Amirauté Rulebook

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

• Application
  • Number of participants
  • Place and equipment
• II / The Principles of Action of the Game
  • Weapon elements
• Aggression Factors
  • A/ Principles of fire
  • 2 / Anti-aircraft (air target)
  • TORPEDOES
  • BOMBS FROM AIRCRAFT
  • MINES
  • DEPTH CHARGES
  • B / Practical modalities
  • COMBAT AGAINST SUBMARINES
  • EXTRINSIC DATA OF INTERVENTION
• III / The Dynamics of the Game
  • STARTING SITUATION
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
  • I / Literary references
  • II / Technical references
  • III / Historical references
• Annexes
• Annex No. 1: Chance Cards (non-exhaustive list)
• Annex No. 2: Ship Identity Card (example)
• Annex No. 3: Weather Card (example)
• Annex No. 4: "Transmissions" Tables (at the referee's discretion)
• Concrete Examples
  • 1) Air combat
  • 2) Naval-air combat
  • 3) Surface combat
  • 4) Torpedo combat
• Proposed Themes
• Theme no. 11: The Guadalcanal Campaign (Campaign Scenario)
  • Guadalcanal: rules and approach
  • SEPARATE TACTICAL THEMES
• Global Strategic Theme
  • Situation
• Strategic Theme: Complementary Rules
• Annexes to the Global Theme
  • American dossier for the global strategic theme
  • Japanese dossier for the global strategic theme
• Glossary of Ship Abbreviations (as printed)

Application

Number of participants

By definition, a combat brings together at least two opponents. But the limits of action are quickly reached, which keeps the game light while carefully avoiding falling into the heaviness of a complicated chore. Thus the addition of new participants is desirable as soon as the scale of the ambitions and the means exceeds a certain level. Fletcher Pratt in New York in the 1940s managed in this way to gather several hundred players simultaneously.

A third person proves equally indispensable: the referee, who operates the game, presides over the application of the rules, specifies and judges doubtful cases, and coordinates the action. His action, which makes possible the game of secrecy, adds an incomparable savour, and it will be seen very quickly that his role is irreplaceable.

Place and equipment

With the rules dossier and its annexes (reference directories, tables, etc.) in hand, the game can essentially be played in two ways:

• either with models (generally at 1/1,200) in metal, wood or plastic, or smaller in cardboard silhouette. This is perhaps the more realistic practice, but it requires a large surface that is hard to find and, above all, to keep occupied for a long time. Note also that with the manoeuvre materialised in this way, movements take place in full view of the antagonists, excluding feints, hidden movements and uncertainties.
• or on paper: much broader but more abstract are the card games, which may be:
  • open: for simple themes without surprises, on the same sheet, possibly two sheets if no referee is available, though a referee is always useful, and his role is then more limited;
  • closed: the two sides are separated, each concealing its manoeuvres until visual contact and combat. It is then that the referee fulfils his role as coordinator in its full extent, and his personal participation in the game is no less interesting than that of the opponents.

Besides paper, this form, as in the previous one, requires pencils, rules, protractors, lotto tiles, dice and, often very useful, a pocket calculator. The use of tracing paper, standardised speed scales, and compasses for pre-prepared ranges of action is very practical.

Finally, it is always possible to combine the two practices if one wishes to detail a particular phase of play.

II / The Principles of Action of the Game

The game always uses:

• FIXED DATA, which are the technical characteristics of the forces concerned, and
• RANDOM DATA, supplied by the intervention of dice and lotto tiles (out of 100, not out of 90), which we prefer to the cards of certain authors for their more flexible arithmetical use.

One can also use two twenty-sided dice (one for the tens, the other for the units). The method is equally valid but less quick than drawing a lotto tile. On the other hand, the ease of use of a computer will be very attractive. The use of simple programmes, in particular for aviation, avoids tedious manual draws and very noticeably speeds up the dynamics of play.

Weapon elements

The weapon elements in play (ships, aircraft, coastal defences, etc.) are given values in points representing their potential resistance. This value is reduced by that of the hits received. When the total of aggression points reaches the value assigned to the weapon element, that element is destroyed.

Determining this value and quantifying it is therefore the first task and the first difficulty. One immediately perceives the arbitrariness and imprecision of such an undertaking. The principle most often adopted is the assignment of a certain number of points aimed at quantifying the most notable objective characteristics of the object studied.

Featherstone, following Fletcher-Pratt, thus takes into account for a ship: displacement, age, armour, armament and speed.

For our part, it seems more rational to confine, at least for ships, the data to the static resistance potential alone. The reach or agility of a boxer in no way prejudges his capacity to absorb blows. The evaluation of artillery and speed, elements equally essential, will therefore be deferred, for this reason, to the study of the dynamic phase of the action, that is to say the combat. We shall therefore retain here only the displacement, the thickness of the armour and the age, according to the formula:

Dw / 1,000 + (Bv + Bh) + K = points value

• Dw = Washington displacement, the reference base of the Directories.
• Bv and Bh = vertical and horizontal armour, in centimetres.
• K = variable coefficient from +10 % to −10 % according to the year of construction (the reference period of the zero point being, for example, 1925–1930 for ships concerned with the Second World War).

EXAMPLES:

• CU (cuirassé, battleship) RICHELIEU: 35,000 / 1,000 + (40 + 17 + 4) + 10 % = 105.6 points.
• CU BRETAGNE: 22,500 / 1,000 + (24 + 3 + 4 + 4) − 10 % = 51.75 points.
• CL (croiseur léger, light cruiser) ALGERIE: 10,000 / 1,000 + (11 + 3 + 7.5) + 10 % = 34.6 points.
• CL PRIMAUGUET: 7,250 / 1,000 + (0) ± 0 = 7.2 points.
• CT (contre-torpilleur) JAGUAR: 2,100 / 1,000 + (0) − 5 % = 2 points.

Etc.

To illustrate these figures, let us say that a protected heavy cruiser has a potential of resistance which, as we shall see below, balances the impact of 4 or 5 shells of 380 mm. These are the same conclusions reached by the studies of the US Naval War College in 1939 (U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, XI 1958).

For merchant ships, the average characteristics below will be used to determine the value: 0.5 point per 1,000 tons deadweight, classed as "small" with a length up to 100 m, "medium" from 5 to 10,000 tons with a length of 120 to 150 m, and "large", generally liners with a length that may exceed 200–250 m, but whose deadweight does not give them more than 5 points.

A similar approach allows us to assign in the same way a point value to the other elements: coastal batteries, aerodromes, shipyards, fixed radars, etc.

Examples:

• Port installations: value assigned according to their equipment, 1 point permitting the handling of 1,000 tons in 24 hours per quay berth.
• Protected batteries (angle of fire generally limited to 30°): from 10 to 30 points according to calibre.
• Unprotected batteries (angle of fire not limited): from 1 to 5 points according to calibre. (Batteries generally comprise 1 or 2 guns.)
• Aerodromes, according to size from 6 to 36 and more, in proportion to their housing capacity:
  • 1 point for 2 aircraft, with a minimum of 6 points for 12 fighters;
  • 12 points for 24 fighters or fighter-bombers;
  • 18 points for 36 aircraft of all types, etc.

For submarines, the formula must be adapted, because the very particular vulnerability of these ships is not especially proportional to displacement. According to age and type, the value will be between 0.5 and 1.5.

Likewise, the value of merchant ships will be between 1 and 5 points according to size, which it is preferable to characterise simply by deadweight tonnage.

On the other hand, unlike what has just been set out for ships, we felt it indispensable to include in the value of aircraft their speed and armament, which are priority qualities. Indeed, the problem of combat is here treated globally and in a different manner, and these factors could not be separated without leading to an impossible complexity. We have therefore retained: speed, ceiling, armament, number of engines, possible armour and manoeuvrability, for a basic formula:

V / 100 + P / 100 + A + M + K = number of points

• V and P are the speed and the ceiling, in km/h and hm.
• A is the armament (machine guns of 7.7 mm = 0.15; 13.2 mm = 0.2; 20 mm = 0.4, etc.).
• M is the number of engines: 2 engines = 0.2; 3 engines = 0.3; 4 engines = 0.4.
• K is a variable coefficient according to manoeuvrability, protection or other possible factors.

EXAMPLES: Swordfish: 3 points; Ju 87: 4.9; Me 109: 7.8; Spitfire: 9 points; D.W. 520: 7.2; Wellington: 5.4, etc.

Note that "aircraft" points have a specific value which is not comparable to that of the other weapon elements. They serve only to resolve the problem of aerial combat. On the other hand, each unit is assigned a value of ONE point, whatever it is (fighter or bomber), when it is on the ground, and this value is added to that of the terrain to give an overall sum used in calculating the effects of aggression.

It is recommended to prepare in advance "identity cards" for these different elements, summarising their characteristics, immediately available and avoiding repeated searches in the directories, which are a source of loss of time.

Aggression Factors

A/ Principles of fire

ARTILLERY

The result depends on the calibre, the range of the guns, the distance, the size and the speed of the target.

1° Naval target

Ranges are in general proportional to calibre, with exceptions marking above all the date of construction of the guns. They are easily found in official works.

Target size is so variable that it requires a simplification within the reach of the "wargamer". We propose the division into 6 classes, calculated as follows:

(L × l) / 10 = T (L = length, l = width)

• T1 = more than 500
• T2 = from 300 to 500
• T3 = from 150 to 300
• T4 = from 80 to 150
• T5 = from 40 to 80
• T6 = less than 40

Examples:

• CU RICHELIEU: (248 × 33) / 10 = 818 = T1
• CL TOURVILLE: (191 × 19) / 10 = 362 = T2
• T ORAGE (torpilleur): (105 × 10) / 10 = 105 = T4, etc.

The speed of a target is likewise divided into ten classes:

• V1 = 0–3 knots
• V2 = 4–8 knots
• V3 = 9–12 knots
• V4 = 13–16 knots
• V5 = 17–20 knots
• V6 = 21–25 knots
• V7 = 26–30 knots
• V8 = 31–35 knots
• V9 = 36–40 knots
• V10 = more than 40 knots

This speed can be reduced by:

• weather conditions, according to the size and type of the ship (or aircraft);
• damage, after a reduction of 20 % except in the case of torpedoing, where the reduction is immediate;
• other causes (accidents, etc.).

All of these data therefore determine the percentage of chance of hit. The study of very numerous documents from the two last wars allowed the construction of a base curve (Annex no. 6) determining, for a large number of eventualities, this percentage of chance of hitting. The results have been gathered in fire tables for rapid and practical use (cf. Annex no. 7). Let us note in passing that, by convention, the time sequence in combat is 5 minutes.

EXAMPLES:

• A modern battleship firing its 380 mm guns at another stationary CU at 28,000 m has 17 chances in 100 of hitting; if the target steams at 20 knots, it has only 14. The same CU firing at 14,000 m in the same conditions will have respectively 70 and 55.
• A modern light cruiser firing its 152 mm guns at 16,000 m at a stationary destroyer: 7 %; at a destroyer making 15 knots: 6 %; at a destroyer making 30 knots: 4 %.
• The same at 8,000 m: stationary destroyer 50 %; at 15 knots 38 %; at 30 knots 25 %; and at 40 knots 16 %.

2 / Anti-aircraft (air target)

Air defence has been treated in a fairly similar way, but the distance has been replaced by the mode of attack, reduced to five cases: dive, torpedo, low-altitude bombing, medium-altitude bombing and other (high) altitude. The percentage chance of an aircraft being shot down (damage is not considered) is calculated according to the number of guns of AA (DCA) in action against the aircraft, taking into account that aircraft attacking in a dive, with torpedoes or at low altitude are engaged by all calibres, medium altitudes only by the 37 mm and above, and high altitudes by the 75 mm and above.

The conventional hypothesis is adopted that one gun against one aircraft has a 5 % chance of hitting it:

• 1 gun: 5 % chance of hitting it;
• 2 guns: 10 % chance of hitting it;
• 3 guns: 15 % chance of hitting it;
• etc.

As usual, a table has been drawn up which gives the results at a glance (cf. annex "Aircraft hits" 15-2).

TORPEDOES

The maximum range is that given by the technical descriptions now well known for all navies.

We recall the rough but sufficient distinction between "speed" torpedoes (10,000 m at 40 knots) and "distance" torpedoes (20,000 m at 30 knots), the extremes being represented by light torpedoes launched by aircraft (3,000 m at 35 knots on average) and the Japanese "long lances" (40,000 m at 32 knots, or 20,000 m at 50 knots). The target size is the length of the hulls (the draught sometimes plays a restrictive role — destroyers for example — provided for in a table, as does the state of the sea (cf. annexes).

Two very important elements must be added to the data of this torpedo problem:

• their own speed, most often inversely proportional to their range;
• the "angle of fire".

As for artillery, the chances of hitting have been summarised in tables which, at the cost of an acceptable approximation, dispense with long and tedious calculations (cf. annexes nos. 12 and 13 – Torpedo hits).

EXAMPLES:

• A 40-knot torpedo fired at 3,600 m at a 200 m long target making 28 knots, at an angle of fire of 35° in calm sea: 55 % chance of hitting.
• A 35-knot torpedo fired at a 180 m target making 25 knots, at an angle of 120°: 1 %.
• A 40-knot torpedo fired at 1,800 m at a 100 m target making 32 knots at an angle of 70°: 33 %.
• The same elements, but on a target making 12 knots: 49 %.

A very detailed study of torpedo fire is given in an annex and will make it possible to understand well the solution of this rather delicate problem.

As can be seen, the range of possibilities is very wide and reflects fairly faithfully the real actions in all their diversity.

BOMBS FROM AIRCRAFT

The data for aircraft have been seen essentially in the AA (DCA) sense. In the "attack" sense, the results depend on the mode of assault, which remains the same, and on the size and speed of the target. It is enough to add, to keep to the main data, an imprecision factor due to anti-aircraft fire:

• an aircraft diving on a stationary CU without defensive reaction will have a 90 % chance of hitting it, 50 % if the latter steams at 22 knots and 33 % at 32 knots;
• a torpedo aircraft attacking a CL steaming at 28 knots without AA fire will have 28 % chance of hitting, and 18 % against a destroyer under the same conditions;
• the first aircraft meeting artillery opposition (calculated by the number of guns against it) will see its chances diminished by 15 % if there are 3 AA guns, 25 % with 4 guns, 30 % with 5 guns and 50 % with 10 guns (cf. annexes 15-4);
• kamikazes are treated as aircraft in a dive whose chances of impact are increased by 20 %;
• the effect of "strafing", i.e. attack on a land or naval objective with the aircraft's own weapons (machine guns or light cannon) at low altitude: the overall result is treated as the use of a 50 kg bomb (or more rarely two bombs, according to the armament of the attacking aircraft).

Effects of aerial fire and bombing on land objectives:

• Coastal batteries: no difficulty when the position of the guns is known. When it is not, one must wait until it unmasks itself by its fire in order to attack it.
• Port installations: the handling or repair times are doubled in case of damage at 50 % and quadrupled for total destruction.
• Airfields: recall that the overall value of the objective = the airfield's own value + the value of the aircraft present on the ground.
  • Example: a small airfield fully occupied = 6 points of airfield + 12 points of aircraft = 18 points. An airfield of 12 points fully occupied = 12 + 24 = 36 points. If this same airfield has only 10 aircraft present at the moment of attack, the overall value of the objective will be 12 + 10 = 22 points.

The distribution of aggression points is made in proportion to the respective values. Examples:

• Airfield of 12 points with 4 aircraft on the ground = 16 points. Each aggression point has 4 chances in 16 of hitting an aircraft and 12/16 of hitting the airfield.
• Airfield of 12 points with its full capacity of 24 aircraft on the ground. Each aggression point has 24 chances in 36 of destroying an aircraft and 12/36 of damaging the airfield.
• Airfield of 36 points with 4 aircraft on the ground: 4/40 chance of destroying an aircraft and 36/40 of hitting the airfield.

This distribution of risks accounts for the danger of saturating installations and, conversely, for the advantages of dispersal (case of a surprise attack or not, for example).

Damage suffered by airfields will obviously reduce their capacity in direct proportion. The rapid repair of runways being known, a repair period will be fixed by the referee according to the particular data of the action envisaged (isolated action or campaign). For example, as an indication: 12 hours per point of airfield damage, aircraft remaining permanently destroyed.

MINES

The laying of a minefield is done according to the type of devices employed:

• Influence or contact mines, with or without moorings (the latter only in depths of 30 m at most).

• The chances of impact are calculated according to the simple formula:

  l / (AB × sin a) − K = % chance

  • l = width of the ship;
  • AB = distance between two mines or influence zones;
  • a = angle of approach of the field by the ship;
  • K = moderation coefficient simulating errors and other imponderables, determined by the referee between 10 and 20 %.

The minefield (offensive or defensive) is communicated to the referee when it is laid.

EXAMPLES:

A ship 15 m wide approaching a minefield of mines spaced 50 m apart at an angle of 40° gives 47 (−10 %) = 42 chances in 100 of hitting; at an angle of 90°: 27 %; and at 20°: 79 %.

Translator's note on the mine formula: the printed numerator is a single letter that the list of symbols identifies as the ship's width (l); the worked examples are reproduced as printed and are consistent with K being applied as a 10 % reduction of the computed result (for instance 15 / (50 × sin 90°) = 30 %, reduced by 10 % = 27 %).

DEPTH CHARGES

The effects are given directly by the drawing of a lotto tile (cf. below).

B / Practical modalities

ARTILLERY

The players indicate to the referee the data of the fire (calibre of the firer, number of shots in the salvo, size, distance and speed of the target). The latter determines from the appropriate fire table (cf. annex "Artillery hits") the percentage of chance of hit (*). The player then draws a lotto tile which gives a positive result (from 1 to x) or a negative result (from x + 1 to 100). In the case of a positive result, a second lotto tile is drawn to find the number of hitting shots of the salvo according to a ready-made table (annex no. 9). Finally a number of dice corresponding to the hits gives the value in points of the latter (annex no. 10 "Aggression points"). The referee records the result in the operations log. He informs both parties, or only the unlucky recipient according to the conventions (except in the case of obvious total destruction in the sight of the firer).

This multi-stage process may seem, at first sight, complicated. It is not in reality, and it has the very important advantage of widely opening the range of consequences of artillery fire in order to better reflect reality. One can see, for example, that for the same number of hits on target, the effects can vary from one to ten. However, the law of large numbers obviously applies, and in a prolonged combat an average asserts itself mathematically. This is, in any case, the only way to answer such different hypotheses as the destruction of the BISMARCK in its first salvoes or the miraculous outcome of 3 days of bombardment of the RICHELIEU.

However, it must be added here that, in pursuit of acceleration, a synthetic calculation has been developed and can sometimes be used (cf. annex no. 11). One then proceeds as follows: as before, the players indicate the data of the fire, and the referee always determines the chances of hit and the possible number of hits on target. Instead of asking the dice for the value of the aggression points, the latter is given by the drawing of a third and single lotto tile and a table indicating a coefficient which will be multiplied by the number of hitting shots of the salvo. This table was established by calculation and gives mean results identical to the first method. The process gains in speed what it loses in flexibility and suspense, but has the same practical value. It is especially useful in combat involving a large number of ships.

By convention, it is provided that the striking power of a ship is reduced in direct proportion to its damage: thus a cruiser worth 30 points and armed with 8 main guns will no longer have more than half of these after damage amounting to 15 points. Aircraft carriers, because of their particular vulnerability, suffer an increase of 10 to 60 % in aggression points (according to the throw of a die), and their aircraft become non-operational when the ship is damaged to 50 %.

TORPEDOES

By a process identical but a little more complex, the chances of a torpedo hitting are calculated by the referee from the information supplied by the players:

• the angle formed by the axis of the target's course with the line of fire, which we call here by convention the "angle of fire" (acute if the target is approaching, obtuse if it is moving away);
• the distance to the target;
• the speed and quality of the torpedo.

The referee transfers these data to special tables (cf. annexes nos. 12 and 13 "Torpedo hits"), calculates where necessary the factors required (in extreme cases not foreseen), and gives the percentage of chances. A lotto tile is drawn and, according to the result, a die determines the value of the hit in points.

AERIAL BOMBS

The chances are found directly on pre-established tables (cf. annex no. 15), the players indicating the number and mode of attack, the identity of the target and its speed. A lotto tile and, if applicable, a die will give the effects as usual.

AIRCRAFT DEFENCE (AA)

Knowing the number of attacking aircraft and the number of guns able to counter-fire at them, reference to the corresponding table will give the percentage of chances of destruction of each aircraft (cf. annex no. 15-2).

AIR COMBAT

These have been summarised as a simple ratio of numerical value, determining directly from a table the chances of destruction, established on the following bases (cf. annexes nos. 15-3 and 15-3 B):

• two aircraft of equal value fighting each other have 16 chances in 100 of being lost;
• one aircraft against two: 8 % for each of the last two and 32 % for the first;
• one aircraft against three: 6 % and 54 % respectively, etc.

When the aircraft are of different value, the value of each one is multiplied by the number, and the result of the ratio is treated according to the same table.

Example: 3 SWORDFISH against 2 Me 109: (3 × 3) / (2 × 7.8) = 9 / 15.6 = 1.7 — which gives 27 % of misfortune for each British aircraft, against 11 % for the Germans.

A correcting coefficient must nevertheless apply in the particular case of an attack by a large formation of bombers by fighters much inferior in number. Indeed, taking into account the totality of the bombers would not be realistic, because the quarry — especially when laden — is not very manoeuvrable and has a mission other than offensive air combat... We shall therefore consider that the fighters will oppose at most their own number × 1.5.

Example: 12 Hurricanes attacking 48 He 111 (laden):

12 × 7.1 = 85.2 against 12 × 1.5 = 18 He 111, which will have a total value of 18 × (5.8 − 0.5 laden) = 95.4, which gives a ratio of 1.1 in favour of the Germans (or of 18 × 5.8 = 104.4 if they are not laden, with a ratio of 1.2). Of course, if the bombers are protected by fighters, the totality of the latter will be added. Fighter-bombers are considered as bombers if they have their bomb load, and as fighters if they have dropped their bombs.

These figures have been studied to present the conclusion of the encounter in its entirety, not renewable between the same adversaries.

Aircraft faster by at least 30 km/h are free to refuse combat, but they can impose it on slower adversaries.

COMBAT AGAINST SUBMARINES

This sequence of play was the most difficult to develop. One is struck, indeed, on approaching the study of underwater warfare by its great complexity, owing to the very numerous factors involved in the data. Keeping them faithfully entails an application burden that quickly becomes intolerable for the amateur; too radical a simplification loses its connection with reality and all interest for the "wargamer". We have therefore tried to make a synthesis following only in its broad lines the spirit and principles of the action, schematising sufficiently to remain manageable. Whether with models or directly on the map, submersion requires the use of a hidden method, and this phase can be played only on paper with the compulsory intervention of a referee. The movements of the ship when submerged are then recorded on a special map (tracing paper, for example) placed at the disposal of the coordinator, who judges the respective situation of the units.

When the submarine comes within the detection range of an ASDIC (2,000 m), determined by the midpoint of the escort's path travelled at 16 knots in 5 minutes, a lotto tile is drawn by the referee who, after consulting the appropriate table, indicates whether or not there is an echo, and its approximate direction (E-NE-S-SW, etc.). The possibility of a false echo is envisaged but is then not communicated as such to the searching ship. The latter, as well as the other escorts nearby, may launch the attack, and a second lotto tile is drawn, again by the referee, who gives the results according to the scale provided:

1) Submarine at shallow depth (up to 30 m):

• 1 to 5: destroyed without objective sign (result communicated to the submarine's side but not to the attacker);
• 5 to 10: destroyed with objective signs (result to both sides);
• 11 to 13: damaged (0.4 point) and obliged to surface;
• 14 to 17: damaged (14 = 0.8; 15 = 0.6; 16 = 0.4; 17 = 0.2) without objective sign;
• 18 to 20: damaged (18 = 0.5; 19 = 0.3; 20 = 0.1) with objective sign;
• 21 to 100: no damage.

(As printed, the first two ranges, 1 to 5 and 5 to 10, share the value 5.)

2) Submarine at medium depth (31 to 80 m): the same principles, but the chances of being destroyed are halved.

3) Submarine at great depth (more than 80 m):

• 1–2: destroyed without objective sign;
• 3–4: destroyed with objective sign;
• 5: damaged (0.6) and obliged to surface;
• 6: damaged (0.5) without objective sign;
• 7: damaged (0.4) with objective sign;
• 8 to 100: no damage.

In cases 2 and 3, the submarine cannot use its torpedoes. By convention of play, it can cross only one depth level per 5-minute movement.

Ramming of a submarine on the surface: the results are given by the throw of 2 dice.

• Rammer: 1 = damage of 1 point; 2 = damage of 1/2 point; 3 = damage of 1/4 point; 4–5–6 = negligible damage.
• Rammed: 1 = damage of 2 points (sunk); 2 = damage of 1 point; 3 = damage of 3/4 point; 4 = damage of 1/2 point; 5 = damage of 1/4 point; 6 = negligible damage.

By day, the submarine firing its torpedo may be betrayed by the torpedo's wake. Besides the side of the victim that is hit (port or starboard), always reported, the referee indicates the direction of the wake (by day) if he draws a lotto tile of 1 to 50 in sea state 0, 1 to 40 in sea state 1, 1 to 20 in sea states 2 and 4, and 1 to 10 in sea states 4 and 5.

The tables above apply to one overall depth-charge pattern for each ship concerned, which corresponds, let us recall, by convention of play to a sequential attack of 5 minutes. For the result, the number of depth charges dropped is not detailed by unit, but one is obliged to take account of the total consumption of this non-replaceable weapon at sea. Battleships, aircraft carriers and cruisers had none; destroyers generally carried 40 to 60 and specialised escorts 60 to 80. It will be considered that one pattern uses about ten on average.

If one wishes to centre the interest specially on underwater warfare, it goes without saying that these very schematic rules may be refined and complicated according to the wishes of the participants.

In summary, these AGGRESSION FACTORS, which determine the points deducted from the value of the weapon elements, are the effect of:

— ADVERSE ACTION:

• Artillery: broadly proportional to the weight of the projectile, corrected for medium and small calibres according to the rate of fire;
• Torpedoes: whose effect is in direct proportion to the weight of explosive or other special characteristics;
• Aerial bombs: according to weight (roughly one third of the shell of corresponding weight);
• Mines: according to weight too and type (contact or influence), and can be treated like torpedoes for their consequences.

— MISCELLANEOUS ACTIONS:

Sea fortunes, accidents, weather, etc., determined by "chance cards" and other tables regularly consulted by the players. This is what we shall now see in the

EXTRINSIC DATA OF INTERVENTION

Under this heading we bring together very important elements for the interest of the game, such as intelligence and its transmission, the weather, etc. They fall essentially within the domain of the referee, who acts following the indications of the chance cards drawn. An indicative but non-exhaustive list of some of these possibilities is given in an annex. For large-scale games other elements may be integrated, such as new construction, repairs, fuel, the functioning of electronic detection and its hazards (radar and direction-finding, for example).

Weather is established on special cards valid for a period of time, drawn at random, and on which are shown: visibility, cloud cover, ceiling, direction and force of the wind, and the state of the sea on the Beaufort scale. Visibility is usually reciprocal for surface ships (except under a particular provision agreed in advance), but for submarines it varies according to rules of their own, which are summarised on a special and easy-to-use graph.

Example: periscope range: 12,000 m in sea states 1 and 2; 10,000 m in sea states 3 and 4; 8,000 m in sea states 5 and 6; etc.; visibility of the submarine itself as a function of distance and sea state, etc.

Cloud cover directly conditions the success of aerial reconnaissance (1/10 cloud = 90 % chance of discovery, 2/10 = 80 %, 3/10 = 70 %, etc.).

The distance of visual contact between aircraft depends essentially on weather conditions (clear or cloudy sky, haze, ceiling height, etc.), and it is impossible to take all factors into account in detail. One may be guided, in general, by retaining one quarter of the visibility at sea level when the objective stands out against a sky background, and it should be remembered that vertical acuity from top to bottom is much more random. The referee will intervene more precisely if he judges it necessary, according to the number of aircraft involved, the position of the sun, etc.

Similarly, the field of vision of an aircraft searching for a surface objective will generally be estimated at one and a half times that of a ship, and for very small units (or submarines cruising semi-submerged) the state of the sea will be taken into account, which makes the discovery of the objective also more uncertain...

The ceiling mainly conditions the modalities of air attacks. We shall retain the orientation of the winds only for take-offs and landings on aircraft carriers. Visibility may be artificially reduced by smoke screens, a method often employed by a combatant in difficulty. This may be represented on the map, without forgetting the influence of the prevailing wind and its temporary duration, as well as its cancellation by radar. One may also apply a simple system of decreasing visibility at dusk (but to refine the detail further, down to the variation of the sun's position, seems to us to exceed the advantages of fidelity to reality in complexity of translation).

Intelligence and its transmission have clearly played a decisive role in certain critical phases of recent conflicts (the breakout of the German capital ships from Brest, Midway and the seaplane of the TONE, etc.). The intervention of these factors is therefore essential in this simulation of naval warfare. To simplify, they may be conceived on two levels:

• abstract and general situation: intelligence given directly by the referee, who faithfully follows the "chance cards" or the dossiers prepared in advance;
• specific concrete situation: results of reconnaissance by the adversaries (by surface ships, submarines or aircraft). All the hazards of transmitting this intelligence will then be given by the usual drawing of a lotto tile and reference to a pre-established table (complete and immediate transmission, incomplete and immediate, complete and delayed, erroneous as to place, time, number, etc.).

III / The Dynamics of the Game

This naval wargame is a reflection game of the sequential type in time, that is to say each participant determines his action by separate moves alternating with those of his opponent. We are well aware of the artificial nature of the method, but in the present state of techniques, a better simulation of real war is not yet available to amateurs. (Let us note in passing the very recent appearance on the American market of an electronic game which seems to resolve this problem: the adversaries can play all their moves without waiting for the other's reply. The computer integrates all new data as they arise, and this possibility of simultaneous action is a considerable progress — ENCOUNTER.)

TIME BASE: On the map, movements are recorded on two scales:

• Large movements: valid for 12 hours: 06–18 and 18–06 = daylight movements and night movements (by convention the 24 hours remain divided into two equal parts by two regular twilights of one hour in which visibility varies).
• Small movements: recorded every 5 minutes at the time of combat; this is the basis retained for the establishment of the fire charts.

Straight-line movement poses no problem, but for the turning of ships the following principles should be retained, which may be important in combat:

• for speeds below 25 knots the turning radius (RG) is roughly independent of the category of the vessel;
• for an optimum rudder angle one should assess a 25 % loss of speed due to turning;
• shallow water considerably increases the RG and consequently the duration of the turn;
• below 5 knots ships are practically not manoeuvrable.

In practice: up to 25 knots, an RG of 300 m for small ships up to destroyers and 500 m for larger ones (fast patrol boats excluded).

Above 25 knots, the RG increases rapidly: at 30 knots of real turning speed take 400 m for destroyers and 600 m for large ships, etc.

Reduce the maximum turning speed by 1/4 (for example a ship with a maximum speed of 32 knots will not be able to turn effectively at more than 24 knots).

Take account, where appropriate, of shallow water (20–30 m).

The referee may, if he judges it interesting for the conduct of the game, cut the movements into shorter periods (two movements of 6 hours, for example, or even less), or lengthen them (movement of 24 hours) on the contrary, according to the tactical needs of the battle or the strategic needs of the campaign.

The exact determination of the scale is left to the judgement of the players, according to concrete possibilities which are too variable to be imposed (size of the paper, of the table, of the piece, etc.). As an indication, experience shows that for map games the scale of 1 cm to 100 km is convenient for large movements, and 1 or 1/2 cm to 1 km for small movements.

STARTING SITUATION

Established beforehand in detail by the players and the referee with a majority of known elements:

• list of ships with or without their position (in whole or in part);
• list of airfields with the total number and type of aircraft;
• locations and types of coastal defences;
• value of port installations (berths, repair potential, stock of fuel where applicable, etc.);
• land forces if an inter-arms campaign is envisaged, etc.;

and a certain number of hidden elements:

• distribution of aircraft among airfields;
• position of ships in whole or in part (depending on the theme chosen);
• entry into service of new weapon elements, etc.

In practice one proceeds as follows:

• From a precise fictitious hour, the adversaries carry out their first movement of the agreed duration by tracing the course of their ships on their maps, and do likewise for the second movement, the third movement, etc., until contact. From contact onwards the sequence will necessarily be of 5 minutes (fictitious combat time).
• For fire, the side with the longer range opens fire first if it wishes (an obvious one-sided situation). At long distance the advantage is more theoretical than practical, but in a close combat this advantage may be decisive. Thus when two adversaries are in range and wish to open fire at the same time, chance decides who goes first. In the case of damage received, the reduction of the struck ship's striking potential is taken into account immediately, simultaneity of damage hardly ever occurring at the opening of fire. On the other hand this is not the case in torpedo duels, which take place at much shorter distances and above all because of the low speed of the weapons (it is not rare to see runs of 5–10 minutes and more). In that case the possibility must of course be taken into account: the adversaries shall specify the exact minute of their launch, and if there is simultaneity (that is, the two launches within the limits of the most rapidly covered run) the two possible hits will be counted together.
• Once combat has begun it continues on the principle of alternating moves in the same order, the advantages then being equalised: each side moves and fires every five fictitious minutes until exhaustion or break of contact. E.g.: 06:00–06:05: the ships move. At the end of this mini-movement side A fires and the results are noted; then side B fires in its turn (taking account of any damage). Then the following movement is repeated: 06:05–06:10: the ships move, side A fires, then B, etc.
• In aero-naval combats the rule of 5 minutes will be exceptionally set aside and the engagement treated as a whole, to avoid an arbitrary fragmentation that would be useless and unrealistic. The order of resolution is: attacking aircraft against defending aircraft; then AA (DCA) against aircraft; finally aircraft remaining against ships.
• On the other hand, one will scrupulously return to the 5-minute sequences for all combat operations concerning submarines.

Conclusion

Thus are given the basic principles and some examples of application of a logical Kriegsspiel whose constant concern is to follow reality as closely as possible without falling into paralysing complexity. But what has been summarised here is more a method of wargaming than a complete review of what can be done. It seemed preferable to leave the tool presented with its rigorous character. According to tastes, imagination and the possibilities of each person, it may receive all the personal marks desired, without distorting the principles of the game, which are sound and solidly established. New situations which may arise will then be treated in the same way, that is by determining objectively the percentage of chance of the event occurring. It is essential to begin with simple themes, which will quickly show that the application is much less difficult than the reading of these rules would suggest. The easy use of the many pre-established calculation tables makes the practice extremely rapid. Once well in hand, the method allows one to insert without difficulty, passing from tactics to strategy, many other factors making the exercise ever more realistic and absorbing. A very thorough preparation of the proposed themes, in detail, allows greater flexibility and above all a great speed of progress of the action. It is essential, indeed, to avoid as far as possible breaking the rhythm of the game by the occurrence of unforeseen problems and disputes to be settled, and, given the breadth of the strategic scale, it takes enough interest to devote the maximum of a time which is always too precious. It can then continue for days or even weeks. Note in passing that it does not seem desirable to start from rigorous equality in the distribution of the opposing forces. This would bring nothing but an unrealistic intellectual satisfaction. It is preferable to increase the scale of the game in order to appeal to the imagination and skill of the players. The richness of possibilities for exploiting the framework presented here will appear infinite and will satisfy the most demanding, provided one rigorously refrains from accepting, for ease of play, a flagrant implausibility. Reference to known facts is the best guide, and will always be to hand to seek an acceptable simulation.

It is quite clear that, despite all the care taken to capture the maximum of true data for a wargame, it will remain foreign to factors that cannot be quantified, such as the value of training or the morale of personnel. How to inject into a computer the feelings of a commander on his bridge? This reservation, in our eyes, takes nothing away from the interest of the enthusiast, who finds a field wide enough for the desires of his recreation. One word finally to outline the limits. Unlike the "Kriegsspiel" of the professionals, whose raison d'être is to foresee events, all these constructions rest on the reconstitution of past events. They have the solidity of historical bases definitively established, but also the limits of the amateur, who will take good care not to extrapolate about the future, not being able to grasp exactly the atomic weapon, for example. But simply to rewrite History — is that not a temptation of all times?

Bibliography

I / Literary references

• FEATHERSTONE: Naval Wargame.
• P. DUNN: Sea Battle Game.
• A. WILSON: La guerre et l'ordinateur (War and the Computer).
• U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE: Gaming at the Naval War College.
• FUCHIDA and OKUMIYA: Midway.
• SCIENCE ET VIE no. 124: Les Jeux de Réflexion.

II / Technical references

• Les navires de guerre italiens (USMM), 6 volumes.
• IAN ALLAN directories (12 volumes).
• MAC DONALD directories (11 volumes).
• Fighting Ships (Jane's).
• Weyer, Taschenbuch der Kriegsflotten.
• Almanacco navale.
• Revue maritime.
• Warship International.
• Warship (Conway Maritime Press).
• The Belgian Shiplover.
• Warship in Profile.
• JENTSCHURA-JUNG: Die Japanischen Kriegsschiffe.
• GRONER: Die Deutschen Kriegsschiffe.
• PARKES: British Battleships.
• J. MARCH: British Destroyers.
• PRESTON: Battleships in W.W.II.
• H. LE MASSON: Forces sur la mer.
• FECHTER-HUMMELCHEN: Seekriegsatlas.
• BIZZARI (ed.): Navi Italiane 2a Guerra Mondiale, 15 volumes.
• GRONER: Minenschiffe und Schlachtkreuzer 1905–1970.
• DUMAS-GUIGLINI: Les cuirassés français de 23 500 t.
• Galuppini: Le guide des cuirassés (Nathan).
• Galuppini: (Nathan).

III / Historical references

Too numerous to be listed in detail; only the principal ones are given here:

• La Marina Italiana nella 2a Guerra Mondiale (19 volumes).
• Sea Battles in Close-up (IAN ALLAN, 15 volumes).
• ROSKILL: The War at Sea (3 volumes).
• S.E. MORISON: Les Grandes Batailles Navales du Pacifique (3 volumes).
• H.W. WILSON: Les Flottes de Guerre au Combat (2 volumes).
• ROHWER: Critical Convoy Battle of March 1943.

Etc.

Annexes

Note on the annexes: the annex index below lists seventeen annexes. Several of them are graphs, large fire tables or unit directories that are not reproduced in this transcription (see the notes after each affected annex).

Annex index (as printed):

• No. 1: The "Chance cards" group the miscellaneous incidents and intelligence activities. They form a deck and are drawn one by one by the player designated by lot, at regular intervals fixed beforehand (every 2, 4 or 6 movements of 12 hours, for example). The player shows the card to the referee and follows the indications, which are equal in number favourable and unfavourable. The quantity or variety of cards used varies with the scale of the game envisaged. They may be left out for a short and simple theme, or the list may be lengthened at will to cover as many possibilities as possible in a large campaign.
• No. 2: Identity cards for ships: very useful, if not absolutely indispensable, for having the technical characteristics immediately to hand. For players who do not have directories or other documents, an indicative list of some types of ships and combat aircraft of the Second World War gathers the indispensable data (cf. Annex no. 2 B).
• No. 3: Weather cards: on the model proposed, about ten at least will be prepared, with data that are obviously variable; the card in force is drawn by the referee, who communicates its elements to the players as the action proceeds, 24 or 48 hours in advance.
• No. 4: "Transmissions" table: an interesting tool once the game is played at a more elaborate level; it is only an indicative example of the treatment of electronic hazards at the referee's discretion.
• No. 5: Summary table of distances covered as a function of speeds: avoids calculations move by move (established in km, unlike the professionals' custom, but more in keeping with the habits of laymen).
• No. 6: Base curves for establishing the artillery fire tables: abscissa the distances, ordinate the percentage of chance of hit. The six curves correspond to the sizes of the targets, classed in 6 categories, for the maximum range of the heavy calibres. All calculations for the smaller calibres and shorter ranges derive from them.
• No. 7: Detailed fire tables (2): drawn from the preceding curves with the addition of the ranges of the guns and the speeds of the target. One finds at the top of the left-hand columns the maximum range of the gun concerned, one goes down the corresponding column to the level of the real distance of the shot, which one follows horizontally to the box on the right corresponding to the size of the target. In it, the intersection with the "speed" column gives immediately the percentage of chances of hitting.

Scan gaps and omissions (transcriber's note): the printed tables that the text cites for Annexes 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 and 16 are not present in this scan, so those annexes are transcribed from the index and the text that refers to them only. Annexes 6, 14 and 17 are graphs in the scan and are not reproduced. The ship and aircraft directories (Annex 2 B and the aircraft list) are unit data and are omitted.

Identity cards of German, American and Japanese ships are also given. The French, British and Italian ones are given in "Mare Nostrum".

N.B.: The number and appearance of these annexes might at first glance put off the enthusiast. But he will be reassured on testing them, and will very quickly find in them the value of effective and easy tools. These pieces, although they have proved their worth, do not claim to be rules without appeal. If not all of them are of the same importance, it is in order to leave a wide choice for personal adaptation in each case. From the simplest to the most complex, they will enter the game as its extension proceeds, and at the limit may be modified or supplemented by new rules devised by the "wargamer", who has become through practice even more demanding in the simulation of reality.

Annex No. 1: Chance Cards (non-exhaustive list)

• An engine breakdown slows your largest ship at sea to 10 knots for 6 hours.
• One of your submarines must return to its base for repair at 10 knots on the surface.
• In a storm one of your destroyers (of less than 1,500 t) sinks. To be used within 48 hours in the corresponding weather (sea 8 to 12).
• A sabotage damages one of your ships in port:
  • 1st die gives the category of the unlucky one. E.g.: 1 for CU or CL; 3 for cl; 4 for destroyer; 5 for S/M; 6 for another category.
  • 2nd die gives the extent of the damage. E.g.: 1 for 6 points; 2 for 5 points; 3 for 4 points, etc.
• You lose fighter aircraft through accident: number determined by a die...
• An enemy reconnaissance aircraft is lost at sea after 1 hour of flight (card to be used within 24 hours).
• An accident to a torpedo occurs on one of your destroyers (cf. aggression points).
• One of your submarines disappears with all hands.
• Two of your merchant ships in convoy collide and one sinks.
• One of your reconnaissance aircraft disappears at sea, mission accomplished.
• A gunnery incident deprives your largest opponent of a turret for 10 minutes (to be used within 36 hours).
• You gain knowledge of the ships present in an enemy port of your choice.
• of the coastal defences of an enemy sector (to be used immediately).
• of the complete losses of the opponent.
• of the position of an enemy submarine (to be used within 24 hours).
• of the largest enemy squadron (valid 24 hours).
• of the position of an enemy minefield.

Etc.

Annex No. 2: Ship Identity Card (example)

The annex gives a worked example of a ship identity card (the British battleship HOOD) in the format used by the players. The entries are: name; year of construction (A) with the coefficient applied to the value (here 1920, −10 %); tonnage (To); armour (Pr, in mm); length × beam (L); speed in knots (V); armament (Ar, by turret and calibre, with anti-aircraft guns marked "aa" and machine guns "mt"); range of fire (Po) at the stated angles; torpedo data (Te); number of torpedo tubes (T); shell and ammunition data (Ps); and the resulting value in points (Pts).

Entry	Example (HOOD)
Name	HOOD
A (year) / coefficient	1920 / −10 %
To (tonnage)	42,200 t
Pr (armour)	305 + 50 + 50 + 38 mm
L (length × beam)	262 × 31.7
V (speed)	31 knots
Ar (armament)	VIII 380; XII 140; VIII 102 aa; XXIV 40 aa; XX mt
Po (range)	32,000 m (30°); 16,200 m (30°); 19,500 / 12,500 m (45°/90°)
Te	8.9
T	1
Ps	875 kg; 37 kg; 15 kg
Pts (points value)

The ship-type directory (Annex 2 B, PDF pages 20–26) and the aircraft-type directory (PDF page 27) are unit-data listings and are not reproduced here; see the source note.

Annex No. 3: Weather Card (example)

The weather card gives, for each day, the visibility, the cloud cover (in tenths), the ceiling, the wind (direction and speed in knots) and the state of the sea (Beaufort/sea state scale). The example card contains ten days:

Day	Visibility	Cloud cover (tenths)	Ceiling	Wind direction	Wind (knots)	Sea
1	1 km	8/10	−2,000 m (as printed)	↓ (arrow as printed)	20	4
2	12	6/10	3,000	↓	20	4
3	18	4/10	4,000	↓	30	4
4	22	1/10

Column headings as printed: Jour (day), Visibilité (visibility), Couverture nuageuse (cloud cover), Plafond (ceiling), Vents (wind: direction D and speed in knots), Mer (sea state). The wind arrows show the direction as printed on the card; the printed key for the arrows is not on the page. The day-1 ceiling is printed with a leading dash ("−2000 m") in the source, transcribed as printed.

Annex No. 4: "Transmissions" Tables (at the referee's discretion)

I / Messages intercepted by the adversary (direction-finding, GONIO):

Lotto:

• 1–10: transmitter located, exact position, identified by name;
• 11–20: transmitter located, exact position, identified within its category (CU, PA, CL);
• 21–30: transmitter located, exact position, not identified;
• 31–40: transmitter located, to within 20 km, identified by name;
• 41–50: transmitter located, to within 30 km, identified within its category;
• 51–60: transmitter located, to within 40 km, not identified;
• 61–70: transmitter located, to within 60 km, not identified;
• 71–100: not located.

II / Discovery messages (information passed by the referee to the searching side):

Lotto:

• 1–10: does not get through (breakdown or jamming);
• 10–20: 11 = incomplete: adversary not counted;
  • 12 = category of ships not specified;
  • 13 = place imprecise;
  • 14 = place imprecise;
  • 15 = place imprecise;
  • 16 = speed not specified;
  • 17 = speed not specified;
  • 18 = direction not specified;
  • 19 = number and category not specified;
  • 20 = number and category + speed not specified;
• 21–30: 21 = erroneous: number increased by 10 to 30 %;
  • 22 = number reduced by 10 to 30 %;
  • 23 = on the category;
  • 24 = on the category;
  • 25 = on the position, by 40 km;
  • 26 = on the position, by 60 km;
  • 27 = on the position, by 80 km;
  • 28 = on the speed (+ 30 %);
  • 29 = on the speed (− 30 %);
  • 30 = on the direction (+ or − 30°);
• 31–40: 31–34 = delayed by one hour;
  • 35–38 = delayed by two hours;
  • 39 = delayed by four hours;
  • 40 = delayed by six hours;

Concrete Examples

1) Air combat

• One Me 109 against one MS 406 gives a value ratio of 7.8 / 6 = 1.3. Referring to table 3 of Annex 15, one reads 21 chances in 100 of being lost for the weaker side (here the MS 406), against 14 % for the Me 109 (the stronger side).
• An encounter between 2 Me 109 and 1 MS 406 gives 15.6 / 6 = 2.6, that is to say, following the same procedure, respectively 45 % and 7 %.
• Conversely, reversing these data: 2 MS 406 against 1 Me 109 gives 12 / 7.8 = 1.5, which means 24 chances in 100 for the Me 109 of being lost, against 12 % for each of the two Morane. Note that the German aircraft, being clearly faster than the French, has the possibility of refusing the engagement.
• 6 Curtiss H 75 meeting 4 Me 109: 42 / 31.2 = 1.3.

To speed up play, table 3 bis (Annex 15) is used, which treats the eventualities by groups of 6 aircraft. In that case a die roll replaces the single lotto draw, which in the present case remains in use for each Me 109. To illustrate the procedure, here are the eventualities obtained in four test draws:

• H 75 (die rolls): 5 = no loss; 4 = no loss; 1 = 3 losses; 4 = no loss.
• Me 109 (lotto draws): 3-11-49-38 = 2 losses (by 3 and 11); 14-17-22-38 = 2 losses (by 14 and 17); 44-33-57-62 = no loss; 13-77-50-31 = 1 loss (by 13).

This combat actually took place on 20 September 1939 and resulted in the loss of two French aircraft and one German.

• 5 Me 109 against 3 Hurricane: 39 / 21.3 = 1.8, that is to say 10 % and 29 % chances of loss respectively.
  • Test draws, Germans: 8-9-96-56-84 = 0 losses; 5-20-39-95-77 = 1 loss; 5-90-29-22-81 = 1 loss; 11-27-74-85-41 = 0 losses.
  • Test draws, British: 21-1-5 = 3 losses; 15-75-98 = 1 loss; 14-27-96 = 2 losses; 28-98-70 = 1 loss.
  • In reality, on 22 December 1939, two Hurricanes were lost in these conditions.
• 14 Leo 45 against 9 Me 109 and 5 Me 110: (6.6 × 14) = 92.4 against (9 × 7.8) + (5 × 7) = 105.2, that is to say a value ratio of 105.2 / 92.4 = 1.1.
  • Four test draws: French = 2 tens + 2 units = 2 dice + 2 lotto draws. Germans = (1 ten + 3 units) + (5 units) = (1 die + 3 lotto draws) + (5 lotto draws).
  • Results as printed: (6 − 3) + 20 − 49 = 1 loss; (5 − 3) + 17 − 30 = 2 losses; (3 − 4) + 8 − 88 = 3 losses; (2 − 5) + 13 − 17 = 4 losses. Second set: (3) + 18 − 53 − 33 + 12 − 19 − 72 − 10 − 20 = 3 losses; (4) + 18 − 97 − 76 + 74 − 50 − 5 − 79 − 73 = 1 loss; (2) + 6 + 86 − 47 + 30 − 31 − 27 − 81 − 21 = 3 losses; (1) + 14 − 5 − 71 + 35 − 28 − 56 − 46 − 47 = 5 losses.
  • On 6 June 1940, this combat saw the loss of 2 Leo 45 and of 3 Me 109 and 3 Me 110.

2) Naval-air combat

When counting the anti-aircraft (DCA) guns, the guns' effective arc of fire must be taken into account. The presence of superstructures can reduce the value of a gun by half: in case (a), each lateral gun counts only for half; the two together are equivalent to one gun in case (b). An approximate estimate will suffice, and unclear cases will be settled by the referee.

• 1st example: A CT of the "AIGLE" type steaming at 34 knots, attacked in a dive by 3 Stukas carrying a 500 kg bomb: DCA / A = 4 / 3 = 1.33 = 7 % chance of loss for each aircraft (cf. table 2 of Annex 15). Each aircraft has 21 chances in 100 of hitting the target (cf. Annex 15, table 1, part T 3, 8th line of the 1st column).
  • Following the four test lotto draws taken as the example:
    • Ship against aircraft: 10-12-70 = no loss; 72-46-95 = no loss; 71-46-56 = no loss; 2-67-47 = 1 aircraft lost.
    • Aircraft against ship: 50-37-34 = no hit; 94-18-44 = 1 bomb hits, which gives for example 1/4 point of aggression by a die showing a 6 (cf. Annex 10, table BB, column 500); 26-32-72 = no hit; 31-47 = no hit.
• 2nd example: A CU of the "DUNKERQUE" type plus 2 CT of the "AUDACIEUX" type, steaming at 31 knots, attacked in a dive by 12 Stukas: DCA = CU: 40 guns concerned, plus 4 for each CT, making a total of 48, hence DCA / A = 48 / 12 = 4, which gives each aircraft a 20 % chance of being shot down. After the same series of four test draws, we take for example 3, 4, 4 and again 4 aircraft lost. The remaining aircraft have 33 chances in 100 of hitting the CU targeted, so, by the same scheme:
  • 1 bomb causing damage amounting to 4 points (a die showing 1);
  • 1 bomb causing damage amounting to 1 point (a die showing 5);
  • 4 bombs causing damage amounting to 7¼ points (4 dice showing 1-4-3-6);
  • 3 bombs causing damage amounting to 6½ points (3 dice showing 1-3-5).
• 3rd example: A CU of the "CAVOUR" type escorted by 4 "ORIANI" (IV 120, IV 37 aa, VI mt, 22,000 m, length 105 m, 33 knots, 1.9 pt), steaming at 26 knots, attacked by 8 SWORDFISH with torpedoes: DCA / A = 30 + 20 / 8 = 6.2 (as printed), that is 30 % chance of being shot down; this gives, over 4 trials, 1, 2, 2 and 2 aircraft lost. Each remaining aircraft has 28 % chance of placing its torpedo, that is respectively 1, 3, 3 and 2 torpedoes on target (for example 25, 57, 63 and 3 aggression points after drawing the corresponding dice, for torpedoes of 350 kg).

3) Surface combat

Range and precision of fire. A gun has its maximum range when it is elevated to 45° (100 %). In old guns this elevation was most often limited, for technical as much as doctrinal reasons: thus the heavy artillery of the "BRETAGNE", initially pointing at 11° at most, was later improved to 23°, which gave a reach limited to 70 % of its theoretical range (25,200 m instead of 36,000 m theoretical). It goes without saying that the precision of fire must be judged in relation to the theoretical maximum range.

Generally, the range of guns is in direct relation to the calibre. However, it should be noted that an improvement was sometimes made from one war to the next with more modern techniques, which explains sometimes notable differences for guns of the same calibre but of more recent models. Schematically, one will retain for:

• battleships: 30,000 to 42,000 m for the main artillery (except where elevation is limited);
• heavy cruisers: 28,000 to 36,000 m;
• light cruisers: 22,000 to 24,000 m;
• destroyers (contre-torpilleurs and torpilleurs): 14,000 to 20,000 m;
• submarines and avisos: 11,000 m to 15,000 m.

The armament of ships is indicated fairly precisely in the directories which served as the basis. However, it underwent frequent alterations during the war years, going above all in the direction of strengthening anti-aircraft defence, to the detriment at times of surface artillery. This explains why the data supplied may show some differences from other sources, but this only affects details and is of little importance.

Let us recall, moreover, that the field covered by the artillery guns does not cover the full 360° of the horizon: the rear guns, for example, obviously cannot fire forward along the axis, the rotation of the turrets being limited by the superstructures. As it is impossible to give here the exact opening of the arc covered by the fire of a turret on all ships, an average of 300° will be taken as a sufficient practical value (that is, with a blind angle of 60°).

To avoid over-complicating the rules, the problems of ammunition consumption have been set aside.

Example: A CU of the "COURBET" type (identical to the BRETAGNE but with a lighter armament: XII 305, 432 kg; XXII 138; VII 75 aa; II 47 aa) fires at a CL of the "POLA" type (identical to the ZARA) steaming at 30 knots at a distance of 26,000 m. In this particular case of an old ship, one will first consult Annex no. 16 to know the theoretical maximum range of the battleship's heavy guns. The curve shows that an elevation of 23° represents about 72 % of the theoretical range at 45°. This maximum range would therefore be 36,000 m, and it is to that which one must refer in Annex no. 8. The target being of size T 1, one finds 9 chances in 100 of hitting. A lotto draw settles this hazard. If it is favourable to the attacker, a second lotto draw gives the number of hitting shots of the salvo: thus for a full broadside (12 guns) lotto no. 40 indicates, according to Annex no. 9, five hits on target, lotto 88 eleven, etc. If the CU uses only 4 guns, for example, the correspondence will not be found in the annex, the calculation being sufficiently obvious (1 to 25 = 1 hit on target, 26 to 50 = 2 hits, 51 to 75 = 3, etc.).

Assuming 3 shells on target, one finally draws 3 dice which supply the aggression points: for example 2, 3 and 6, which represents, according to Annex no. 10 (column "305", 515 kg): 6, 3 1/2 and 1/2, a total of 10 points. In the case of a large battle bringing together a high number of ships, it will be advantageous to use Annex no. 11, the synthetic surface-fire table: the die draw is replaced by a third lotto draw: 64, for example, will multiply the coefficient found by the 3 hits on target assumed here: 3.56 × 3 = 10.68 points.

4) Torpedo combat

As for artillery, one must not forget to take into account the arc covered by the torpedo tubes. One will generally take 60° on either side of the beam for cruisers (which have broadside tubes) and only 45° for destroyers (which most often have centreline tubes).

Most often torpedoes are for single use, the tubes not being reloadable in combat, except on large Japanese destroyers and cruisers (an operation that is long and difficult, often requiring half an hour or more and a relatively calm sea).

Let us therefore recall that:

The chances of hitting with artillery fire depend on:

• the power of the gun (maximum range);
• the speed and size of the target;
• the real distance of the shot.

The chances of hitting with a torpedo depend on:

• the distance, the speed and the size of the target, but also:
• the power of the torpedo (range and own speed);
• the angle of fire, which conditions the closing speeds of the two mobiles (torpedo and target) and the angle of impact (a factor neglected at this stage in artillery fire). The latter in turn determines the last indispensable datum of the problem, which is the relative size of the target.

One must therefore know:

• the distance between the adversaries at the precise moment of firing;
• the "angle of fire", that is to say the angle formed by the target's axis of march and the line from the shooter at the moment of firing (acute if the target is approaching, obtuse if it is moving away);
• the speed of the target;
• the speed of the torpedo (generally 30 or 40 knots).

These data make it possible, by consulting the multi-entry table of Annex 12, to find quickly the distance the torpedo must travel to reach the target and its angle of impact.

Example: A firer launches 4 torpedoes of 40 knots at a target 150 m long steaming at 20 knots, at a firing distance of 3,000 m with an "angle of fire" of 30°:

• One first establishes the ratio of the speeds of the two mobiles: V1 / V2 = 0.5.
• In the "0.5" line of Annex 12, at the intersection with the "30°" column, one finds 71, that is to say the distance of impact will be 71/100 of the firing distance = 2,130 m, and at an angle of 45° (figure given in the bottom right corner of the box).

(It will be understood that this last angle may vary according to the case, from right angle to acute. Striking at 90°, a torpedo will have the whole length of the ship in front of it, but at 45° it will have only 7/10 of it (sin 45), which is the case in the example; at 30°, half (sin 30); at 15°, 26/100; at 10°, 17/100, etc.)

We therefore calculate the relative length of the target: here 7/10 of 150 m = 105 m, which is carried, together with the distance of impact (2,130 m), to the table of Annex 13 to find the chances of hitting immediately. In table L 4, on the line 2,100 (approximation of 2,130), at the intersection with the column for speed 17–20, one finds 46 chances in 100 for each of the 4 torpedoes. One draws a lotto tile and, in case of hit, one looks up the effect of the torpedo in Annex 10 as usual.

(When the exact length of a ship is not given, a length similar to that of ships of the same type and the same period will be taken. This approximation will be sufficient in most cases. It should also be noted that, at the limit, the relative length of a ship reduces to its width in the case of a frontal attack or a chase. If one wishes to refine things, one may take this into account in table L 8 of Annex 13 by reducing the chances of impact.)

Other examples:

• A submarine fires two torpedoes at 40 knots at 3,200 m at a light cruiser (cl) 160 m long coming towards it at 25 knots, at an angle of 60°:
  • One establishes V1 / V2 (that is, speed of the target / speed of the torpedo) = 25 / 40 = 0.62. At the intersection of the "0.6" line and the "60" angle of fire (that is, as recalled, the angle between the shooter and the target in the direction of the target's march at the moment of firing), one finds "x", the distance of impact: 86/100 of 3,200 m, which makes 2,750 m, with an angle of impact of 89°, that is to say practically a right angle, which gives a relative length of the hull almost equal to the real length. In Annex 13, table L 3, at the distance 2,700 m and the speed 25 knots, one finds 43 chances in 100 of impact. Suppose, to complete the example, that a torpedo hits: the usual die roll will give the aggression points, which in the concrete case would amount to 40 for a 1 rolled (torpedo of 500 kg) and would sink the cruiser.
• The same problem, but with the target moving away from the shooter, would give: initial angle of sight (that is, inclination of the target relative to the shooter) of 120° instead of 60°:
  • "x" = 183/100 of D, that is 183 × 3,200 / 100 = 5,860 m, or 5,900 m rounded up, at an angle of 29°. The relative length of the target will be: L sin 29 = 77 m.
  • Consulting Annex no. 13 in its table L 5, one finds for a target steaming at 21 to 25 knots: 7 % chance of hitting. The usual draw of 2 lotto tiles and any dice will decide the attack.
• A special case: a destroyer fires 4 torpedoes of 40 knots at 4,000 m at a light cruiser (CL) 200 m long steaming at 30 knots at an angle of 135° (the angle of incidence of the target at the moment of firing), that is here, the target moving away. One has V1 / V2 = 0.75. At the intersection of the "0.75" line and the "135" column of the angle of fire (Annex 12), one should find "x", the real distance of impact. In the present case the box is empty and the calculation must be made by the referee. He will easily show that the distance is three times the initial distance "D", that is theoretically about 12,000 m, at an approximate angle of 13°. The relative length of the target will be L sin 13 = 45 m. Referring again to Annex 13, table L 6 corresponding to this relative length, one finds that the chances of impact are below 1 % and will not be retained.
  • This is the reason why extreme eventualities like these have not been pre-established in the tables.

Simultaneous torpedo attack on two ships. Let us take two destroyers steaming at 25 knots, 120 m long, located 2,500 m away, launching torpedoes of 35 knots:

1. The firer gives the referee, besides the distance D, his "angle of fire", that is the angle between the bearing line of the target (materialised by the line of distance) and the target's line of march, here 110°. The targeted ship gives its speed and its length. V1 / V2 = 25 / 35 = 0.71. In Annex 12, on the 0.75 line (approximation), in the 110° column, one finds 221, which gives the distance of impact: 2,500 × 221 / 100 = 5,525 m, at an angle of 25°. The "relative length" of the target will be 120 × sin 25 (0.42) = 50.4 m. Annex 13 consulted in its table L 5 gives, for a distance of 5,500 m, a target steaming at 25 knots will be hit in 9 % of cases. A lotto draw will settle it.
2. The firer in his turn gives the elements of his fire: distance D (2,500 m), his "angle of fire": 55°, the speed of his torpedo (25 knots). The targeted ship: its speed and length (identical elements by convention of the example). V1 / V2 = 0.71, and in the corresponding 55° column one finds 82, a coefficient which allows the simple calculation of the distance covered by the torpedo: 82/100 of 2,500 m = 2,050 m, at an angle of impact of 86°, whose sine is 0.99. The relative length of the target is then easily established: 120 × 0.99 = 119 m. One finds finally, in table L 4 of Annex 13: 43 chances in 100 of hitting.

This simple example brings out clearly the importance of the respective positions of the ships for the useful employment of torpedoes: ship B, ahead of the target, is clearly advantaged. Its torpedo finds the target at a shortened distance and at a favourable angle. Ship A, placed astern, sees its target moving away; its following torpedo has a longer run to cover and presents itself at a more closed angle of impact, which reduces by as much the "relative length" of the hull aimed at.

In the rare case where the speed of the torpedo employed is less than that of the target, a position abeam of or astern of the target makes firing obviously impossible; it can only be made ahead of the target. This case where V1 / V2 is greater than 1 has not been entered in the table of Annex 12; it can easily be handled by approximation by the referee.

Finally, in the case of a stationary target it is obvious that the "distance of fire" is equal to the distance covered by the torpedo, and the angle of impact to that of the "angle of fire".

Proposed Themes

Theme no. 1: Surface action, of the River Plate battle type, December 1939. A very simple theme and an excellent first training exercise for handling the fire tables, which can be played by two players with models or on maps. Situation: ADMIRAL GRAF SPEE against EXETER, AJAX and ACHILLES (in the state of the period). High-seas combat. Start fixed at the limit of visibility (various variants possible in the chronological and meteorological sequence).

Theme no. 2: Surface action, of the Battle of Cape Spada type, 19 July 1940 (cf. Mare Nostrum). Also a very simple surface action, to which one may add an introduction to aerial action of the reconnaissance and bombing type, at high or medium altitude. Situation: COLLEONI and BANDE NERE against SYDNEY and 4 destroyers of the HAVOCK type. According to the option chosen, one may add 4 Z 501 and 15 S 79 on the Italian side. High-seas combat or close to a shore. As in the previous case, the game may be repeated by varying the other data (weather, chronology of interventions, etc.), in order to treat several tactical possibilities.

Theme no. 3: Simple aero-naval action, of the Norway type, April 1940. Situation: 3 troop transports escorted by a cl of the GLOIRE type, 1 cl aa of the CAIRO type and 4 CT of the BISON type, attacked by 12 Ju 87 and 6 Ju 88. This exercise is short and intended essentially for handling Annex 15.

Theme no. 4: More complex surface action, of the Java Sea type. This theme, already more ambitious, requires a longer available time (1 to 2 hours depending on training). Besides the artillery tables, it will probably give a good introduction to the torpedo problem (Annexes 12 and 13). Situation: 2 CL (HOUSTON, EXETER) + 3 cl (DE RUYTER, JAVA, PERTH) + 5 American DD, 3 British DD and 3 Dutch DD, against 2 CL (HAGURO, NACHI) + 2 cl (NAKA, JINTSU) + 14 Japanese DD. Start at 16:00 at the limit of visibility (30,000 m).

Theme no. 5: Aero-naval action of the Cape Teulada type (27 November 1940) (cf. Mare Nostrum). The forces engaged are larger and the scale of the action makes the presence of the coordinating referee highly desirable, in order to make the best use of all the possibilities offered by the case. Situation: on the British side: 2 CU (RAMILLIES, RENOWN), 1 CL (BERWICK), 1 cl aa (COVENTRY), 4 cl (NEWCASTLE, SOUTHAMPTON, MANCHESTER, SHEFFIELD), 1 PA (ARK ROYAL with 24 Skuas, 21 Swordfish and 5 Walrus), 10 DD. On the Italian side: 2 CU (VITTORIO VENETO, CAVOUR), 6 CL (ZARA, POLA, FIUME, TRENTO, TRIESTE, BOLZANO), 14 DD (CT), to which will be added 15 S 79, 5 CR 42 and 20 Cant Z 506, which the proximity of the coasts allows to bring into action. Start in sight (32,000 m) at 12:00; calm sea, cloud cover = 1/10.

Theme no. 6: Anti-submarine action: attack on a small escorted convoy with the means of 1940 (cf. Mare Nostrum). Situation: 4 merchant ships + 2 escorts of the LA CURIEUSE type (one of which is fitted with ASDIC), attacked by the submarine PROVANA. Different variants are possible according to the time and the weather; a coordinating referee is indispensable. A simple theme, to accustom players to the special conditions of anti-submarine action.

Theme no. 7: Aero-naval action of a fleet at sea against a fleet at anchor. Situation: (a) of the Mers-el-Kébir or Dakar type (with coastal defence and moderate aviation); (b) of the Taranto or Pearl Harbor type. One approaches this kind of exercise at a level that is all the more interesting as it is more complex. The best way not to get lost is, at first, to simplify the data by mutual agreement. The theme may be taken up again in more detail, but always referring to reality according to the published works.

Theme no. 8: All the preceding exercises have as their main aim to accustom the player to knowledge of and rapid handling of the tables. After this useful running-in, he will be well armed to tackle the much more interesting stage of semi-strategic actions. Example:

Situation:

• Place: on the attached map (see the map sheet, not reproduced in this transcription).
• Movements: large (on paper) of 4, 6 or 12 hours according to the referee; small (on paper or with models) of 5 minutes (combat).
• Weather: regular north wind of 15 knots; visibility: surface by day = 30,000 m, by night = 10,000 m, aerial = 50,000 m; no cloud.
• Forces: distribution at the discretion of the players; all the ships in port except the submarines.
  • Italians: 1 CU of the CAVOUR type, 3 CL of the ZARA type, 4 cl of the COLLEONI type + 8 CT of the "NAVIGATORI" type + 4 T of the "SPICA" type, + S/M ADUA.
  • Aviation: 6 Cant Z 506, 12 SM 79 and 12 CR 42.
  • Merchant ships: 3 of 8,000 TPL at 12 knots and 3 of 4,000 TPL at 8 knots.
  • British: 1 CU of the BARHAM type, 1 PA (EAGLE) with 15 Swordfish and 6 Skuas, 2 cl of the SOUTHAMPTON type, 2 cl aa of the CHARYBDIS type + 6 DD of the HARDY type and 4 of the COSSACK type + S/M UNITY.
  • Aviation: 2 SUNDERLAND and 6 GLOSTER GLADIATOR (land-based aviation).
  • The Italian ships are distributed between A and B, the British between C and D, and their respective missions are to transport 60,000 t from A to B and from C to D. All the weapon elements have their 1940 characteristics, and for this case without radar. Likewise, by convention of play, the operating ranges of aircraft have been reduced to the scale of the map in a fair proportion.
  • The importance taken here by search and reconnaissance makes the presence of the coordinating referee obviously necessary.
  • Duration: 2 to 3 hours depending on training, or longer if one goes into detail.

Theme no. 9: Free theme on the attack and defence of transatlantic supply lines.

Situation:

a) Tactical option (cf. attached map):

• British: in A-B-C-D: BARHAM + ARK ROYAL (with 24 FULMAR and 30 SWORDFISH) + 2 CL + 4 CL + 12 DD + 4 corvettes of the "FLOWER" type + 12 WELLINGTON + 12 SPITFIRE.
  • Mission: move 10 merchant ships of 8,000 TPL at 10 knots from D to A, and 6 merchant ships of 10,000 TPL at 8 knots from E to B.
• German: GNEISENAU + 6 S/M of the VII type + 6 ARADO 196 + 18 JU 88; all of it at F.
  • Mission: prevent the adverse action.

b) Strategic option: the same geographic disposition, but a marked increase of the means, the missions and the time, as follows:

• For the British: ensure an average resupply of 30,000 t per 24 hours at A or at B for 30 days (with an advance at the start limited to 10 days), on pain of capitulation. Means: HOOD + PRINCE OF WALES + ARK ROYAK [sic] + HERMES + 4 CL + 4 cl + 15 DD + 8 "FLOWER" + 18 WELLINGTON + 18 SPITFIRE, plus:
  • at A and B: 12 empty merchant ships;
  • at D: 14 loaded merchant ships;
  • at E: 10 loaded merchant ships (to simplify, the ports and the speeds are normalised at the same level: 10,000 t and 10 knots). It will be considered that 48 hours are needed for loading or unloading the cargo ships.
  • The British warships will be supposed to be in port at the discretion of the "British" player.
• For the Germans, the side will have: BISMARCK + SCHARNHORST + A. G. SPEE + 12 S/M of the VII type (of which 1/3 are permanently at F, which can put to sea only on the return of another S/M coming to refuel with torpedoes or to repair, or again as a replacement for a sunk submarine). It will also have at F: 6 ARADO + 18 JU 88 + 12 HE 111 + 12 Me 109.

In this option, the modalities of action, depending to a large extent on operational search by aerial exploration or intelligence, are very numerous, and it is difficult to foresee exactly the game time required.

Remarks on the aerial equipment of the aircraft carriers: they were armed according to the circumstances of the missions requested. In preparing a free theme one may take as a schematic basis: 1/3 fighters, 1/3 torpedo aircraft and 1/3 bombers. For a precise historical theme one will refer to the exact data of the bibliographical works. The bombers carried 500 to 1,000 kg of bombs according to the type of aircraft. The torpedoes carried are, in the very large majority of cases, lighter than those of the ships.

Theme no. 10: Tactical theme. This tactical theme, inspired by (TH. HONDEMARK) the situation in the Barents Sea in autumn 1942, details the concrete carrying out of a fairly complete aero-naval encounter. (The strictly exact identity of the means of the period is not important here, the purpose of this example being above all practical.) Reading some works dealing with the subject would usefully contribute to perfect preparation. Let us cite for example:

• La tragédie du P.Q. 17 (Günter Karweina — Ed. France-Empire).
• Le convoi de la mauvaise chance (Donald Moore — Ed. France-Empire).
• Les convois de Russie (B.B. Schofield — Presses de la Cité).
• Convois vers l'U.R.S.S. (Georges Blond — Librairie Arthème Fayard), etc.

On a sheet of squared paper at a scale of one centimetre, measuring 100 × 60 (dressmakers' pattern sheets are quite suitable for this use), a quarter-circle of 12 cm radius is drawn in the upper left corner, representing the "British" zone. In the lower right corner the same is done for the "Russian" zone. At the centre of the lower edge a half-circle of the same radius is drawn, the "German" zone, in which the outline of the northern coast of Norway is shown very approximately. The upper and right edges of the sheet represent, by convention, the impassable ice-pack. The scale adopted is 1 cm = 10 km. A second identical map is prepared, each adversary having one, and the referee having several sheets of tracing paper to facilitate his interventions.

Then, for each side, a documentation is prepared and supplied, comprising the common data of the theme and the personal data unknown to the adversary:

• WEATHER: day and night of 12 hours (by convention, for convenience), sea state 3, wind from the N.E. of 20 knots; day visibility: 30,000 m at surface, 40,000 m by aircraft; night visibility: 10,000 m at surface; periscope visibility: 10,000 m by day, 5,000 m by night. No cloud cover.

• CHANCE CARDS: a number established if necessary by the referee for the occasion, unknown or not to the adversaries, and drawn for example at each sequence of 6 hours of fictitious time. It should be noted that this intervention of extrinsic factors is not indispensable but adds a welcome suspense, provided care is taken not to introduce an element too favourable to one of the players and clearly unbalancing the forces present.

• "BRITISH" FILE:

  • Forces available: 1 CU: DUKE OF YORK (type PRINCE OF WALES) with radar of 40,000 m at surface and 60,000 m aerial; 1 CL: NORFOLK (type CORNWALL) with the same radar; 1 cl: BELFAST (see characteristics further on), same radar; 1 cl aa: DIDO (type HERMIONE) with aerial radar of 50,000 m and surface radar of 35,000 m; 6 DD: type COSSACK (with radar of 30,000 m range); 6 escorts of the FLOWER type (these last two types fitted with ASDIC of 200 m range); 1 escort carrier: AVENGER with 12 Sea HURRICANE and 6 SWORDFISH; 20 merchant ships of 10,000 t deadweight, at 8 knots, including 2 "CAM" ships (that is, with 1 non-recoverable HURRICANE). Each merchant ship will be armed with 4 mt aa and will have a value of 5 points.
  • All these forces will be placed in the British zone at the discretion of the player concerned.
  • Intelligence: presence in the Altenfjord of two battleships, including the TIRPITZ, accompanied by an indeterminate number of destroyers. Number of enemy submarines at sea supposed to be from 4 to 8. In addition, the presence of two or three dozen aircraft of all types.
  • Mission: bring the convoy safe and sound into the Russian zone.

• "GERMAN" FILE:

  • Forces available: at base: 1 CU: TIRPITZ (type BISMARCK) with surface radar of 35,000 m and aerial radar of 45,000 m; 1 "pocket" battleship: ADMIRAL SCHEER (type SPEE), same radars. For the practical maximum range of the 380s, take 42,000 m; 4 DD of the Z 25 type (see characteristics further on); aircraft: 4 ARADOS, 12 STUKAS, 12 He 111, 6 Me 109.

To avoid complicating the game, the problems of consumption (fuel or ammunition) will not be taken into account.

In a variant of the data, each side may be given an overall number of points representing a potential of surface ships, submarines and aircraft. The choice of number and type remaining within the limits of the "envelope" is made by the player. The referee will intervene summarily if necessary to avoid categorical and flagrant imbalances leading to implausible engagements. (For 60 points, for example, one could imagine at the limit a CU against 40 S/M, which would be unrealisable and without interest.)

Procedure (Déroulement): At the start of the game, the adversaries, separated from each other, place their forces on their personal map as they see fit, according to their respective data, and inform the referee of their organisation and intentions. The referee gives the signal to begin operations, for example: Day D at 0 hours, and proposes a first movement of 6 hours. The players will then trace the courses of their units during the 6 hours of this night movement. A second movement will then be programmed by the referee according to the tactical situation of the sides, of which he obviously synthesises the knowledge: he will propose a movement of 1, 2, 3, 4 hours or more, according to the interest of the phase. Indeed, aerial explorations probably launched at dawn may perhaps already give results. The referee, judging the situation, "stops the clock" at the interesting moment. Objectively noting the intelligence which each of the players separately gives him, he will communicate it to the interested side (for example the "timing" of a reconnaissance aircraft, a radar search, a direction-finding fix, or more simply the visual observation of a ship). Thus the first phase of the game — the search phase — will continue for a time that varies with the more or less effective actions of the players. When the adversaries come into contact (aircraft, surface ships or submarines), the referee transfers the forces concerned (within the range of visibility, of course) to a map at a scale ten times larger, and the combat takes place in sight according to the rules set out above. At this moment the time sequence adopted will always be 5 minutes, which is the basis of calculation of the fire tables. For aero-naval engagements one will treat first the aircraft-against-aircraft phase, then AA (DCA) against aircraft (taking into account the effective range of fire of the ships concerned according to their grouping and the disposition of the guns; in general one will retain, according to the type, 60 to 90 % of the anti-aircraft artillery in action); finally the attack proper of the aircraft against the target ships. These engagements do not require the graphic representation of the aircraft's movement in combat, which would needlessly overload the maps. On the other hand, all movements will be precisely traced at 5-minute intervals for surface combats. In the case of a combat against a submerged submarine, its movement will be shown on a sheet placed beneath a sheet of tracing paper representing the surface and separated from it by an opaque screen. Each side, manoeuvring its units without the other's knowledge, the referee coordinates the actions and judges the results. At the end of the engagement the referee will resume the movements, for a length of fictitious time always governed by the interest of the moment.

Allow a real duration of 6 to 12 hours to finish the game.

Note on the ship table: the brief documentation table for the ship classes used in these example themes (the names, classes and armament data) is unit data and is not reproduced here.

Concluding note on the themes: the progression of themes proposed here is only a suggestion of logical progression for acquiring a good command of the principles. It will allow the beginner in naval wargaming to grasp all its appeal and to continue discovering the subject on his own.

In the preceding themes, the tactical identity inspired in the players mostly total actions, without concern for secondary consequences, since these do not exist: the game, limited by the definition of the theme, ends with it. This artificial aspect disappears if one includes it in the strategic framework of a campaign. The desire to preserve forces badly committed in order to use them in later, more favourable circumstances considerably strengthens the possibilities of rebound. Freedom of action and long-term forecasting naturally increase greatly the variety and interest of the game. That is why it seems logical to us to end these suggestions with the presentation of a more complete subject which, around one unit of time (6 months), one bounded place (a well-defined archipelago) and classic aero-naval actions, offers a perfect application of all the rules proposed.

Theme no. 11: The Guadalcanal Campaign (Campaign Scenario)

Historical simulation game of a crucial phase of the aero-naval war in the Pacific (1942).

Summary (as printed): Geographical reminder; military situation; practical realisation; separate tactical themes (1 Battle of Savo Island; 2 Battle of the Eastern Solomons; 3 Battle of Cape Esperance; 4 Battle of Santa Cruz; 5 Battle of Guadalcanal, a–d: night of 12–13 November 1942, day of 13 November, day of 14 November, night of 14–15 November; 6 Battle of Tassafaronga; 7 Battle of Rennell Island); overall strategic theme; American and Japanese naval elements; annexes; American dossier; Japanese dossier.

After six months of uninterrupted victories, an indecisive combat in the Coral Sea and an unexpected defeat at Midway, the Imperial Japanese Navy found itself in the summer of 1942 facing the realities of the first deliberately aggressive American move in the central Pacific. The adversaries would need six months of hard struggle, alternating success and reverses, to conclude this "trial of strength" — the first link in a chain of Japanese withdrawals which would end thirty months later in total capitulation. This campaign for the possession of Guadalcanal island in the Solomon Islands archipelago is the perfect setting for a complete application of the rules set out in "AMIRAUTE". The historical intensity, the balance of forces at this moment of the conflict, the limitation in time and space, and the variety and number of the engagements offer naval wargame enthusiasts a privileged field of unique interest.

Geographical reminder. The archipelago, the theatre of these merciless combats, extends over more than 1,000 km to the south-east of the great base of Rabaul established by the Japanese in New Britain. Seven main islands (Bougainville, Choiseul, New Georgia, Santa Isabel, Malaita, Guadalcanal and San Cristobal) and many other smaller ones line up curiously on two roughly parallel lines, leaving between them a natural channel called "the Slot" by the Americans. Thus protected on its flanks by geography, this route, on the other hand, invited systematic searches by American reconnaissance, since it was almost obligatory, for its security and its direction, to reach Guadalcanal coming from the Japanese route. These physical data, added to those of alternating days and nights of equal length, conditioned a game of "hide-and-seek" between the adversaries from the start of the campaign to its end. Just below the equator the region has a hot and humid climate, where rains are frequent and abundant and the winds moderate and regular. The very mountainous islands have rare and small plains little suited to the development of a land war of movement. On the American side the counterparts of Rabaul were situated at a greater distance — essentially to the south-east: Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides at 900 km, and above all Nouméa in New Caledonia at 1,500 km.

Military situation. The Japanese had occupied the archipelago almost without combat, creating a powerful base at Rabaul and planning their subsequent push towards the south. This base constituted an excellent springboard for extending the perimeter of conquests towards New Caledonia and for cutting the America–Australia links. The accidental discovery of the construction of an airfield at Guadalcanal on 4 July 1942 had revealed the great danger to the Americans. Heartened by their fine victory at Midway, they considered themselves able to strike back, and the armed forces were given the mission of seizing and occupying the New Britain, New Ireland and New Guinea zone, including the great base of Rabaul. The first objectives would be the urgent capture of the Santa Cruz islands, Tulagi and adjacent positions. A corps of 11,000 Marines transported by 15 ships landed — and easily — on 7 August 1942 at Guadalcanal and Tulagi.

The reader who wishes a fuller picture of the events may refer with great profit to works such as:

• Bernard Millot, La Guerre du Pacifique (B. Lafont).
• S.E. Morison, Les Grandes Batailles Navales du Pacifique II (Payot).
• David Brown, Carrier Operations Vol. II (Ian Allan).
• Th. Roscoe, Destroyer Operations (U.S. Naval Institute), etc.

A detailed study of this slice of history not being our purpose, we shall only recall the points which bring out the characteristic physiognomy of this campaign:

• Oscillation of fortunes: alternation of victories and defeats for both camps, with in the background the irresistible rise in power of the Americans. But victory was very dearly won at the end of six or seven major engagements and very numerous other minor ones. It was a fine demonstration of the result of the "small packets" method — a method historically open to criticism, but adopted because the leaders on both sides did not think they could do otherwise.
• Confirmation of air supremacy, which led to surface combats being risked only at night.
• The relatively modest role of submarines, which, while not absolutely negligible, remained far short of that of their counterparts in the European theatre.

Practical realisation. The best way is to play this game on paper. Two scales will be used: a large one for the large movements (of 4, 6, 12 or 24 hours: deployment of forces and explorations, for example), covering the whole archipelago, and another smaller one for combats. For the latter we give the example of the Guadalcanal–Savo area, aptly and humorously called "scrap-iron bottom" by the American sailors. Others may obviously be drawn up according to needs. At the players' convenience, enlargements of the maps will be prepared in duplicate, one for each side (we recommend dressmakers' squared paper of 100 × 60 at one centimetre, very practical for the map at 1/100,000 for the combats).

Map of the Solomon Islands (page 43 of the source) and the Guadalcanal–Savo combat chart are graphics and are not reproduced here.

Guadalcanal: rules and approach

The rules applied are those set out in the first part, completed as the needs of the situation envisaged require, thus showing the flexibility of the method. The complete technical characteristics of the forces engaged are given in the annex.

As always, the problem of wargames presents itself under two aspects, which we shall consider in succession:

• In a first part we shall study the outlines of the principal combats as they actually took place, proposing to follow the theme very closely to reality;
• In a second part we shall consider a staff hypothesis: the free strategic theme of the campaign in its entirety.

SEPARATE TACTICAL THEMES

(1) Battle of Savo Island (9 August 1942). It was the first violent reaction to the American landing at Guadalcanal. The Japanese forces left Rabaul on 7 August with the intention of carrying out a counter-landing and destroying the enemy forces. The torpedoing by a submarine of a vital transport cancelled the first part of the programme but did not affect the execution of the second, which was the most brilliant Japanese night victory — a consequence of American unpreparedness for this kind of combat, of excessive confidence in radar, still rudimentary at that time, and finally of poor air liaison. At the end of the encounter the American forces were almost destroyed, while those of the Japanese were almost intact.

Situation:

• Weather: sea 3; day visibility: 28,000 m at surface, 50,000 m by aircraft. Night visibility: 11,000 m, reduced in squalls. Prevailing east wind, regular, 20 km/h.
• Japanese side — intelligence: American forces of 8 CL (heavy cruisers) and about a dozen DD (destroyers) escorting as many transports in the waters of Guadalcanal.
  • Forces available at Rabaul: 4 CL: CHOKAI, AOBA, KAKO, KINUGASA; 2 cl (light cruisers): TENRYU, YUBARI; 1 DD: YUNAGI; 6 cargo ships of 5,000 t deadweight.
  • Aircraft: 27 BETTY, 18 ZERO, plus the embarked aviation of the cruisers.
• American side — intelligence: composition and movement of the Japanese force reported by an Australian aircraft, but received with error and delay.
  • Forces available (engaged): 5 CL: CANBERRA, CHICAGO, VINCENNES, ASTORIA, QUINCY; 6 DD: BLUE (DD 387), TALBOT (DD 390), PATTERSON (DD 392), BAGLEY (DD 386), HELM (DD 338), WILSON (DD 408); 6 APD of the COLHOUN type (former destroyer converted to fast transport); 15 transports of 8,000 to 10,000 t deadweight.
  • Aircraft: those embarked on the cruisers, the protecting aircraft carriers having withdrawn before the action considered.

Application:

• A / Historical: the start of the action is fixed at 7 August 1942 at 16:28 (hour of departure from Rabaul). The length of the movements will be determined by the referee in the best interest of the game, as usual. The chaos and confusion which characterised this famous battle are difficult to recreate in the calm of the fictitious exercise, and above all with knowledge of the facts after the event. To approach as closely as possible the real conditions, some points need to be specified:

  • Visibility: the conditions resulting from the passage of squalls will be left to chance: a die is rolled at each hour of fictitious time, halving visibility for a 5 or 6 and reducing it by 3/4 for a 3 or 4.
  • The chances of hitting in night combats are halved.
  • Searchlights are a double-edged tool: while they allow the target to be seen well, they betray the origin; we shall consider that their use restores the percentage of chances of hitting to normal daylight conditions, but in both directions.
  • Fires: when the aggression points reach one quarter of the potential of resistance, the target will be assumed to be sufficiently lit to fall back into the visibility and vulnerability conditions of day combat.
  • Transmissions: delays and errors will be determined by the referee. The percentage chance of a discovery message being transmitted by an aerial scout shot down by an adversary is estimated at 2/3.

  Note on this historical scheme the possible variants, without departing from reality. Thus this theme may be played and replayed without tiresome repetition. Rising higher and higher, one arrives at the application:

• B / Free: the same starting time, but with an additional disposition of American forces not engaged in the real combat but present in the Guadalcanal area: CL: AUSTRALIA; cl: SAN JUAN, HOBART; DD: MONSEN (DD 436), BUCHANAN (DD 484), SELFRIDGE (357), HENLEY (DD 391), MUGFORD (DD 389); submarines S 44 and S 38 on patrol.

  • The movements of the adversary's aerial, scouting or combat naval forces are free. The scope of the possibilities is immediately apparent.
  • Fictitious time: 72 hours, as in the previous case.

(2) Battle of the Eastern Solomons (24 August 1942). The second Japanese attempt to drive the Americans definitively out of the Solomons brought together considerable means — at all events, those which appeared sufficient to the Imperial Japanese Navy's staff: 3 PA, 3 CU, 11 CL, 2 cl, 31 DD, 9 S/M and a seaplane carrier, all to cover the transport of 1,500 men. The plan of action was complicated, the forces being organised into 7 formations. In outline: an advance force with 5 CL, 1 cl and 5 DD; a support group with 1 CU, 1 seaplane carrier and 4 DD; an attack group with 2 large PA and 6 DD; a vanguard group with 2 CU, 3 CL, 1 cl and 6 DD; a diversion group with a small PA, 1 cl and 2 DD. Finally a last group with the special mission of going down "the Slot" and "softening up" the land defences, and particularly bombing the airfield: 4 CL, and the reinforcement sub-group proper with 1 cl, 8 DD and transports.

The disproportion of forces was marked, but the dispersal of the Japanese allowed an unquestionable American victory: enemy losses were clearly heavier, and above all the mission was abandoned.

Situation: on 24 August 1942 at 06:00.

• Weather: sea 4; cloud cover 5/10. Day visibility: surface 30,000 m, aerial 50,000 m; night: surface 15,000 m.

Japanese side — intelligence: existence of an American naval-air force in the area, but without further precision.

• Forces engaged:
  • 550 km north of Malaita, the "main body" steaming at 160 in three formations:
    • (a) 2 PA, 1 CU, 1 seaplane carrier and 10 DD:
      • SHOKAKU with 26 ZERO, 24 VAL, 18 KATE and 2 JUDY;
      • ZUIKAKU with 27 ZERO, 27 VAL, 18 KATE;
      • MUTSU and CHITOSE with 11 JAKES and 11 PETE;
      • DD: MAKIGUMO, KAZAGUMO, AKIGUMO, YUGUMO, SHIKINAMI, URANAMI, MARASAME, SAMIDARE, HARUSAME, NATSUGUMO.
    • (b) 2 CU, 3 CL, 1 cl and 6 DD somewhat ahead: HIEI and KIRISHIMA; SUZUYA, KUMANO and CHIKUMA; NAGARA with the DD YUKIKAZE, MAIKAZE, TANIKAZE, HATSUKAZE, HAKISUKI, NOWAKI.
    • (c) an advance force of 5 CL, 1 cl and 5 DD: ATAGO, MAYA, TAKAO, MYOKO and HAGURO; YURA + 5 DD: ASAGUMO, YAMAGUMO, HAYASHIO, OYASHIO and KUROSHIO.
  • 100 km ahead of this main body, the "bait" force steaming south: the PA RYUJO with 21 ZERO and 16 KATE; the CL TONE and 2 DD: TOKITSUKAZE and AMATSUKAZE.
  • 100 km on the 220 bearing from this diversion formation was the transport group: KIRYU MARU with the cl JINTSU and 8 DD: KAGERO, UZUKI, MUTSUKI, YAHOI, UMIKAZE, SUZUKAZE, ISOKAZE and KAWAKAZE.
  • Two submarine barrages:
    • on a NE–SW line centred 300 km south of Malaita: 6 S/M 25 km apart: I 9, I 15, I 17, I 19 and I 26;
    • on a N–S line 300 km east of Guadalcanal: I 31, I 74 and I 75.
  • Land-based aviation at Rabaul: 4 EMILY, 36 BETTY and 48 ZERO.

American side — intelligence: presumption of an imminent Japanese counter-offensive movement, but ignorance of the PA south of Rabaul.

• Forces engaged: 250 km east of the middle of the east coast of Malaita: 2 PA, 1 CU, 3 CL, 1 cl and 11 DD:
  • SARATOGA with 37 DAUNTLESS, 36 WILDCAT and 15 AVENGER; ENTERPRISE, the same aviation;
  • the CU NORTH CAROLINA; the CL MINNEAPOLIS, NEW ORLEANS and PORTLAND;
  • the cl ATLANTA and the DD: DD 363, DD 401, DD 397, DD 398, DD 435, DD 436, DD 360, DD 348, DD 352, DD 351, DD 353.
• Land-based aviation: Espiritu Santo: 8 B-17; Henderson Field (the Guadalcanal airfield): 19 WILDCAT + 12 DAUNTLESS; Santa Cruz: 5 PBY and Malaita: 9 other PBY.

Application:

• A / Historical: the composition and disposition of the forces correspond to those described above, and the remarks made for the preceding theme remain valid. Proposed fictitious time: 30 hours. Real playing time: 4 to 8 hours.
• B / Free: take an earlier starting hour. The important point will be the disposition of the American side of the squadron which was unfortunately absent at the time of the combat: 1 PA, 2 CL, 1 cl and 7 DD: WASP with 29 WILDCAT, 36 DAUNTLESS and 15 AVENGER; SAN FRANCISCO and SALT LAKE CITY; SAN JUAN + the DD 491, 483, 484, 399, 406, 407 and 356.
  • Proposed fictitious game time: 36 to 72 hours depending on the starting hour. Real playing time: 6 to 10 hours.

(3) Battle of Cape Esperance (11–12 October 1942). After these acute encounters, a period of attrition struggles settled in the area until the night of 11 to 12 October, when the American ships had the opportunity to win an unquestionable but impure night victory against a Japanese squadron trying to reinforce the garrison of Guadalcanal: the losses of the Imperial Navy were appreciable, but the landing succeeded.

(3, continued) Battle of Cape Esperance (11–12 October 1942).

Situation: 11 October 1942 at 23:00.

• Weather: visibility at surface and aerial: 50,000 m. Sea 3. Wind from the S.E., 25 km/h.
• Japanese side — intelligence: existence of a surface force in the waters of the island, the exact composition of which is not known.
  • Forces engaged, coming down "the Slot": 3 CL: AOBA, FURUTAKA and KINUGASA, escorted by the DD FUBUKI and HATSUYUKI, in a group located 40,000 m north-west of Savo.
  • Astern and to the west of this formation, the reinforcement group composed of: CHITOSE and NISSHIN + the DD NATSUGUMO, YAMAGUMO, MURAKUMO, AKIZUKI, SHIRAYUKI and ASAGUMO.
• American side — intelligence: knowledge of Japanese forces coming down "the Slot" and located at 18:00 at 180 km from Savo.
  • Forces engaged: 2 CL: SALT LAKE CITY, SAN FRANCISCO; 2 cl: HELENA, BOISE + 6 DD: 488, 484, 485, 459, 491.
  • HELENA and BOISE are fitted with SG radars with a range of 28,000 m, equipment of good quality but whose use was not yet mastered.

Application:

• A / Historical: order of battle and disposition as above, bearing in mind that although the new radar was of good quality, insufficient training and use led to numerous errors and confusion. Proposed fictitious playing time: 1 h 30 to 2 h. Real time planned: 1/2 to 1 h.
• B / Free: the same composition of forces, but the start of the action at 12 or 18 hours depending on the playing time available (2 to 4 h). Fictitious time: 24 h. An air force may optionally be added.

(4) Battle of Santa Cruz (26 October 1942). The second great aero-naval battle of the campaign, with a disputed result: an immediate tactical success for the Japanese, but burdened with personnel losses very damaging in the long term. The Imperial Navy wished to combine a powerful offensive at sea with a decisive action by the land forces engaged on the island. This action was conditional on the capture of the airfield, or at least its lasting neutralisation. This was not achieved, and the naval part of the programme was not sufficient to conclude. The American squadron planned a raid north of Santa Cruz and then to fall back to the south-west on a mission to protect Guadalcanal. The Japanese squadron, cruising 300 miles to the north, awaited the capture of Henderson Field before moving further forward, seeking out and attacking the American fleet with much superior forces.

Situation: 26 October 1942 at 06:00.

• Weather: sea 2. Day visibility: 30,000 m, aerial: 50,000 m; night: 12,000 m. Cloud cover 5/10.
• Japanese side — intelligence: enemy forces of 2 PA, 1 to 2 CU, 6 to 10 cruisers whose exact position is not known.
  • Forces engaged:
    • Attack force, 450 km NNW of Santa Cruz: 2 PA: SHOKAKU with 27 ZERO, 27 VAL and 18 KATE; ZUIKAKU with 27 ZERO, 27 VAL and 18 KATE; 1 CL: KUMANO + 8 DD (as printed; seven names follow): ARASHI, TERUZUKI, TOKITSUKAZE, YUKIKAZE, HAMAKAZE, MAIKAZE and HABUKAZE.
    • Advance-guard force, 160 km from there in the 190 direction: 1 PA: ZUIHO with 21 ZERO and 6 KATE; 2 CU: HIEI and KIRISHIMA; 3 CL: TONE, CHIKUMA and SUZUYA; + 7 DD: URAKAZE, TANIKAZE, ISOKAZE, KAZAGUMO, MAKIGUMO, AKIGUMO and YUGUMO.
    • Advanced force, 180 km west of the PA: 4 CL: ATAGO, TAKAO, MAYA, MYOKO; 1 PA: JUNYO with 18 ZERO, 18 VAL and 9 KATE; 1 cl: ISUZU + 6 DD: SUZUKAZE, UMIKAZE, KAWAKAZE, MAKINAMI, NAGANAMI, TAGANAMI.
    • Aviation based at Rabaul: 48 ZERO + 48 VAL.
• American side — intelligence: at 03:00, knowledge of a PA 200 miles to the north-west and other enemy ships 300 miles in the same direction.
  • Forces engaged: 2 PA: ENTERPRISE with 34 WILDCAT, 36 DAUNTLESS and 12 AVENGER; HORNET with 36 WILDCAT, 36 DAUNTLESS and 15 AVENGER; 1 CU: SOUTH DAKOTA; 3 CL: PORTLAND, NORTHAMPTON, PENSACOLA; 3 cl: SAN JUAN, SAN DIEGO and JUNEAU; 13 DD: 356, 364, 376, 379, 401, 373, 378, 371, 414, 410, 413, 599, 417.
  • Land-based aviation: Guadalcanal: 26 WILDCAT, 20 DAUNTLESS, 2 AVENGER; Espiritu Santo: 23 WILDCAT, 30 B-17 and 30 PBY.

Application:

• A / Historical: order of battle and disposition as above. Fictitious time: 24 h. Playing time: 6 to 10 h.
• B / Free: start of play 24 hours earlier, with the addition:
  • On the Japanese side, a support force composed of: 2 CU: KONGO and HARUNA + 6 DD: MURASAME, SAMIDARE, KAGERO, OYASHIO, YUDACHI; 1 CL: CHOKAI + 3 DD: SHIRATSUYU, AKATSUKI and IKAZUKI; 1 cl: YURA with the DD AKIZUKI. The whole located 500 km NNE of the Santa Cruz islands. In addition, 12 S/M at the disposal of the player: I 4, I 5, I 8, I 22, I 176, I 9, I 15, I 21, I 24, I 174, I 175.
  • On the American side, a fleet located 300 km south of the same islands: 1 CU: WASHINGTON; 1 CL: SAN FRANCISCO; 2 cl: HELENA, ATLANTA + 6 DD: 397, 488, 483, 487, 445, 486.
  • Add to the Espiritu Santo aviation: 12 HUDSON.
  • After the introduction of these additional forces, the free theme takes on an entirely different dimension. Fictitious time: 4 days. Playing time: 8 to 12 hours or more.

(5) Battle of Guadalcanal (12–15 November 1942). The high point of the campaign. This encounter brought together, on both sides, powerful forces with a predominance of surface ships, and extended over nearly 72 hours with three night battles framing two days of intense aero-naval action. The combat ended in an unquestionable American victory. Not only were Japanese losses heavier, but once again the mission of neutralising the airfield could not be fulfilled. Without entering into the detail of operations, we shall note that the first phase — the night of 12 to 13 November — had imprecise results; that the days of 13 and 14 marked the superiority of American naval aviation over the enemy surface forces; and that the second night combat — the night of 14 to 15 November — finally gave the advantage to the Americans, whose intervention by modern battleships was decisive. The study of this battle brings out the broad schematic features, but these are sufficient for this phase of our historical simulation game.

(5a) Night of 12 to 13 November 1942.

Situation:

• Weather: sea 2. Visibility: from 1,500 to 10,000 m depending on the squalls. Moderate south-east wind.
• Japanese side: 2 CU: KIRISHIMA and HIEI; 1 cl: NAGARA + 11 DD: IKAZUKI, INAZUMA, AKATZUKI, TERATZUKI, AMATSUKAZE, YUKIKAZE, YUDACHI, HARUSAME, SAMIDARE, MURASAME, ASAGUMO. Formation located at 01:30 in the 240 direction from Savo, steaming south-east at 20 knots.
• American side: 2 CL: SAN FRANCISCO, PORTLAND; 3 cl: HELENA, ATLANTA, JUNEAU + 8 DD: 376, 459, 407, 450, 436, 599, 483, 445. Formation steaming north-west at 30,000 m in the 140 direction from Savo Island.

Application:

• A / Historical: start at 01:30 on 13 November with the order of battle above. On the Japanese side, the shortage of armour-piercing shells is represented by a reduction of 1/3 in the aggression points of the heavy-cruiser artillery. Fictitious time: 3 hours. Real playing time: 1 to 3 h.
• B / Free: start on 12 November at 18:00. Japanese forces located in "the Slot" 250 km from Savo; American forces on patrol off the eastern tip of Guadalcanal. Add: the S/M I 26 50 km south-east of the large island, and on the opposite side: 12 B-17 and 12 PBY at Espiritu Santo, 29 WILDCAT, 37 DAUNTLESS and 9 AVENGER at Henderson Field. Fictitious time: 18 hours. Real playing time: 2 to 4 h.

(5b) Day of 13 November 1942.

Situation:

• Weather: sea 2. Visibility: from 10,000 to 30,000 m depending on the squalls. Moderate south-east wind. Cloud cover 4/10.
• Japanese side: add, 450 km north of Guadalcanal: 2 CL: ATAGO and TAKAO + 5 DD: HAYATSUKI, SHIRAYUKI, AYANAMI, URANAMI, SHIKINAMI; ... to the Shortlands; 4 CL: CHOKAI, KINUGASA, SUZUYA, MAYA; 2 cl: ISUZU, TENRYU + 6 DD: ARASHIO, ASASHIO, MAKIGUMO, YUGUMO, MICHISHIO and KAZAGUMO (bombardment group).
  • Aviation at Rabaul: 48 ZERO, 36 BETTY, 4 EMILY.
• American side: add the aviation of 5 HUDSON at Espiritu Santo.

Application:

• A / Historical: start at 06:00. Fictitious time: 12 hours. Playing time: 2 to 4 hours.
• B / Free: add submarines: on the Japanese side, I 15, I 16, I 17 and I 21; on the American side, TROUT, STURGEON and GRAYBACK.

(5c) Day of 14 November 1942.

Situation:

• Weather: sea 3. Moderate south-east wind. Same visibility.
• Japanese side: the bombardment force located 180 km from Savo, steaming north-west. Add the reinforcement group in "the Slot", 280 km from Savo and heading south-east: 11 merchant ships and 10 DD: OYASHIO, KAGERO, HAYASHIO, KAWAKAZE, UMIKAZE, SUZUKAZE, MOCHIZUKI, AMAGIRI, MAKINAMI and TAKANAMI.
• American side: 620 km south-south-east of Guadalcanal: 1 PA: ENTERPRISE with 10 AVENGER, 31 DAUNTLESS, 38 WILDCAT; 1 CL: NORTHAMPTON; 1 cl: SAN DIEGO + 6 DD: 410, 361, 411, 413, 414, 417.

Application:

• A / Historical: start at 06:00.
• B / Free: same start, but with a longer fictitious playing time.

(5d) Night of 14 to 15 November 1942.

Situation:

• Weather: sea 1. Visibility: 12,000 m.
• Japanese side: 75 km north of Savo: 4 CU: KIRISHIMA; 2 CL: ATAGO and TAKAO; 2 cl: SENDAI and NAGARA + 5 DD: TERUZUKI, ASAGUMO, AYANAMI, URANAMI, SHIKINAMI. (To these forces will be added the DD OYASHIO and KAGERO, detached from the transport force and actually engaged.)
• American side, patrolling off the western tip of Guadalcanal: 2 CU: WASHINGTON and SOUTH DAKOTA; 4 DD: 379, 433, 397, 416.

Application:

• A / Historical: start at 18:00. Fictitious time: 12 hours. Playing time: 4 to 6 hours.
• B / Free: same start, but with the fictitious time extended to 24 hours, the playing time requiring 3 to 6 hours.

Remark: a FREE THEME OF 72 HOURS for the whole of the battle of Guadalcanal. Start: 12 November at 12:00. Fictitious time: 72 h. Add to the Japanese side the CU KONGO and HARUNA, the CL TONE, and the PA JUNYO and HIYO (which did not really take part in the combats but were in the Rabaul area).

(6) Battle of Tassafaronga (night of 30 November to 1 December 1942). This last great night battle, typical of the campaign, was a clear Japanese victory, but coming too late it had no strategic influence, because the balance of forces was tilting too strongly on the American side. It set against each other a squadron of 8 DD of the Imperial Navy and a group of 5 cruisers and 6 DD of the enemy.

Situation:

• Weather: sea 2. Visibility: variable from 6,000 to 10,000 m.
• Japanese side: 6 DD (as printed; eight names follow): NAGANAMI, TAKANAMI, KUROSHIO, OYASHIO, KAGERO, MAKINAMI, SUZUKAZE and KAWAKAZE.
• American side: 4 CL: MINNEAPOLIS, PENSACOLA, NEW ORLEANS, NORTHAMPTON; 1 cl: HONOLULU + 6 DD: 445, 377, 401, 366, 487, 367.
• Note: the disappointing use of American radars is to be taken into account (playing modalities to be specified before the start of the game between the players and the referee).

Realisation:

• A / Historical: start on 30 November at 22:30, the Japanese forces being 10 km north-west of Savo, the American forces 35 km south-east of the same island. Fictitious time: 2 hours. Playing time: 2 to 4 hours.

(7) Battle of Rennell Island (29 January 1943). This was essentially a Japanese air attack on an American squadron. This theme was chosen for its clarity, which allows a player who is still inexperienced in this type of encounter to acquire concretely a useful ease for what follows.

Situation:

• Weather: east wind of 20 km/h. Cloud cover 8/10. Sea 2. Surface visibility 20,000 m, aerial 35,000 m.
• Place: zone located 80 km north of Rennell Island.
• Japanese side: 30 BETTY torpedo bombers.
• American side: 3 CL: WICHITA (with aerial radar of 100 km), CHICAGO and LOUISVILLE; 3 cl: MONTPELIER, CLEVELAND and COLUMBIA; 6 DD: 448, 466, 507, 468, 619, 451. No air protection.

Realisation:

• A / Historical: forces described above, widely spaced, with a position, speed and direction well known to the attackers. Fictitious time: 2 hours. Real playing time: 1 hour.
• B / Free: add, 50 km to the south-east: 2 escort PA: CHENANGO and SUWANNEE (each with 18 WILDCAT and 12 DAUNTLESS); 2 DD: 607 and 602. Fictitious time: 18 h from the start fixed at 19:00, as in the previous application. The conditions of night visibility will be varied as usual. Playing time: 1 to 2 hours.

---

The account of the principal sequences of combat that marked this campaign is long enough for the very numerous secondary encounters not to have been taken into consideration. In total, one will retain:

• the tenacity of the adversaries in holding, or trying to neutralise, the airfield — a permanent stake in all the battles;
• the successive engagement of all the forces available in the theatre of operations;
• air supremacy during the day;
• the balance of control of the sea during the night;
• the steady build-up of the US Navy, which compensated for losses, and the symmetrical and progressive decline of the Imperial Navy, which did not have the same industrial potential.

A choice of games among the themes proposed makes it possible to "relive" history in its hazards, but followed too closely the course of events soon reaches its limits of interest. The imagination of the wargame enthusiast will then demand a wider field, and that is why we shall consider the global theme of the CAMPAIGN.

Global Strategic Theme

Attention is drawn to the fact that this theme brings into play very large means entering into action according to a staged programme over time, prepared by the referee, and thus deliberately moving away from a purely tactical conception to come closer to that of strategy.

This is the problem of a "Campaign" that is tackled here, and it will be solved well only if enough time is allowed (possibly several days, depending on the number of participants and their mastery of the game). On the other hand, the "land" aspect of the game requires a preliminary adjustment which, without going into detail, will allow the play to keep to plausibility (a more complete study drawing on modern wargames would be interesting to include in this naval wargame and would give it a third dimension that is sometimes lacking). For the moment we propose, on this subject, to reduce the results of land confrontations to the principle of the largest battalions: the greater number prevails. (The ratio of the opposing strengths will determine the direction and speed of the advance. A table, as usual, will summarise these conventional data for occasional use.)

In order not to overload the historical simulation beyond the means of the players, it is necessary to take some liberties with certain constraints, those of the calendar in particular. The arbitrariness of the method is not lost on us, but its advantage for the concrete realisation of the game clearly outweighs the abstract theoretical disadvantages.

Situation

1. Geographical: the Solomon Islands archipelago with the following approximate data, indispensable for the rest of the game:

• Guadalcanal: 6,000 km²; San Cristobal: 4,000 km²; Santa Isabel: 5,000 km²; New Georgia: 5,000 km²; Vella Lavella: 1,000 km²; Choiseul: 3,000 km²; Bougainville: 9,000 km²; Rennell: 3,000 km²; Santa Cruz: 4,000 km²; Florida: 1,000 km².

The rugged terrain allows the installation of airfields only at Guadalcanal, Bougainville, New Britain and New Ireland. On the other hand, seaplane bases can be established throughout the archipelago, which in any case is held in its entirety by the Japanese, the American adversaries being grouped in New Caledonia and the New Hebrides.

2. Military: Japanese side:

• Rabaul: principal rear naval-air base;
• Kavieng: secondary base; at Florida: small seaplane base; at Guadalcanal: a 12-point airfield (24 aircraft) being completed, 4 days from operational status.
• In total, deployed: 5 old CU, 5 PA, 14 CL, 6 cl, 45 DD, 20 S/M, 2 seaplane carriers, 24 merchant ships (150,000 t deadweight), 200 aircraft in addition to the embarked aviation, 100,000 men distributed in the archipelago, and finally coastal defences.

American side:

• Nouméa and Espiritu Santo: principal rear bases from which the actions of the campaign start, which will deploy a total of:
  • 3 modern CU, 4 PA, 3 PAE, 13 CL, 8 cl, 50 DD, 22 S/M, 4 APD, 30 merchant ships (200,000 t deadweight), 200 aircraft (in addition to the embarked ones), 100,000 men.
• Mission: seize the archipelago held by the Japanese, including the great base of Rabaul.

Strategic Theme: Complementary Rules

• Logistical constraints: supply 100 t per day per 1,000 men, the garrisons having an advance of 10 days. A troop unsupplied and engaged loses 50 % of its combat value for 48 hours beyond this term, and completely after these two critical days.
• Repair potential: at Rabaul: 1/4 point per ship per day; at Espiritu Santo: 1/4 point per ship per day; at Nouméa: 1/2 point per ship per day.
• Time to build airfields: Japanese: 12 days per 6 points; American: 6 days per 6 points.
• Time to repair damaged airfields: 1 hour per point of aggression.

The following data are also taken into account:

• Cruising speed: 3/4 of maximum speed (a convention to simplify fuel problems).
• Transport capacity of destroyers: 40 t per APD; 150 men per ordinary DD.
• Unloading time for a ship: 12 hours for cargo, 3 hours for personnel.
• Weather: from D+1 to D+8: visibility by day 30,000 m, by night 12,000 m, aerial 50,000 m. Ceiling 4,000 m; cloud cover 4/10. Wind from the South-East at 15 knots.
• From D+9 onward, a pre-established "weather card" is drawn at random, the aerial visibility always being one and a half times greater than at the surface.

Table of hazards of land actions. R = ratio of the larger to the smaller strength. Columns: die rolled 1 to 6. Entries as printed:

R	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	4	2	–	–	−2	−4
1.3	8	4	3	2	1	–
1.6	20	15	10	8	6	4
2	40	30	20

• Convention: during the first 24 hours of landing, the attackers occupy 1 km² per 1,000 men.
• Progression per 24 hours per 1,000 men, in km²: the table is used after 24 hours of landing operations, the average time of convenience for grouping the opposing forces.
• Example: an island of 3,000 km² defended by a garrison of 2,000 men and attacked by a force of 5,000 men will see a strength ratio of 2.5. For each 24-hour period the die rolled gives the progression of the attacker, and the island is declared conquered when the surface potential is erased and the defending garrison destroyed. The losses of the victor will be estimated at 1/3 of those of the vanquished.

In conclusion, this theme, which is the HISTORICAL SIMULATION of a TRUE CAMPAIGN, essentially raises the problems of the reconnaissance and supply of an Expeditionary Corps, of the attack and defence of the coast, and of close and distant naval support — that is to say, those of a confrontation whose conclusion can be reached only after a succession of phases spread over time.

Annexes to the Global Theme

American dossier for the global strategic theme

— DAY D, 0 HOUR

Situation. Intelligence: progressive reinforcement of the archipelago, endangering the New Hebrides and New Caledonia.

• Supposed coastal defences: at Rabaul and vicinity: 2 protected batteries of 203 mm (20 points each), 3 protected batteries of 155 mm at 15 points each, 4 protected batteries of 127 mm (12 points), 8 unprotected 127 mm (2 points); 12 guns of 120 mm AA (2 points) and 20 guns of 40 mm AA.
• At Bougainville: 4 protected 155 mm guns and 8 of 120 mm AA.
• Supposed air deployment: at Rabaul 30 aircraft; Bougainville: 24 aircraft.
• Supposed naval deployment: at Rabaul: 4 CL, 12 DD, 2 S/M, 10 merchant ships of 6,000 t deadweight or 1,000 men.
• Supposed reinforcement potential:
  • after 20 days: 4 CL + 6 DD + 8 merchant ships + 20 aircraft;
  • after 30 days: 2 CU + 6 DD + 12 merchant ships + 36 aircraft;
  • after 40 days: 2 CU + 6 CL + 2 cl + 36 aircraft.
• Supposed strength: 60,000 men, the distribution of which is unknown, with a reinforcement potential of 1,000 men per day up to a total of 40,000 men.

Order of battle: all the forces are in the two bases except the submarines S 38 and S 39, which are at sea at the discretion of the player.

• At Nouméa: 20,000 men + 8 merchant ships (with a transport capacity of 1,000 men or 8,000 t each). Aircraft: 12 P 40 and 12 B 17.
• At Espiritu Santo: 20,000 men.
  • LEXINGTON, WASP, HORNET (these 3 PA with radar of 120 km), HOUSTON, ASTORIA, QUINCY, VINCENNES, CANBERRA, HELENA, HOBART + the DD: 376, 377, 379, 374, 397, 387, 393, 416, 383, 453, 459, 436; APD 2, 3, 4, 5; + the S/M S 44.
  • Aircraft: 12 B-17, 6 PBY, 6 HUDSON, 6 WILDCAT.
  • Merchant ships: 6 of 10,000 t carrying 2,000 men; 10 of 8,800 t deadweight (or 1,000 men) making 12 knots.

— DAY D+8, 0 HOUR: at Nouméa: + 6 merchant ships of 10,000 t deadweight; at Espiritu Santo: + 12 B-17 and 6 P 40.

— DAY D+16, 0 HOUR: at Nouméa: + 20,000 men; at Espiritu Santo: + 6 WILDCAT.

— DAY D+20, 0 HOUR: at Nouméa: + 20,000 men; at Espiritu Santo: + 12 WILDCAT, 6 DAUNTLESS, 6 AVENGER, + YORKTOWN, NORTHAMPTON, PORTLAND, CHICAGO, ATLANTA, JUNEAU + the DD 364, 363, 401 and 399.

— DAY D+30, 0 HOUR: at Nouméa: + 10,000 men; at Espiritu Santo: + 6 WILDCAT, 6 DAUNTLESS, 6 AVENGER, + NORTH CAROLINA, + the DD 420, 412, 391, 599, 406, 407; + the escort carrier LONG ISLAND; + the S/M GRAMPUS, GRAYBACK and GROWLER.

Later reinforcements will be given at the discretion of the referee, according to the development of the game, within the limits foreseen at the start.

Japanese dossier for the global strategic theme

— DAY D, 0 HOUR

Situation. Intelligence: supposed American forces at Nouméa and Espiritu Santo: 60 aircraft, 2 PA, 4 CL, 10 DD, 10 merchant ships and 30,000 men.

Supposed reinforcement potential:

• 1 PA + 2 CL + 10,000 men after 20 days;
• 1 CU + 12 DD + 20,000 men + 40 aircraft after 30 days.

Order of battle:

• At sea, at the discretion of the player: the submarines I 26 and I 36.
• At Rabaul and vicinity: 4 guns of 203 mm protected (20 points), 6 guns of 155 mm protected (15 points), 6 guns of 127 mm protected (12 points), 12 of 120 mm AA (2 points) and 20 of 40 mm AA (1 point).
  • 30 BETTY, 12 ZERO, 6 VAL, 3 EMILY (an airfield of 60 points and a seaplane base of 12 points).
  • KINUGASA, HURUTAKA [as printed], AOBA, KAKO (CL) + 6 DD: MUTUKI, SATUKI, KISARAGI, UZUKI, KIKUTUKI and MINATUKI.
  • • 6 merchant ships of 6,000 t deadweight or 1,000 men.
  • • the S/M I 15 and I 17. Finally: 30,000 men.
• At Kavieng and vicinity: 4 guns of 155 mm protected (15 points).
  • 12 ZERO, 3 EMILY (an airfield of 24 points).
  • 12 CL (as printed; the two ships named suggest 2 CL): MYOKO, HAGURO + 2 cl: YURA, NAGARA; 4 merchant ships of 8,000 t deadweight or 1,000 men.
  • A garrison of 4,000 men.
• At Bougainville: secondary base with sheltered anchorage: 4 protected guns of 124 mm (12 points), 10 of 40 mm AA, 4 of 120 mm AA; 12 ZERO (airfield of 12 points), 3 EMILY (seaplane base of 12 points).
  • cl YUBARI + 6 merchant ships of 6,000 t deadweight or 1,000 men.
  • A garrison of 10,000 men.
• At Choiseul: 2,000 men.
• At Santa Isabel: 2,000 men.
• At Guadalcanal: 2,000 men + an airfield of 12 points being completed.

— DAY D+6, 0 HOUR: at Rabaul: + ATAGO and MAYA + 12 ZERO.

— DAY D+10, 0 HOUR: at Rabaul: + 2 merchant ships of 8,000 t (2,000 men) + 12 BETTY + 12 ZERO.

— DAY D+18, 0 HOUR: at Rabaul: SHOKAKU + ZUIKAKU + 6 DD: KAGERO, SIRANUMI, KUROSIO, OYASIO, HUTUKAZE, NATUSIO + 12 ZERO + 6 VAL.

— DAY D+20, 0 HOUR: at Kavieng: + 2 merchant ships with 2,000 men each and 4 unprotected coastal-defence guns (2 points).

— DAY D+22, 0 HOUR: at Rabaul: + PA RYUJO + 2 CL: SUSUYA, KUMANO; + transport NISSHIN with 6 guns of 127 mm coastal defence + 1,000 men.

— DAY D+24, 0 HOUR: at Rabaul: + 6 BETTY + 3 cl: TENRYU, JINTSU, ISUZU + 6 DD: ISOKAZE, URAKAZE, ARASI, HAGIKAZE, NOWAKI, TANIKAZE + 4 merchant ships of 8,000 t deadweight + 8,000 men.

— DAY D+30, 0 HOUR: at Rabaul: + 2 CU: HIEI and KIRISHIMA + 4 DD: ASAGUMO, YAMAGUMO, HAYASHIRO and OYASHIRO + 12 ZERO.

Later reinforcements will be given at the discretion of the referee, according to the development of the game, within the limits foreseen at the start.

Note on this section: the order-of-battle lines above were read from the page image; where the scan is illegible the transcription follows the most legible reading, and a few ship names in the Japanese dossier are given in the form printed in the source.

Note: the American and Japanese element-characteristic pages (printed pp. 53–56, PDF pages 55–58) are unit data and are not reproduced here. The map pages (PDF pages 38, 45, 46) are graphics and are not reproduced here.

Glossary of Ship Abbreviations (as printed)

• CU: cuirassé (battleship)
• CL: croiseur lourd (heavy cruiser)
• cl: croiseur léger (light cruiser)
• PA: porte-avions (aircraft carrier)
• PAE: porte-avions d'escorte (escort carrier)
• PHA: porte-hydravions (seaplane carrier)
• CT: contre-torpilleur (destroyer leader)
• DD: destroyer
• DE: destroyer d'escorte (escort destroyer)
• APD: destroyer de transport (transport destroyer)
• T: torpilleur – torpille (torpedo boat)
• A: aviso (sloop)
• S/M: sous-marin (submarine)
• aa: anti-aérien (anti-aircraft)
• mt: mitrailleuse (machine gun)