George Greene's 12th Corps brigade of New Yorkers is all that occupies the defensive works running from the top of Culp's Hill (which is occupied by the battered remains of Wadsworth's Division from 1st Corps) down almost to the Baltimore Pike Bridge over Rock Creek.

The action here is limited to that which occurred before Geary's Division of 12th Corps returned to reinforce the position.

7.16 Sputtering into Night

This scenario begins just as Anderson's attack on Cemetery Ridge is falling back across the Emmitsburg Road and Johnson is about ready to start his demonstration against Culp's Hill (fully unaware that half the line ahead of him is empty). Pender is down and Lane is not about to commit the division without new instructions from Hill. Rodes is just now moving out of town to line up for his fizzled attempt at attack. Early has not yet begun to move.

7.17 Early is Up Late

This is the finale of the 2nd Day at Gettysburg. Two brigades of Jubal Early's division assault and actually capture East Cemetery Hill. Union forces regroup to push them back off the hill. The Confederates wait in vain for help that was never sent. The South's chance at taking the hill — the culmination of all the effort and sacrifice of the massive battle that raged on the Second Day — fades away forever when the brigades fall back to their start positions.

7.18 Dawn of the Last Day

This is the historical Third Day start. The off-shoot scenarios allow you to try out possibilities as either Lee or Longstreet envisioned them, but here, the Confederate dawn attack is pre-empted by 12th Corps and Longstreet's failure to act. What becomes of the day after that is up to you.

(The scenario also lists "Options to Explore" variations for further play.)

7.19 The General Plan was Unchanged

In this scenario, much remains as it was in the historical 4am start except that Longstreet also follows the orders Alexander obtained at Longstreet's headquarters. He orders Pickett's Division up during the night and is prepared to attack with his corps at dawn.

(The scenario notes several "Options to Explore" for handling the pre-emptive 12th Corps action and coordinating it with the flanking maneuver.)

7.20 The Way 'round the Right

As reported by Longstreet and repeated in The Killer Angels and the movie Gettysburg, Longstreet argued himself hoarse trying to convince Lee to maneuver around "to the right." Admittedly, Longstreet actually was talking about a far larger maneuver than most gamer's think on the evening of the 1st and morning of the 2nd. He was trying to convince Lee to move the entire army to a position between the Army of the Potomac and Washington — aiming, coincidentally enough, at the same ground Meade picked along Big Pipe Creek.

7.21 Pickett's Charge

This scenario isolates the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble Assault (there's a reason I've stuck with the common, less precise "Pickett's Charge" for my purposes). It sacrifices some of the side areas of the action (and the southern cavalry attack in its entirety), but gives the desperate infantry assault its full consideration.

7.22 Pickett's Charge: Whole Map

For every Southern boy fourteen years old, not once but whenever he wants it, there is the instant when it's still not yet two o'clock on that July afternoon in 1863, the brigades are in position behind the rail fence, the guns are laid and ready in the woods and the furled flags are already loosened to break out and Pickett himself with his long oiled ringlets and his... — the William Faulkner passage (Intruder in the Dust) that gives this scenario its epigraph. This version of Pickett's Charge uses the entire map, restoring the southern cavalry action and side areas that 7.21 sets aside.