Africanus: SPQR Battle Module V

Expansion for SPQR (First Edition)Expansion for SPQR (Deluxe Edition)

Africanus: SPQR Battle Module V Rulebook

Table of Contents

Baecula, 208 BC

Historical Background

Proconsul P. Cornelius Scipio vs. Hasdrubal Barca, Spain, 208 BC

Following the death of his father and uncle, who had commanded in Hispania since Hannibal's invasion of Italy in 218 BC, the 27-year-old Publius Cornelius Scipio asked for and received Hispania as his command (voted imperium pro consule in 210 BC). His first action was to rebuild the Roman army, bring it up to the strength of four legions, and then launch an assault on the Carthaginian stronghold of Carthago Nova, supposedly impregnable. With a little help from Neptune (the low tide allowed the Romans to wade across the lagoon that protected one of the approaches), Scipio surprised Rome and, especially, Carthage, taking the city in the first year of his proconsulship.

In 208 BC Hannibal was still causing trouble in Italy, but the main Roman effort now lay in Hispania, Carthage's principal recruiting base and the "jewel of her crown". With the loss of her "capital", the Carthaginians were obliged to divide their forces into three armies, under two Hasdrubals (Barca and Gisco) and Mago Barca. Scipio was working on his Iberian allies, some of whom were beginning to defect to the Roman cause, and Scipio seemed somewhat more "indulgent" than the harsh Carthaginians. With his supply of Iberians reduced, Hasdrubal Barca began to grow nervous about keeping his army intact. With Hasdrubal Gisco and Mago apparently occupied elsewhere, Scipio decided to attack Hasdrubal Barca.

The Carthaginians were camped just south of the village of Baecula with some 25,000 men or more. (The number seems low, and some sources say Hasdrubal's strength was even equal to Scipio's, although much of it was made up of Iberians undecided between the two sides.) Scipio had four double legions, reinforced by some of his marines, at least 10,000 men more than Barca. But Hasdrubal's position, on top of a large hill ringed by cliffs that were easy to defend, was formidable. When Scipio approached, Hasdrubal deployed most of his light troops on the cliffs below the camp, while his heavier infantry waited inside the fortification. Scipio spent a day or two studying the position, after which he sent an extended line of velites, plus some legionaries. While the Roman light troops steadily pushed back the Carthaginian light troops, Scipio split his heavy infantry into two spearheads and sent them around the flanks of the Carthaginian hill.

Scipio's non-linear attack rather disconcerted Hasdrubal, who, after sending some of his heavies to reinforce the light infantry, now had to consider what would be best for the "big picture". Knowing that the main Carthaginian thrust was still in Italy, with his brother, he began to pull back the heavy troops he had committed, which fought a stubborn retreat, and got most of his veterans out of the hill to the north, away from Scipio, while the Romans cleared what was on the left. (No cavalry action is mentioned in this battle.)

Although Scipio claimed an important victory, he had allowed Hasdrubal to get away. However, instead of joining Gisco and Mago, Hasdrubal Barca marched for Italy, where he met his fate at the Metaurus. Despite his "failure" to destroy Hasdrubal's army, Scipio had shown at Baecula that he was not a slave to Roman tactical doctrine. There was no standard, linear "Push Ahead" attack up the hill. His army was divided into different "divisions", each with its own mission. The Hastati, Principes and all the other heavy infantry were used as a single unit, the first notable example of what would practically become the Marian cohort system.

Map

The Baecula map included with this module is used. Historians are very sure where the battle of Baecula took place, just south of the modern Spanish town of Bailén, between that town and the Guadiel river. The high ground between the town and the river is the most probable location of Hasdrubal's camp. However, the two main sources on the terrain, Kromayer-Veith and Scullard, disagree on the exact location. We have chosen the Kromayer-Veith description. Scullard would move the battle some 800 meters east, with the stream that is currently on the right (east) side of the map becoming the left (western) edge of the battlefield. Both proposals have their arguments, but our decision rests on three factors:

In terms of the effect on the game version of the battle, both locations are almost identical; but
The Kromayer-Veith location has a more realistic front (and this is where we disagree with Scullard); besides which
It makes for a more interesting game.

Counters

Counters are from SPQR unless marked with an asterisk (*).

Difficulty

Baecula is what players like to call a "puzzle", as opposed to a straight head-on clash. This is because the Carthaginians are offered several alternatives for "winning", and the player must decide how much of each to use. We estimate playing time for Baecula at 5 to 6 hours.

Balance

For balance, the Romans have the numbers (see the Army Size and Troop Quality table under Victory), but the Carthaginians have the position. The main factors are how well the Roman player uses Scipio, Scipio's tactical theories, and which options the Carthaginian player takes. This is a difficult battle for the Carthaginians to win "in situ". However, as the player will see in the victory conditions, he can "lose" on the battlefield but win "strategically" by bringing out his army nearly intact, which is what most historians consider the real result. To that end, the Romans will find it hard to win a "strategic" victory against a cautious Carthaginian. The historical version slightly favors Scipio. For competitive play, we recommend the Rout Point Bet Method for balancing.

Initial Deployment

Baecula (together with Ilipa, also recreated here) presents two of the most unusual legionary deployments of the pre-Caesarian era, so unusual that they stand out like Heidi Fleiss at a Boy Scouts grand reunion. In this respect Baecula is a major turning point in Roman military history, because Scipio abandons the strict three-line theory of attack, heavy-in-the-center, that had been dogmatically accepted for the previous two centuries, in favor of a more flexible use of his troops. This required retraining many of his veterans, moving them away from linear maneuver so that they could perform missions similar to the cohorts that would become predominant in the age of Marius.

Added to this, as noted in the historical notes above, the Carthaginian army is not organized in a standard line (half of it is still in the camp), and there is one of those oddities for players: a (nearly) encounter battle in which the player gets to deploy the troops. We also provide a more traditional type of initial deployment, "here-is-where-we-put-them-ehm", for those who wish to respect history strictly (or at least as much of history as we can perceive).

Unfortunately, most of what we know about Baecula, in terms of numbers and types of troops, is extremely general. The only specific distinctions made are between "light troops" and "heavy troops". There is a small mention of the effect cavalry had on the actual battle: there was a skirmish between the cavalry of both sides a day or so before the real battle, and that obliged Hasdrubal to deploy his Numidian cavalry at the start. Moreover, most indications are that Hasdrubal had sent his elephants (and their war chariot) forward.

Apart from Hasdrubal Barca (one of the many Hasdrubals who crowd the war; see the note on the Hasdrubals below), P. Cornelius Scipio and Laelius, no other commander is named. We know Masinissa was very probably present (his nephew was captured by Scipio), but that Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco were not, nor were any of Scipio's staff: the legate M. Junius Silanus, or his brother Lucius Cornelius Scipio (who commanded at Magnesia and was with him at Ilipa as an adviser).

Therefore, although the initial deployment we suggest is certainly within the parameters of the available information, and follows very closely the deployment suggestions of Kromayer-Veith and Scullard, together with some extrapolation from what we know of warfare at the time and of how each side used its armies, it is not definitive in the sense that there is no other possible scheme.

Historical Deployment Version

This version skips much of the Romans' initial entry, uses Scipio's actual troop deployment, and catches Hasdrubal just as he is bringing his heavy troops out of the camp.

Carthaginian Army under Hasdrubal Barca. All units generally face south.

Leaders	Hex
*Hasdrubal Barca [OC] [a]	1914
Hanno [d]	With North African HI
Bostar [c]	With Iberian HI
*Himilco [c]	With any LI
Masinissa	2605
*Aspanio [c]	1625

Counter	Hex(es)
Skirmish Line
Balearic SK Slingers (1-5)	3139, 3237, 3238, 2933, 2935
Iberian LI (1-6) [b]	2922, 2923, 2925, 2927, 2929, 2931
North African LI (1-4)	2919, 3019, 2920, 2921
Mauritanian MI (1-4)	3114-3117
North African LI (5-6)	3111, 3112
Numidian LI (1, 2)	3108, 3109
Iberian Cavalry
Iberian LN (1-4)	1625-1628
Numidian Cavalry

a = this is Hasdrubal, brother of Hannibal. Also present in Spain was Hasdrubal Gisco (in command at Ilipa). And emerging here and there during the war is Hasdrubal, Hamilcar's son-in-law, Hasdrubal Calvus, and Hasdrubal the Boy. A true festival of Hasdrubals. However, the Hasdrubals are few compared with the Hamilcars (of whom there are 7) and the Hannos (who tie the Hasdrubals at 5), and this is without counting the plethora of Magos running about. All for the Second Punic War! Warmington, in Carthage: A History, counts 7 Hamilcars, 4 Hannibals, 8 Hannos, 7 Magos and 9 Hasdrubals. There must be a thesis here.

b = the number of Hispanic troops Hasdrubal had with him seems to have been quite low, because a great majority of the local tribes had changed allegiance, a tribute to Scipio's political acumen and personal charm as well as to Carthaginian brusqueness in dealing with the population. The keyword, however, is "seems", since there is no specific discussion of this subject regarding the numbers at Baecula. We have assumed that some Hispanic allies stayed, especially because the Carthaginian army at Ilipa contained large Hispanic contingents.

c = as indicated above, most sources state that Hasdrubal had sent his elephants away, not wishing to lose them and knowing their value in such terrain to be minimal. However, Livy mentions elephants that were around, so if the player believes Livy, he may use these two. Only Hasdrubal or Hanno can give orders to the elephants.

d = there was a Hanno in Spain in 207 BC, just one of the many Hannos mentioned by Livy and Polybius. Exactly which is which is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to discern. To be honest, this Hanno arrived after Baecula, but there is another Hanno who served as one of Mago's cavalry officers, so, given the plethora of Hannos, the use of this counter seems safe.

e = the real Bostar was a minor leader with Hannibal, in Italy. Himilco and Aspanio are simply filler leaders, needed as commanders, for whom we have no specific names. Aspanio is a cavalry-only leader.

Roman Army under Proconsul P. Cornelius Scipio. Scipio commands two consular armies (we give him the Legions and Alae III, V, VII and X), reinforced by about 3,000 Marines. There is no indication that he made use of his new Hispanic allies, with the best wishes of Indibilis and Mardonius (of the Ilergetes), at this point, since those units would not be trained. The Roman units and reinforcements may begin the game In Column.

Counter	Hex(es)
On the Map
Left Wing Cavalry
III RC, V RC, VII RC, X RC, AS/III RC (a, b) [c], Prefect Eqt. Drusus	3841-3843, 3940-3942
Right Wing Cavalry
AS/V RC (a, b), AS/VII RC (a, b)	3702-3704, 3802-3804
AS/X RC (a, b), Prefect Eqt. Falco
Velites Line
All Velites of III, AS/III, V, AS/V, VII, AS/VII, X, AS/X	Hexes 4006 to 4038, inclusive
*Marines (1-6), Tribune Cassius [d]
Cohort Vanguard

a = Laelius is an infantry leader here, not a cavalry leader. Scipio is the Overall Commander (OC).

b = Triarii are NOT used in this battle. They stay behind to protect the Roman camp and the bridges over the river on the flanks.

c = each legion or ala has lost its EX cavalry unit or the "c" unit. No cavalry is mentioned in the actual battle, so much of this is speculative. A heavy cavalry skirmish (which seems to have occurred) took place a day before the real battle, so part of the cavalry would be out of action, and we have reduced the Carthaginian ranks accordingly too. Furthermore, Scipio knew that two more Carthaginian armies, under Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco, were moving through Spain, so it is highly probable that he used some of his cavalry as scouts and to guard against surprises.

d = the Tribunes may command Roman legionaries and AS legionaries alike.

The Encounter Scenario

This scenario begins the battle with the Romans south of the river (off the map), just starting their initial approach. The Carthaginians deploy as Hasdrubal instructed them after watching Scipio for several days: the light troops out, the rest of the army in the camp. The Carthaginians deploy first, and then the game begins with the Roman player bringing on his first wave of troops.

Carthaginian Army. (For the actual counters available, see the Historical Deployment Version above.)

All MI, LI and SK units (except the four archer units and two of the Balearic slinger units, which go into the camp) are placed on any Level Four or higher hex that is at least 10 hexes from a camp hex, and not on a map-edge hex.

All cavalry units are placed wherever desired, except that they must be in a line, and at least one unit in that line must be within a radius of ten (10) hexes of the Carthaginian camp.

All other units are placed inside the camp in any manner, deployed as the player sees fit. (If the player is using the Elephants, they may be placed inside the camp or on any hex outside and adjacent to the camp.)

Leaders are assigned as the Carthaginian player wishes.

Roman Army. The Roman player may bring his units on in any manner he wishes. They enter as reinforcements through any hex on row 4200 (south edge). As Scipio is an Elite Leader, he may assign the initial Elite phase to any group or leader he wishes.

Game and Historical Note: the Roman army's historical deployment may be taken from the Historical Deployment Version above. (The source reads "below"; the Historical Deployment Version is printed above this scenario.)

Line Command Validity

Roman	Carthaginian
1. *Velites (VE) and LI Marines	1. *All Skirmishers
2. *Hastati (HA) and Ala Cohorts (CO/CE)	2. Phalanx (PH) and Heavy Infantry (HI)
3. *Principes (PR) and Ala Cohorts (CO/CE)	3. Medium Infantry (MI) and Light Infantry (LI)
4. *All Cavalry	4. Iberian Lancer Cavalry (LN)
	5. Numidian Light Cavalry (LC)
	6. Elephants

* = need not be adjacent; see 4.24.

** = Carthaginian skirmishers may operate with any of the Carthaginian lines above, or independently. If they operate independently, a one-hex gap is permitted.

Special Rules

Hasdrubal's Camp. The Carthaginian camp lies about two km south of Baecula. Use the SPQR Roman Camp Effects Table, ignoring the references to bars/quarters. The Archers and Slingers in the Towers may Fire without an order. In addition to any Reaction fire, they may fire twice in any Phase, at ANY time and without an order. They need not be Under Command. The player simply says "I am firing my Tower archers" or a similar phrase. Use the Active/Reaction Fire markers for this purpose. All Ammunition rules apply. Units in Tower hexes are free to change facing before firing, even without an order.

The Command Range of all Carthaginian leaders is doubled inside the camp.

Carthaginian Movement Restrictions. This rule reflects Hasdrubal's indecision. It greatly helps the Romans, so players who want more balance may choose to ignore it. However, we suggest that it be mandatory when playing the RUN option (see Victory, below), and that it NOT be used when playing the HOLD option. Again, since these are "hidden" options, the Carthaginian player may need to hedge his bets to implement this rule.

No Carthaginian unit inside the camp may leave the camp until one of the following occurs:

A Roman LG unit enters any Level Four hex (example: hex 3130) or greater.
A Roman LG unit enters the row of hexes 3000 or north of it.

Routing and the Camp. Carthaginian units that are Routing may complete their Rout Movement by withdrawing into the camp, and may continue to withdraw within the camp, thus getting out of the way. They must, however, enter the camp through a gate. Routing Carthaginian units that are inside the Carthaginian camp do NOT have to make Rout Movement at any time. They may be reorganized by any leader inside the camp; Command Range is not traced through the walls for this purpose.

Roman Velites. When initially deployed, and if the normal rules are used, Cassius could give Line Command to only one group. For the first two turns only, a single leader may give Line Command to the Velites and Marines regardless of the distance between the units, provided all the other Line Command rules are met.

Elite Leader. Scipio is an Elite Leader. Although he begins "off the map", for the first turn of play he may give his Elite Initial Orders Phase (OIE) to any subordinate leader, on or off the map.

Roman Command. Roman leaders, except for the Prefect Equitum, may command normal legion troops and ala troops.

Withdrawal Edges. The Romans withdraw off the south edge. However, any unit that routs across the river is eliminated. The Carthaginians withdraw toward the north edge (see the camp rules above).

Terrain

Baecula Terrain Effects

Terrain	Move Cost (PM)	PH	LG, HI, MI	LI/SK	Cav	EL	Effect on Missile Fire	Effect on Shock
River	+1	1 [b]	1 [b]	0	2	0	−	2 columns left **

Cohesion Hit cost to enter, as shown in the PH through EL columns.

a = any unit that routs across a river hex is automatically eliminated.

b = no Cohesion Hit cost for a unit In Column.

** = if some Attackers are attacking across the hexside.

Design and Play Note: The River actually runs along the south length of the map. Although it does not appear along that edge, in fact it lies just beneath it. This is why a routing unit cannot avoid the river that runs along it. The modern Guadiel river does not seem to have a Roman name that we can find.

Victory

Automatic End of Game. Practically no SPQR battle has a set ending, but Baecula may have one. At the end of any turn in which the only non-routed Carthaginian unit left on the map is inside the Carthaginian camp, the game ends. Otherwise the game ends in the usual way, when one side reaches its General Withdrawal Level.

Voluntary Carthaginian Withdrawal. Hasdrubal seems to have known that, despite his good defensive position, his numerical inferiority and his (apparent) lack of heavy troops meant that holding his position against four double legions would not be easy, especially since his men were too few to cover his perimeter. He therefore realized that his secondary strategic objective was to get most of his army out of this situation intact, to join Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco, and to set in motion his plan to reinforce Hannibal in Italy.

From that point of view, his defense was (more or less) successful, all the more so because some historians of the time comment on Scipio's failure to destroy Hasdrubal's army. Scipio was not aware of this possibility; he had detached several "cohorts" (a digression: the use of this word has caused much consternation among military historians regarding the tactical methodology used by the Roman army of the time). The consensus is that "cohort", as applied here, is a word of "artifice" rather than one implying use. Scipio's army, although in transition from the Polybian four-line formation, had not yet been transformed into the Marian legion, and was used to watch the river crossings on the Roman right and left flanks. This proved fruitless, if that was its purpose.

To simulate this dichotomy of purpose on Hasdrubal's side, the following rules are in effect:

Carthaginian units that voluntarily leave the map from the 4th Game Turn onward (the Carthaginian Movement Restrictions above still apply), through the hexes in the north corner of the map marked as Exit Hexes (1000-1002, 1100 and 1200), do NOT count as eliminated units when Rout Points are determined. Units that rout off the map through these hexes, or that leave before the 4th turn, are considered eliminated.
If, when the game ends, the Rout Point value of the non-eliminated units that left the map is greater than the Rout Points of the Carthaginian units eliminated plus the Rout Points of those left inside the camp, the Carthaginians win a Strategic Victory, in which most of their army has lived to fight another day.

Winning.

Method A: one side wins when the other withdraws by reaching its General Withdrawal Level, as below.
Method B: if the game ends automatically (see Automatic End of Game above) and neither side has withdrawn, it is a Carthaginian victory if the Rout Points of units that left voluntarily exceed the Rout Points of routed units PLUS those remaining inside the camp, under the Voluntary Withdrawal rule. Otherwise the Roman wins.

The Roman Army withdraws when units worth 215 Rout Points have been eliminated. The Carthaginian Army withdraws when units worth 100 Rout Points have been eliminated.

Hasdrubal's Defensive Stance. To make things more interesting, before the game begins the Carthaginian player decides whether he will "Run" or "Hold and Fight". He does not have to tell the Roman player his choice until the game ends.

If he decides to RUN, he may use the Voluntary Withdrawal rule and a 30% Rout Ratio, as given above.
If he decides to HOLD, he may NOT use the Voluntary Withdrawal rule, but his Rout Ratio rises to 40%, and he loses when units worth 135 Rout Points have been eliminated (instead of 100).

Army Size and Troop Quality

Army	Units	Size	Rout Points [c]	Rout Ratio [d]	Average TQ
Carthaginian	55	243 [a]	340	30%	5.7
Roman	110	362 [b]	623	35%	5.7

Elephants are NOT counted in any of the determinations above. So, although they carry few Rout Points, because they do not appear when Rout Ratios are determined, their loss matters more than the simple point totals.

a = the Carthaginian army contains approximately 26,350 men.

b = the Romans camped with about 35,000 men or more. This excludes the triarii, who are south of the river and not in play. There were approximately 4,000 triarii, as well as 1,200 cavalry on scouting and advance-guard duty, for a total of 40,000 or more.

c = the large difference in Rout Points arises from the large number of skirmisher (SK) units the Carthaginians had (11), which reduces their total Rout Points below the pure size ratio the player might expect.

d = the "Historical" Carthaginian Rout Ratio is lower than normal for a Carthaginian army because of Hasdrubal's mental attitude toward what he had to do, which was to bring out as much of his army intact as he could. This is not conducive to a hold-and-fight mentality.

Ilipa, 206 BC

Historical Background

Proconsul P. Cornelius Scipio vs. Hasdrubal Gisco and Mago Barca, Spain, 206 BC

In 206 BC the two Carthaginian armies still in Spain, those of Hasdrubal Gisco and Mago Barca, had combined but had failed to halt the Romans' success in making Hispania more and more a Roman province. It was time to halt this backward slide and face Scipio. With more than 50,000 men, including 4,500 horse and 32 elephants (many sources say Hasdrubal had at least 75,000!), the Carthaginians chose to stay at the edge of a plain, at Ilipa, some 15 kilometers from modern Seville.

Scipio's army was practically the same as the one he had had at Baecula, this time strongly reinforced by some Iberian allies under Culchas, a local prince. However, Scipio had never been very impressed with the Hispanics' battle capabilities, and he had to find some way to use Culchas's Iberians without depending on them. He also had to find some way to implement the new tactical innovations he had made at Baecula: it was more "economical" to attack the flanks than to use the old Roman doctrine of pushing the center with HI. The Carthaginians, he knew, were much more numerous, and their "line" was certain to overlap his, and the Carthaginians still had Masinissa and his super-cavalry of Numidians. What Scipio did was simply to turn standard Roman tactical doctrine on its head.

Scipio pitched his camp several kilometers across the valley from Hasdrubal. For three days Hasdrubal would march out and deploy his army, followed by the Romans. They would watch each other for half a day, exchanging some missiles and engaging some cavalry, and then retire to camp. Each day, as Scipio carefully noted, Hasdrubal deployed the same way: heavy infantry in the center, light on the flanks.

On the fourth day Scipio took matters in hand. At dawn he sent a picked force of velites and cavalry to attack Hasdrubal's camp, stirred African blood, and got the Carthaginians to move. As Scipio expected, Hasdrubal, never a genius, took the bait, organized his army and quickly brought it out onto the plain to deploy it in the usual way, but this time without breakfast (revenge for Trebia served up cold, a little too cold). This time Hasdrubal must have been somewhat disconcerted to see that the Romans had changed their deployment. In Scipio's center were the Roman light troops and the Iberians, while on each wing there were two legions of heavy infantry.

Scipio waited until he noticed that the hungry Carthaginians had had enough, and then advanced. His whole army moved forward, the Hispanics in the center, the Romans on the wings. With Hasdrubal apparently paralyzed (inexplicably, since no source comments on what he was doing while all this was happening), Scipio's army moved to about 700 meters from the Carthaginian line, at which point, as if on parade, it performed one of the classic maneuvers of ancient warfare.

With Scipio leading the right and Silanus and Marcius on the left, each of the wings wheeled into column and marched, the right wing to the right and the left wing to the left. As the center slowed its advance, the two wings (hastati, principes and triarii, all in line) carried out a new series of wheeling maneuvers (see the diagram). The final result put each of the heavy infantry wings astride the flanks of the Carthaginian light infantry. Hasdrubal, totally disconcerted by Scipio's unorthodox movements, was now pinned. His flanks were completely overmatched and ready to be surrounded, while his strong center could not afford to move to help without opening an enormous gap and presenting the Roman center with an opportunity to slip through it.

It was a rout, despite the furious fighting of Hasdrubal's veteran Africans. The Carthaginian flanks disintegrated, and the center was about to be encircled when a storm broke, flooding the battlefield and allowing the left of Gisco's army to escape. Hispania was now in Roman hands, and Rome had created the military genius who could defeat Hannibal.

Map

The Ilipa battlefield was one of those "specials" of the ancient world: flat and without terrain features. In essence it was a level plain between two low hills, on each of which the opposing armies had planted their camps, some 2 km behind their respective lines. With this in mind, the maps of SPQR can be used. Use the Cannae and Zama maps as follows:

Zama is the left (west) half and Cannae is the right (east) half.
The Zama Stampede compass should be in the lower left corner; the "Cannae" logo will be in the lower right corner.
Fold the Cannae map along the line of hex rows xx03/xx04, so that you have, for example, all of 1404 but only half of 1304, and the SPQR logo starts on the first whole hex available in row 4100.
Place the folded Cannae map over the right part of the Zama map so that the first row of whole hexes is covered. When 3801 (Z) ends it should lead directly to the next hex, 1404 (C), and the SPQR/Zama logos are just (but completely) visible in what is now the center-bottom of the map.
All terrain on both maps is ignored.

Hexes of Zama are marked with a "Z" prefix; hexes of Cannae with a "C". The compass on the Zama map is used for direction and Stampede.

Counters

Counters are from SPQR unless marked with an asterisk (*).

Difficulty

Ilipa is one of the largest battles in the SPQR pantheon. Each side has more than 100 counters to place. With more than 15 leaders to work with, this also means it could be a long game, especially if the "No Restriction on First Turn" method is used. However, when played solitaire and/or using the "Historical" method, the game moves along more quickly.

Balance

This brings us to the question of balance. Using all the historical rules, this is a "bet-the-mortgage-and-the-alimony" proposition for a Roman victory, mainly because the rules allow Scipio to do what Hasdrubal never would have let him. The historical version strongly favors the Romans. However, using free deployment, an ahistorical model, it is a very balanced game in which both sides have defined advantages and exploitable weaknesses. Scipio's leadership and the flexibility of the Roman troops give a slight nod to the Boys of Rome.

Therefore we recommend the historical versions for solitaire play, or for "research". For competitive play, the Free Deployment version is the only one that gives both players a relatively even opportunity, especially when the Rout Point Bet method is used to balance it.

Initial Deployment

The sources are quite detailed about the schematic position of the troops; the descriptions of the tactical maneuvers in this battle are among the most detailed in Polybius and Livy. However, the exact form of each section remains open to conjecture.

Historical Deployment

This initial setup begins with Scipio having outwitted Hasdrubal, who expected him to deploy in the standard arrangement of heavy in the center and light on the wings. As can be seen, Scipio has contravened this a great deal, as he did at Baecula, but in a more formal way.

Carthaginian Army under Hasdrubal Gisco and Mago Barca. This is the largest Carthaginian army that SPQR puts on the battlefield, some 55,000 troops (Polybius says there were 75,000, but nobody believes him, not even Livy). We know there were African troops, who made up the entire heavy center and probably some of the wings, reinforced by the Hispanic allies still left to Hasdrubal, plus a horde of new recruits. Some of these seem to have been LI and MI, since they would not have had the equipment to make them HI. Within these imprecise parameters we give what we believe best represents Hasdrubal's army. The units are deployed facing directly toward the Romans.

Leaders	Hex
*Hasdrubal Gisco [OC] [a]	C3310
Masinissa [d]	Z1934
Bostar [d]	Z1917
Mago [c]	Z1910
*Himilco [b]	C3311
*Attenes, Prince of the Turdetani [c]	C3329
*Cartalo [b]	C3334

Counter	Hex(es)
Right Wing Cavalry
Numidian LC (1-6, Green)	Z1929-Z1934
Skirmish Line
African Elephants (1-3)	Z2127, Z2129, Z2131
African Elephants (4-6)	C3129, C3131, C3133
Balearic SK Slingers (1-8), between Z2119 and C3120
*Iberian SK Archers (1-3), inclusive	Between Z2119 and C3120, inclusive (judgment call, see the Table of Contents note)
Main Line
Numidian LI (1-3)	Z1925-Z1927
Mauritanian MI (1-4)	Z1923, Z1924, Z1823, Z1824

a = Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, was not regarded as a first-rank leader; Caven says he was not on a level with any of the Barcids. (We have rated him only a little higher than that estimate.) He ended up in command of the defense of Carthage itself before Hannibal returned. He is also the father of Sophonisba; see "d" below.

b = these represent the "unknown" Carthaginian leaders. Hamilcar is still in Italy, and it seems that all the available Hannos are either dead (one very recently, in Hispania) or elsewhere.

c = one of our favorites: Attenes, Prince of the Turdetani.

d = the legendary leader of the Numidian cavalry, the last appearance of Masinissa in Carthaginian uniform. Shortly afterwards he became an independent agent and signed on with the Romans for a kingdom and a couple of shots at Sophonisba, daughter of Hasdrubal Gisco and wife of his rival, Syphax. The young woman, who seems to have been one of the most sought-after brides in Africa, at one point opted for a "Cicuta Light" (hemlock lite), when marrying everyone in sight did not save her from becoming a Roman captive. The triangle of Syphax, Sophonisba and Masinissa is the great romantic tragedy of the Second Punic War, which has inspired several novels and at least one opera. However, several historians insist that Livy made it all up. Who cares? It is fascinating in a romantic-novel sort of way, at least.

e = this may or may not be Mago Barca, the brother of Hannibal. Polybius seems to indicate that it is the (other) Mago who was in command of the Carthaginian forces at Carthago Nova. However, Brian Caven, in The Punic Wars, and Warmington, in Carthage, opt for this Mago Barca.

Elephant Leaders: the only Carthaginian leaders who may command Elephants are Hasdrubal, Mago, Bostar and Himilco. The Carthaginian player deploys Elephant leaders if this rule is in use.

Roman Army under Proconsul P. Cornelius Scipio. The "front line" of LI and Iberian skirmishers must begin the battle facing the Carthaginians. The remaining Roman legionary units may begin facing in whatever direction the Roman player wishes.

Leaders	Hex
P. Scipio [OC]	C1827
*M. Junius Silanus	Z3428
*L. Marcius Septimus	Z3628
Tribune Antonius	C1905
Tribune Cassius	C1627
Prefect Soc. Rebilo	C1312
Prefect Eqt. Drusus	Z3827
Prefect Eqt. Falco	C1426
*Culchas

Counter	Hex(es)
Skirmish Line
Iberian Roman Allies	Between Z3215 and C2016, inclusive
SK Slingers (1-6) [a]
*SK Iberian Archers
Roman Allies (1-4) [a]
Left Wing
All HA, PR, CO and CE of III, AS/III, V and AS/V	Z3410-Z3427 (2 per hex)
All VE of III, AS/III, V, AS/V, *Marines (1-3)	Z3615-Z3627
*LC Tarentine (1)	Z3827
III RC, V RC, VII RC, X RC	Z3823-Z3826

a = these represent the Hispanic allies provided by Culchas, Indibilis and Mandonius. Caven states that the Iberians were "heavy infantry", and the reason they were not grouped with the Romans was that Scipio had a low opinion of them. However, Polybius says the center was entrusted to "light troops", while Livy says they were Hispanic "auxiliaries". We are reading translations here, of course, but none of these words leads us to anything approaching "heavy infantry". (Livy, rather interestingly, also says the Hispanic center was concave, a "more artistic verisimilitude", we suppose.)

Roman Leaders: the Tribunes and Prefects Sociorum may command either or both legions and alae. Culchas may command only the Iberian units.

Free Deployment (Alternative)

The Carthaginian player deploys first, placing his army in whatever way he wishes, provided no unit is south of the row of hexes Z2100/C3100. The Roman player then places his units in whatever way he wishes, provided no unit is north of the row of hexes Z3200/C2000. The Romans then place their units to simulate Scipio's historical adjustment of Hasdrubal's deployment to Scipio's own benefit.

Line Command Validity

Roman	Carthaginian
1. **Skirmishers	1. **Skirmishers
2. Velites (VE) and Marines (LI)	2. Phalanx (PH) and Heavy Infantry (HI)
3. Hastati (HA), Principes (PR), Cohorts (CO/CE)	3. Medium Infantry (MI)
4. Triarii (TR)	4. Iberian Lancer Cavalry (LN)
5. Iberian Light Infantry (LI)	5. Numidian Light Cavalry (LC)
6. *Legion and Ala Cavalry	6. *Elephants

* = need not be adjacent; see 4.24.

** = Skirmishers may operate with any of the lines above, or independently. Skirmishers are treated as in line if they are within three hexes of another skirmisher unit (not two).

Special Rules

Triarii. The Triarii Doctrine is NOT in effect in this battle. Scipio may use his triarii as he wishes.

Scipio's Oblique Maneuver. Ilipa is, at least in terms of pure military history, one of the most interesting and important battles of the zenith of the Roman Republic. Apart from having driven the Carthaginians out of Spain, it reveals Scipio as a leader of exceptional creativity (such creativity being almost anathema to Roman military doctrine). At least, this is so if one believes the descriptions of the battle by Polybius and Livy, which practically all historians do. [The source points to a note on Delbrück's source "below"; no such note is printed in the Ilipa pages of this module.] We have important reservations about what really happened. Those reservations do not arise from the genius of Scipio, which we accept and endorse, but from the simple fact that Hasdrubal Gisco, though not Hannibal (not even a Barcid Hasdrubal), was not the directly total idiot this battle seems to show us.

All of this brings us to what players may do with Scipio's oblique flanking maneuver. In game terms, the Roman player must move his three lines of LG, VE and cavalry, each in two sections, in a parade formation, so that they arrive ready to fall upon the flanks of the Carthaginian army, all without the Carthaginian player doing anything to prevent it. We have seen some rather dense players today, but we have even seen some who would allow this to happen.

So there are three approaches to playing this battle, and they apply to both the Historical and the Free Deployment versions. In terms of competitive play, methods 2 and 3 greatly reduce the Carthaginians' chances.

Player's Delight: there is no restriction on who can move and when. The standard rules are used.
Historian's Delight: the Roman player gets a free turn. He plays the turn in terms of who goes and Momentum as if it were a normal turn, except that the Carthaginian player does nothing. He cannot move or truncate. He simply sits and watches. All "Fate rolls" are ignored. They do not end the turn or Reactivate; they simply stop any extra Momentum. To make things worse, Roman units that move more than once in the First Turn (only) do not suffer Cohesion Hits for that additional movement. We recommend this mainly for solitaire play.
Indecisive Delight: when it is the turn of a Carthaginian leader, he must first be activated. Any of the following activates a Carthaginian leader:
- There is a Roman combat unit within three hexes of any Carthaginian combat unit within that leader's range; or
- He rolls the die. If the roll is equal to or less than the leader's Initiative Factor, he is activated and free to be used normally. If not, he is skipped, passing to the next leader in the sequence (of either side). If the leader is not within Hasdrubal Gisco's Command Range, add one (+1) to the roll. Once activated, a leader remains activated for the rest of the game.

Note of Play: method 2 is best for solitaire play, or for two players who wish to explore the historical possibilities. Method 3 is, of course, an agreement between the players.

Withdrawal Edges. The Romans withdraw off the south edge. The Carthaginians withdraw toward the north edge.

Victory

The Roman army withdraws when units worth 285 Rout Points have been eliminated. The Carthaginian army withdraws when units worth 230 Rout Points have been eliminated.

Army Size and Troop Quality

Army	Units	Size [a]	Rout Points	Rout Ratio	Average TQ
Carthaginian	106	466	650	35%	5.6
Roman	150	489	819	35%	5.5

a = the Carthaginian army has approximately 53,250 men; the Roman army some 46,100.

Elephants have NOT been counted in any of the determinations above. Therefore, although they carry few Rout Points, because they are not taken into account when Rout Ratios are determined, their loss is more significant than the simple point totals.