Caralis: The Battle for Sardinia, 215 B.C
Caralis: The Battle for Sardinia, 215 B.C Rulebook
Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Rome Threatens Sardinia in the First Punic War
The First Punic War began in 264 as a contest between Rome, Syracuse and Carthage for control of eastern Sicily. Rome defeated Syracuse early on, and the war expanded as a clash between the Carthaginian and Roman empires. However, as long as Rome lacked a fleet, she could threaten only Sicily. Sardinia, and Africa, were safe behind the patrols of the Carthaginian navy. Punic raids were launched from Sardinia against the Italian coast, while the Punic navy brought support to beleaguered cities on the Sicilian coast. Within the Roman Senate, the realization came that this war could never be won unless Carthage was challenged at sea. So, in 260 Rome built her first battle fleet, and with ingenious boarding ramps (the corvus) defeated the Punic navy at Mvlae.
In 259 the consul Lucius Cornelius Scipio led the first Roman expedition against Corsica and Sardinia. He had some success against the garrisons, before being driven off by a reinforcing fleet under Hannibal, son of Gisgo. In the following year, the consul Gaius Sulpicius Palerculus campaigned with a Roman fleet in Sardinian waters, defeating Hannibal and capturing or destroying all his ships. Hannibal was crucified by his own officers for his repeated failures. Another Punic fleet under Hanno arrived to restore the situation, and the Romans departed.
As the long war dragged on, Roman interest in Sardinia waned. The immediate objective of ending naval raids on Italy had been accomplished. Rome turned to a more direct strategy of invading Africa. When this effort was foiled by disaster on land (the Battle of the Bagradas featured in SPQR) and sea (256-55), Rome reverted to a strategy of attrition on Sicily. Sardinia was never again threatened during the First Punic War. Rome finally won the long war with a naval victory at the Aegates Islands in 241. In the Peace of Lutatius that ended the war Carthage lost Sicily and had to pay an enormous indemnity, but retained control of Sardinia and Corsica.
The Rape of Sardinia
The end of the First Punic War brought no relief to Carthage. Hard on the heels of this war came the revolt of the mercenaries, the Truceless War, 240-238 (featured in C3i Nr. 7). While this brutal war raged in Africa, the contagion of rebellion spread to Carthage's mercenary garrison on Sardinia in 239. These soldiers of fortune rose up, and slew their Carthaginian commander Bostar and his officers. In response, Carthage sent an expedition under (another) Hanno to punish the rebels, but his troops deserted and joined the mutineers. The rebels crucified Hanno, then ran rampant over the island, slaying all the Carthaginian settlers. Once the euphoria of the initial uprising had worn off, these mercenaries began to dread retribution from Carthage. So they sent an offer to Rome to surrender Sardinia to them.
The Roman Senate refused the offer. The senators decided to honor the terms of the Peace of Lutatius, which expressly forbid taking as an ally any ally of the other power. Meanwhile, on Sardinia the mutinous mercenaries turned on the local populace. Their depredations at length drove the native tribes to rise up and attack them. The mercenaries were expelled from the island in 238, and Sardinia was briefly independent. Carthage, as soon as the rebel mercenaries in Africa had been suppressed, began preparing an expedition to re-conquer the island.
In Rome, however, there was a change of heart. The senate reversed itself and proclaimed the annexation of Sardinia and Corsica, in flagrant disregard of the Treaty of Lutatius. When Carthage complained, Rome threatened war and increased the indemnity Carthage had to pay to keep the peace. This aggression became known as the Rape of Sardinia. Rome may have gained a valuable province, but she also earned the undying hatred of Hamilcar Barca and his sons (Hannibal, Hasdrubal and Mago), a matter of no small consequence.
The Roman Province
Victory in the First Punic War brought Rome her first two overseas provinces, Sicily and Sardinia. The highly civilized island of Sicily became a profitable and peaceful possession. Wild, untamed Sardinia was another story. Carthage had never conquered the entire island, content with coastal enclaves and diplomatic, commercial and cultural domination of the island. Roman ways were different. A series of expeditions were sent to the island to pacify it completely. Both consuls fought on the island in 238, and after a brief interlude consular armies were dispatched every year for five years, from 235-231. The first of these expeditions was led by the consul Titus Manlius Torquatus, of whom more will be heard anon.
Finding the administration of overseas provinces a burden on the limited officers of the Roman government, the number of praetors was expanded from two to four in 227. The first praetor of Sardinia in that year was Gains Flaminius, destined to meet his end at Hannibal's hands by Lake Trasimene. In 225 the consul Gaius Atilius Regulus was dispatched with his army to quell another uprising on Sardinia. His colleague, Lucius Aemilius Papus remained in Italy to guard against an expected Celtic invasion. Atilius Regulus suppressed the Sardinian revolt and returned to Italy in time to take part in the Battle of Telamon (featured in C3i Nr. 6). On the eve of the Second Punic War Sardinia was a province barely pacified. A generation of Roman commanders and legionnaires had their chief battle experience from campaigns on this island.
The Second Punic War
Sardinia did not figure prominently in the opening campaigns of the Second Punic War. The island was held for Rome only by a garrison of allied troops, probably no more than 5,000 men. Hannibal's surprise crossing of the Alps, and his first major victory at Trebbia, convinced the Romans that this war would be neither easy nor short. The Roman senators knew that Carthage would attempt to regain Sardinia at the first opportunity. Therefore, early in 217 the praetor Aulus Cornelius Mammula was sent to reinforce the island's garrison with Legion V, a full-strength double legion with some 10,000 foot and 800 horse. Cornelius Mammula maintained a tenuous control of Sardinia over the next two years, as Hannibal's continuing string of victories over Rome excited the anti-Roman passions of the native tribes. The praetor had to exact ever increasing taxes and tribute from his province to support the war, which contributed greatly to the rising discontent.
The council in Carthage also took more direct action to break Sardinia away from Rome's grasp. A general, Hanno, infiltrated onto the island as an agent provocateur, to foment rebellion. Hanno soon made common cause with Hampsicora, the leading Sardinian chieftain, to prepare a massive island-wide insurrection. Cornelius Mammula, however, was a wary and circumspect governor. Even after the Battle of Cannae, when much of southern Italy rebelled, Hanno and Hampsicora bided their time. They awaited a more favorable moment to raise the cry of 'freedom from Rome!'.
The opportunity they sought came soon enough. At the end of 216, the propraetor Cornelius Mammula was recalled to Rome, pending the arrival of his successor. The praetor Quintus Mucius Scaevola arrived early in 215, and immediately came down with a serious, incapacitating illness.
Cornelius Mammula, alarmed by the turn of events, hurried back to Rome to make his report. Leaderless, the Roman garrison was unable to react as Hanno and Hampsicora now unleashed the long simmering rebellion. The insurrection quickly spread across the island. Legion V hunkered down in its bases and waited.
Hanno and Cornelius Plea for Reinforcement
The opposing generals, Hanno and Cornelius Mammula, both hurried to get urgent pleas for reinforcing expeditions to their home governments. Cornelius Mammula reported in person to the senate on the impending revolt and the incapacitation of Mucius Scaevola. Rome, unfortunately, had just about scraped the bottom of her manpower barrel. After Cannae in the fall of 216, Rome had barely managed to conscript one new consular army of two legions. Additional armies were formed from the survivors of Cannae and a force of slave and convict volunteers, the volones. Then another disaster befell Rome in the winter of 216-215. The praetorian army of two legions, in Cisalpine Gaul was ambushed and annihilated in the Litani forest by Celtic tribes, instigated by Hannibal. This brought to ten the number of legions completely destroyed so far in the war. The senate had reluctantly concluded in early 216 that no additional forces could be raised, and that the Litani ambush must go unavenged for now. It was in this situation that Cornelius Mammula made his plea for reinforcements. Despite their many difficulties, the senate ordered a levy to be raised. Somehow, the urban praetor, Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, managed to scrape up a reinforced Roman legion, the XIV. Its strength was 5,000 foot and 400 horse. It was most likely composed of teen-agers, old men and those earlier rejected as unfit for service. But Legion XIV would have to do.
Hanno's message met an entirely different response in Carthage. The way had been paved by Mago Barca's mission to the council following Cannae in the autumn of 216. Mago had poured a bushel basket of gold rings cut from the fingers of dead Roman nobles and knights onto the council chamber floor. Mago's request for 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry was readily approved. When Hanno's emergency dispatch arrived, Mago Barca was on the point of sailing for Italy with the first contingent of this levy, 12,000 foot, 1,500 horse and 20 elephants. Arriving at nearly the same time as Hanno's plea to re-conquer Sardinia came news of Hasdrubal Barca's disastrous defeat at Dertosa in Spain (featured in C3i Nr. 4). The council was forced to allocate resources amongst three competing theaters - Italy, Spain and Sardinia. The councilors' decision revealed their strategic priorities. Mago and his army were diverted to protect Spain. A mere 4,000 cavalry and 40 elephants were sent with Bomilcar and the home fleet to reinforce Hannibal in Italy. (It was the only reinforcement he ever received.) A new army of 12,000 infantry, 1,500 cavalry and 20 elephants was prepared for an expedition to Sardinia.
The expeditionary army was probably formed of a core of some six thousand solid Libyan spearmen, supported by over 1,000 superb Numidian light cavalry and heavy Carthaginian horse. There was also available a force of 13,850 Iberian infantry and 1,200 cavalry from the Thersitae, Mastiani, Oretes and Olcades tribes. This unit had been posted to Africa in 218 by Hannibal, in keeping with his policy of defending Spain with African troops and Africa with Iberians. Probably about six thousand of these Iberian foot, with supporting cavalry were assigned to the Sardinia bound army. This Iberian contingent was by now well drilled, after three years of garrison duty in Africa.
The Commanders
So both Carthage and Rome prepared expeditions for Sardinia in the spring of 215. But these armies needed commanders, and this posed a problem for both empires. The Roman Senate habitually turned to experienced consulares (former consuls) to lead her armies in emergencies of this nature, however, few were available. Five consulares had already been slain in the first three years of this war: Gaius Flaminius (Trasimene); Lucius Aemilius Paullus, Marcus Minucius and Gnaeus Servilius Geminus (Cannae); and Lucius Postumius Albinus (Litani). Tiberius Sempronius Longus (Trebbia) and Gains Terentius Varro (Cannae) were in disgrace. Quintus Fabius Maximus and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus as consuls, and Marcus Claudius Marcellus as proconsul faced Hannibal, while Gnaeus and Publius Cornelius Scipio were in distant Spain. There were few tried leaders left. The praetor Fulvius Flaccus, charged with designating a temporary commander for Sardinia, chose Titus Manlius Torquatus.
Manlius was one of the elder statesmen of Rome, a stern, harsh man known for his conservative, traditional views. His intransigence played a key role in the rejection of Hannibal's offer to ransom the 8,000 Roman prisoners taken at Cannae, condemning these men to a life of slavery. He was probably already over 60 years of age, and like Marcellus, he had probably served as a junior officer against Hamilcar Barca in Sicily. His first consulship had been served in Sardinia in 235. His second consulship had been in 224, leading a punitive expedition against the Celts after the invasion of Telamon. Tradition dictated that no man serve more than two consulships. Even though Fabius, Marcellus and others ignored this provision and served multiple consulships during the Second Punic War, Manlius would have none of it. Later, in 210, after the leading century had elected him, he forced them to annul the vote and begin anew. Again in 207 he would refuse to stand for the consulship when it was offered. But in this case he agreed to serve temporarily as the deputy of the stricken praetor Mucius, probably as a propraetor. Manlius would return to Sardinia a full two decades since his first command on the island.
Carthage had as yet lost no senior commanders in this war. Nevertheless, Carthage was also short of experienced generals. The veteran commanders of the Iberian conquest had all accompanied Hannibal. Hasdrubal, his chief of staff, Hanno, son of Bomilcar, Maharbal, Mago Saunites, Hamilcar and Carthalo were all with the army in Italy. Hasdrubal Barca, his deputy Himilco and his brother Mago were engaged in Spain. With the best commanders already committed, the council in Carthage selected Hasdrubal the Bald to lead the Sardinian expedition. He does not seem to have been a veteran of the Iberian campaigns, but Hasdrubal may have campaigned against the tribes on Carthage's African frontier. The council assigned Hasdrubal a deputy commander, Mago. This general was said to be a close relative of Hannibal, probably a cousin. Hasdrubal could also rely on the support of the general Hanno, already in Sardinia.
The Race is On
Carthaginian and Roman expeditions were both prepared for Sardinia in the spring of 215. The question was, which would arrive first? Hasdrubal set out first from Carthage, his army of 13,500 escorted by 60 quinqueremes. If he could arrive first, he could join the rebel Sardinian army to his own and besiege the leaderless Roman troops in their bases. But fate took a hand. When in the open sea between Carthage and Sardinia, Hasdrubal's fleet was caught by a savage storm and hurled some 300 miles west onto the Balearic Islands. Loss of life was not severe, but Hasdrubal found he had to repair many of his ships before continuing the journey. Hasdrubal took advantage of this unexpected diversion to reinforce his army with a strong body of the renowned Balearic slingers.
While the Carthaginians cooled their heels in the Balearics, Manlius set out with his 5,400 men escorted by some 40 quinqueremes. The Roman voyage to Sardinia was uneventful, and Manlius put in at the provincial capitol, Caralis (modern Cagliari). The Romans had won the race, with a helping hand from Neptune. But Manlius still faced a serious situation, with the island in full revolt and the garrison disheartened and demoralized. Manlius took command of Mucius' Legion V and added the original garrison allied troops to his green Roman Legion XIV to form a second double legion. This gave him a full consular army of about 18,000 infantry, but with only 1,200 cavalry.
Manlius was not satisfied. To swell his ranks, he grounded his fleet and pressed the marines and rowers into service as infantry. The crews of 40 quinqueremes would provide over 1,500 marines and 8,000 rowers. Manlius formed the marines into cohorts, and selected some 2,500 of the most capable rowers to serve as lightly armed velites. This added 4,000 men to his army, bringing his force up to 22,000 foot and 1,200 horse.
Manlius undoubtedly would have appreciated some time to drill his force and develop more cohesion amongst his V and XIV Legions, garrison troops and naval infantry, but there was no time to spare. Manlius had to suppress the Sardinian rebellion, before the rumored Carthaginian expedition arrived. So Manlius led his disjointed army out of Caralis, seeking the main rebel concentration. As fate would have it, when Manlius came upon the main rebel host, Hampsicora was away, recruiting amongst the Goatskin tribes of the mountains. He had left his son Hostus in command of the army, which may have numbered 15,000 men. Hostus was young and reckless and immediately attacked the larger Roman army when it approached. Manlius predictably routed the rebel army. Its losses were only 3,000 killed and 800 taken prisoner, indicating that most of the rebels fled before the fighting got too hot.
Hasdrubal and Company Arrive
Hampsicora established a new base at Cornus with his Goatskin light infantry and began collecting the scattered remnants of his army. Manlius, as soon as he learned of Hampsicora's location, advanced on Cornus to finish off the insurrection. The war in Sardinia would have been over, but just then word came that a Carthaginian fleet had landed on the western coast. Hasdrubal the Bald quickly disembarked his force of over 14,000 men, then dismissed his fleet. Manlius chose a cautious course, abandoned the field and withdrew back to his base at Caralis.
Hasdrubal joined with Hampsicora, who by now had rallied an army of over 12,000 Sardinian tribesmen to reinforce the Carthaginian expedition. The combined armies now numbered nearly 27,000 men.
Manlius' hasty retreat seems a bit premature in retrospect. A more aggressive commander could have held the field and possibly prevented the junction of Hasdrubal and Hampsicora. Manlius, however, was not chosen for his aggressiveness. It was his steady, cautious nature that the Roman senate counted on. Manlius knew well that ten Roman legions had already been lost in this war. He wasn't about to lose two more. A younger noble, in his first praetorship or consulship, might have felt compelled to risk battle to establish his reputation. Manlius already had his share of glory, and could freely put the interest of Rome ahead of his own. Besides, the Punic superiority in cavalry meant that he could have had little intelligence on the size or intentions of Hasdrubal's army. The prudent course was to fall back on his secure base, develop the situation, and engage in battle only under clearer, safer circumstances.
Hasdrubal, with an army slightly larger than the Roman force, followed Manlius, looting and pillaging the villages of any pro-Roman tribes along the way. Manlius fell back all the way to Caralis, gradually piecing together a clearer picture of the invading army he faced. Though the force was large, a great portion of its strength was from the often beaten irregular Sardinians. Hasdrubal's hard core of professional mercenaries was much smaller than the Roman army. In any case, Manlius could not allow the pillage of Rome's loyal subjects to continue indefinitely. Manlius took the field just outside, Caralis. Hasdrubal accepted the challenge of battle with no reluctance.
The Battle of Caralis
Unfortunately, Livy's account of the battle (Book XXIII, Chapter 40) is typically vague and muddled, but it is the only one we have. Hasdrubal had about 25,000 foot, 2,000 horse and 20 elephants. Some 2,000 of his infantry would have been left behind to guard his camp. Manlius had 22,000 infantry and 1,200 cavalry, and would have detailed a camp guard of similar size. All we know for sure about the deployment is that Hasdrubal the Bald deployed his army in two wings - the Carthaginian expeditionary force on one side and the Sardinian levies on the other. This would have been similar to Hasdrubal Barca's later deployment at the Battle of the Metaurus. Like his namesake, the bald Hasdrubal may have tried to reinforce his weaker (Sardinian) wing with a secure flank, defensible terrain and his elephants. Manlius most likely deployed his army in standard formation - two Roman legions in the center, with Italian allies and the marines and rowers on the flanks.
The battle was hotly contested, the fighting reportedly lasting four hours. The Carthaginian wing was having the best of it on its side, while the Romans gradually gained the upper hand over Hampsicora's levies. Finally, the Sardinians were routed. The Roman legion which overpowered the Sardinians next swung around to fall on the flank and rear of the Carthaginian wing. The African and Iberian mercenaries were trapped and practically annihilated. The Romans counted 12,000 slain on the battlefield, and took 3,700 prisoners.
Hostus had died fighting. His father, Hampsicora, fled with a few horsemen. When he learned of the magnitude of the defeat, and the death of his son, Hampsicora fell on his sword that night. Hasdrubal, Mago and Hanno were all captured alive, an unusual occurrence perhaps brought about by the envelopment of the Carthaginian wing. Captivity was surely a cruel fate, but certainly better than the crucifixion that awaited so many earlier unsuccessful Carthaginian commanders in Sardinia.
Aftermath
The war for Sardinia was over. The remnants of Hasdrubal's army were hunted down. The captured mercenaries may well have been taken into Roman service, as happened later in Sicily. Manlius, when the campaign was complete, gathered up his sailors and re-manned his fleet. The wizened Manlius then laid down his command in Sardinia, and sailed back to Rome. The senate kept a full consular army of two legions in Sardinia for most of the remainder of the war, to guard against the threat from Carthage. In the event, Carthage never mounted another attack on this island province.
The failure of Hasdrubal the Bald's expedition was one of a number of disappointments that ruined the only chance Carthage had to win the war, during the campaign of 215. First Hasdrubal Barca had been defeated at Dertosa, then Hasdrubal the Bald lost this battle in Sardinia and finally the ambassadors negotiating the treaty between Hannibal and King Philip V were captured by Roman naval patrols, delaying the Macedonian entry into the war for a whole year. The momentum of victory, painstakingly generated at Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae, was squandered on the fields of Dertosa and Caralis.
Notes on the Scenario
Legions probably didn't have permanent numbers at this time, so the designations V and XIV are not historical, but rather chosen to match the units in the SPQR counter-mix. The deployment for both armies is only an educated guess, and players may wish to use free deployment. If using this option, allow the Roman player to select the map and deploy first. The Carthaginian player may observe the Roman dispositions and then deploy his forces, the advantage of a superior mounted force.